

Indian Revolutionaries Abroad, 1905-1922 : In the Background of International Developments



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To
the sacred memory of my father
KANAI LAL BOSE
who taught me to respect
the unknown soldiers of India's
fight for freedom.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<i>Serial No.</i>	<i>Terms and Expressions</i>	<i>Abbreviated letters and words</i>
1.	Commissioner	Com.
2.	Correspondence	Corr.
3.	Criminal Investigation Department, Government of India	C. I. D.
4.	Department	Dept.
5.	Deposit	Dep.
6.	Director, Criminal Intelligence, Government of India	D. C. I.
7.	Foreign Political	F. P.
8.	General	Gen.
6.	Immigration	Imm.
10.	Government	Govt.
11.	Home Political Records	H. P.
12.	Justice and Public	J. & P.
13.	Materials collected by the State Committee for compilation of the History of Freedom Movement in India, Bengal Region	Materials
14.	Microfilmed files of the United States Department of Immigration and Justice	Roll
15.	Microfilmed files of the German Foreign Office	D. A. A. Reel
16.	Political and Secret	P. & S.
17.	Sedition Committee, 1918 Report	Rowlatt
18.	Volume	Vol.



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NOTES ON NON-ENGLISH EXPRESSIONS

<i>Serial No.</i>	<i>Non-English Expression</i>	<i>English Equivalents</i>
1.	Dar al-Harle	The land of the infidel
2.	Dar al-Islam	The land of Islam, the faithful
3.	Fatwa	Fiat issued, usually, by an ecclesiastical authority
4.	Ghadar	Revolt
5.	Granthi	Sikh priest
6.	Gurdwara	Sikh temple
7.	Hajj	Pilgrimage to the Muslim holy places in Arabia
8.	Hizrat	Exodus
9.	Jehad	Holy war
10.	Kashatriya	The warrior caste of the Hindus, second in respectability to the Brahmins
11.	Maulvi	Muslim Divine
12.	Muhajir (pl. Muhajirin)	Refugee
13.	Mujahid	One who fights for his faith



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1. Virendranath Chattopadhyaya
2. Dr. Jadugopal Mukherjee
3. Jyotindranath Mukherjee
4. Dr. Pandurang Khankojé
5. Mahendra Pratap before the flag of Provisional Government of Free India at Kabul, in December, 1915.
6. Kazim Bey, Henting, Mahendra Pratap, Niedermayer, Barakatullah, Roehr, Kurt Wagner and Guenther Voigt at Kabul in 1915-16
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(All illustrations are facing page 128)

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PREFACE

Those of us who woke in the morning of 15 August 1947 to find India free had been for a generation so familiar with certain hallowed names that they almost formed a part of our national landscape, and it was quite difficult to think of ourselves and our national movement except in their terms. But history demands that we go to the sources of our national movement, trace its continuity, and explain and assess its various aspects.

For obvious reasons no such task could be seriously undertaken as long as India remained under British rule. However, shortly after independence, many state (then known as provincial) governments appointed specially constituted boards of historians to write the history of freedom movement in their respective regions. Since these semi-official boards were to write on the freedom movement in their own states, someone, I thought, should make a detailed study of the activities of the Indian revolutionaries abroad and their contribution to our fight for freedom.

But relevant official records were not yet open to scrutiny, and I started with interrogating and corresponding with the surviving few, who in the past had been associated with Indian revolutionary activities abroad. This method, of course, has its own shortcomings. However, an opportunity to make some improvement came when I went to Oxford, for a couple of years, in 1955. Though my course of study there had nothing to do with my interest in Indian revolutionaries, I could still utilise the summer vacations in meeting and securing valuable information from the surviving Germans and Englishmen, who in the past had been connected with the Indian revolutionaries. These naturally encouraged me to make a thorough study of Indian revolutionary activities abroad, within the limits imposed by the official restrictions, then in force.

However, the Government of India gradually relaxed many of the archival restrictions, and access was granted to the official records for the period under study. The National Archives of India also secured microfilms of American and German records relevant to a study of the Indian national movement. So it appeared that an authen-

tic monograph could be written on Indian revolutionaries abroad, which might help in filling a gap in our knowledge of India's fight for freedom. An opportunity to make use of the source materials in Britain came when in, 1965, the British Council helped me make a second trip to that country. Fortunately, the old regulation, prohibiting the scrutiny of archival materials in Britain for the preceding fifty years, was relaxed in February 1966, and this enabled me to make use of relevant records and private papers for the years till 1922.

During my visits to Hong Kong and Singapore, I made enquiries at the local archives, but was told that these were mostly destroyed during the Second World War, and hardly anything is available there for the years before 1945. I am sure the Imperial Archives of Japan and the Royal Thai Archives contain valuable information relevant to my work. But, while it has not been possible for me to utilise the former, the latter, I learnt to my disappointment, is still closed to public scrutiny, at least by foreigners. The archives at Tashkent may also reveal useful information. Dr. Kaushik of Kuruksetra University has made some use of the materials there, and the relevant information at his disposal were made available to me.

Despite the wide range of source materials made available to me, I am perfectly aware of the subjective limitations an Indian, in particular, suffers from while writing on anything related to Indian nationalism. Our memory of the Indian national movement is still charged with emotions, and a true historian has to find his way through the web of myths and prejudices. To ensure the desired objectivity, I have deliberately kept comments to a minimum, and have allowed facts to tell their tale. After all, the language of facts is more adequate and eloquent than exhaustive commentaries.

Although this book is based essentially on available primary sources, the very nature of the subject made it desirable that these should be properly, and very carefully, supplemented by the oral and written statements of those, who played their part in the drama narrated here, as well as by the information supplied by contemporary newspapers. Among the newspapers mentioned here, only *The Indian Sociologist*, *The Word*, *Comrade*, *Times*, *Siraj al-Akhbar*, *Mahratta*, *San Francisco Bulletin*, *San Francisco Chronicle*, *San Francisco Examiner*, *Straits Echo*, *Singapore Times*, *Singapore Free Press*, and *Young India* (in microfilms) have been used *in extenso* from the original files. Others, mentioned in this thesis, have been referred

to as cited in the volumes of the *Reports on Native Newspapers* of the different former Indian provinces.

Except in the case of Sumatra, and where (as in the cases of Malaya or the French Indo-China) the present name of a country denotes a territory significantly different from what is implied in the present study, I have always used names and spellings of towns and countries according to the present practice of the local peoples, e.g. Djakarta instead of Batavia, and Guyana instead of British Guiana. Instead of such Europe-centric expressions like the Middle East and the Far East, I have made use of terms like West Asia and East Asia, and by the latter I have meant the entire region from Japan to Singapore. Indian names, except in the case of Virendranath Chattopadhyaya (i.e. Chatterjee), have been spelt as they are usually done in English, e.g., Bose and Mukherjee in place of Basu and Mukhopadhyaya. In writing German names I have avoided the use of umlauts, and have spelt the names as they are pronounced. In writing Chinese names I have followed the method approved by Professors Wade and Giles, and the surnames have been placed before the personal names.

In case of Japanese names, however, the surnames have been placed at the end. Names of Indian Muslims have been spelt as they are usually done in the Indian sub-continent without strictly adhering to their original Arabic form. Names that occur more than once have been usually, except in the first instance, referred to in short, either by their surnames (as is always the case with non-Indians) or by their personal names, as they were known to their Indian contemporaries.

In the present study the term 'revolutionary' has been used in a rather general sense, to mean all nationalists who actively aided or attempted the liberation of India from the British yoke through violent means. I start the story with the year 1905, when for the first time revolutionary activities among Indians abroad secured an organised expression, and I break off my story in the year 1922, when the first phase of revolutionary activities by Indians abroad virtually came to a close. Although the organisations and activities of Indian revolutionaries abroad form the central theme of this thesis, sufficient emphasis has also been given to their relations with and responses to events within and outside India.

Before I conclude, I must express my sincere thanks to the staff of the National Archives of India, the National Library of India, the West Bengal State Archives, the India Office Library, the British Museum, the Khuddabux Library and the Sinha Library of Patna, The National Library of Scotland, the Bodleian Library (Oxford), and the University Libraries of Patna, Visvc-Bharati, Malaya, London, Cambridge, and Birmingham, without whose whole-hearted co-operation it would never have been possible for me to collect the necessary information and evidences. I am indebted to so many for the assistance I received that it is not possible to express my gratitude for each one of them separately. However, I must make particular reference to Sri Prithvindrath Mukherjee, Dr. Bisvadev Mukherjee, Dr. Ulrich Gehrke, Dr. Siniya Kasughai, Dr. D. Kaushik, and Dr. D. P. Singh for having translated for me valuable documents, and for allowing me the use of their unpublished theses and research materials. I am particularly grateful to Dr. R. J. Moore of the School of Oriental and African Studies, London, for valuable help and advice during my stay there in 1965-66, and to my former colleagues, Dr. Kaliprasad Biswas, Dr. Himangshu Bhushan Mukherjee, and Mr. John A. Webber for suggesting various improvement in expression. Shri V. C. Joshi, formerly of the National Archives of India, was particularly helpful to me with timely information and suggestions regarding the materials I needed. To my esteemed teacher, Dr. Kali Kinkar Datta, I am under a deep debt of gratitude for his valued advice, comments, and encouragements. I should also thank all, in India and abroad, who unhesitatingly helped me with their statements, patiently answered my questions, and, wherever possible, allowed me the unrestricted use of their personal collections and diaries. Lastly, I shall be failing in my duty if I do not express my thankfulness to my wife, Anjali, who has helped me immensely by taking down valuable notes and correcting mistakes in typing.

May, 1971

A.C.B.

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INTRODUCTION

It is widely believed that the failure of the Mutiny of 1857-58 marked the end of the phase of armed challenge to British power and ushered in an era of the so-called constitutional agitation by the English-educated middle-classes. No doubt, the English-educated middle-classes, in this period, gradually organised themselves in political and cultural associations, and began seeking satisfaction of their demands and ambition through prayers and petitions. But that does not mean that this middle-class movement completely replaced those who advocated physical resistance to foreign rule. Most likely, it was this westernized middle-class background of the public figures, journalists and historians of the time and of subsequent decades that made them, not deliberately I suppose, ignore or minimise the part played by others in the early years of India's freedom movement.

But others did play their part, and the rebellions by the Wahabis, the Kookas and the Maratha peasants under Y. B. Phadke, and the Arms Act of 1879 are eloquent testimony to continued attempts at meeting force with force. For only a decade or so did the Congress really capture the faith and attention of the educated Indians, and not much was heard of the use of force in politics. So, the renewed appeals, since the late nineties, and more eloquently after 1905, to meet force with force should be looked upon more as the resurgence rather than as the emergence of extremism in Indian national movement.

The roots of this resurgent extremism can be traced to a variety of causes. Unlike in the past, its recruits were drawn—at least in its earlier phases,—almost entirely from among the English-educated Hindu middle-classes. They had been brought into existence as a class and given their present shape and status primarily by the British rule in India. In return they had, till recently, given the latter their warm co-operation.

But towards the end of the 19th century their attitude fast began to change. A series of acts of the Government contributed to their increasing frustration and bitterness. They had been given English education, which they believed qualified them for all the posts held by Englishmen. Yet the higher ranks of the bureaucracy were

virtually closed to them; and as education spread fast the embers of bitterness began to burn brighter among the unemployed and under-employed intelligentsia. Even official favour for their new organisation, the Congress, soon hardened into hostility. The practice of the Governor of the province, where the Congress met, of inviting its delegates to tea was given up after 1887.¹ Even Lord Dufferin, disapproved of the policy and methods of the Congress at the St. Andrews Day Dinner in Calcutta on 30 November 1888, on the eve of his retirement, and described the people associated with it as "constituting a microscopic minority possessing neither experience, administrative ability, nor any adequate conception of the nature of the tasks before them." That year, the Congress met at Allahabad but in the teeth of the pronounced hostility of Sir Auckland Colvin, Lt. Governor of the then United Province.³ Official circulars issued between 1887 and 1890 clearly aimed at preventing Government servants from associating themselves with the Congress or any such political organisation.⁴

The Indian Councils Act of 1892 also fell short of the expectations of nationalist India,⁵ and "the administrative mutilation of the manifest intention of the Parliament in forming the Indian Councils' Act" was further resented.⁶ The early leaders of the Congress had reposed almost undiluted faith in their Liberal patrons in Britain, and this

1. "The Madras session marks the end of cordial relations. From then onwards the attitude of the Government was far from friendly." H. L. Singh, *Problems and Policies of the British in India* (1885-1898), Bombay, 1963, p. 229.

2. Lord Dufferin, *Speeches Delivered in India*, 1884-88, London, 1890, pp. 237-44.

3. Correspondence between Colvin and Hume, in October 1888, cited in H. L. Singh, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

Also, W. Wedderburn, *Alan Octavian Hume*, London, 1913, pp. 66-70.

Also, the speech of Pandit Ayodhya Nath, the Chairman of the Reception Committee of the Annual Session of the Congress at Allahabad, in 1888. *Indian National Congress, Report of the Fourth Annual Session*.

4. Public Proceedings, No. 367-68, April, 1888, No. 54, April, 1890 and No. 1-4, January, 1891, quoted in H. L. Singh, *op. cit.*, pp. 229-237.

5. R. C. Majumdar, *History of the Freedom Movement in India* (vol. 1), Calcutta, 1962, pp. 406-407.

6. Presidential Address by Alfred Webb. *Indian National Congress, Report of the Tenth Annual Session*.

policy was based on the presumption that the Government would gradually respond to their legitimate demands. Yet such unpopular measures, like the closing of the mints and the grant of Exchange Compensation Allowance in 1893, the imposition of the countervailing excise duty of five per cent on Indian yarns in 1894 and changes in excise and import duties on cotton yarns and goods in 1896 at the instance of Manchester manufactures⁷ were passed by the Liberals themselves; and it was they who refused to implement the resolution of the House of Commons regarding simultaneous examination for the I.C.S. in Britain and India.⁸ Then the Conservatives came to power, and "between 1895 and 1905 one finds a marked stiffness in the Government's attitude."⁹ Both Hamilton, the Secretary of State, and Curzon were decidedly opposed to the Congress, and it was primarily due to official hostility that the aristocracy gradually gave up associating themselves with the Congress,¹⁰ thus adversely

7. Such "fiscal injustice," to quote R. C. Dutt, was harshly criticised by the *Mahratta*, 16-12-1894 and 9-2-1896, *Bengalee*, 22-12-1894 and 8-2-1896, *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, 29-12-1894 and *Indu Prokash*, 31-12-1894. The Congress criticised these measures in 1902 and 1904, and even Curzon admitted in his letter dated 28 October 1903, to the Secy. of State, Brodrick, that the countervailing excise duty had been imposed "in order to placate the Lanchashire members." Amallesh Tripathi, *The Extremist Challenge*, Calcutta, 1967, pp. 51-52.

8. This resolution, moved by Herbert and seconded by Dadabhai Naoroji, was passed on 2 June, 1893.

9. H. L. Singh, op. cit., p. 255.

10. *Indian National Congress, Report of the Fourteenth Annual Session*, p. iii.

Also, *Indian National Congress, Report of the Fifteenth Annual Session*, p. v.

Hamilton wrote to Lord Elgin on 24-6-1897, "The more I see and hear of the National Congress Party the more I am impressed with the seditious and double-sided character of the prime-movers of the organisation." In May 1899, he suggested to Curzon certain measures for curbing the influence of the Congress, viz., to wean away the princes and noble-men from the Congress, to prefer for honours and distinctions those who did not join the Congress, and to exercise greater control over education. Curzon wrote to Hamilton in November the same year, that "one of his greatest ambitions while in India is to assist it (Congress) to a peaceful demise." Curzon treated the Congress with "positive discourtesy" by refusing to receive a deputation which proposed to wait upon him with

affecting its financial position and social standing. In fact, most of the important demands made by the Congress and embodied in its various resolutions in the first twenty years of its life remained unsatisfied.¹¹ As a result, the Congress stood discredited, and in the words of Lord Curzon, "The best men in the Congress are more and more seeing the hopelessness of their cause."¹² Besides, the growing belief that India under British rule was getting poorer had already caused a serious under-swell of discontent even among the advocates of constitution agitation.¹³

Unkind nature also lent a helping hand to the acts of the Government in adding to popular frustration and bitterness. The last few years of the 19th century were lean ones for the Indian peasantry. There had been a few minor famines in the seventies and eighties. These were followed by the terrible famines of 1896-97 and 1899-1900, each of which affected almost half of India. About the latter, Lord

the resolutions of the Congress passed in its Bombay session in 1904. A. C. Mazumdar, *Indian National Evolution* (2nd edition), Calcutta, pp. 80-90.

11. Demands for the abolition of the India Council and for simultaneous examinations for the I.C.S. (1888); separation of the judiciary from the executive (1886); amendment of the Arms Act (1887); technical and industrial development (1888); reform of land revenue policy (1889); reform of currency (1892); abolition of forced labour and the repeal of cotton excise duty (1893); improvement of the condition of Indians in colonies (1894); repeal of the Bengal, Bombay and Madras Regulations of 1818, 1827 and 1819, respectively, and of the Sedition Act, (1897); repeal of the Indian Universities Act and Official Secrets Act (1903); and advance in local self-government (1905).

12. Curzon to Hamilton on 18.11.1900, quoted in H. L. Singh, *op. cit.*, pp. 293-94.

13. Dadabhai Naoroji, *Essays, Speeches and Writings*, (ed. C. L. Parckh), Bombay, 1887, pp. 28, 91-111.

Also, Dadabhai Naoroji, *Poverty and Un-British Rule in India*, London, 1901, p. 197.

Also, M. G. Ranade, *Essays on Indian Economics*, Bombay, 1898, pp. 191-92.

Also, William Digby, *Prosperous British India*, London, 1901, pp. 127-28, 131.

Also, R. C. Dutt, *Speeches and Papers on Indian Questions*, 1897-1900, Calcutta, 1904, p. 36.

Also, G. K. Gokhale, *Speeches*, Madras, 1916, p. 52.

Curzon estimated that one fourth of the entire population of India had come to a greater or lesser degree within the radius of relief operation.¹⁴ These famines had been accompanied by a new horror, the plague, which scourged western India in 1896-97.

Continued physical distress of the many led to the intellectual discontent, verging on to despair, of the few, the educated youth of India. No doubt, the senior leaders of the Congress still continue to swear by their faith in their British masters, but the younger generation of the Indian intelligentsia were fast losing their former faith in British good-will and assurances. No longer could they look upon the British rule as a 'divine dispensation' for India, nor could an increasing number of them retain their trust in the programme and promises of the Congress.¹⁵ On the other hand, their new awareness of nationhood made them increasingly sensitive to the humiliations heaped upon them as a people by many western writers and missionaries.

Repelled by the victorious West and disgusted with their contemptuous attitude, the new generation, in increasing numbers, naturally sought shelter and sustenance in the womb of Mother India, in her heritage and history (though often exaggerated and misconstrued). The chauvinism of the West bred an equally aggressive chauvinism in the Indian mind. National paranoia, as often in history, led to national narcissism.

In that atmosphere of doubts and disgust fresh appeals to one's own powers and possibilities, as a reaction to their collective humiliation and frustration, found a ready response, and once again appeared to many young men as an alternative course of action. In fact, there cannot exist for long a vacuum in the world of hopes and ambition. What the Congress failed, nay, was not allowed, to sustain and to fulfil, others were likely to come forward to uphold in their own way. The agitations against the Age of Consent Bill, cow-killing, and police

14. *Lord Curzon in India*, being a selection from his speeches as the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, 1898-1905, London, 1906, (Vol. II), pp. 94-105.

15. Tilak said, "Political rights will have to be fought for. The Moderates think that these can be won by persuasion. We think that these can only be got by strong passion." M. A. Buch, *Rise and Growth of Indian Militant Nationalism*, Bombay, 1940. p. 47.

Also, R. G. Prodhon, *India's Struggle for Swaraj*, Madras, 1930 p. 78.

vigilance during the plague were answers to the failures of the Congress, deriving strength from the passion and the pride of the people, and it was this failure—whoever might have been responsible for it—that to a large extent proved to be one of the main springs of Indian revolutionary movements.

This assertive self-confidence, on the other hand, was to a great extent the creature of influences from and events abroad. The 19th century Western Indologists had been highly effective in making the Indian intelligentsia aware of their potentialities. The grand revelations regarding the antiquity of their civilization, the working of democratic republics in ancient India, the efficient administrative structures of the Mauryas and the Guptas, their widespread commercial and colonial activities across the seas, the success and sacrifices of the Buddhist missionaries abroad, the magnificence of their philosophy and the richness of their classical literature quite reasonably gave the educated Indians, mostly composed of Hindus, a new respect for their heritage and culture, and a new confidence in themselves and their future. Pride in their own civilization was further heightened by the profound reverence of western theosophists for certain truths in Hinduism. This growing self-confidence and pride as a nation became a messianic message of manliness, unity, service and sacrifice through the teachings of, to mention the important few, Swami Daynanda Saraswati, Swami Vivekananda, Bal Gangadhar Tilak and Aurobindo Ghosh. Vivekananda's spectacular success in the West and a few less significant achievements of individual Indians abroad further helped dispel the inferiority-complex of educated Indians.¹⁶

16. According to Shri Aurobindo, "The going forth of Vivekananda marked out by the Master as the heroic soul destined to take the world between his two hands and change it, was the first visible sign to the world that India was awake not only to survive but to conquer." *Karmayogin*, 26-6-1906, cited in Amallesh Tripathi, op. cit., p. 24.

Prince Ranji's brilliant debut in English cricket in 1895; Atul Chandra Chatterjee standing first in the I.C.S. examination in 1897; R. P. Paranjpe becoming the Senior Wrangler in Mathematics at Cambridge in 1899; and J. C. Bose's sensational experiments in radio physics in England in 1896 and in plant physiology in Paris in 1901.

The *Justice*, 18-7-1908, spoke of recent successes of Indians abroad. H. P. 1909 June 36A.

This new-born self-confidence drew further nourishment from the belief that Britain was no longer as strong as before. In France and Russia she had her traditional rivals. Germany under the new Kaiser had, of late, entered the lists,¹⁷ and a show-down with these powers was then much talked of. Britain's diplomatic isolation was rudely revealed during the Boer War, and her early discomfitures in that war were interpreted as indications of her military weakness and dependence on Indian soldiers.¹⁸ In the tripartite intervention against Japan in 1896 the indistinct outlines of a 'continental league',¹⁹ potentially directed against Britain, were visible to the hopefuls. By his two state visits to Turkey, the Kaiser had clearly demonstrated Germany's new ambition in Asia, and his famous speech at Damascus on 9 September 1898 declaring himself as a "friend of the Protector of Islam" was not lost upon the Muslim extremists, in particular. Already they were being attracted and encouraged by the pan-Islamic movement organised by Sultan Abdul Hamid²⁰ II. Western reactions on Turkish conduct during the Macedonian revolts and Armenian massacres only sharpened the edge of their anti-British feeling,²¹ while Turkish victory over the Greeks in 1897 gave them a new inspiration and confidence.²² In 1898, an Etheopian army annihilated the Italians at Adowa, and it helped to break the spell of Western invincibility.²³ A few years later, Japan did it more convincingly by defeating a major European power, Russia. Many in India, naturally, began asking themselves why could not they repeat these performances against Britain in the near future.²⁴ The Boxer

17. *Kal*, 19-4-1901 and 20-4-1901.

18. *Gupati*, 5-11-1899; *Indu Prokash* and *Dyan Prokash*, 9-11-1900; *Mahabatta*, 24-12-1900; *Kal*, 28-12-1900 and 11-4-1902; *Ahmedabad Times*, 30-12-1900.

19. *Gorokhi*, 29-9-1901.

20. De Lacy O'leary, *Islam at the Cross Roads*, London, 1923, p. 122.

Also, Edwin Pears, *Life of Abdul Hamid*, London, 1917, p. 150.

21. *Native Opinion* and *Mahratta*, 9-6-1895; *Champion* and *Poona Vaibhav*, 18-10-1896.

22. *Native Opinion*, 27-5-1897; and *Mahratta*, 30-5-1897.

Also, Foreign (Political) Proceedings Nos. 106 and 124 June 1899, quoted in L. K. Choudhury, *India and Turkey: a phase in their relations, 1899-1924* (unpublished Ph.D. thesis Patna University, 1963), p. 34.

23. V. Charol, *Indian Unrest*, London, 1910, p. 3.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 148.

rebellion—the first major anti-Western rising in Asia since the Indian revolts of 1857-58—also served a source of inspiration and a model.²⁵

Under the influence of such an emulsion of rather opposite inspirations this resurgent extremism became, jenus-like, a two-faced movement. While the one looked wistfully back at the much-extolled superiority of Indian values and culture and the achievements of their forefathers, the other studied the international scene and national movements abroad for hope and useful lessons.²⁶ The very idea of the bomb and the secret society, and of propaganda through action and sacrifice were imports from the West; and so were the beliefs that an unpopular administration could be paralysed by individual terrorism, that some princely states might be persuaded to play the role of Piedmont in Indian history, that the Indian soldiers, the mainstay of British rule in India, could be incited and, like Garibaldi's volunteers, led against their foreign master, and that someone may, like Cavour, secure foreign arms and intervention against Britain in India. The banners and the war-cries were those of the Indian tradition, while the struggle was to be waged with modern techniques and tools.

Also, V. Chirol, *India*, London, 1926, p. 113.

Also, C. F. Andrews, *The Renaissance in India*, London, 1912, p. 4.

25. *Kal*, 22-3-1901, and 29-3-1901, and 10-5-1901.

26. "Not only did the Bhagwat Gita, the teachings of Vivekananda, the lives of Mazzini and Garibaldi supply them with mental pabulum... It (*Mukti kon Pathe*) pointed out that arms could be obtained by grim determination...that young Indians could be sent to foreign countries to learn the art of making weapons. ...it appealed to the revolutionaries to seek the assistance of the Indian army.... Aid in the shape of arms may be secretly obtained by securing the help of foreign ruling powers." Sir Lawrence Jenkins, Chief Justice of Bengal, quoted in R. C. Proddhan, *op cit.*, pp. 88-89.

Also, "Indian revolutionaries imitate the Irish Fenians and the Russian anarchists. Their literature is replete with references to both. Tilak took his 'no rent' campaign from Ireland, and the Bengalces learnt the utility of boycott from Irish history. Kanai Dutt was compared to Patrick O' Donnell, who had killed James Cary. Political dacoity to collect money they have learnt from the Russians. Lajpat Rai's *Life of Mazzini* and Savarkar's translation of Mazzini's autobiography are favourite books. References to periods of European revolution and to Garibaldi and Washington are made." V. Chirol, *Indian Unrest*, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

Also, Rabindranath Tagore, *Jeeban Smriti* (in Bengali). Calcutta, 1947, pp. 246-47.

This new spirit that abjured the accepted policy of prayers and petitions, and stood for complete independence, extreme measures and use of force found its earliest expression in Bombay, primarily among the Chitpavana Brahmins. It was Tilak who gave this urge strength and shape by organising the Ganapati and the Shivaji festivals since September 1893 and May 1895, respectively. These were soon followed by his opposition to the Government measures for the control of the plague and the murders of Rand and Lt. Ayerst by the two brothers, Damodar Chapekar and Balkrishna Chapekar, on 22 June 1897. The two men, responsible for their arrest, were also murdered in February 1899. This new urge received some implied recognition in December 1897, at the Amaravati session of the Congress. Bengal was soon to catch the fire. The right atmosphere was created there by the romantic early endeavours of Nabagopal Mitra, Rajnarayan Bose and the Tagores,²⁷ as well as by the message and advice of Bankim Chandra Chatterjee, Vivekananda and the Japanese scholar, Kakuzo Okakura.²⁸ By the dawn of the present century the two presidencies of Bombay and Bengal had many youth organisations that spread the ideals of self-help and moral regeneration and were engaged in social service and physical culture. In most cases their inner core formed secret societies of their own for revolutionary purposes and began using their clubs, libraries and gymnasiums as recruiting centres. But in India, the political extremists, not to speak of the actual revolutionaries, had little freedom under the law for the dissemination of their ideas, far less for organising and equipping their movements. Even before the nineteenth century was over, the fate of Tilak and the Natu brothers in 1897²⁹ had proved how

27. Basanta Kumar Chatterjee, *Jyotirindranath Jeeban Smriti* (in Bengali), Calcutta, 1919, pp. 166-67.

Also, Rabindranath Tagore, *Jeeban Smriti* (Bengali), Calcutta, 1947, pp. 97-100.

28. Okakura visited India in 1900-01. Conversations with him gave the political extremists fresh inspiration, and led many of them expect Japanese assistance against Britain. His book, *The Ideals of the East*, published in London in 1905, begins with the words, 'Asia is one.'

29. Tilak was sentenced to eighteen months' rigorous imprisonment for his writings in his Marathi weekly, the *Keshari*, in June that year. The Natu brothers were deported for two years without trial under the Bombay Regulation No. XXXV of 1827.

promptly an unrestrained voice could be suppressed in India; and instances of even greater repression became common in course of a decade.³⁰

But outside India, even in Britain, Indian revolutionaries could live and work with greater liberty, and many of them went abroad in search of greater safety and better opportunities. At the same time educated Indians, mostly senior students, in foreign countries, where risks and restrictions were fewer, came in rather close contact with revolutionary exiles from India and other subject countries struggling against British imperialism and responded adequately to the call of an edifying adventure. Thus, very early in this century, Indian revolutionary centres came into existence in London, Paris and New York to be followed within a few years by similar centres elsewhere in different continents.

Indian revolutionaries abroad lived and worked under conditions more or less similar, but basically different from those of their comrades at home. They were away from the scene of struggle and not in regular contact with their countrymen. At the same time they were much more exposed to world forces and outside influences. Willy-nilly, they had closer contacts with some governments and public figures of other countries and had to observe and adjust themselves to the changing patterns of international developments. Moreover, they functioned in an atmosphere of greater liberty. The leavening influence of unexpected liberty and the dignity of the individual as well as the relative absence of many of their traditional social restrictions and allegiances soon altered the attitudes and outlooks of even the poor and uneducated Indian immigrants³¹ and attracted them into the revolutionary movements

30. Between June 1906 and July 1907 prosecution was instituted against nine newspapers and three persons for publishing seditious articles. On 24 June 1908, even Tilak was arrested for his articles in the *Keshari*, on 12 May and 9 June.

Lajpat Rai and Ajit Singh were deported to Mandalay in summer 1907.

Nine prominent Bengalis were deported on 13 December 1908.

Prevention of Seditious Meetings Act was passed on 1 November 1907.

Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act was passed in December 1908.

Press Act was passed on 8 June 1908.

31. "...release from the authority and custom of a thousand years may operate in minds introduced to a milieu to which they are quite

long before members of those classes within India took any active interest in their country's cause. Greater liberty also meant that those abroad could communicate with one another more often and with less difficulty than they could with those at home. Due to their relative safety and the nature of their opportunities, their organisations, unlike the secret societies in India itself, were, until the advent of the Ghadar movement in the U.S.A., rather loose-knit ones of like-minded and like-inspired people, seeking to attract as many as possible and giving their movement and cause the largest measure of publicity. Because of these common circumstances and experiences the revolutionary movements abroad developed with a distinct pattern of their own.

Even their immediate aims and objectives were considerably different from those of their comrades at home. The struggle against the British *raj* had to be waged and won ultimately on Indian soil, and they were away from the stage. So how best to contribute to that struggle from abroad was the question that gave their efforts a distinct orientation. They themselves were quite conscious of their rather peculiar position and opportunities vis-a-vis their comrades at home, and sought to spearhead and supplement the latter's work accordingly. So the first item in their programme was to publish revolutionary leaflets and journals, and to conduct an effective propaganda with a view to inspiring their countrymen, especially the army, to throw off the British yoke, to denigrate British rule in India before the world public, and to win the sympathy of world opinion in their favour and thus to convert the question of Indian independence into a world issue. Soon arms and explosives as well as instructions for their preparation and use came to be smuggled home along with revolutionary literatures. Every opportunity abroad was utilised to learn the making of bombs, and to secure military training by getting into the armies and military academies of the countries where they stayed. Then, as the revolutionary movements at home and abroad gained momentum and world events evolved in their favour, these centres abroad became, in many cases, valuable points of contact with foreign powers and bases *d'appui* for armed raids on India. Thus the revolutionaries abroad, away from the scene of actual struggle,

unaccustomed." George MacMunn, *Turmoil and Tragedy in India, 1914 and After*, London, 1935, p. 94.

worked as useful adjuncts to the efforts of their comrades at home. These underlying uniformities in the Indian revolutionary movements abroad and their basic differences with similar movements at home, as regards their position, possibilities and policies, gave the former, while forming an integral part of India's revolutionary struggle, a distinct character of their own that makes a study of those as a separate subject possible and worthwhile.



Gul Hayat Institute

CHAPTER—I

INDIAN REVOLUTIONARIES IN BRITAIN AND FRANCE BEFORE WORLD WAR I

Early in January 1905, a journal with a rather unfamiliar name, *The Indian Sociologist*, made its first appearance in London.¹ Few Londoners would have taken any notice of it, but to its editor and publisher, Shyamji Krishnavarma and his associates it meant the beginning of a fresh campaign for India's independence.

Krishnavarma was about forty years old when he finally came to London, in 1897, and joined the Inn of the Inner Temple.² He was already a man of considerable means and experience, and was bitterly opposed to the continuance of British rule in India. His residence at 9 Queen's Wood, Highgate³ soon became the rendezvous of many like-minded Indians of London.⁴ The best known among those who gathered round him in those years were Sirdarsingh Raoji Rana and Madam Vikaji Rustomji Cama. The former had come to London in 1898, and had soon become an ardent convert to Krishnavarma's political views. The following year, however, he moved to Paris to start a lucrative trade in jewelleries.⁵ After a few years he organised there the Paris Indian Society, mainly in co-operation with another Indian merchant, M. B. Godrej.⁶ But he would come to London so often and maintained such close contact with his political mentor, Krishnavarma that their associates in London and Paris felt and were generally known as members of the same group, with Krishnavarma as their leader. Cama too arrived in London in

1. Indulal Yajnik, *Shyamji Krishnavarma*, Bombay, 1950, p. 122. This journal will be referred to hereafter as the *Sociologist*.

2. Indulal Yajnik, op. cit., p. 102. Krishnavarma was born in 1857.

3. P. & S. (India Corr.), 2611, vol. 233 of 1906.

4. Indulal Yajnik, op. cit., p. 106.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 152.

6. Hem Chandra Qanungo, *Banglaye Viplab Prochesta* (in Bengali). Calcutta, 1928, pp. 185. Also, the statement of Guy Alfred Aldred.

M. B. Godrej had come to Paris in 1901, P. & S. (India Corr.) 2611, vol. 233 of 1906.

1901. Her experience in Bombay during the plague epidemic of 1897 had made her bitterly anti-British, and she soon became one of the most ardent members of Krishnavarma's group. J. M. Parikh, J. C. Mukherjee and many others also joined them in those years.⁷

In Europe nationalism and revolution were then in the air, and Indians in London and Paris were often personally known to Irish Fenians and revolutionary exiles from East Europe.⁸ Even in India a new spirit of defiance and self-assertion had become active, and it was but natural that educated Indians living among free peoples and under fewer restrictions than at home were deeply moved by what they saw around them and by the sad plight of their countrymen. Gradually the urge to do something for their country took hold of Krishnavarma and his associates. But they had little faith in the mendicant policy of the Congress, and believed that, like all other peoples, Indians too would have to achieve independence through their own effort. That is why they had little contact with the local East Indian Association, the London Indian Society or the British Committee of the Congress.⁹

But, despite all their enthusiasm for a revolution, Krishnavarma and his associates were rather elderly people, comfortably settled in life, and were not prepared for the hard life of an active revolutionary. However, they believed in a possible division of labour in their national struggle, and felt that with their experience, pen and the purse they could make themselves useful by influencing Indian opinion in the right direction, by acquainting the world with the actual conditions and aspirations of the Indian people, and by training up a select corps of Indian revolutionaries who might in future organise and lead a revolutionary movement at home. In India it was almost impossible to speak for a revolutionary movement, and the incarceration of Tilak and Natu brothers in 1897 had proved how ruthlessly an uncomfortable voice could be silenced by the government. But in Britain even Indians enjoyed considerable freedom of expression and

7. Indulal Yajnik, op. cit., p. 106.

8. M. Pavlovich, "Revolutsionnye Suluety" in V. Gurko-Kryazhin and Veltman, *Indiya v borbe za nezavisimost*, Moscow, 1925.

Also, Hem Chandra Qanungo, op. cit., p. 210.

Also, D. Keer, *Veer Savarkar*, Bombay, 1966, p. 40.

9. Indulal Yajnik, op. cit., pp. 106-07.

movement. There was a sizable Indian community of students and traders, mainly concentrated in London,¹⁰ and most of them were likely to hold positions of influence on their return home. So, Krishnavarma decided to start among them a revolutionary movement and to help the cause of his countrymen from the vantage point of London.¹¹ The *Sociologist* was to be the monthly organ of this new movement.

The spirit and political attitude Krishnavarma sought to inculcate among its readers, were clear from the two statements of Herbert Spencer, which were written at its top as the motto of the journal: "Every man is free to do that which he wills provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other" and "Resistance to aggression is not simply justifiable but imperative. Non-resistance hurts both altruism and egoism."¹² The first number of the *Sociologist* also contained the following advice of H. M. Hyndman: "Indians must learn to rely upon themselves and organise themselves apart from their foreign masters for their final emancipation." Through the columns of his journal Krishnavarma regularly advised his countrymen to look to themselves alone for their political salvation, i.e., the forcible expulsion of the British rule from India and not to hope for anything from the changes of governors and governments.¹³

In its very first number Krishnavarma announced his decision to found five travelling fellowships of the value of Rs. 2,000/- each, for enabling Indian graduates to finish their education in Britain to qualify themselves for an independent profession.¹⁴ But these fellows were not to accept posts under the government.¹⁵

No sooner had the *Sociologist* made its appearance than Krishnavarma turned his attention to organising his friends and followers for an effective agitation. On 18 February 1905, the Indian Home Rule

10. Charu Chandra Datta, *Purano Kutha* (in Bengali), Calcutta, 1962, p. 91.

There were at the end of the 19th century about four hundred Indians in Britain.

11. P. & S. (India Corr.), 666, vol. 186 of 1906.

12. *The Sociologist*, June 1905 and a few other issues.

13. W. Curzon Willie's note of 24-12-1905, P. & S. (India Corr.), 666.

14. Indulal Yajnik, *op. cit.*, pp. 115-116.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 130. Also, Circular No. 7, 15-6-1909, H.P. 1909 July 15 Dep.

Society was formally started in his house at Highgate, London.¹⁶ He became its president with Rana, J. M. Parikh, M. B. Godrej and S. Suhrawardy as vice-presidents, and J. C. Mukherjee as its secretary. The proclaimed objectives of the society were "to secure home rule for India, to carry on propaganda in the U. K. to that effect, and to spread among Indians an awareness of the advantages of freedom and national unity".¹⁷

It may appear from these that Krishnavarma, in 1905, was demanding nothing more than mere home rule or self-government, which Dadabhai Naoroji had already asked for India the year before at the International Socialist Congress at Amsterdam and which the Congress, in 1906, was to declare as its goal. But, a careful perusal of his writings and his ruthless criticism of men like Gopal Krishna Gokhale and Pheroze Shah Mehta for their limited demands leaves one in no doubt about what he sought for his country. His ostensible preference for mass non-co-operation as the means and home-rule as the end obviously sprang from his desire to escape the long arm of the law. But lest his views should be misunderstood, he made it clear, in January 1906, that if the use of force appeared to be the only effective means of achieving freedom it would be neither immoral nor repugnant to him.

In the meantime, he had purchased a mansion at 63 Cromwell Avenue, Highgate to use it as a boarding house and training centre for his revolutionary recruits. It was named India House, and was formally opened on 10 July 1905¹⁸ by Hyndman, with these words: "As things stand, loyalty to Great Britain means treachery to India. . . . from England herself there is nothing to be hoped. . . . It is the immoderate men, the fanatical men, who will work out the salvation of India by herself."¹⁹ There was enough of a hint in these words

16. Indulal Yajnik, *op. cit.*, pp. 130-131.

17. H. P. 1908 Oct. 27-35 A (Confidential). Also Indulal Yajnik, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

Also, *Materials*, paper 60.

There the usual weekly charge for food and board was 18s. 6d. But those who received the Krishnavarma and Rana scholarships had to pay 16s. only.

P. & S. (*India Corr.*) 2611, vol. 233 of 1906.

18. Indulal Yajnik, *op. cit.*, p. 142

19. *Ibid.*, p. 141.

of the purpose India House was going to be used for. Symbolic of solidarity among all fighters for freedom, its opening ceremony was attended by Dadabhai Naoroji, Lajpat Rai, Lala Hansraj, Anthony Quelch, Madam Deshpard and Sweeny.²⁰ From now on India House became the headquarters of this group. Meetings were arranged there almost every Sunday afternoon where all Indians were invited and questions relating to Indian independence were discussed.

In January 1906, it was announced in the *Sociologist* that Krishnavarma had offered six lectureship of Rs. 1000/- each to enable Indian authors and journalists to visit foreign countries in national interest. Rana also announced the offer of three fellowships of Rs. 2000/- each, the conditions imposed being the same as those on Krishnavarma's fellowships.²¹

The year 1906 marked a definite intensification in the activities of this group, which soon put it on the road to a really revolutionary movement. The anti-partition movement in Bengal and the repressive measures that followed had a stirring effect on educated Indians everywhere. On 4 May 1906, a meeting was organised in India House to protest against the arrest of Surendranath Banerjee at Barisal in East Bengal. The following day a similar meeting was also organised by the Paris Indian Society.²²

Besides, in summer 1906, the recipients of the Krishnavarma and Rana fellowships began reaching London. One of them was Vinayak Damodar Savarkar.²³ He took up residence at India House and joined Gray's Inn. He and his brothers, Ganesh Savarkar and Narayan Savarkar were already members of the Mitra Mela and then of the Abhinav Bharat Society, the best known revolutionary organisations of western India. He had definite ideas about revolutionary struggles, and came to Europe primarily to learn the methods and organisations of European secret societies, to establish friendly under-

20. P. & S. (India Corr.) 2611, vol. 233 of 1906.

21. Indulal Yajnik, p. 169. Also, *Sociologist*, February, 1906.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 170. Also, Circular No. 7, op. cit.

23. The *Sociologist* of April 1906 name the recipients of the five fellowships and two lectureships.

P. & S. (India Corr.) 666, vol. 186 of 1906. He will be referred to hereafter as Savarkar.

standing with the anti-British revolutionary exiles from other countries, to discover opportunities for military training, and to help his comrades at home with arms and a more effective propaganda campaign.²⁴ He was soon joined by men like Virendranath Chattopadhyaya, who believed with him that it was time to strike the British Lion.²⁵

The need for arms and the knowledge of explosives was felt equally by Indian revolutionaries in India and Britain. For them Paris was certainly a safer place for training in and experiments with explosives. The first to be sent out from India with this purpose was Hem Chandra Das of the so-called Yugantar group of Bengal. He reached Paris towards the end of August 1906,²⁶ and was soon joined by Pandurang M. Bapat and Mirza Abbas from India House.²⁷ In December 1907, they left for India with their new knowledge and bomb formulae.²⁸

In the meantime, two revolutionary emissaries from India, Nitisen Dwarkadas and Gyanchand Varma had arrived in London, in September 1906. They soon opened the Eastern Export and Import Co. at Gray's Inn Place, ostensibly to trade in Indian merchandise, but actually to conduct a secret traffic in arms and propaganda-leaflets under its business cover.²⁹ Nitisen Dwarkadas soon succeeded J. C. Mukherjee as the secretary of the Indian Home Rule Society. Gyanchand Varma took over from him in July 1907.³⁰ Their activities were already attracting the attention of the authorities, and in Sep-

24. D. Keer, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

Also, the confession of H. K. Koregaonkar, J. & P. 349, vol. 981 of 1910.

25. Statement of Guy Alfred Aldred, hereafter referred to in foot notes as Aldred. Virendranath Chattopadhyaya will be hereafter referred to as Chattopadhyaya. He was the brother of Mrs. Sarojini Naidu.

26. Hem Chandra Qanungo, *op. cit.*, p. 180. Later, Hem Chandra Das used his family title, Qanungo, as his surname.

27. Koregaonkar's confession, *op. cit.*

Also, P. M. Bapat's letter to author, dated 10-3-1958.

28. Rowlatt, p. 9.

Also, Hem Chandra Qanungo, *op. cit.*, p. 218.

29. Materials, paper 60.

Also, Circular No. 7, *op. cit.*

30. *Ibid.*

tember 1906 *The Times*, for the first time, referred to the harm done by Indian agitators in Britain.³¹

To have a more effective revolutionary organisation, Krishnavarma, on 2 February 1907, announced at the second general meeting of the Indian Home Rule Society a further donation of Rs. 10,000/-. In June, the *Sociologist* announced the constitution of the new organisation, the *Desh Bhakt Samaj*, i.e. the Society of Patriots. It was to have an *Antaranga Sabha* (Central Committee), comprising Krishnavarma and a few extremist leaders in India with organised cadres of *Bhaktas* (political missionaries), *Sahayakas* (workers) and *Mitras* (sympathisers). A sum of Rs. 1500/- only was sanctioned annually for Indian propaganda abroad, and Bipin Chandra Pal was selected as the first lecturer of this *Samaj* in the U.K., for the year 1907. His incarceration, however, postponed his departure for Britain by one year.³²

Valuable contacts had, in the meantime, been established with Irish nationalists in Britain, including a few in the employ of Scotland Yard and some newspaper concerns. Through their Irish friend, Hugh O'Donnel, inmates of India House were introduced to Mustafa Kemal, the young and undisputed leader of Egypt, during the latter's visit to Britain, in July 1906. Co-operation between Indian and Egyptian nationalists was to grow with years, and Farid Bey and Mansur Rifat were always counted among the best friends of Indians in exile.³³

The year 1907 was also the fiftieth anniversary of the outbreak of the so-called Indian Mutiny, and on 10 May it was solemnly observed by the Indian revolutionaries in London. There, leaflets captioned 'Oh Martyrs' and 'Grave Warning' were openly distributed.³⁴ On 11 May and 7 June, meetings were held in Paris and London respectively, condemning the deportation of Lajpat Rai and Ajit Singh from India.³⁵ These did not escape the notice of the British authorities

31. P. & S. (India Corr.) 1251, vol. 190 of 1906.

32. Materials, paper 60. Also, Indulal Yajnik, op. cit., p. 201.

33. Indulal Yajnik, op. cit., pp. 208-209. Also, Niranjan Pal, 'Thirty Years Ago' in the *Mahratta*, 27-5-1938.

34. Rowlatt, p. 8. According to Koregaonkar the meeting took place not in India House but in the house of Dwarkadas, J. & P. 349, vol. 981 of 1910. These leaflets are quoted in full in M. M. Ahluwalia, *Freedom Struggle in India (1858-1909)*, Delhi, 1965, pp. 403-408.

35. Indulal Yajnik, op. cit., pp. 217-218.

The correspondence of Krishnavarma and his associates began to be intercepted, and an agent provocateur, O'Brien, started making friends with them.³⁶ On 17 May and 19 June *The Times* commented on the activities of the inmates of India House, and in the June number of the *National Review*, Sir Ivan Jones made panicky references to that 'house of mystery'. Scenting danger in these developments Krishnavarma hurriedly moved to Paris, in June,³⁷ and established himself at 10 Avenue Ingress Passy. From there, however, he continued to direct the affairs of India House and the *Sociologist*.³⁸ Cama too left Britain, in October 1907. At first she went to the U.S.A., whence she came and settled down in Paris, in the spring of 1909.³⁹ With Krishnavarma, Rana and Cama in Paris the city became, for the next few years, one of the chief centres of Indian revolutionary activities abroad.

That year, the International Socialist Congress met at Stuttgart. It opened on 18 August, and on the 22nd Cama, in spite of the opposition of the British delegation led by Ramsay Macdonald, succeeded, with the support of Hyndman, Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg and Jean Jaures, in moving a resolution in favour of India's freedom.⁴⁰ Since this resolution had not been submitted to the Bureau of this Congress in time, it could not be put to vote. But, Singer, the President of this Congress, said that "the spirit of the resolution is approved by the Bureau and the Congress."⁴¹ Cama was even allowed to unfurl on the dias the Indian national flag, as designed by her.⁴² Thus, while the British Committee and delegates of the Con-

36. *Ibid.*, pp. 224-225. Also, the note by H. A. Stuart of the office of the D.C.I. on 19-7-1907. *H.P. 1907 August 243-250 A.*

37. Krishnavarma's letter to *The Times*, published on 2-6-1908, J. & P. 1956, vol. 966 of 1908.

38. Rowlatt, p. 6. Also, Materials, paper 60.

39. Materials, paper. 60. Also, the History Sheet of Cama. H.P. 1913 July 1-3A.

40. Indulal Yajnik, op. cit., pp. 229-230. Also, the History Sheet of Cama, op. cit. It was attended by Cama and Chattopadhyaya.

41. Indulal Yajnik, op. cit., p. 230. For details see *VII-e Congress Socialist International tenu a Stuttgart du 16 au 24 aout 1907 compte rendu analytique*, Brussels, 1908, pp. 320-326.

42. Indulal Yajnik, op. cit., p. 230. An illustration of this flag was published in the *Bande Mataram* (Geneva) in August 1911. Notes in the office of the D.C.I., H.P. 1911 November 55-56B.

gress sought to make India's demands a live party issue in British politics, these revolutionaries tried to raise those to the level of an international question.

With the departure of Krishnavarma and Cama, Savarkar naturally emerged as the undisputed leader of Indian revolutionaries in Britain. Early in 1908, he was joined by V. V. S. Iyer, T. S. Rajam and M. V. Tirumal Achari,⁴³ Nitisen Dwarkadas and Gyanchand Varma, who had gone back to India in January 1908, also returned in August.⁴⁴ They all believed that the time had come when they must act vigorously and help their comrades at home. By the summer of 1908 bombs had actually exploded in Bengal and martyrs had been produced. Naturally, the question of supplying arms and the technical know-how to their comrades at home now secured precedence over their all other activities.⁴⁵ At one of their Sunday meetings, in June 1908, Dr. Desai, a student of chemistry in the London University, actually gave a talk on the making of bombs.⁴⁶ To conduct their struggle in these changed circumstances Savarkar, late in 1908, formed the Free India Society with a few selected men. Obviously, he became its first president with Iyer as the vice-president.⁴⁷ Open appeals were also issued to Indian princes to emulate Victor Emanuel II, and to identify themselves with the cause of their countrymen.⁴⁸ Towards the end of that year Tirumal Achari from Britain and Nanda Kumar Sen from India were sent to Paris for training in explosives.⁴⁹ In France, Govind Amin was their most important contact-man and expert regarding arms and explosives. Special emissaries also moved from time to time between India and Europe for arms and bomb manuals. It was through one such emissary, Chaturbhuj Amin of India House, that Savarkar, in

43. Koregaonkar's confession, op. cit.

44. J. & P. 2908, vol. 881 of 1908. Also, Materias, paper, 60.

45. H.P. 1911 April 21-67 A

46. Rowlatt, p. 8. Also, H.P. 1909 March 148-150 A.

47. Chitra Gupta, *Life of Barrister Savarkar*, Madras, 1926, p. 86.

Also, D. Keer, op. cit., p. 30.

48. Pamphlet, *Choose Oh Princes*, in D. Keer, op. cit., pp. 61-62. Also, Secy., Dept. of Commerce and Industries, India to Director General of Post Offices, India on 19-1-1910, H.P. 1910 January 165-166 A.

49. Note by H. A. Stuart and H. Adamson, dated 24-5-1909, H.P. 1907 August 243-250 A.

February 1909, sent to his brother Ganesh Savarkar in India a package of twenty Browning pistols that Rana had sent him from Paris. It was with one of these that Jackson, the District Magistrate of Nasik, was fatally shot on 21 December 1909. Later, more efficient arrangements were made for illegal procurement of arms through specially set-up emporiums ostensibly dealing in foreign goods.⁵⁰

Away from Britain even the cautious Krishnavarma could write more aggressively. He would exhort revolutionaries in India to befriend Indian soldiers and to incite them to revolt, and to learn the art of organising secret societies and insurrections from the Nihilists, because 'the only methods which can bring the English government to its senses are the Russian methods.'⁵¹ In April 1908, the *Sociologist* actually reproduced from the *Everybody's Magazine* an article, entitled the "Constitution of Russian Secret Societies".⁵²

Because of its growing militancy, the *Sociologist* had already been banned in India since 19 September 1907. As *The Gaelic American* and the *Justice* also wrote in the same vein and often quoted from it, these two were banned from May 1908. But these still came to India, along with arms and leaflets, mainly through French and Portuguese possessions there.⁵³ The British Government too took fright, and in August and September 1908 two successive printers of the *Sociologist*, Arthur Borsley and Guy Alfred Aldred, were arrested and sentenced to one year's imprisonment.⁵⁴

Intra-party tensions also were increasing in the meantime. The dichotomy in Krishnavarma's mission that he would only pay and preach from safety while others would act and suffer caused considerable misunderstanding between him and his associates. Away

50. Notes in the office of the D.C.I., H.P. 1911 March 12 Dep. Also, *Material*, paper 60.

Also, W. Roy Smith, *Nationalism and Reform in India*, Yale University Press, 1938, p. 65.

51. The *Sociologist*, December 1907. Also, Circular No. 7, op. cit.

52. *Materials*, paper, 60.

53. G. C. in Council to Morley on 1-4-1909, J. & P. 1951, vol. 929 of 1909. Also, letter from officiating Chief Secretary, Bengal to Secretary, Home Dept., India dated 10-10-1908, J. & P. 483 of 1909 with 3753, vol. 890 of 1908. Also, note by C. J. Stevenson, Moore, dated 19-2-1909, H.P. 1909 August 49-52 A. (Confidential).

54. Indulal Yajnik, p. 272. Also, statement of Aldred.

from Britain he fast lost his moral authority over the India House group. Even in Paris senior leaders like Rana and Cama were critical of his self conceit and extreme caution. But it was the arrival of Bipin Chandra Pal and G. S. Khaparde, in September 1908, that brought to light these growing differences.⁵⁵

Pal's political past and his recent incarceration had made him an idol of Indian revolutionaries, and they expected a fresh lead from him in Europe. Instead, he disappointed them from the very beginning. In Paris, *en route* to London, he had sharp differences with Krishnavarma, and speaking at India House on the day of his arrival, 26 September, he condemned the use of violence.⁵⁶ In fact the main trend of his lectures in Britain was an attempt at reconciling the national ideals and aspirations of India with the multi-national British imperial system and the highest ideals of humanity to which Britain and India should jointly contribute.⁵⁷ These amounted in the eyes of the revolutionaries to a *volte face* by their esteemed leader, and had a demoralising effect on them.⁵⁸

Still, many gathered round him to benefit from his reputation and to use him as a counterpoise against Krishnavarma's position. It was decided that a conference of all Indian nationalists in Europe should meet, when the Congress would be meeting at Madras for the first time without its extremist members. Such a conference attended by eminent extremist leaders like Lajpat Rai, Pal and Khaparde would serve as a protest against the decision of the moderate-controlled Congress and raise the spirit and prestige of the Indian revolutionaries in

55. Indulal Yajnik, *op. cit.*, pp. 263-265. Also, statements of Aldred and S. S. Datta. G. S. Khaparde reached London on 31-8-1908 and B. C. Pal on 26-9-1908. Appendix to Circular No. 7, *op. cit.* Also, Khaparde on 31-8-1908 and 27-9-1908. They will be hereafter referred to as Pal and Khaparde.

56. Confidential History Sheet No. 49 of B. C. Pal for his lectures in England, cited in Haridas and Uma Mukherjee, *Bipin Chandra Pal*, Calcutta, 1958, p. 117.

57. *Ibid.*, pp. 117-118.

Also, B. C. Pal, *Nationality and Empire*, Calcutta, 1916, pp. 9-11.

58. Statements of S. S. Datta. His full name is Sukh Sagar Datta. He is the younger brother of Ullaskar Datta, convicted in the Alipore Bomb Case in 1908. At present he is a medical practitioner at Bristol. The *Sociologist*, October 1908 spoke critically of Pal.

Europe.⁵⁹ The conference met at Caxton Hall in London on 20 December 1908, with Khaparde in the chair. The highlights of its proceedings were resolutions demanding complete freedom for India, calling for an all-India boycott of British goods, and congratulating the Turks on their achieving a constitutional form of government. Many Egyptian nationalists too attended the conference, and it was decided there that an Indo-Egyptian National Association be formed to co-ordinate their struggle against their common enemy.⁶⁰ Its inaugural meeting took place on 23 January 1909 with Pal in the chair. But, though Indian and Egyptian nationalists closely collaborated in Britain and elsewhere, little is known about the subsequent history of this association.

In the meantime, Pal and Khaparde had formed the Hind Nationalist Agency, with Chattopadhyaya as its secretary, and had announced on 10 December 1908 the starting of their own monthly journal, the *Swaraj*. Its office was in the premises of the Eastern Export and Import Co. at 10 Grays Inn Place. Its first issue came out on 27 February 1908. But, sandwiched between the *India* and the *Sociologist*, it could not carve out an audience for itself, and its last issue saw the light of day on 16 March 1909.⁶¹ In fact, Pal had by then earned further unpopularity for himself by counselling the London Indian Society, on 20 February, to be more moderate in their expression, in view of the repressive laws then known to be on the anvil.⁶²

Persistent efforts were, however, made to make the India House group the sole voice of Indians in Europe. To do something specta-

59. Materials, paper 60. Also, Minto to Morley on 4-3-1909, Morley Papers, D. 573/18, Vol. XIII.

Also, H.P. 1909 March 148-150 A (Confidential).

60. V. N. Chattopadhyaya, *Om Bande Mataram*, J. & P. 4685 vol 904 of 1908.

Also, H P 1909 March 148-150 A; and Materials, paper 59. Also, Niranjana Pal, "Thirty years Ago," the *Mahatta*, 27 May 1938. Also, Viceroy to Secy. Of State on 4-3-1909, Morley Papers, D. 573/18, vol. XIII.

61. Materials, paper, 59. Also, Appendix to Circular No. 7, op. cit.

Also, *Swaraj*, 16-6-1909, J. & P. 2887, vol. 950 of 1909.

Also, D.C.I. on 24-6-1910, H.P. 1910 August 26-88 A

An Indo-Egyptian Club was actually formed on 2-1-1909, at a meeting in Imperial Hotel, London. Khaparde on 2-1-1909.

62. Material. paper, 59.

cular and to catch popular imagination, Kunjalal Bhattacharya and Vasudeb Bhattacharya managed to secure interviews with Lee Warner in the India Office, on 12 January and 1 February 1909 respectively, and slapped him on the face. During their trial they made full use of the opportunity to defame British rule in India.⁶³ Early in 1909 many of the India House group deliberately joined the London Indian Society and the East Indian Association, and soon secured control of those.⁶⁴ Their growing influence on Indian students in Britain and their activities caused the British authorities considerable worry, and the police began shadowing Indian students in general.⁶⁵

However, in the meantime, the rivalry between the supporters of Pal and Krishnavarma was growing, and it led to an acrimonious show-down between Savarkar and Haidar Raja, on 4 April 1909. It all but killed the movement for the next couple of months.⁶⁶ In May, the number of resident-members in India House fell to only four, and their party fund, due to non-payment of subscriptions, stood at £30 only.⁶⁷

But when, on 9 June, news reached London that Ganesh Savarkar and a few of his associates had been sentenced to transportation for life in the Nasik Conspiracy Case, it had a definite tonic and unifying effect on the Indian revolutionaries there. In their usual Sunday meeting on 20 June, Savarkar swore vengeance on the British, and everyone felt that some sort of a fitting reply should be given.⁶⁸ Madanlal Dhingra, a student of University Engineering College, was

63. Note on a salute on Lee-Warner in Lee-Warner papers, E.U.R., F 92 in J. O. Lib. Also, Materials, papers, 60.

64. Materials, paper, 60. Also, statement of S. S. Datta.

65. Secretary, Overseas League, London to the Under-Secy. of State for India on 1-5-1909, J. & P., 1652, vol. 1632 of 1909. Also, J. & P., 758, vol. 919 of 1909. "They (Indian students in the U.K.) only learn sedition and treason, which they infuse into the minds of their countrymen both in England and in India." King to Minto on 17-8-1909, in Minto Collection, M. 997. The *Sunday Despatch* on 14-3-1909 in an article captioned 'House of Mystery' spoke of the seditious atmosphere in India House.

Indulal Yajnik, op. cit., p. 263.

66. Materials, paper, 60. Kharparde and Pal disliked some of Krishnavarma's recent statements. Kharparde on 18-2-1909.

67. *Ibid.*

68. Rowlatt, p. 6.

deputed for this purpose, and on the night of 1 July he shot and killed Sir Curzon William Willie of the India Office at a friendly get-together at the Imperial Institute, London. A local Parsi physician, Dr. Cawas Lalkaka, was also accidentally killed.⁶⁹ Dhingra's last testament, which Savarkar got published in *The Daily News*, on 18 August, through some Irish employees, ran as follows: "I attempted to shed English blood intentionally and of purpose as an humble protest against the inhuman transportations and hangings of Indian youths.... I believe that a nation held down by foreign bayonet is in a perpetual state of war, since open battle is rendered impossible to a disarmed race.... The only lesson required in India at present is to learn how to die, and the only way to teach it is by dying ourselves."⁷⁰ The day before he had been hanged in Pentonville jail, London. Commenting on his martyrdom the *New Age* said on 26 August, "It is the beginning of the end of British rule in India."⁷¹

These developments were really too much for cautious Krishna varma. Scentsing danger, he sold off his India House and, for the time being suspended the publication of the *Sociologist*. It was, however, soon shifted to the safe distance of Paris, where it made its first appearance in November 1909.⁷² These really completed the disillusionment and dissociation of the young revolutionaries with their erstwhile leader. It is indeed an irony of history that extremist

69. *Ibid.* Also, D. Keer, op. cit., p. 53.

Also, Commissioner of Police, London to D.C.I. on 2-7-1909, H.P. 1909 September 66-68 A.

70. W. S. Blunt, *My Diaries, Being a Personal Narrative of Events, 1888-1914* (vol. II, London, 1917, Appendix III, p. 461. According to Churchill these were "the finest ever made in the name of patriotism." Both he and Lloyd George were full of admiration for Dhingra. W. S. Blunt, op. cit., p. 288.

Also, *Free Hindustan* (New York), July-August 1909. J. & P. 4803 of 1911 with 275, vol. 1129 of 1912.

David Garnett in his *Golden Echo*, London, 1936, p. 148, claims to have helped in the publication of this statement. Khaparde who had written on 2-7-1909 that he was horrified at Dhingra's action, considered his last testament wonderful. Dhingra even refused Dr. Pollin's offer to defend him free of cost. Khaparde on 22-7-1909.

71. J. & P. 3243, vol. 956 of 1909.

Also, W. S. Blunt, op. cit., 276.

72. Indulal Yajnik, op. cit., p. 272.

leaders, in their later years, are often branded as moderates by their more warm-blooded former disciples.

But, while Dhingra's martyrdom supplied young Indians in Europe with a new ideal and an inspiration, it also exposed the weakness and inconsistencies of their venerable leaders. At a meeting of Indians in London, on 3 July 1909, presided over by Surendranath Banerjee, even Pal and Khaparde condemned Dhingra's action. On 5 July, another similar meeting was organised with the Aga Khan in the chair. Savarkar only invited physical violence by protesting against the resolution condemning Dhingra's action.⁷³ The young revolutionaries could only reply to these by organising separate meetings in praise of Dhingra's conduct, on 4 July and 1 August.⁷⁴

In the meantime, the courage and resource exhibited by Savarkar in the hectic days of July and August had confirmed him in his position as the undisputed leader of the London revolutionaries. Iyer and Chattopadhyaya as his closest collaborators stood next to him. They also enjoyed the support of Rana and Cama.⁷⁵ For some time past they were not happy with the rather moderate tone of the *Sociologist*, and now that their separation from Krishnavarma was virtually complete, they felt more keenly the need of a suitable journal to spread their ideas and organise their ranks around it. But, such a journal, as the fate of Borsley and Aldred suggested, should be published from beyond the reach of the British authorities. So the *Bande Mataram* was started at Geneva as their monthly organ, and its first issue came out on 10 September 1909.⁷⁶ It was named so in memory of the famous Calcutta daily with the same name, which had of late been suppressed by the government. Cama because its editor with her office at 25 Rue de Ponthieu, Champs Elysees, Paris, and for the first few months she was ably assisted by Har Dayal and Tirumal Achari.⁷⁷ The importance they laid on revolutionary propaganda is borne out by the following editorial in the *Bande Mataram*, March

73. Materials, paper, 60. Also, Circular No. 11, dated 28-10-1909, H.P. 1909 November 32 Dep. Also, Khaparde on 3-7-1909 and 5-7-1909.

74. *Ibid.* Also, Statement of S. S. Datta.

75. Appendix to History Sheet of Cama, op. cit. Also, Indulal Yajnik, op. cit., pp. 272-273.

76. History Sheet of Cama, op. cit. Also, J. & P. 25 of 1913 with 4742, vol. 1202 of 1912. Also, Indulal Yajnik, op. cit., p. 280.

77. Appendix to the History Sheet of Cama, op. cit.

1910: "We must recognise that the importation of revolutionary literature into India from foreign countries is the sheet anchor of the party.... and the centre of gravity of political work has shifted from Calcutta, Poona, Lahore to Paris, Geneva, Berlin, London and New York."⁷⁸

The *Bande Mataram* was soon followed by the *Madan's Talwar* in November 1909.⁷⁹ Though officially published from Paris under Cama's editorship, it was for some time actually issued from Berlin. The choice of Berlin as a new centre of activity suggests that at least some of the Indian revolutionaries had realised the importance of having friendly contacts in countries that were potential enemies of Britain. This point was made clear by the *Bande Mataram*, in February 1910, with these words: "The *Talwar* has made its appearance in Berlin, the capital of the country which is at present most hostile in spirit to England."⁸⁰ However, this journal had a rather short and irregular career, and an Indian revolutionary movement could be organised in Germany only in more favourable circumstances after the outbreak of the First World War.

Though banned in India under the Sea Customs Act, such journals and pamphlets used to be smuggled into India mainly through the French and Portuguese settlements there. The most important channel was through the office of the *India* at 58 Rue de Mission Etrangere, Pondicherry, with whose editor, S. Srinivas Chari, Cama and Tirumal Achari were in regular correspondence.⁸¹ These revolutionary literatures would also reach Indians in Africa and elsewhere causing grave concern to the British authorities.⁸²

Abd al-Karim's Riff rebellion had, in the meantime, provided the Indian revolutionaries in Britain with an interesting diversion. It was decided that some of them would go to Morocco and join the rebels. It would be a grand gesture of international solidarity of subject peoples, and would at the same time offer them experience in

78. *Ibid.* Also, *The Gaelic American*, 25-12-1909, quoted in Indulal Yajnik, *op. cit.*, p. 279.

79. *Bande Mataram*, vol. 1, No. 6 in History Sheet of Cama, *op. cit.* Also, D. Keer, *op. cit.*, p. 63. It was usually referred to as the *Talwar*.

80. History Sheet of Cama, *op. cit.*

81. *Ibid.*

82. J. & P. 3513 with 3805, vol. 1032 of 1910.

the use of arms and guerrilla warfare. On 17 August 1909, Tirumal Achari and S. S. Datta left for Gibraltar *en route* to Melila as their advance party. But, due to lack of local knowledge and necessary travel documents, they had soon to return from Tangier.⁸³ No more effort was made to establish contact with the Riff rebels.

The strain of these years of hectic activity was already telling upon the fragile health of Savarkar. On 6 January 1910, he left for France to recuperate his health.⁸⁴ In his absence a serious difference of opinion appeared between Iyer and Chattopadhyaya. While the former believed in acts of terrorism, the latter advised patience and sustained preparation to strike effectively during the Anglo-German war, which then appeared in the offing.⁸⁵ Reports of these differences possibly persuaded Savarkar to return in haste. The Government of Bombay had long been keen on securing his arrest, and as soon as he reached Victoria Station in London he was arrested on 13 March 1910.⁸⁶

This again brought together Iyer and Chattopadhyaya, and at a meeting on 20 March 1910, they were elected the leader and deputy leader, respectively, during Savarkar's absence. Then, on 10 April, the obviously inflated news that India was ready for revolt reached them. This brought Chattopadhyaya round to Iyer's point of view that a campaign of terrorism should be immediately unleashed, which could be gradually widened into a national war of liberation. On 15 May, they even discussed the possibility of securing Japanese help, as Anglo-Japanese relations were then strained over Japan's policy towards Korea. But no effective step was then taken in this direction.⁸⁷

83. Tirumal Achari's statement contained in the letter of the British Minister, Lisbon to the Foreign Office London on 28-9-1909, in H.P. 1909 December 37 B.

Also, S. S. Datta's letters to author dated 30 March and 7 April 1958. Also, David Garnett, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

84. Materials, paper, 60. Also D. Keer, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

85. Materials, paper, 60. Savarkar had forecasted an Anglo-German war in the first issue of the *Talwar*. D. Keer, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

86. Materials, paper, 60. Also, Viceroy to the I.O. on 3-7-10. J. & P. 2416 with 1849, vol. 934 of 1909.

87. Materials, paper, 60.

In the meantime, it had been announced, on 2 May, that Savarkar would be sent to India to be tried for his alleged complicity in the Nasik Conspiracy. Foreseeing the fate that would await him there, his friends clamoured for his trial in Britain, and by the end of May £200 only were raised for his defence. Meanwhile, Niranjana Pal, son of Bipin Chandra Pal, had established contacts with Savarkar in gaol, through some Irish guards, and Chattopadhyaya, Gyanchand Verma, Madhav Rao, and their Irish friend, David Garnett planned his rescue while he would be taken to and from Bow Street Police Court.⁸⁸ The attempt proved impossible, and the *Morea* sailed for India with Savarkar, on 1 July. Information had already been sent to their friends in France through Iyer to be in readiness in the port of Marseille when the ship was to reach there. It was believed that some of them were actually present near the wharf with a motor car to spirit him away.⁸⁹ But when, on 8 July, Savarkar actually wriggled out into the water through the port-hole the harbour police, failing to understand his broken French, handed him over to the captain of the ship, and he was brought to India for trial.⁹⁰

The news of Savarkar's futile bid to escape was first published in the Paris edition of *The Daily News* on 11 July. Cama and Rana immediately communicated with Jean Jaures, the Mayor of Marseille, who took up Savarkar's case with the Quai d'Orsay and demanded his return to France. *L'Humanite*, *L'Eclaire*, *Le Temps* and *Le Matin* supported his demand, and on 23 July *La Action* published a life sketch of Savarkar. On 18 and 25 July, the French Government under pressure of public opinion at home requested Whitehall to return Savarkar to France, where he had, obviously, sought political asylum. Even in Britain, Aldred, who on his release from prison in July 1910 had been appointed editor of *The Herald of Revolt*, formed in August the Savarkar Release Committee, and raised a furore against

88. *Ibid.* Also, David Garnett *The Golden Echo*, op. cit., pp. 158-159.

89. J. & P. 847, vol. 989 of 1910. Also, D. Keer, op. cit., p. 78. D. Keer holds that Cama, Iyer and others reached Marsaille late by a few hours, p. 83.

Also, W. S. Blunt, op. cit., p. 327. Also, David Garnett, op. cit., p. 160.

Chattopadhyaya, Gyanchand Verma and Madhav Rao had come to France on 9-6-1910. Iyer had come there earlier, on 19-4-1910. Materials, paper 60.

90. J. & P. 847, vol. 989 of 1910.

Savarkar's trial in India.⁹¹ The International Socialist Congress, that opened at Copenhagen on 27 August, and was attended by Krishna-varma and Iyer, also passed a resolution demanding that Savarkar be returned to France.⁹² At last, on 25 September, the Governments of Britain and France signed an agreement to take the case to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague. The tribunal met on 14 February 1911, and on the 24th the verdict was given in favour of Britain.⁹³

Although, this futile bid to escape and the international dispute it occasioned had highlighted India's aspiration, and secured for her fresh sympathisers in the West,⁹⁴ the outcome of the whole affair left the Indian revolutionaries in Britain and France demoralised. Their leaders in Britain had come to France when Savarkar's rescue was being planned, and now they did not consider it safe or worthwhile to return to Britain. Pal made one more attempt to fill the vacuum and re-assert his leadership, and announced on 8 November 1910 the formation of a society named Hind Bradaree. Its first meeting took place with J.M. Parikh in the chair. Pal became its president with Asaf Ali, D. P. Mukherjee and K. N. Dasgupta as vice-presidents, and Niranjan Pal as the secretary. Shortly thereafter, its name was

91. Letter from British Foreign Office to I.O., dated 30-9-1910 speaks of violent popular pressure on the French Government. J. & P. 320 of 1911 with 3823, vol. 1032 of 1910. Also, *The Time*, of 20-7-10, J. & P. 847, vol. 989 of 1910. Also, Yajnik, op. cit., pp. 288-289. Also, D. Keer, op. cit., pp. 93-94.

The Herald of Revolt, March 1911, gave details about this case, and supported Savarkar. J. & P. 2823, vol. 1171 of 1912.

92. *Social Demokraten*, 1-9-1910 in J. & P. 3175, vol. 1023 of 1910. Keir Hardie and Macdonald opposed Indian representation at the conference. *Ibid.*

93. *The Morning Post* and the *Daily News* of London, *La Societe Nouvelle* in Brussels, and *Der Wanderer* of Zurich criticised the decision. Relevant extracts from these were quoted by Aldred in his journal *The Word*, April 1947. *Irish Independent*, 11-3-1911; *L'Humanite*, 25-2-1911; and *L'Independence Belge*, criticised the Hague Tribunal's decision. J. & P. 25 of 1913 with 4742, vol. 1202 of 1912.

94. *Le Temps*, 19-7-1910 and *L'Action*, 23-7-1910 spoke highly of Savarkar. See, *The Word*, April 1947. On 25-7-1910, *La Action* published a short biography of Savarkar, and *L'Humanite* and *Le Advocate* also supported him. History sheet of Cama, op. cit.

changed to Hindusthan Society. In March 1911, Pal again began publishing a monthly journal, *The Indian Student*, with financial assistance from the Gaekward of Baroda. But, by then Pal himself was a spent force. The journal ceased to appear after its second issue, and the Hindusthan Society too was formally dissolved on 13 May 1911.⁹⁵ This, in fact, marked the end of Indian agitation in Britain on revolutionary lines, and when in September 1911 Pal left for India, little notice was taken of his departure.

Dispirited and divided among themselves, the Indian leaders, now in Paris, soon let the movement to disintegrate. Krishnavarma was already a fallen hero, and Savarkar was gone. Rana and Cama were ageing, and lacked the necessary qualities of leadership. The younger leaders, Iyer, Chattopadhyay and Har Dayal could not agree upon a comprehensive programme of action and bury the hatchet of their rivalry. On 28 September 1910, Har Dayal had left Paris for Ras Djibuti, whence he went to the U.S.A., in February 1911.⁹⁶ Within a month of his departure, Iyer also left Paris for Geneva, *en route* to Berlin. From there he went to Pondichery, which he reached on 4 December 1910.⁹⁷ Chattopadhyaya alone among the younger leaders stayed behind in France. But he too had serious differences with Cama which came to a head in December 1910. On 24 December, a meeting was called by their common friends to settle their differences. But, it does not appear to have been very fruitful. Another attempt at reconciliation, early in 1911, also proved fruitless; and in April even Tirumal Achari left for Munich.⁹⁸

But Paris was also the most important centre of young Arab nationalists in Europe, and there Indian and Egyptian revolutionaries came in still closer contact with one another. They decided to hold a joint conference at Paris in the third week of September 1911. But on 16 September, the French Government announced a ban on the meeting. So, its venue was hurriedly shifted to Brussels,

95. Materials, papers, 59 and 60.

Khaparde had left Britain for India on 16-9-1910. Khaparde on 16-9-1910.

96. Materials, paper, 60. Also. History Sheet of Cama, op. cit.

97. *Ibid.*

98. *Ibid.*

where it was formally opened by Farid Bey on the 22nd. It was indeed a very well-advertised demonstration of anti-British fraternity between the Indian and Egyptian nationalists. Even such ambitious assurances were given that the Egyptians would block the Suez Canal in case of a revolt in India, and that their Indian friends would prevent the use of Indian soldiers to suppress Egyptian national aspiration.⁹⁹

But, all these could not breathe life into the Indian movement there, and by the end of 1911 organised agitation by Indians in Europe had come to an end. Only that indomitable lady, Cama still continued with the publication of the *Bande Mataram* almost single-handed. Reports about the modest success achieved by Barakatullah in Japan and of a growing sentiment there against the Anglo-Japanese Alliance prompted Rana, Cama and Hiralal Banker, in February 1912, to attempt establishing contacts in Japan through some Japanese merchants.¹⁰⁰ But, nothing useful was achieved. Krishnavarma too was then living in Paris in tragic isolation. Though caught between the cross-fire of the British press and of his dissident disciples, he still carried on propaganda work for his country through the columns of the *Sociologist*.¹⁰¹ But these were after all uncoordinated individual efforts, and the movement that had come into existence in 1905 was by then a thing of the past.

Then, as events rolled towards the first World War one could smell powder in the air. The news that King George V would come to Paris, on 21 April 1914, confirmed the impression that France might not be safe for Indian revolutionaries much longer. In fact, it was quite likely that some of them might have been interned as a precautionary measure on the eve of the royal visit. Chattopadhyaya on the look out of fresh opportunities went to Germany, in the second week of April.¹⁰² The aged Krishnavarma moved to Geneva in June,

99. History Sheet of Cama, op. cit. Also, Materials, paper 60.

100. History Sheet of Cama, op. cit. *Bande Mataram*, April 1912 quotes from the *Osaka Mainichi* and *Nichi Nichi* to suggest that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was virtually dead. J. & P. 25 of 1913 with 4742, vol. 1202 of 1912.

101. Indulal Yajnik, op. cit., pp. 311 and 314.

102. Abinash Chandra Bhattacharya, *Europey Bharatiya Viplaber Sadhana* (in Bengali), Calcutta, 1958 p. 132. Hereafter this book will be referred to by its title.

and published the *Sociologist*, even from there, in July 1914. But as the war broke out he was advised by the Swiss authorities to suspend his political activities.¹⁰³ Rana and Cama preferred to stay behind in France. But, in June 1914, the *Bande Mataram* was suppressed by order of the French authorities. After the outbreak of the war Rana and Cama were kept under police surveillance at Bordeaux and Marseille, respectively. Cama's attempt at influencing Indian soldiers disembarking at Marseille led to her expulsion from there, on 25 October. She came to Bordeaux only to find that Rana had already been arrested on 6 October on the same charge. He was deported to Martinique with his whole family in, January 1915, and Cama was kept interned at Vichy for the major part of the war.¹⁰⁴ A chapter of Indian revolutionary activities abroad reached its conclusion.

The course of this movement suggests that anti-British agitation beyond a certain limit could not be carried on in Britain or even on the soil of her allies. Viewed from this angle, the entire movement appears to have been somewhat wrongly located. In 1905, of course, few could foresee the shape of things to come in the evolution of European alignments. Since Britain attracted the largest number of Indian students, the task of influencing them abroad could be best carried out in Britain. Thanks to the work done by Naoroji and other Indian leaders in the past and the sympathy of many British and French socialists, not to speak of the personal contacts of Krishna-varma himself and the presence of a small but prosperous Indian business community in London and Paris, it was much easier to organise an Indian movement in Britain and France than in most other countries. Besides, there was the feeling that an active agitation in the heart of London would convince the British public of the strength of India's demands.

But, in course of this movement, the limits and the psychological effects of agitation in Britain were revealed. On the other hand, evidence was there that an Anglo-German war was in the offing,

103. Indulal Yajnik, op. cit., p. 314. Also, D.C.I. to Home Secy., India on 10-11-1914, H.P. 1914 December 169-170 A. Also, D.C.I. on 5-1-1915, H.P. 1915 September 145-148 B.

104. D.C.I. on 1-12-1914, H.P. 1914 December 227-29 B.
Also, D.C.I. on 5-1-1915, H.P. 1915 September 145-48 B.
Also, D.C.I. on 17-8-1915, H.P. 1915 August 552-56 B.

Still, the Indian revolutionaries in Britain and France made little attempt, besides publishing the *Madan's Talwar* from Berlin for a few months, at organising their work in Germany or establishing friendly contacts with her leaders. Besides, they were not much interested in understanding the social forces working in their country, and the real interests and possible alignments of different sections of her people. Just as their sources of inspiration ranged from Rana Pratap and Victor Emanuel II to Sivaji and Garibaldi, and from Mazzini and Guru Govind Singh to the daring terrorists among the Carbonnari, the Nihilists and the Fenians, their appeals for co-operation too were directed at the educated youth of their country and the near-illiterate Indian soldiers as well as at conservative businessmen¹⁰⁵ and the reactionary Indian princes.¹⁰⁶ They never worried themselves with the question on which side the ultimate interest of these princes lay, and looked with hope even at the growth of pan-Islamism in India,¹⁰⁷ totally ignoring its logical effect on the future of Indian Nationalism. In fact, besides their specific revolutionary work, they were primarily interested in creating in their country a spirit of unrest and making as many sections of their countrymen, at home and abroad, disaffected with the British rule. The various measures against their propaganda work bear testimony to the efficacy of their movement.

Still, it is a fact that these pioneer Indian revolutionaries abroad did valuable work within the limits imposed by circumstances. They opened a new chapter in the history of India's fight for freedom in the potentialities they discovered of what might be done by Indian patriots abroad. The seeds of 'sedition' that were so sedulously sown in London and Paris were soon wafted across oceans to strike roots in distant corners of the world. Till the appearance of the *Ghadar*, in November 1913, the *Sociologist* and the *Bande Mataram* were the most important revolutionaries in different countries. Through the

105. The leaflet captioned 'Grave Warning,' quoted in M. M. Ahluwalia, op. cit., pp. 406-407.


Also, in H.P. 1909 March 148-156 A.

106. See p. 32.

107. *The Gaelic American*, 8-12-1906, in P. & S. (India Corr.) 1251, vol. 190 of 1906.

Also, *Bande Mataram*, November 1911, in J. & P. 2184, with 275, vol. 1129 of 1912.

press, the platform and other political contacts they did their best to help raise India from the relative obscurity of Britain's domestic problems and place her on the map of world opinion. To them, for the first time, the much talked of Afro-Asian solidarity and anti-colonial front were not hollow moral gestures but practical political propositions. Last but not the least India House, as intended by its founders, was really a training centre for future revolutionaries. Men like Chattopadhyaya, Har Dayal, Teja Singh, Dr. Sunder Singh and Tirumal Achari, who received their early political training here, were to lead and shape Indian revolutionary movements in different countries in subsequent years.¹⁰⁸



Gul Hayat Institute

108. C. R. Cleveland, the D.C.I. said of Krishnavarma that "he has a good claim to be regarded as the founder of this Indian revolutionary movement abroad." D.C.I. to Home Secy., India on 10-11-1914, H.P. 1914 December 1969-70 A.

CHAPTER—II

INDIAN REVOLUTIONARIES IN THE U. S. A. AND CANADA BEFORE WORLD WAR I

Indian students and their local patrons in and around New York.

It was Swami Vivekananda who first created in the U.S.A. an atmosphere of friendly interest in and sympathy for India. Branches of the Ramkrishna Mission also were soon opened in New York and several other leading cities of the U.S.A., and his self-chosen task of propagating India's message there was ably carried out first by Swami Abhedananda¹ and then by the latter's close associates and successors, Bodhananda, Paramananda, Prokashananda and Trigunatitananda.² They made quite a favourable impression on the American public, and through their lectures and writings successfully interpreted the aspirations of resurgent India as much as the message of the Vedanta. In fact, religious fervour and a deep patriotic feeling characterised these holy men, and they often helped the young Indian patriots in various ways. Thus, their religio-cultural activities, in the U.S.A., paved the way for the work of the Indian nationalists and their friends and patrons there.³

However, the actual situation of the Indians there was considerably

1. From London Abhedananda went to New York, in 1897, and stayed there till May 1906. His lectures in the U.S.A. were seditious and when published as a book entitled, *India and her People*, New York, 1906, was proscribed by the Government of Bombay.

Materials, Paper No. 45.

2. On 10 April 1907, Prakasananda and Trigunatitananda were given a rousing reception at California University with Prof. Wheeler in the chair. *Ibid.*

3. Abhedananda and Prokasananda were in full sympathy with Indian patriots in the U.S.A. Bodhananda even allowed Chandra Chakravarty to use his address in connection with the arms conspiracy with Germany. *Ibid.*

Also, *The Gaelic American* wrote on 22-9-1906, "To Swami Vivekananda and his co-adjutors belongs the credit for exciting American interest in India." P. & S. (India Corr.) 1251, Vol. 190 of 1906.

different from what obtained in Britain. While there was already a substantial Indian community of students and traders in Britain, mostly concentrated in London, who had among them a few eminent individuals capable of providing a movement with the necessary finance, prestige and leadership, there was no Indian community worth the name even in New York, before 1903. Even later, the number of Indians there was much smaller than in London, and they had hardly any one among them capable of giving a united lead. But, whereas the Indians in Britain had to work in the home of their enemies, though actual restrictions were fewer in Britain than in India, their counterparts in the U.S.A. enjoyed not only the freedom of an independent democratic nation but also the help and goodwill of the sympathetic fringe of the American population, consisting primarily of Irish settlers.

Most of the Irish-Americans were bitterly anti-British, and had their own patriotic organisations and journals since the middle of the 19th century. Many of them were acquainted or in correspondence with Krishnavarma and Cama, and found in the increasing anti-British agitation among Indians a growing force to ally with against their common enemy.⁴ Who first started this Indo-Irish collaboration in the U.S.A., and when, cannot be said with certainty. But this much is known, that through active Irish co-operation some Indian students in New York had been sending revolutionary literature to India even as early as 1903.⁵ One of the early links between the Irish and the Indian patriots there was an Indian student, Camille F. Saldanha. In May 1906, he was helped by the Clan-na-Gael to go to Dublin to establish contacts with the Sinn Fein leaders⁶ there. Unfortunately, nothing more is known about him or his efforts.

Already, since early 1905, the most popular of Irish organs in the

4 *The Gaelic American*, 29-9-1906 spoke for Indo-Irish co-operation, P. & S. (India Corr.) 1251, vol. 190 of 1906

5. British Consul-General, New York to British Ambassador, Washington on 16 October and 6 November 1906, P. & S. (Home Corr.), vols. 318 & 321 of 1906, quoted in S. R. Wasti, *Lord Minto and the Indian Nationalists*, Oxford, 1964, p. 90.

6. *The Irish Independent*, 3-12-1906 in P. & S. (Home Corr.) vol. 321 of 1906, quoted in S. R. Wasti, *op. cit.*, pp. 90-91.

Also, P. & S. (India Corr.) 1251, vol. 190 of 1906.

U.S.A., *The Gaelic American*, under the editorship of George Fitzgerald 'Freeman', had been openly espousing the cause of Indian independence and inciting Indians, especially the soldiers, to revolt.⁷ Taking advantage of the covering fire thus provided by *The Gaelic American* and encouraged by developments in India and London, the local Irish and Indian leaders began organising the Indian students in New York and their American friends in an India House type movement. Obviously, India House with all its prestige as a successful pioneer was a model of movements among Indian students abroad. But, while India House, thanks to abler leadership, remained for years, despite inner dissensions, the sole organisation of Indian revolutionaries in London, the Indians in New York, in the absence of a strong unifying personality, were organised almost from the beginning in different associations under different leaders. In fact, the Irish in the U.S.A. themselves were divided in many groups, and the Indian movement growing under their inspiration could not but reflect similar divisions.

The earliest Indian organisation in the U.S.A. with some political purpose was the Pan-Aryan Association. It was established in New York, in Autumn 1906, primarily through the efforts of Samuel Lucas Joshi and Maulavi Barakatullah.⁸ For a couple of years it carried out effective and helpful anti-British and pro-Indian propaganda among the local population. Because of the traditional

7. Note by B. Duff (Army Department), on 5 June, 1907. H.P. 1907 August 243-250 A.

The most seditious articles came out on 25 May and 9 December 1905; 26 May, 30 June, 7 July, 29 September 1906, 27 October 1906; 13 April, 11 May and 18th May 1907. These suggest Indo-Irish unity and revolutionary secret society movement, and passive resistance if revolution appeared impossible. *Ibid.*

On 28-4-1906, it published translations of the patriotic song, *Bande Mataram* in different Indian languages. On 21-7-1906, it referred to the repressive measures adopted to break up the Barisal Conference. On 1-9-1906, it spoke bitterly of press censorship in India. On 11-11-1906, it published extracts from the *Mahratta*, the *Bande-Mataram* (Calcutta) and the *Amrita Bazar Patrika* to voice India's demands. P. & S. (India Corr.), 1251 vol. 190 of 1906. George Fitzgerald 'Freeman' to be referred to hereafter as Freeman.

8. Notes in the C.I.D., H.P. 1911 August 17 Dep.

He will be referred to hereafter as Barakatullah.

American hatred for colonialism and admiration for human liberty such associations advocating Indian independence always enjoyed considerable local sympathy. But the Association virtually came to an end with Barakatullah's departure for Japan in February 1909, and Joshi's for Britain in the following month.⁹ Henceforth, in the absence of any Indian who could give a lead, the movement among Indian students came to be sustained and directed mainly by their local American patrons.

On 5th September 1907, an eminent Irish-American, Myron Phelps, had founded in New York a separate organisation, the Indo-American National Association. In November, the name of this association was changed to the Society for the Advancement of India, with \$1 as its membership fee. Myron Phelps became its secretary-cum-treasurer. The other five directors were also Americans. This speaks of its innate weakness as an Indian organisation and of the political indifference of the local Indian students. Still, it continued for a few years as a pro-Indian propaganda centre.¹⁰ At its first meeting in New York, on 20th December 1907, Myron Phelps read out letters from Swadeshi agitators in India, and Rev. Dr. Cuthbert Hall spoke of the sad plight of Indians under British rule. A three-man committee consisting of Phelps, Werner and Dr. Hall was formed to consider ways and means to make the movement more effective for its purpose. In its second meeting on 15th January 1908, they decided to enquire into the causes of Indian famines with the aim of suggesting remedies. Little, however, is known about the work and report of the committee entrusted with this task.¹¹

In the meantime, to carry on his work more effectively among the Indian students in the U.S.A., Myron Phelps in co-operation with the Pan-Aryan Association had rented a house in New York, in January 1908, and had named it India House, obviously, to serve the purpose of its more reputed namesake in London. Apart from pro-

9. Note by J. C. Ker, P. A. to D.G.I., on 17-12-191 in Circular No. 12, H.P. 1913 March 150 B.

10. On 26 February 1909, it protested against President Theodore Roosevelt's speech of 18 January 1909 in support of British rule in India. (Appendix to C.R. Cleveland's Circular No. 4, dated Simla, 16 May 1910), H.P. 1910 October 17 Dep.

11. *Ibid.*

viding cheap board and lodging to a few Indian students, it provided a meeting ground for its members and their local friends. Soon its branches were opened at Chicago and Detroit, and the total membership rose to a few hundred.¹² The Indo-Irish co-operation at the time was highlighted by a statement of the Irish friends of India in the New York daily, *The World*, dated 31 May 1908. The Clan-na-Gael, in those days, used to openly proclaim their political alliance with the Indian revolutionaries.¹³ But most of the Indian members of India House were not genuinely interested in the political mission of Phelps.¹⁴ Moreover, many of them had been antagonised by his over-bearing manner,¹⁵ and by the end of the year its membership had fallen to one hundred and fifty only. Even the general American public, almost totally ignorant of Indian affairs, had not responded with the expected enthusiasm. So, realising the futility of further work among Indians in the U.S.A., Phelps closed down his India House with effect from February 1909, and on 27th March left Boston for Naples, *en route* to India.¹⁶

In January 1909 Freeman, who had kept himself more or less aloof from the organisations of Phelps, founded another short-lived association called the Indo-American Club. This too was wound up in March 1910, and little is known of its efforts and achievements.¹⁷

The Director of Criminal Intelligence, C. R. Cleveland has rightly said, "With the failure of these societies organised agitation among the Indian student community in New York came to an end."¹⁸ These efforts proved so ineffective largely due to the absence of proper leadership and financial resources. In London and Paris the per-

12. Circulars No. 4 & 12, *op. cit.*

13. Circular No. 5, H.P. 1908 November 6 Dep.

14. He wrote in the *India*, (London) on 20 November 1908, that Indians were not sufficiently interested in their affairs. Circular No. 4, *op. cit.*

Also, Secy., Home Department, Bombay to Secy., Home Dept., India on 7-9-1911, H.P. 1911 September 124-125 B.

15. Some of them wrote him an open letter on 15 March 1908, which was published in the *Bande Mataram* (Calcutta) on 11 April 1908. Circular No. 4, *op. cit.*

16. Circular Nos. 4 & 12, *op. cit.*

17. Circular No. 12, *op. cit.*

18. *Ibid.*

sonality and financial resources of Krishnavarma, Rana, and Cama, and the dedication and ability of their lieutenants like Savarkar, Chattopadhyaya, and Iyer could attract so many Indians—many were deliberately recruited from India by offers of scholarships and travel grants—and keep the organisation going so long; and once an organisation remains active for a few years and secures the necessary publicity, it continues to command confidence and following for some time. But, lacking in these essential pre-requisites, the best intentions of a few almost unknown Indian patriots in the U.S.A. and their local friends could not be very effective. Even their American patrons were not united in their efforts.

Still, the influence they could exert on the so-called sentimental fringe of the American public caused some concern in Whitehall.¹⁹ It has to be admitted that American interest in and sympathy for the so-called Indian question, which later became such an important factor in our national struggle, owed their origin to the faltering steps first taken by these little-known Indian students and their Irish patrons in the U.S.A.²⁰ Besides, these years had been fruitfully used by many in learning the preparation of explosives, and in smuggling home much-needed arms and bomb manuals.²¹ However, Indian agitation in North America could assume effective dimensions only when the message of revolution had spread among the relatively large and growing Indian community on the west coast of that continent.

Indian Immigrants on West Coast.

Either it was due to an uncritical imitation of Krishnavarma's India House movement among Indian students or due to their unconscious contempt for the rustic Indian immigrants that the early organisers of Indian agitation in North America remained pathetically unaware of the revolutionary potentiality of the fast-growing Indian

19. Morley to Minto on 27 February 1908, Minto Collections, M 1002, 1908.

Also, R. H. Bruce-Dickson to Secy. of State on 8-3-1910, and the latter's reply on 29-3-1910, H.P. 1910 November 40-47 B.

20. H.P. 1910 November 40-47B.

21. John Devoy of the Clan-na-Gael was of great help to Indians in these. H.P. 1911 August 17-D. Freeman too was in touch with Cama in Paris regarding smuggling of arms. D. C. I. on 9-3-1915, H.P. 1915 April 412-415B. Also, the History sheet of Myron Phelps, Circular No. 4, *op. cit.*

community on the Pacific coast. Yet it was on the Pacific coast of Canada and the U.S.A. that the swift emergence of a fairly large Indian community, creating and facing fresh problems, brought about a new situation loaded with explosive possibilities.

Indian immigration into the western regions of Canada and the U.S.A. was a mere trickle at the dawn of this century. It was from 1904 that immigration in large numbers actually began, till, by 1906, their annual influx had swelled into thousands.²² The reasons for this sudden influx are many. Some employers of the sparsely populated western regions realised the utility of cheap Indian labour, which could also weaken the bargaining strength of the local trade unions. Even some shipping agencies and their unscrupulous agents in India sought to make a profit by enticing the sturdy Punjabee peasants to emigrate with tempting assurances and travel facilities.²³

Most of these immigrants were Sikh ex-service men. Their imagination had been fired first by the reports of their comrades returning through Canada from the Diamond Jubilee celebrations of Queen Victoria's reign in London, and later by the prosperity and encouraging statements of their predecessors, who had returned home to collect their families. Besides, the monsoon had been poor in the Punjab between 1905 and 1910, and this gave emigration an added incentive.²⁴ As a result, by 1908, about three thousand five hundred Indians

22. *U. S. Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration for 1919-1920*, Washington, 1920, pp. 180-181. Also, *Canada, Report of the Royal Commission of 1907 to enquire into the methods by which Oriental labourers have been induced to come to Canada*, Ottawa, 1908 p. 75.

23. The Canadian Pacific Railways and their agents, Gillander Arbuthnot, in particular, used to recruit cheap Indian labour through their Calcutta branch. Hopkinson's Report on Hindu Affairs, 16-10-1913, U. S. Immigration File No. 52903/110 B of 1913 in Roll I. Also, Bureau of Immigration and Naturalisation, Washington to Commissioners of Immigration at Montreal, Seattle, San Francisco, Honolulu, and El Paso, on 7-10-10. *Ibid.* Also, report by W. L. Mackenzie-King, Dy. Minister of Labour, Canada, J & P. 1954 with 3392 vol. 1383 of 1915. Also, Minto to Morley on 26-9-1907, J. & P. 3330, vol. 777 of 1906.

See also, Harry A. Mills, "East Indian Immigration to British Columbia and the Pacific Coast States," *American Economic Review*, March, 1911.

24. R. K. Das, *Hindusthani workers on the Pacific Coast*, Berlin and Leipzig, 1923, pp. 4 and 10. Also, Khuswant Singh, *The Sikhs*, London, 1953, pp. 119-120.

had settled down in British Columbia, and nearly as many in the western states of the U.S.A.²⁵

Usually, coming in groups from the same villages and often from the same units of the Indian army or the police, these immigrants lived mostly in small concentrated groups. The majority of them worked on farms and orchards, in railways and saw-mills, or cleared the forests on contract. Their average daily income ranged from one and half to two dollars.²⁶ There was almost no unemployment among them, and, thrifty as they were, they could on an average save thirty-five dollars per month. Many of them, in course of time, purchased their own farmlands too.²⁷ Almost everywhere they soon formed clubs of their own for mutual co-operation, social contact, and religious ceremonies. These were commonly known as Hindusthane Association.²⁸ Since they were predominantly Sikhs, most Indian settlements, as their population and prosperity increased, came to have their own *gurdwaras*, which naturally became the centres of their community life. Their contribution to the economic development of the region too could not be ignored. In California it was these immigrants who opened up the Imperial Valley to farming and developed rice cultivation in Colusa county.²⁹

But hard-earned prosperity³⁰ did not assure them an honourable

25. Hopkinson's report, op. cit.

26. Exhibit No. 100 in the Komagatamaru Commission of Inquiry, J. & P. 5028 vol. 1325 of 1914.

27. Col. E. J. C. Swayne to Lord Crewe on 20-12-1908 and 20-12-1908, annexes No. 8 and 6 to letter from Morley to Minto, dated 26-2-1909, J. & P. 320 of 1909 with 275 vol. 1129 of 1912. Even in the lean winter months of 1906-07 only 45 out of 2200 Indians were out of employment. They and the new-comers stay in the 'Hindu-ghar' or with other Indians, but are never public charges. Col. F. Warren to Col. Hanbury Williams on 8-1-1907, J. & P. 3330 vol. 777 of 1906.

28. Though sometimes named Indian Association or Hindi Sabha, the most common name, Hindusthane Association, has usually been used in this work. These Hindusthane Associations were again different from the Indian student organisation, Hindusthan Association, established by Khagendra Chandra Das, Basant Kumar Roy, Y. M. A. Nandelkar, and Shewde at Chicago, in late 1911.

Statement of Khagendra Chandra Das.

29. S. Chandrashekhar, "The Indian Community in the United States", *Far Eastern Survey*, vol. 14, No. 11 (6-6-1945), pp. 147-148.

30. By 1911, Indians owned property worth three hundred thousand dollars at Victoria and two hundred thousand at Vancouver, had raised

niche in the Canadian or American society.³¹ On the contrary, the large-scale Indian immigration made the lurking dislike of many, especially lower class white men, more pronounced and widespread.³² The local labour hated them because of their use as strike-breaking blacklegs and in forcing down the wage levels. Many employers in their turn hated them because of their habit of agitation and rather close association with syndicalists and anarchists.³³ As early as 1906, Indians had on occasions been man-handled in California. Early in 1907, Indian workers were expelled from the mills at Bellingham in Washington, and in some western towns of the U.S.A. many Indian houses were raided during a railway strike at Tacoma.³⁴ Demands for restricting their immigration and, if possible, to resettle them somewhere else came to be frequently voiced.³⁵ The Government of India, too, obviously at the request of the Canadian Government, circulated a warning, in December 1906, discouraging intending immigrants from going to Canada.³⁶ These deterrents notwithstanding, Indian immigrants continued to pour into Canada and the U. S. A. in increasing numbers.

To check this growing influx of Indians, the Canadian Government, in January 1908, passed the 'continuous journey regulation', which required all Asian immigrants to reach Canada from their

one thousand dollars for a night school, and had sent home six thousand dollars. J. & P. 4803 of 1911 with 275, vol. 1129 of 1912. In the U. S. A. the average area of their orchards ranged from 40 to 80 acres, their rice farms from 500 to 1000 acres, and the cotton farms usually were more than 160 acres. R. K. Das, op. cit., pp. 23-24.

31. Randhir Singh, *Ghadar Heroes*, Bombay, 1945, pp. 6-7.

32. R. K. Das, op. cit., pp. 8 and 16. Also, S. Chandrashekhar, op. cit., pp. 147-148. Also, C. Kondapi, *Indians Overseas*, New Delhi, 1951, p. 207.

33. British Ambassador, Washington to Foreign Secy., Britain on 7-5-1914, H. P. 1914 December 96-98A.

34. Randhir Singh, op. cit., pp. 6-7.

35. Asiatic Exclusion League to the President of the U. S. A., 17-12-1910, Roll 1. Also, Labour Council, San Francisco to Com. Gen. of Immigration, Washington, on 12-9-1913, *Ibid.* Also, Supdt. of Immigration, Ottawa to U. S. Com. for Immigration, Montreal, 15-9-1913, *Ibid.* Also, resolutions of Central Labour Councils of Almeida, dated 15-7-1913, and of Stockton, and Kern, dated 15-9-1913, *Ibid.*

36. I. O. memo. on Indian Immigration into Canada, dated 26-8-1915, J. & P. 3277 vol. 1381 of 1915.

homes without breaking their journey on the way.³⁷ Since there were direct shipping lines connecting China and Japan with Canada, this was obviously directed against Indian immigrants, in particular. On 3 June, it was further announced that every Asian immigrant must have with him, on arrival in Canada, a minimum of two hundred dollars, and W. L. Mackenzie-King was sent to London to discuss a possible solution of the Indian immigration question.³⁸ These restrictions virtually put a stop to Indian immigration to Canada,³⁹ but did not correspondingly affect the Chinese or Japanese immigrants, whose governments had separate arrangements for them with the Canadian authorities.⁴⁰ The Government of India, however, did not move in this matter. Rather, it was suspected that they as well as the British Government had actually encouraged the Canadian and U.S. authorities to exclude Indians from their territories.⁴¹ It was this callous, nay almost treacherous, attitude that gradually turned the increasing bitterness of these unfortunate immigrants against their alien government at home.

The U. S. authorities, however, did not resort to any such

37. *Ibid.*

38. *Ibid.* Also, *Report of the Immigration Commissioner*, Vol. II, Washington, 1911, p. 629. Also, H. H. Stevens, M. P. from Vancouver said in the Canadian House of Commons in 1914 that "his Government knew that there was no steamship line direct from India to Canada and therefore this regulation would keep the Hindus out, and at the same time render the Government immune from attack on the ground that they were passing regulations against the interests of the Hindus, who were British subjects". K. Singh and S. Singh, *Ghadar 1915*, New Delhi, 1966, p. 9.

39. *Canada, Report of the Royal Commission of 1907*, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

40. I. O. memo. on Indian immigration into Canada, dated 26-8-1915, J. & P. 3277, vol. 1381 of 1915. Also, when early in September 1907, anti-Japanese riots took place at Vancouver, the local Japanese Consul vigorously intervened. J. & P. 3330, vol. 777 of 1906.

41. Holderness of I. O. to Under Secy., Colonial Office, London on 12-7-1915, J. & P. 3271 vol. 1381 of 1915. Also, Minto wrote to Sir Wilfred Laurier, Premier of Canada, on 1 March 1909, "We hold the view that the continuous passage and the two hundred dollar regulations are likely to prove effective in putting a stop to immigration of Indian labour. We have published the conditions imposed by Canada widely.... We raised no objections to the methods adopted by Canada, and we have not any intention to raising questions regarding them...." K. Singh and S. Singh, op. cit., p. 8.

special legislation. They just sought to turn back the intending immigrants for one or the other of the following reasons: liability to public charge, suffering from dangerous contagious diseases, or violating the 'alien contract labour Law'.⁴¹ However, many of the immigrants could circumvent the existing regulations and enter the U.S.A., by staying at Honolulu, on their way, for the required period.⁴² So the Indian community in the western states of the U.S. A. still continued to grow, though slowly, till by the end of 1913 their number had risen to 6656.⁴³ Consequently, agitation against their entry was also growing. In many western towns Asiatic Exclusion Leagues were formed to stop 'the tide of turbans'.⁴⁴ There were fresh anti-

The Indian National Congress, at its annual session at Karachi in 1913, protested against the anti-Indian measures, then in operation in Canada. P. Sitaramayya, *The History of the Indian National Congress*, Vol. I, Bombay, 1935, p. 49.

"The policy of exclusion of Indians (called Hindus in America) originated through British initiative, as early as 1907-08, when the Canadian authorities shamefully ill-treated the Indian immigrants and advocated exclusion of Indians from Canada. The present Prime Minister of Canada, Mr. Mackenzie-King, was the first to put forward the idea. The Canadian authorities, with the approval of the British Government in England and possibly with the full sanction of the India Office, made the proposal to the American authorities that they should exclude the Indians as they had excluded the Chinese. The proposition was presented demi-officially, as I was told on excellent authority, by Lord Bryce, the then English ambassador in Washington. This proposition was made after a riot occurred in the city of Bellingham (Washington State), when several Hindu labourers working in the saw-mills were mobbed by Americans."

Elizabeth S. Kite, "An American Criticism of 'The Other Side of the Medal'", *Modern Review*, February, 1927, p. 169.

41 (a). *The Pacific Monthly*, vol. 17 of 1907, p. 584, cited in K. Singh and S. Singh, op. cit., p. 13.

42. *San Francisco Examiner*, 28-9-1910, cited in Roll 1, Immigration file, 52903/110 of 1910. Also, note by the Bureau of Immigration, 5-10-1910, *ibid*.

43. Memo. on Hindu Immigration to the U. S. A., Roll 1, Immigration file, 52903/110 C of 1913-1914. Indians still coming through San Francisco at the rate of 400 every month. Imm. Com., Washington, to Com. of Labour, Washington on 11-8-1910, Roll 1, Immigration file, 52908/110 of 1910.

44. R. K. Das, op. cit., 8 and 16. Also, C. Kondapi, op. cit., p. 207. Also, S. Chandrashekhar, op. cit., pp. 139-141.

Indian riots in Oregon and St. John on 21 March 1910, with the local police even allegedly conniving at these hooliganism.⁴⁵ It was only after 1911 that the rate of annual Indian immigration to the U.S. A. registered a sharp decline.⁴⁶

Living among free peoples under fewer restrictions than at home and exposed to exotic influences, these immigrants became more conscious of their honour and independence, and receptive to new and revolutionary ideas. At the same time, the cumulative effect of high expectations and new-born confidence, and a pervading sense of insecurity in a foreign land made them extremely bitter and excitable. Such indeed was the fertile field where the 'seeds of sedition' could easily strike root, and there were many, who could give a shape and direction to their disaffection.⁴⁷

Many Indian students in the western towns, living near their poor persecuted countrymen on a distant shore, felt stronger than ever before that they were all Indians, shared their feeling of humiliation and injustice, and felt the urge to do their bit for them. Their uneducated countrymen were really in need of sincere help and advice in their manifold difficulties in a foreign land. For the young patriots from India this indeed was a very desirable situation, where they could serve their countrymen, win their confidence and, availing of the freedom of the land, educate and organise them for a revolutionary struggle. With such mixed motives, early in 1907, Taraknath Das, Pandurang Khankojee, Ramnath Puri, and Khagendra Chandra Das—not all of them were actual revolutionaries—formed the Indian Independence League among the Indian settlers around San Francisco. Its main purpose was to safeguard Indian rights and interests, and to give their uneducated but adventurous countrymen, what they thought, 'the proper political education'. Such social and political work soon

45. Letter from the Judicial and Public Dept. to the British Foreign Office on 12-9-1911, J. & P. 956 vol. 990 of 1910. Aso. J. & P. 3274 of 1911 with 956 vol. 990 of 1910.

46. U. S., *Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration for 1919-1920*, op. cit., pp. 186-187.

47. U. S. Consul, Calcutta to Washington on 2-4-1908, cited in D. P. Singh, *American Official Attitude towards the Indian Nationalist Movement, 1905-1929* (unpublished Ph. D. thesis of the Hawaii University, 1964), p. 182.

began in almost all the major Indian settlements, and everywhere the purpose was, more or less, the same—to intensify their bitterness towards the British, to draw an encouraging picture of the political situation at home, and to make them believe that the cure for all their misery and humiliation lay in national independence.⁴⁸

The Hindusthane Association slowly became the centre of growing political activity and heated discussion. The actual revolutionaries among them, of course, sought to help their comrades at home by learning the rudiments of war and preparation of explosives, and by smuggling home arms and revolutionary literature from time to time. However, they were only a few in number, and the vast majority of Indian settlers had at first little interest in politics except in the restrictions and discriminations from which they suffered. Only sustained propaganda among them for years, and the increasing bitterness caused by the anti-Indian measures of the local authorities and the callousness of their government at home could slowly stimulate large numbers of them to participate in a revolutionary struggle.

Ramnath Puri was the first to start publishing a journal for revolutionary propaganda among the Indian immigrants in 1907. It was an Urdu weekly commonly known by the English translation of its name, *Circular of Freedom*. It used to be published first from 3700, California Street, San Francisco and later from 11, Magnolia Street, Oakland. Revolutionary pamphlets were also occasionally printed there and secretly sent home, mainly to undermine the loyalty of Indian soldiers. But, this journal could not be published for more than a year primarily due to lack of funds.⁴⁹ Sacramento and Portland, however, continued as centres of social and political work among Indians in the U.S.A.⁵⁰

However, the centre of Indian agitation soon shifted to Vancouver, the largest Indian settlement on the Pacific coast. Anti-Indian riots and the news that severe immigration laws were on the anvil brought Taraknath Das there, in late 1907. Co-incidentally, Surendramohan Bose from Japan and Gurudutt Kumar from India also reached there

48. Pandurang Khankojé's letter. Quoted in Bhupendranath Datta, *Aprokashito Rajnaitik Itihās* (in Bengali), Calcutta, 1953, p. 228. Also, the statement of Khagendra Chandra Das.

49. Colin Campbell's note, H. P. 1908 November 6 Dep.

50. Statement of Khagendra Chandra Das.

in the same year.⁵¹ To educate and unite the Indians of British Columbia, Taraknath Das, early in 1908, opened a school for them at Millside, New Westminster near Vancouver. But it was soon closed down on a representation to the Government by Hopkinson. Surendra-mohan and Taraknath also started the Indo-American Association⁵² to organise the Indians and to create among the local population a sympathetic understanding of the Indian cause. But it was obviously very difficult for two Bengali new-comers to win the confidence of and work effectively among Sikh workmen. So, this association too proved to be a short-lived one.

In the meantime, in March 1908, they had started publishing at Vancouver a bi-monthly journal in English, the *Free Hindusthan*. Its motto was: "Resistance to tyranny is service to humanity and a necessity of civilisation." Published in English its main purpose was not so much to arouse the immigrants as to advise the Indian revolutionary leaders at home and abroad. It soon began enjoying a good circulation within and beyond the American continent. Taraknath, however, soon found it difficult to work freely in a British dominion and, early in autumn 1908, moved to Seattle to publish his journal from there.⁵³ Immediately, the tone of his writing changed. He began preaching the necessity of winning over the Indian army to the nationalist cause, and often made direct appeals to the Sikhs, in particular.⁵⁴ As a result, the Government of India began intercepting it with effect from July 1909,⁵⁵ and expressed the desire that legal action against it be taken by the U.S. authorities.⁵⁶ But it was found that it had not trespassed the limits of law. Besides, the American public opinion was in favour of the continuance of such an independent organ speaking for the mute millions of India.⁵⁷ Later, when Taraknath moved

51. Circular No. 12, op. cit. Also, J. & P. 4917 of 1911 with 275, vol. 1129 of 1912. Also, History Sheet of Gurudutt Kumar, H. P. 1912 April 82 B.

52. V. Chisol, *Indian Unrest*, pp. 146-147. Also, Secy. of State to Viceroy on 26-2-1909, J. & P. 320 of 1909 with 275, vol. 1129 of 1912.

53. J. & P. 1882 of 1909 with 1309 vol. 925 of 1909. Also, D. C. I. on 30-9-1908, H. P. 1908 November 17-18 A. Also, Circular No. 12, op. cit.

54. Circular No. 12, op. cit.

55. Note by the D. C. I.'s office, H. P. 1911 November 55-56B.

56. Cleveland's suggestion, H. P. 1911 September 4 Dep.

57. Dist. Attorney, New York to Governor, New York on 13-9-1911,

to New York, the *Free Hindusthan* was issued from there, and Freeman was closely associated with its publication.⁵⁸ But, it ceased to appear after November 1910, mainly due to lack of funds.⁵⁹

Some of its views, however, indicate a definite departure from the old line of thought expressed by other Indian revolutionary journals. In its July-August number of 1909, it asked Indians to follow the Chinese way, and warned, "India will never achieve her freedom by mere political assassination." In March-April 1910, it wrote, "Uplift the mass to uplift the country, otherwise we fail like the Mutiny," and quotes Mazzini, "Education and insurrection are the only methods by which we can arouse the mass of the people."⁶⁰ Such critical reflections on the past and emphasis on a mass movement speak of their growing political maturity.

In the meantime, Taraknath, in co-operation with a few American liberals, had founded at Seattle, in January 1910, the Association for the Promotion of Education for the People of India. Professor Edward McMohan of the Dept. of History, Washington University was elected its first President, and Taraknath became its first Secretary. But, as stated above, Taraknath soon moved to New York, and in his absence this association soon died of atrophy.⁶¹

In British Columbia, in the past few years, Indian agitation had gained considerable momentum. Soon after the Indo-American Association had ceased to exist, some locally prominent Sikhs took the lead, in co-operation with Surendramohan and Taraknath, and established at Vancouver, early in 1908, the Committee for the Management of Sikh Gurdwaras and Temples. It was to bring together all such institutions and, for that matter, almost the entire Indian community in British Columbia under one organisation.⁶² This was the first organisation in North America, which could claim to speak for a fairly large sec-

ibid. Also E. R. Schmidt, *American Relations with South Asia, 1900-1940*, (unpublished Ph. D. thesis of Pennsylvania University, 1958), pp. 146-147, cited in D. P. Singh, *op. cit.*, p. 284.

58. D. G. I. on 9-3-1915, H. P. 1915 April 412-415 B. Also, Circular No. 12, *op. cit.* In New York it used to be published from 749, Third Avenue. British Ambassador, Washington to Foreign Secy., Britain on 23-6-1909, J. & P. 2573 vol. 945 of 1909.

59. Notes in H. P. 1911 August 17 Dep.

60. J. & P. 4803 of 1911 with 275, vol. 1129 of 1912.

61. J. & P. 2184 with 275, vol. 1129 of 1912.

62. Colin Campbell's note, *op. cit.*

tion of Indian settlers there. It was this committee that, in late 1908, negotiated with the British Government about the proposed scheme to re-settle the Indians of British Columbia in British Honduras, nominated representatives to visit the latter country, and ultimately rejected the offer on 22 November 1908.⁶³ Although this committee, as the name suggests, was no revolutionary organisation, it indirectly helped the growth of revolutionary movements by providing the Indians of that province with organisational unity and confidence, and the revolutionaries in particular with a useful cover.⁶⁴

However, the Indian agitation in British Columbia received a new impetus when, early in November 1908, Niranjan Singh, alias Teja Singh, a brilliant Sikh organiser, came to Vancouver from New York to help his countrymen in their predicament.⁶⁵ He could infuse among them a new spirit and determination, and soon became their undisputed leader. To make his countrymen, as far as possible, economically self-supporting, he, on 23 November 1908, started the Guru Nanak Trust and Mining Co., with a capital of fifty thousand dollars. Within five months they purchased 172 acres of land in North Vancouver, near Point Atkinson, for twenty-five thousand dollars only. They also started a few gold-mining, timber, and banking concerns. A committee of twelve looked after these enterprises, and they had their official agents also in New York, Chicago, San Francisco, and Seattle. As a result, even in the lean winter months of 1908-09, unemployment among Indians fell to less than 5% only.⁶⁶ These, obviously, contributed further to the unity, confidence, and assertive spirit of the Indians there, and gave a spur to increased revolutionary activities among them.

In November 1909, Gurudutt Kumar started the Swadesh Sevak Home at 1632 Second Avenue, Fair View, Vancouver ostensibly to provide for the poor and unemployed Indians but actually as a ren-

63. *The East Indians in British Columbia*, Government publication under the authority of Frank Oliver, Minister of Interior, Canada. Roll 1.

64. Colin Campbells note, *op. cit.*

65. Annex No. 9 to note by E. J. C. Swayne, J. & P. 320 of 1909 with 275 vol. 1129 of 1912.

66. Hopkinson to Cony of the Ministry of Interior, Ottawa on 5-4-1909, J. & P. 1882 with 1309, vol. 925 of 1909. Also, confidential memo., dated Ottawa, 18-1-1909, *ibid.*

devours and residence for revolutionaries. To supplement his work, he, in January 1910, started publishing a Gurumukhi monthly, *Swadesh Sevak*, and soon it had a circulation of about 500 copies. It was banned in India, with effect from March 1911, due to its inflammatory influence, particularly on the Sikhs. Even Vancouver, Kumar soon discovered, was too hot for him, and he left for Seattle in June 1911. In his absence both the organisation and the journal soon languished and ceased to exist.⁶⁷

In the meantime, the condition of Indians in British Columbia had further deteriorated after the passage of a new immigration law on 9 May 1910. In effect it was to prevent the Indian settlers from bringing their families to Canada. On 28 June, Kumar, as the Secretary of the Hindustanee Association of Vancouver, wrote to the Prime Minister of Canada protesting against the unfairness of the law, but he did not receive a proper reply even.⁶⁸ It was in that time of crisis that Taraknath again came back to Vancouver in September 1910. He and Kumar decided to utilise the prevailing temper of their countrymen by once again trying to organise among them an effective revolutionary movement. Once again the model was India House of London. They rented a house at Vancouver, and named it United India House. It was suspected that the Gackwad of Baroda, then on his American tour, had financed this project.⁶⁹ But, as the names of Teja Singh and Sunder Singh do not appear among the organisers of United India House, it may be presumed that Taraknath and Kumar had failed to secure the support of the entire Indian community there. In any case, the project had to be abandoned after a few months. In August 1911, however, Sunder Singh had started another revolutionary monthly, the *Aryan*. But shortage of funds again stood in the way, and by early 1913 it had ceased to see light.⁷⁰

67. History Sheet of Gurudutt Kumar, H. P. 1912 April 82 B. Also, J. & P. 4917 of 1911 with 275 vol. 1129 of 1912. At Seattle he had also started the journal, *Span of Life*. J. & P. 2184 with 275 vol. 1129 of 1912.

68. Hopkinson to the Ministry of Interior. Canada on 10-3-1911, H. P. 1911 June 103 B. Also, Gurdit Singh, *The Voyage of Komagata Maru*, Calcutta, undated 1st ed., p 13.

69. D. C. I., on 14-11-1911, H. P. 1912 April 82 B. Also, History Sheet of Gurudutt Kumar, *ibid.* Indians of British Columbia presented the Gackwad with an address on 22-6-1910. J. & P. 349 with 275 vol. 1129 of 1912.

70. Circular No. 12., *op. cit.*

At Vancouver, in the meantime, the Khalsa Diwan Society and the United India League had been formed, on 15 December 1911.⁷¹ The formation of two separate Indian organisations on the same day only indicates the existence of personal rivalries and traditional social divisions that, particularly, kept separate the orthodox Sikhs from the liberal Sikhs and the Hindus.⁷² However, they usually worked together in smuggling home arms and agitating against the anti-immigration measures. On 22 February 1913, at a general meeting of Indians organised by these two societies at Vancouver, presided over by Chagan Khairaj Varma, alias Hasan Rahim, it was decided to send a three-man deputation to London and then, if necessary, to India to plead for the Indian settlers in Canada.⁷³ In March, Balwant Singh, Nand Singh, and Narain Singh, as members of this deputation, left for London and after some time came to India.⁷⁴ But, nothing hopeful emerged out of this mission, and the Indian immigrants were left all the more frustrated and ready for desperate action.

While the immigration laws and the agitations against these had kept the Indians of Canada more in the lime-light, revolutionary activities of their kinsmen on the West Coast of the U.S.A. were also gathering strength. By 1910, Kansiram Joshi and Sohan Singh Bhakhna had succeeded in moulding the Hindusthane Association of Portland into a definite political body.⁷⁵ The influence spread fast. They toured the nearby Indian settlements, and within a few months the major centres of Indians in Washington, Oregon, and California came to have similar organisations urging political work for their motherland. It came to be increasingly accepted that national

71. Gurdit Singh, op. cit., p. 13

72. D. C. I. on 24-2-1917, H. P. 1917 February 552-555 B.

73. J. W. Rondell, Vancouver to Malcom Reid, Vancouver on 24-2-1913, H. P. 1913 June 5-17 B. Also, Malcom Reid, Vancouver to Cony, Ottawa on 17-3-1913, H. P. 1913 August 37-39 B. Also, Gurdit Singh, op. cit., pp. 13-14. Their main demand was that Indians in Canada should be permitted to bring their families from India. Hopkinson to Cony on 29-4-1913, H. P. 1911 June 103 B.

74. In India they visited the major cities and sought to rouse public opinion in their support. They even met the Governor of Punjab. Mac-Munn, op. cit., pp. 92-93.

75. Pandurang Khankoje's letter, dated 7-6-1949, quoted in Bhupendranath Datta. *Aprokaisto Rajnaitik Itihas* (in Bengali), Calcutta, 1553, p. 230.

sovereignty alone could solve their manifold problems⁷⁶ For Indians, at least, political work was certainly easier in the U.S.A. than in Canada, and their leaders at Portland in those days displayed greater unity and organisational ability than those at Vancouver. So it was in the relatively favourable atmosphere of the U.S.A. that Indians could start a really political agitation, and within a couple of years the psychological base and organisational units were created on which the Ghadar movement could be so quickly built and given a distinct revolutionary orientation.

For the Indian revolutionary movement in North America these were primarily years of growth and preparation, and little that was spectacular or of immediate significance had not yet been achieved. No doubt, some of the revolutionaries had secured the rudiments of military training,⁷⁷ arms and revolutionary literature had been sent to their countrymen in India and elsewhere,⁷⁸ and the Indian community in the U.S.A. and Canada had been roused for revolutionary action. But, none could as yet organise the entire Indian community in one single movement. Some individuals and groups had organised movements and started journals, but in the absence of sustained enthusiasm and a proper organisation they usually ceased to function when the leaders moved away or funds fell short. These uneducated immigrants had brought with them their old sectarian outlooks and narrow fanaticisms, and personal and group rivalries strew the path of every attempt at uniting them for a movement. Bitterness with the British and the existing situation, though growing fast, had not yet become strong enough to unite the vast majority of them behind

76. Memo. by Sidney Brookes, dated 25-1-1916, op. cit. Also, statement of Pandurang Khankojé.

77. Pandurang Khankojé, Taraknath Das, Adhar Ghandia, Laskar, and Jnanendranath Chatterjee were known to have secured some military training at Tamalpais and Vermont. Hopkinson to Cony on 16-10-1911, J. & P. 4615 of 1911 with 275, vol. 1129 of 1911. Also, Hopkinson to Cony on 8-8-1912, J. & P. 2932 of 1912 with 568, vol. 1057 of 1911. Also, Circular No. 5, op. cit. Also, Khankojé's letter, quoted in Bhupendranath Datta, op. cit., pp. 228 and 231. Some of the Indian revolutionaries also secured some military training privately from a South American adventurer, Diaz. Bhupendranath Datta, op. cit., p. 55.

78. District Intelligence Officer, Vancouver to Assistant Director of Intelligence, Ottawa on 5-1-1910, H. P. 1909, 1916 May 187 B. Some sport concerns used to send arms through Mexico. H. P. 1911 August 17 Dep. Also, informer's report, H. P. 1916 February 201 A.

a common purpose. An increasing number among them, obviously, wanted to do something for their honour and motherland, but there was little clarity and still less unanimity about what should be done and how. Though considerable progress had been made, of late, towards organisational unity, the various groups of Indian immigrants had few effective bonds except their emotional attachment to some vague national ideals. It was the almost mesmeric personality of Har Dayal that could give the Indian agitation unity, force, and direction, and his arrival ushered in a new epoch in the history of Indians in North America.

Coming of Har Dayal and the rise of the Ghadar Movement

Har Dayal reached the U.S.A. in June 1911, and soon plunged heart and soul into the Indian revolutionary movement there. He also made friends with Dr. A. W. Ryder of California University and Dr. Stuart of Stanford University, impressed them with his acute mind, and succeeded in joining the latter university as a lecturer in Indian Philosophy in February 1912. From the vantage point of a university lecturer he began carrying on his anti-British propaganda still more openly. By June he picked up the friendship of John D. Barry of the *San Francisco Bulletin*, and began using its columns for his agitational purposes.⁷⁹ Though he was a rather spectacular figure in the university, he overplayed his part, which soon subjected him to considerable criticism from many quarters.⁸⁰ This made him resign his post in September 1912.⁸¹ Now, free from other pre-occupations, he joined the Hindusthance Association of Astoria as a full-time worker and, by the end of that year, published the first revolutionary pamphlet of his career, entitled *Sidelights on India*.⁸² Considering that Indian revolutionary propaganda in Europe had, by then, lost its former unity and vigour, it was widely felt that Indians in the U.S.A. should henceforth conduct a more effective propaganda campaign. So, Har Dayal began regularly publishing and sending anti-British revolutionary pamphlets to India and to centres of Indian

79. History Sheet of Har Dayal op. cit.

80. Dr. Ray Wilbur, ex-President, Stanford University, to G. T. Brown on 22-7-1939, cited in G. T. Brown, "The Hindu Conspiracy, 1914-1917", *The Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. XVII, 1948, p. 300.

81. History Sheet of Har Dayal, op. cit.

82. *Ibid.*

settlers abroad. Because of their inflammatory influence some of these were soon banned in India.⁸³

Like Krishnavarma, with whose India House movement in London he was once closely associated, Har Dayal, soon after his appointment at Stanford, had planned to attract Indian students to the U.S.A. At his request, Jwalla Singh offered the California University five scholarships for Indian students. But, after four out of these five had come over to the U.S.A., Jwalla Singh discovered that he could finance only three of them.⁸⁴ Then, at Har Dayal's request, Nawab Khan agreed to finance the fourth scholar, Sayed Mahmud. But Sayed Mahmud soon began complaining to Nawab Khan and other Muslim members of the Hindusthane Association against Har Dayal and Jwalla Singh, and this incident leading to a show-down between Har Dayal and Nawab Khan exacerbated communal feeling among the local Indians. Nawab Khan dissociated himself for the time being from the Hindusthane Association and wrote to other prominent Indian Muslims in North America not to play the Hindu game in anti-British agitation.⁸⁵ Still, by early 1913, there were thirty-seven Indian students at Berkley, and of them about a dozen had availed themselves of the scholarships or travelling fellowships offered by the Indian community in California.⁸⁶

However, the Government of India, since 1912, had begun taking alarm at the rising tempo of the Indian agitation in North America.⁸⁷ To counter its steady growth and anti-British propoganda in the U.S.A., the Government of India sent their agents, including Christian missionaries and Sikh *granthis*, to speak there in favour of British rule in India, and to cause splits in Indian ranks. Their initial efforts bore fruit when, in November 1912, a group of 16 Indian students, calling themselves 'Loyalists', seceded from the Hindusthane Associa-

83. H. P. 1913 March 23-28 A.

84. Testimony of Nawab Khan, *San Francisco Chronicle*, 20-12-1917, p. 13, cited in G. T. Brown, *The Hindu Conspiracy and the Neutrality of the United States, 1914-1917* (unpublished M.A. thesis of the University of California, 1941), p. 4. This thesis will be referred to hereafter as Brown.

85. Testimony of Nawab Khan, cited in Brown, p. 5.

86. Hopkinson to Dy. Minister of the Interior, Canada on 17-2-1913, H. P. 1913 June 5-17 B.

87. Memo. by the British Consul General, San Francisco on 7-3-1912, J. & P. 1257 with 257 vol. 1129 of 1912.

tion. B.S. Sharma and H. E. Pandey became their President and Vice-President, respectively.⁸⁸

To meet this new menace, Har Dayal wired to Taraknath in New York, on 11 January 1913, to attend a meeting of the Hindusthane Association at Berkley on the 13th inst. There Govind Bihari Lall took the side of Taraknath and Har Dayal, and their aims and programme of action were affirmed and accepted by all present.⁸⁹ This further strengthened the revolutionary group among the local Indians.

For a better organisation of their campaign a meeting of Indian leaders in the U.S.A. was summoned at Astoria by Sohan Singh Bhakhna on 13 March 1913. It was attended by 120 representatives from different centres. A Hindi Sabha, seeking to include all Indians in the U.S.A., was founded. Sohan Singh Bhakhna became its first President, Jwalla Singh and Keshar Singh, Vice-Presidents, Har Dayal, General Secretary, Karim Baksh and Munshi Ram, Organising Secretaries, and Kanshi Ram, Treasurer. It was decided here that the central office of the party would be located in a rented house at 436 Hill Street, San Francisco, and should be named Yuganter Asram, in memory of the famous revolutionary group and journal in Bengal. It was also decided that its own office building would be built at 5, Wood Street, San Francisco.⁹⁰

After the organisational base of the party had thus been consolidated and a steady source of income from subscriptions was assured, Har Dayal, in May 1913, left for an extensive lecture tour up and down the entire U.S. West Coast. Kanshi Ram Joshi, Bhai Paramanand, and Ramchandra Bharadwaj usually accompanied him.⁹¹ For the first time, the leader came in direct contact with the men he was to lead. His dedication, dynamism, and eloquence soon activated the Indian

88. Hopkinson to Cony., Ottawa on 20-1-1913, H. P. 1913 November 62-66 B. Also, History Sheet of Har Dayal, op. cit.

89. History Sheet of Har Dayal, op. cit. Most Indian students in California had sympathy for the revolutionaries. H. E. Pandey to Haider Ali on 27-1-1913, H. P. 1913 June 5-17 B. In the aforementioned record Pandey is misspelt as Pandian

90. Randhir Singh, op. cit., pp. 8-9. Also, Khuswant Singh, op. cit., pp. 123-124.

91. Deposition by Amar Singh, Chief Prosecution witness in the Lahore Conspiracy Case, 1915, cited in D. P. Singh, op. cit., pp. 193-194. Also, *San Francisco Examiner*, 23-11-1917.

community into a, more or less, compact militant body. The masses had found their man and were ready to undertake considerable sacrifice at his call. Money and volunteers for a larger national cause began flowing in, and Har Dayal, as the symbol of this mass awakening and self-confidence, stood forth as the undisputed leader of Indians there.⁹² Within a few months its membership in and outside the U.S.A. ran into many thousands, and branches were opened in many countries of East Asia.⁹³

After the completion of his successful tour among the Indian settlements on the West Coast, the second general meeting of the Hindi Sabha was convened at Sacramento in October 1913.⁹⁴ They planned to bring out an Indian revolutionary journal from their Yugantar Ashram. The purpose was not so much to enthuse the local Indians, who no longer needed it, but to inspire and organize Indian nationalist sentiment throughout the world. The suppression of revolutionary journals in India and the growing unpopularity of Krishnavarma and his *Sociologist* among Indian revolutionaries, convinced Har Dayal and others of the need of having an organ of their own, in the relative safety of the U.S.A. Suggestive of its ideal, it was to be called the *Ghadar*, i.e. the mutiny, and was to be published from San Francisco every week. Since their purpose was to inspire and organise the common Indian, at home and abroad, for a revolutionary struggle, it used to be published in both English and Hindi, and the first issue saw light, on 1 November 1913. Because of the changed atmosphere and the drive and organising ability of its owners, the *Ghadar* soon enjoyed a very wide sale, and began reaching Indian settlements all over the world. It would openly incite them to revolt and assure them of German help against Britain.⁹⁵ To appeal to different Indian communities abroad, it soon came to be published in many other

92. "As compared with Har Dayal these men (Taraknath Das, Gurdutt Kumar, and Barakatullah etc.) have receded to subordinate positions." D. C. J. on 29-12-1914, H. P. 1915 January 278-282B

93. Khuswant Singh, op. cit., p. 124.

94. *Ibid.*, pp. 123-124.

95. History Sheet of the *Ghadar*, Roll 3 file No. 9-10-3, section 7. The press was at 1324 Valencia Street, San Francisco. *Ibid.* Also, J. W. Preston's statement, cited in *San Francisco Examiner*, 23-11-1917, p. 4. "...the effects of his (Dayal's) teachings are to be found in Shanghai, Hongkong, Penang, and Bankok." Supplementary Lahore Conspiracy Case, Judgement, Part III, J. & P. 2186 of 1916 with 4095, vol. 1390 A of 1915.

Indian languages. By late April 1914, the *Ghadar* was being issued in English, Urdu, Hindi, Gujrati, Pashtu, Gorkhali, and in Gurumukhi script. Of course, issues in Pashtu and Gorkhali were rather irregular.⁹⁶

Because of the immense popularity of the *Ghadar*, and the importance that even the British authorities attached to it, the entire revolutionary movement associated with it came to be popularly known as the Ghadar movement. Har Dayal soon organised the members of the so-called Ghadar party into inner and outer circles. Members had to abide by the three basic regulations of the party, e.g. (1) all new recruits must be recommended by at least two members, (2) that none was entitled to know all the party secrets within six months of his obtaining the membership, and (3) that if anyone leaked out any secret or misappropriated the party fund he would be punished with death. Besides, there were seventeen other principles guiding the conduct of different categories of members.⁹⁷ Normally, members used to be on probation for six months, and the penalty for divulging secrets was death.⁹⁸ Har Dayal had not only organised the Indian immigrants into an active movement but had also, in the meantime, established valuable contacts with a few labour organisations in the U.S.A. Ever since his arrival there, he had been quite friendly with a few socialists and anarchists, and was quite an admirer of Marx and Engels. In 1912-13, he actually became the Secretary of the San Francisco branch of the Industrial Workers of the World.⁹⁹ How far these really shaped his conviction is difficult to say.¹⁰⁰ But, like many other Indian revolutionaries, he saw in them a

96. D. C. I. on 8-6-1915. H. P. 1915 June 549-552 B. The *Ghadar* used to be printed in many Indian languages and 2500 used to be mailed to different countries. J. W. Spellman, "The International Extension of Political Conspiracy as illustrated by the Ghadar Party," *Journal of Indian History*, Vol. XXXVII, Part I, April, 1959, p. 32.

97. Testimony of Harcharan Das in the Second Supplementary Lahore Conspiracy Case, J. & P. 2279 Vol. 1472 of 1917. Also, Brown, p. 7.

98. J. P. Jones and P. M. Hollester, *The German Secret Service in America, 1914-1918*. Toronto, 1918, p. 268.

99. Hopkinson to Cony on 20-1-1913, H. P. 1913 November 62-66B.

100. In 1912, he advised young Indians to read the works of Marx, E. Haskel, and August Babel. Har Dayal, "Wealth of Nations", *Modern Review*, Calcutta, July, 1912, pp. 43-50.

useful ally. Later events showed that such expectations were not always belied.

In fact, it was quite easy for Indians to evoke American sympathy by appealing to a few of their traditional points of pride, e.g. that the U.S.A. is a haven for all exiles from tyranny, and is a champion of liberty and equality for all. Besides, there was the deep-rooted dislike for British colonialism. Later, as Anglo-German relations became increasingly strained, Indians began to enjoy the active sympathy of the German-Americans, as well as of the German-controlled press.

Since 1911, another factor has also begun operating in the American mind. The U. S. trained Chinese patriots had brought about a revolution in their country. No wonder, the Indian exiles there might one day take charge of their country's destiny with gratitude for the U.S.A.¹⁰¹

By early 1913, however, a new situation was created in the State of California, when the local authorities declared that no alien could purchase land or take it on lease. Far from taking a positive stand in support of the Indian settlers there, the British Government quietly agreed that they could be treated like other Orientals. Early in 1914, Har Dayal handed over the editorship of the *Ghadar* to Ramchandra and started a vigorous agitation against such callous attitude of the British authorities. Already Har Dayal's close association with the syndicalists and his Marxist views had attracted the irritated attention of the authorities. Now by lodging a formal protest against him the British Consul at San Francisco only put fuel in the fire.¹⁰² On 25 March 1914, he was arrested as an undesirable alien, but was soon released on bail. Realizing that henceforth his freedom of activity in the U.S.A. was sure to be seriously curtailed, Har Dayal immediately jumped the bail put up by his American friends and escaped to Europe.¹⁰³

Har Dayal's departure left Ramchandra, the Editor of the *Ghadar*,

101. British Ambassador. Washington to Foreign Secretary, Britain on 7-5-1914, H. P. 1914 December 96-98 A. Ramchandra had reached the U. S. A. in January 1913 *San Francisco Chronicle*, 8-4-1917, p 3, cited in Brown, p. 7.

102. R. C. Majumdar. *History of the Freedom Movement in India*. Vol. II, Calcutta, 1962, pp. 396-397.

103. Henry Landau, *The Enemy Within, the Inside Story of German Sabotage in America*, New York, 1917, pp 28-29. Also, J. W. Spellman, op. cit., p. 28. Also Brown, pp. 7-8.

as the undisputed leader of the Ghadar movement in the U.S.A. The void created by Har Dayal's departure was shortly filled by the arrival of Bhagwan Singh and Barakatullah from East Asia on 22 May 1914.¹⁰⁴ Bhagwan Singh was by common consent the leading figure among Indian revolutionaries in East Asia. He had toured that region for years, and was in touch with the far-flung Indian communities from Japan to the Philippines. Naturally, his arrival brought about closer contacts between the Ghadarites in the U.S.A. and their comrades and sympathisers in East Asia. This as well as inflated reports about the organisation and preparedness of their comrades nearer home naturally added to the Ghadar leaders' feeling of strength. Ramchandra set about organising the entire Indian community in the U.S.A., with the help of Bhagwan Singh and Barakatullah,¹⁰⁵ for the approaching hour of reckoning, and the inky guns of the *Ghadar* were turned against Britain with increased virulence.¹⁰⁶

The Komagata Maru Episode

The unfortunate *Komagata Maru* incident also increased their excitement and bitterness. Originally there was hardly anything political about it. A Sikh contractor of Singapore, named Gurdit Singh, sought to circumvent the 'direct passage' clause of the Canadian immigration regulation by chartering the above-mentioned Japanese ship to carry intending Indian immigrants from East Asia.¹⁰⁷ They had obviously been encouraged by the decision of the Supreme Court of

104. D. C. I. on 11-5-1914, H. P. 1914 August 1916.

105. Testimony of Nawab Khan, *San Francisco Examiner* 20-12-1917 p. 3.

106. The Commissioner of Police, Bombay wrote to the U. S. Consul, Bombay that the *Ghadar* formed "a source of continual anxiety to the Government of India". The D. C. I. wrote to the U. S. Consul, Bombay on 1 August 1914 that the Government of India had "been put to a good deal of inconvenience by the transmission through the post of a great quantity of anarchist literature emanating from San Francisco." U. S. Consul, Bombay to Washington on 21-8-1914, cited in D. P. Singh, op. cit., p.

202. The *Ghadar* and the Gurumukhi journal, *Sansar-i-Khalsa* (Stockton) were banned in India with effect from 3-7-1914 and 5-10-1914 respectively. *Ibid.* The Government of India was so worried about the success of anti-British propaganda in the U.S.A. that Rustam Rustamjee was sent there, in summer 1914, with pictures and slides to prove Britain's good work in India and Indian loyalty. J. & P. 4159, vol. 1444 of 1916.

107. Bhupendranath Datta, op. cit., p. 229 (foot. note). Gurdit himself said so when he came to Calcutta, in September 1947, to preside over a

Canada which allowed thirty-nine Indian immigrants, who had reached Vancouver, in October 1913, by the *Panama Maru*, to disembark and stay there. But they did not know that new Orders-in-Council regarding 'continuous journey' and the 'possession of two hundred dollars' had been passed and were so worded as to be in conformity with the Immigration Act.¹⁰⁸

The *Komagata Maru* left Hongkong, on 4 April 1914, with one hundred and sixty-five immigrants. One hundred and eleven joined them in Shanghai, eighty-six at Moji, and fourteen at Yakohama. The ship reached Vancouver on 23 May with three-hundred and seventy-six immigrants. Of them twenty-five were Muslims and the rest, almost exclusively, Sikhs.¹⁰⁹ The immigration authorities at Vancouver, however, claimed that these people had not complied with many of the requirements, such as having health certificates or two hundred dollars in cash, and none except the ship's doctor or those already domiciled in Canada was allowed to land.¹¹⁰ The ship, however, remained anchored, and the Indians of Vancouver soon formed a 'Shore Committee' to help their countrymen in the ship by raising the necessary fund, creating a favourable public opinion and, if necessary, by moving the court of law.¹¹¹ On 31 May and 21 June, protest meetings were organised there against the so-called heartless attitude of the immigration and port authorities, and even many Canadian socialists participated in it.¹¹² But the authorities remained firm in their determination to compel the Indians to quit. On 7 July, the Supreme Court gave its judgment that the new Orders-in-Council prevented it from interfering with the decisions of the Immigration Department, and that was the end of their hope of getting justice and legal redress of their grievances.¹¹³

meeting on the occasion of the death anniversary of Jyotindranath Mukherjee. Statement of Jadugopal Mukherjee.

108. K. Singh and S. Singh, *Ghadar 1915*, New Delhi, 1996, pp. 11-12. Also, Gurdit Singh, op. cit., p. 20.

109. Report of the Komagata Maru Enquiry Committee, dated 3-12-1914, J. & P. 5028, vol. 1925 A of 1914.

110. Report of the Komagata Maru Enquiry Committee, op. cit. Also, Gurdit Singh, op. cit., p. 32.

111. Report of the Komataga Maru Enquiry Committee, op. cit.

112. *Ibid.* Also, K. Singh and S. Singh, op. cit., pp. 23-24.

113. Re. Munshi Singh, No. 20-1914, *British Columbia Law Reports*, p. 2450.

The next move of the port authorities was to ask the *Komagata Maru* to get out of the Canadian waters. But it could be easier said than done. The passengers, who were already in a violent mood, now took control of the ship and refused to move. The port authorities at first retaliated by preventing food and fresh water from being brought to the ship, and then sent a tug-boat, *Sea Lion*, with 120 policemen to take control of the ship. But the passengers drove them back.¹¹⁴ Then, in the night of 21 July, a warship, the *Rainbow*, was brought to her side to fire upon the *Komagata Maru*, if necessary. Now some representatives of the 'Shore Committee' came in the *Sea Lion* to persuade the passengers to leave. The Minister of Agriculture, Martin Burrell, also promised to reimburse those who had suffered loss by the refusal of the port authorities to allow the *Komagata Maru* to unload her cargo. At last she sailed back for Yokohama in the morning of 23 July 1914.¹¹⁵

For these two months Indians of the entire West Coast were living in a state of tension and excitement, and that generated in their minds a desire for revenge. In such an atmosphere exaggerated reports about the revolutionary situation at home, many of those emanating from the passengers of the *Komagata Maru*, were eagerly received and believed. By the time the ship left Vancouver the first sparks of war were already visible, and almost everyone felt that the long-expected Anglo-German show-down would soon take place. The belief gained ground that it only required the return of a few thousand zealous revolutionaries, and India would be in flames.¹¹⁶

Late in July 1914, the decision that Ghadar Volunteers should return home *en masse* was first taken at a meeting of the party at Oxnard.¹¹⁷ Similar meetings were also held at Upland, Fresno, Los Angeles, and Clairmont, and special supplements of the *Ghadar*, on 28 July and 4 August, explained to the readers their duty in the event of Britain getting involved in the war that was fast spreading from the Balkans. Then Britain joined the war, and for the Indian

114. Gurdit Singh, op. cit., pp. 72, 75, 103-104 and 109.

115. K. Singh and S. Singh, op. cit., pp. 28-29.

116. Statement of Bhagwan Singh.

117. *Morning Post*, 28-11-1916, J. & P. 4886 with 4095, Vol. 1390 A of 1915. Also testimonies of Amar Singh, Mula Singh, Umrao Singh, and Nawab Khan in Supplementary Lahore Conspiracy Case, Part III, J. & P. 2186 of 1916 with 4095, Vol. 1390 A of 1915. *

revolutionaries the long-awaited hour had come. A general meeting of all Indians was hurriedly called at Sacramento, obviously, to exhort the intending revolutionaries to return home, as soon as possible.¹¹⁸ The great exodus began, and from thousand throats could be heard the war-slogans of the Sikhs as they swarmed into the ships leaving for Asia.



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118. K. Singh and S. Singh, *op. cit.*, p. 35. Partly corroborated by the statement of Bhagwan Singh, H. P. 1914 December 96-98 A.

CHAPTER—III

INDIAN REVOLUTIONARIES IN ASIAN COUNTRIES BEFORE WORLD WAR I

(EAST ASIA)

Some Asian—particularly East Asian—countries had a sizeable Indian population of students and immigrants, and revolutionary stirrings among them were visible even before the outbreak of the First World War.

Japan

Japan alone among these countries, since the beginning of this century, attracted a fair number of Indian students, and their number steadily increased after her spectacular victory over Russia. By 1910-11, there were over one hundred Indian students in Japan. Besides, there were many Indian businessmen, mostly concentrated in Tokyo and Kobe.¹ Yet, in spite of the relatively small size of her Indian population, Japan was to play a very important role in the history of the Indian revolutionary movement, and that was due mainly to her own importance as a major power and the fact that she was generally looked upon as the leader of Asia. Many in India, naturally, expected Japanese sympathy and support in their fight against the British, and the conversations Kakuzo Okakura had with some Indian nationalists strengthened their expectation and gave a definite impetus to the embryonic revolutionary movement in Bengal.²

1. Lancelot Lawton, *Empire of the East*, Part II, London, 1912, p. 804.

2. *The Japan Weekly Mail*, 7-4-1906, cited in R. P. Dua, *The Impact of the Russo-Japanese (1905) War on Indian Politics*, Delhi, 1966, p. 70. Also, Jadugopal Mukherjee, *Viplabi Jibaner Smriti* (in Bengali), Calcutta, 1956, pp. 202-203. Also, Rabindranath Tagore's speech at the Industrial Club, Tokyo on 15-5-1929, quoted in his book *Japan Yatri* (in Bengali), Calcutta, 1962, pp. 136-141. Also, the opinion of Sri Aurobindo, quoted by Dr. Nirod Baran in "Talks with Sri Aurobindo", *Mother India*, March, 1961, p. 9. Also, the revolutionary pamphlet, *Bhawani Mandir* (in Bengali), Calcutta, 1905, advised Indians to emulate the Japanese, cited in Rowlett, p. 17.

In Japan also, even before her victory over Russia had been confirmed by the treaty of Portsmouth (5 September 1905), many had begun indulging in the fond belief that it was their historic mission to lead and liberate the rest of Asia. Encouraged by their obvious anti-British feeling and friendly attitude, Indian students in Tokyo, in 1905, planned to observe the Sivaji Festival in a fitting manner. Thanks to the active co-operation of their many Japanese friends, the festival partook of the nature of a pan-Asiatic demonstration.³ About a month later even the Speaker of the Japanese House of Peers said, "... it was the sacred duty of Japan as the leading Asiatic state to stretch a helping hand... to India, who is capable of civilisation, and free them from European yoke."⁴ Naturally, many Indian revolutionaries began "looking in that quarter (Japan) for guidance and even, perhaps, for assistance."⁵

The first Indian to go there for revolutionary work was Surendramohan Bose. He reached Japan in 1906, and rented a house at 17 Gondwamachi, Aoyama, Tokyo for use as their organisational centre.⁶ This, too, possibly following Krishnavarma's example, was named India House. However, nothing is known about his plans and work in Japan. Obviously, he was disappointed, and left for Vancouver, in late 1907, from where he wrote to the Editor, *Bande-Mataram*, Calcutta, on 29 December that Indians should not expect much from Japan.⁷ The Japanese public, however, continued to evince friendly interest in Indian national movement, and some of their newspapers used to give prominent space to news about India.⁸

But, it was not till Barakatullah reached there that anti-British agitation by Indians could be organised in Japan. He left the U.S.A. for Japan in February 1909 to join the School of Foreign Languages in Tokyo as a teacher in Urdu.⁹ There he soon came in contact with

3. *The Bengalee*, 15-6-1905, quoted in R. P. Dua, op. cit., p. 46.

4. *The East* (Calcutta), 16-7-1905, *ibid.*

5. Lancelot Lawton, op. cit., p. 805. Also V. Chirol, *Indian Unrest*, op. cit., p. 147.

6. *Free Hindusthan*, July, 1908, J. & P. 4803 of 1911 with 275 vol. 1129 of 1912. Also, H. P. 1913 March 150 B.

7. Colin Campbell's note, H. P. 1908 November 6 Dep.

8. Lancelot Lawton, op. cit., pp. 805 and 807. Shun Saitoh, *Japan and India*, Tokyo, 1912 pp. ii-vii.

9. See p. 60.

Capt. Fadli, formerly of the Egyptian army. Fadli had come to Japan in September 1907, as a pan-Islamic agent, and was publishing a journal in English, the *Islamic Fraternity*.¹⁰ Barakatullah soon became associated with its publication and, after Fadli's departure sometime later, became the editor and virtual owner of this paper. The Ottoman Government used to assist this venture with a regular remittance of £ 20 to £ 30 a month. Occasional assistance, possibly, came from Kabul as well. He also secured the active collaboration of Ma, the Muslim Charge'd Affaires of China in Tokyo, and soon converted his journal into an effective anti-British tribune.¹¹ He also found an eager lieutenant in his young Japanese disciple, who soon embraced Islam and was known as Hasan Hatano.¹²

Barakatullah benefited considerably from the growing anti-British feeling in Japan. The alleged cruelty with which the Japanese were reported to have suppressed the Korean revolt, and the formal annexation of that country, on 23 August 1910, had not been favourably commented upon in Britain, and an increasing number of Japanese public men began looking upon Britain as their chief rival and future opponent. Many Japanese businessmen, in particular, felt "the urgent necessity of endeavouring to create close relationship between Japan and India, and so simultaneously to promote the development of trade between the two countries".¹³ Because of the growing anti-British and pan-Asian sentiment, the obvious self-interest of some Japanese commercial houses and seamen could be easily blended with their new imperial ideals, and a substantial part of the illicit arms and ammunition secured by revolutionaries in India used to come primarily from Kobe and Yakohama.¹⁴ The contribution of Barakatullah and his associates, however, lay primarily in creating a favourable climate of

10. British Ambassador, Tokyo to Foreign Secy., Britain on 15-10-1912, H. P. 1913 January I A.

11. British Ambassador's letter from Tokyo, dated 9-5-1914, H. P. 1914 August 7-16 A.

12. *Ibid.*

13. Shun Saitoh, op. cit., p. i. Also, *Japanese Chronicle*, 17-12-1908, referred to in Ramananda Chatterjee (ed.), *Towards Home Rule*, Part II, Calcutta, 1917, pp 97-99.

14. Govt. of Bengal to the Secy. of State on 30-11-1914, H. P. 1915 March 214-229 B. Also, note by D. Petrie of the C. I. D., dated 21-1-1915, *ibid.* Also, British Ambassador, Tokyo to Viceroy, 28-8-1914, Hardinge Papers, Vol. II Part I No. 256.

opinion for India and in establishing valuable contacts in Japan. In fact, Barakatullah soon found powerful friends and patrons in Count Taisuku Itagaki, Dr. Toru Terao, Tsuyoshi Inukai and, last but not the least, Mitsuru Toyama, the dreaded leader of the Kokuryu (Black Dragons).¹⁵)

Ever since his stay in the U.S.A. Barakatullah was in regular correspondence with Indian revolutionaries in Britain and France, and was in regular receipt of the *Sociologist*. In Tokyo his establishment soon became the chief centre in East Asia for distributing the revolutionary journals from Europe and America. His *Islamic Fraternity* and other revolutionary journals, redirected by him, gradually began reaching important centres of Indians throughout East Asia,¹⁶ and with the dawn of the second decade of this century the fruits of anti-British propaganda could be seen among Indian residents, particularly, of China and Thailand. Kobe in Japan also had a small Indian trading population, and slowly grew into a centre of Indian revolutionary activities, under the leadership of Ram Kishen, Ram Lall, and Sohan Singh.¹⁷

Obviously, the Government of India was not to be expected to remain a mute witness to these developments not very far away. On 1 August 1912, the Viceroy appealed to the Secretary of State to request the Japanese Government to put a stop to the publication of the *Islamic Fraternity*.¹⁸ On such a representation being made by the British Ambassador in Tokyo, the Director of the School of Foreign Languages, Murakami, officially rebuked and warned Barakatullah for his anti-British activities.¹⁹ As the tone of the paper still did not change, it was suppressed by an order of the Japanese Government with effect from 12 October 1912. In fact, it had already ceased to come out after September. From that month, however, Hasan Hatano began publishing another monthly journal, the *Al-Islam*,

15. British Ambassador's letter from Tokyo, dated 9-5-1914, H. P. 1914 August 7-16 A.

16. Statement of Lala Sunder Das, who was then at Bangkok in charge of the distribution of revolutionary literature in Thailand, Malaya, and Sumatra.

17. D. C. I. on 1-12-1914, H. P. 1914 December 227-229 B.

18. H. P. 1915 October 242-247 B.

19. British Ambassador, Tokyo to Foreign Secy, Britain on 19-10-1912, H. P. 1914 February 54-58 A.

half in English and half in Japanese. It continued to be published rather intermittently for about a year.²⁰

Barakatullah had realised, even before action was taken against his journal, that to influence effectively the potentially revolutionary but uneducated Indians in East Asia, his appeal must be couched in their own language. So, already in May 1912, he had published an Urdu pamphlet, *An-Nazir al-Uryan*. Even after his journal had been suspended he managed to publish from Tokyo, early in 1913, two more revolutionary pamphlets, the *Akher al-Helal Saif*, in Urdu, and the *Proclamation of Liberty*, in English, for circulation among Indians in East Asia. Many copies of these even reached India via Singapore.²¹ However, the governments of Gombei Yamamoto and Shigenobu Okuma were keen on maintaining good relations with Britain, and so it was not possible for Indians in Japan to carry on an effective anti-British agitation. So Barakatullah left for the U.S.A. on 6 May 1914.²²

Obviously, there was nothing spectacular or of immediate significance in Barakatullah's work in Japan. Yet it has to be admitted that almost single-handed he established the earliest centre of Indian revolutionary work in East Asia, and carried out from there an active anti-British propaganda. In that process he had influenced certain elements in Japanese public life²³ and Indians in East Asia,²⁴ whose sympathy and co-operation contributed considerably to the vigour of the Indian revolutionary movement in that region during the First World War.

Other Countries of East Asia

In contrast, some other countries of East Asia had a sizeable Indian population. Fairly large-scale Indian emigration to the countries of South-East Asia had started towards the end of the 19th century. The overwhelming majority, of course, went to British possessions like

20. Note by R. Hughes-Butler, dated 9-5-1913, H. P. 1914 February 54-58 A.

21. Note, by R. Hughes-Butler, dated 27-7-1913, *ibid.* Also, E. S. Montagu, *Indian Diary* (unpublished), Vol. III, p. 173.

22. C. W. E. Cotton to D. C. I. on 11-5-1914, H. P. 1914 August 7-16 A. Bhagwan Singh, who accompanied him, had come to Japan late in April 1914.

23. From India Office to Home Secy., India on 14-8-1914, H. P. 1914 September 69 A. Dep.

24. Statements of Bhagwan Singh and Lala Sunder Das.

Burma, then an integral part of the Indian Empire, and Malaya. Most of them came from South India, and were primarily engaged in trade and money-lending or as manual labourers. In course of time, the outflow of emigrants spilled over the frontiers of the British Empire, and an Indian community began growing up in Thailand as well. Here also the earliest Indian settlers were Muslims from South India. But, with the dawn of this century, large numbers of Punjabees too began migrating there. Usually, they found employment in the Thai Railways or started their own business in cloth, paper or timber. By the time the First World War broke out, the Indian population in Thailand had risen to nearly two thousand. A few hundred, mostly Sikhs, also went to China mainly to work as night-guards or policemen in the various treaty-ports. A few even went to Sumatra (now officially known as Andalas) and the Philippines, but their number never rose above a few dozen.

Indian communities in these countries, unlike those in North America, did not include a sizeable student population or professional intelligentsia, nor were they subjected to such restrictions and discriminations or exposed to such leavening influences of a very different social milieu as were experienced by their more prosperous kinsfolk across the Pacific. As a result, political discontent or national aspiration secured among them relatively late expression. However, residence abroad among free peoples, and the absence of the long-accustomed British authority and the various restrictions of home gradually shaped the political attitudes and aspirations of these Indians living beyond the reach of British rule. Events like Japan's victory over China, the Chinese Revolution, and the rebellions that followed stirred the imagination even of the common Indian immigrants close to the scene. They read in these developments signs of change, possibly for the better, and became increasingly conscious of the honour of independence. Among Indian communities pulsating with such new urges and aspirations the message of revolt was brought by revolutionary emissaries and *granthis* (Sikh priests) from India, by revolutionary pamphlets from Europe, the U.S.A., and Japan, and by the enraged immigrants or their families returning from Canada or the U.S.A.²⁵ Then, as Anglo-German relations deteriorated, they began receiving active en-

25. Statements of Bhagwan Singh, Lala Sunder Das, Gurubakhs Singh, and Pandit Raghunath Sharma, President of the Thai-Bharat Cultural Lodge, Bangkok.

couragement from local Germans, and a rather vague belief grew that Japan also would help them in their struggle against Europeans. These naturally lent them added confidence.²⁶

Malaya

For obvious reasons the Indian community in former Malaya could not take a prominent part in revolutionary activities. Undoubtedly, the Indian community there was the biggest in East Asia, but the British colonial administration did not offer any better opportunity for political activities than the Government of India. Moreover, these immigrants were mostly from South India and, by and large, they were politically more quiescent than the Punjabees. However, the message of revolutionary nationalism was first brought to them in 1910 or 1911 by Bholanath Chatterjee of the Yugantar group of Bengal.²⁷ He could make a few converts to his cause among the few Punjabee settlers at Penang and Perlis, which soon became small centres of revolutionary activities. Prem Singh and Gujar Singh were the leaders at Penang, while Vir Singh and Jagat Singh were the leaders in Perlis.²⁸ But, for reasons stated above, the revolutionary movement could not make much headway there, and Bholanath, obviously disappointed, returned to India a year later.²⁹

Thailand

In 1913, Bholanath and Nani Bose were sent to Thailand by the Yugantar group to organise a revolutionary movement among the Indian residents there. Thailand was an independent country, not well-disposed towards Britain, and large numbers of Punjabees were then working in the Thai Railways under German engineers. So, it was expected that these emissaries would be able to work there with considerable freedom and establish bases of operation, which might

26. *Ibid.* Also, note by R. H. Craddock, dated 30-8-1914, H. P. 1914 September 211-224 A.

27. Jadugopal Mukherjee, *op. cit.*, p. 29. Details about this Yugantar group in p. 244.

28. D. C. I. on 6-7-1915, H. P. 1915 July 516-519B. Also, D. Petrie's report from Singapore, dated 21-8-1915, F. P. 1917 June 1-46.

29. Statement of Jadugopal Mukherjee. However, after the outbreak of the war, Sikhs of Malaya joined the Ghadar exodus to India to stage a revolt. D. G. I. on 2-3-1915, H. P. 1915 June 60-68B.

be used both as shelters for revolutionaries and for keeping contact with the outside world. At Bangkok, they also became friendly with a local Indian lawyer, Kumud Mukherjee.³⁰ However, they concentrated their efforts on the Punjabees employed in the railway construction works at Pakoh, under the German Section Manager, Lueders, and could recruit for their cause, among others, Amar Singh, Balar Singh, and Ram Singh, alias Narain Singh.³¹ Soon, the message of revolution spread to Bandon in the extreme south. There the German railway officer, Doerring, was in league with Arya Singh, alias Prince, Inder Singh, and three Indian traders, Dewan Chand, Ganapat Rai, and Chattur Lal.³² Through Doerring and Arya Singh an effective liaison was soon established between the Indian revolutionaries and the German Legation at Bangkok.³³ There the *gurdwara* at Pahurat soon became the chief centre of Indian revolutionary activities in Thailand. The leaders there were Buddha Singh, Thakur Singh, and Lodha Singh.³⁴ Thus, by the time the war broke out, a fairly widespread revolutionary movement had been organised among the Indians in Thailand. Many of them were in contact with Indians in other East Asian countries and North America, and an effective understanding had also been arrived at between the Indians and the German officers and Embassy in Thailand. Naturally, Bangkok became a very important centre of war-time Indo-German revolutionary activities in East Asia.

China

To the Indians in China, the message of revolution, it appears, was first carried through Hong Kong. Having escaped arrest during the Punjab disturbances, in 1907-08, Bhagwan Singh reached Hong Kong secretly in March 1910, and joined the local

30. Jadugopal Mukherjee, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

31. *Ibid.* Also, British Minister, Bangkok to Secy., Foreign and Political, India on 25-10-1915, H. P. 1915 November 254-257B.

32. Memo. from Acting British Consul General, Bangkok, dated 28-12-1914, H. P. 1915 June 60-88B.

33. *Ibid.*

34. Report from British Legation, Bangkok, dated 22-3-1915, H. P. 1915 June 60-88B.

gurdwara as its chief priest. His main object was to spread the spirit of revolution among the Indians there, and he was twice arrested in 1911 and 1912 for causing disaffection among the Indian soldiers and policemen. So he left for Japan, on his way to Canada, on 14 May 1913.³⁵

But, by then, the mischief had been done. Hangkow, in 1912, had 140 Indians, and it was known that almost all of them were directly or otherwise engaged in revolutionary work. They used to write incriminating letters to their friends and relatives, even in the army, and were in regular receipt of revolutionary pamphlets and journals published elsewhere.³⁶ Gradually, the revolutionary urge spread among the Indians in Shanghai, Amoy, and Swatow. In Shanghai their leaders were Mathura Singh and Harnam Singh and, by the end of 1913, political meetings were taking place in the local *gurdwara* every week. The leaders of the Indians in Shanghai and Hangkow were also in close touch with the local Germans and German Consulates, and received from them advice and encouragement.³⁷ Since arms were rather easily available in China after the revolution of 1911, some Indian traders there were engaged in secret trade in arms with their friends at home.³⁸

Since there were direct shipping lines between China and North America, an advantage which India and the countries of South-East Asia did not enjoy in those days, Indian immigrants in the U.S.A. and Canada had to pass through China during both their onward and return voyages. Besides, China is relatively near to North America. So, more than those in South-East Asian countries, Indians in China were from the beginning in regular contact with their kinsmen across the Pacific, and the revolutionary movement among them was largely an extension of the Ghadar movement. It was largely due to this that China, after the war broke out, became the first and an important half-way house for revolutionaries returning to India or Thailand.³⁹

35. Bhagwan Singh's letter to author, dated 27-10-1967. Also J. & P. 1193 with 3277, vol. 138 of 1915. Also, H. P. 1914 August 7-16A.

36. Isemonger's note, dated 10-7-1914, H. P. 1914 August 2-6A. Also, D. C. I. on 1-12-1914, H. P. 1914 December 227-229B.

37. Ruedinger's statement in March 1917, H. P. 1917 July 52 Dep.

38. Dy. Foreign Secy., Britain to Secy., Foreign and Political, India on 5-5-1914, H. P. 1914 August 2-6A.

39. See pp. 190-193.

Indonesia

Other countries of East Asia, such as Indonesia or the Philippines, had only a few dozen Indians, and revolutionary activities among them were naturally sporadic and ill-organised. Medan and Deli in Sumatra were two important centres of Indian settlers, and by 1914 small revolutionary groups had been formed there under the leadership of Arjun Singh and Vir Singh.⁴⁰ They were known to be in close touch with Prem Singh of Penang and Abdul Selam of Djakarta. Nothing more is known about these groups in Sumatra. Abdul Selam was an important link with the Germans at Djakarta, and was to play an effective part in war-time attempts at securing arms for a revolt in India.⁴¹

The Philippines

In the Philippines revolutionary work among Indians was first begun by Gurudutt Kumar. He came from San Francisco, in June 1913, to organise a revolutionary group in Manila, which would serve as a mid-station for clandestine shipments of arms and men to India, and as a distributing centre for propaganda literature. He had an excellent reception. 900 dollars were collected within a few days⁴², and a branch of the Hindusthane Association was established at 22 Colla Potala, Manila, with Dost Muhammad, a Pathan night-watchman, as President and Chandan Singh as Vice-President.⁴³ Another prominent member of this group was Kundan Lall.⁴⁴ The new movement soon spread among Indians of other islands, such as Palwan and Mindanao.⁴⁵ However, not much is known about their activities before the war. But, after the war broke out, these revolu

40. D. C. I. on 6-7-1915, H. P. 1915 July 516-519B. Also, C. I. D., Punjab to D. C. I. on 5-8-1915, H. P. 1917 June 1-46.

41. Abdul Selam was arrested in Java, in March 1915, for publishing inflammatory pamphlets, but was released through Emil Helfferich's intervention. D. C. I. on 10-8-1915, H. P. 1915 October 552-556B. Also, Emil Helfferich's letter to author, dated 17-9-1956. Also, testimony of Kumud Mukherjee, Roll 6, exhibit No. 4.

42. Hopkinson to Cony on 29-5-1913, H. P. 1913 August 17-18B. Also, note by the Govt. of Philippines, dated 2-8-1917, Roll 5.

43. Note by the Dept. of Police, Manila, dated 4-5-1917, *ibid.*

44. Note by the Clerk, Municipal Court, Manila, dated 17-9-1917, *ibid.*

45. Statement of Bhagwan Singh.

tionary groups at strategic points proved to be of considerable help to the Indo-German efforts at organising a revolt in India.

By and large, these revolutionary groups among Indians in East Asia owed their origin primarily to the conscious, though not concerted, efforts directed from within and outside India. As a result, lacking in any unifying influence or allegiance, these groups in different countries, in their early years, did not form an organised movement by themselves. But the rise of the vigorous Ghadar movement in the U.S.A., with an unprecedented mass appeal, profoundly influenced the nature and course of Indian revolutionary activities throughout East Asia. Indians there were mostly from the Punjab, like the American Ghadarites, and were in regular communication with their kinsmen across the Pacific. So they readily responded to the virile propoganda of Har Dayal and Ramchandra, and the weekly *Ghadar* exercised an activising as well as unifying influence on the Indians of this region. The presence of the redoubtable Bhagwan Singh in that region from November 1913 to May 1914 further strengthened their unity, and gave their movement a new impetus. By the time the World War broke out, the different Indian revolutionary groups had become emotionally united and affiliated to the Ghadar movement, forming an effective link between the Ghadarites in North America and the Punjab. These developments had naturally begun causing concern to the British authorities when the war overtook them all.⁴⁶

(West Asia)

In West Asia, except in Afghanistan, there was no Indian community with the name as in some North American and East Asian countries. The almost medieval social condition of Afghanistan and her despotic administration were hardly conducive to the growth or spread of a revolutionary movement among the Indian settlers. So it was in the more favourable atmosphere of Iran and Turkey that

46. "Now, however, the number of Indians involved are so considerable that the whole question is entirely altered." Note by Cleveland, dated 28-7-1914, H. P. 1914 August 7-16A. "...the Indian community in the East, taken as a whole, is completely honeycombed with disloyalty." D. Petrie, *Notes on Indian Sedition in Far East, in 1917*, Chapt. VII, quoted in Material, paper 68.

individual revolutionaries from India sought shelter and opportunity to carry on their struggle more effectively.

Iran

Iran had been for years the happy hunting ground of British and Russian imperialism, and her progressive elements were naturally in full sympathy with those struggling against their common enemies. Besides, there was the hope that one might get enlisted in the Iranian army, and secure some military training. Agache was the first Indian revolutionary to go to Iran, and he reached there in late 1906.⁴⁷ Amba Prasad too left India after his acquittal, on 11 January 1908, and reached Iran after spending some time seeking opportunities at Katmandu and Kabul.⁴⁸ He was joined there by Ajit Singh, Rishikesh, Thakur Das, and Zia al-Huq, before the end of 1909. Shiraz was their chief centre of activity, and they were soon on excellent terms with the Kashghai chiefs.⁴⁹ Early in May 1910, they started publishing from Shiraz, in co-operation with their local friends, a revolutionary journal, the *Hayat*.⁵⁰ Their activities and the sympathy they received from the local nationalists were obviously irksome to the British, who after the *de facto* partition of the country in 1907 had secured considerable control over South and East Iran. Attempts were made to arrest these Indian revolutionaries, but they managed to escape to Baft with the connivance of the Deputy Governor of Shiraz.⁵¹ Early in September 1910, Ajit Singh, Amba Prasad, and Zia al-Huq went to

47. Statement of Pandurang Khankhoje Also his letter quoted in Blupendranath Datta, op. cit., p. 233.

48. Kali Charan Ghosh. *The Roll of Honour*, Calcutta, 1965, p. 312. According to Bhai Paramanand, *The Story of My Life*, Lahore, 1934, p. 34, Amba Prasad and Ajit Singh reached Iran in summer 1909. Both of them were definitely in Iran by late 1909, when Thakur Das, alias Gulam Husain, reached there. Circular No. 12, op. cit.

49. British Consul, Shiraz to Political Resident, Bushire on 20-5-1910, H. P. 1911 April 21-67A. Also. Political Resident, Bushire to Foreign Secy., India, received on 18-10-1910, H. P. 1911 January 28-29B. Amba Prasad was commonly known as Sufi Amba Prasad, because of his deep knowledge of and regard for Sufism.

50. British Consul, Shiraz to Political Resident, Bushire on 20-5-1910, H. P. 1911 April 21-67A.

51. Note by A. B. Bernard of the Home Dept., India, dated 24 10-1910, H. P. 1911 January 28-29B.

Bushire, obviously, to establish contacts with their comrades at home through Indian traders and seamen. From there, early in October, Ajit Singh went to Tehran for a few days.⁵² His hurried visit to Tehran, and his stay there with a local book-seller, Sheikh Hussain, suggest that he was then, in all probability, trying to send home propaganda literature.⁵³ But Bushire was very much under British influence, and, as soon as their presence was discovered, attempts were made to capture them. Zia al-Huq was arrested, but others including Ajit Singh, Amba Prasad, Thakur Das, and Rishi Kesh managed to escape through a long-neglected route with the active help of friendly local chiefs.⁵⁴ Amba Prasad retired to Shiraz and continued with the publication of the *Hayat*. Their successful escape and the publication of the *Hayat* were eloquently mentioned in the local journal, the *Najaf*, on 10 Shawal 1328 A.H. (25 October 1910).⁵⁵

These incidents at Shiraz and Bushire had proved how keen were the British to get hold of these Indian revolutionaries, and it was clear that their stay in Iran was unsafe and would be useless. Agache—his name does not appear among this group—seems to have already left for the U.S.A., finding it difficult to join the Iranian army, then under Russian control.⁵⁶ Immediately after his escape from Bushire, Thakur Das left for Paris, and reached the U. S. A.⁵⁷, and the following year Ajit Singh too followed the same course, and reached Rio De Janeiro after spending some time in Paris and Dakar.⁵⁸ Amba Prasad stayed behind with a couple of his Indian associates to carry on propaganda work against Britain, while always on the alert to elude her long grasping hand. There was nothing spectacular in their activities there. But, through years of effort, they could establish friendly understanding with large numbers of Iranian nationalists and tribal chiefs of

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52. Dy. D. C. I. to Political Resident, Bushire on 4-10-1910, *ibid*.

53. Political Resident, Bushire to Lt. Governor, Punjab on 8-11-1909, H. P. 1911 April 21-67A. Also, Political Resident, Bushire to Dy. D. C. I. on 6-2-1910, *ibid*.

54. Notes in the G. I. D., H. P. 1911 January 85B.

55. Statement of Pandurang Khankojé.

56. Circular No. 12, *op. cit*.

57. *Bande Mataram*, Vol. III. No. 1, September 1911. Appendix to the History Sheet of Cama, *op. cit*. Also, D. C. I on 8-12-1914, H. P. 1914 cember 227-229B.

58. Statements of Guenther Voigt and Pandurang Khankojé.

the south, and it was a definite asset to Indian revolutionaries operating in Iran during World War. I.⁵⁹

Turkey

Turkey, too, though a much bigger power than Iran, had been for decades the victim of European aggression and intervention. Her Christian subjects also were frequently in revolt. To these challenges the response of Turkey under Sultan Abdul Hamid II was to rouse and utilise the feeling of pan-Islamism as a political force. Hundreds of politically trained Muslim divines were sent out to India and other countries with large Muslim population, and a press was established especially for printing propaganda leaflets.⁶⁰ *Hajj* pilgrims too used to be sedulously indoctrinated. These gradually gave shape to the pan-Islamic sentiment of millions of Indian Muslims, and made them bitter with the English infidels. Western reactions to Turkish conduct during the Armenian massacres and Macedonian revolts had only sharpened the edge of their anti-British feeling,⁶¹ and the Turkish victory over the Greeks in 1897 gave them fresh inspiration and confidence.⁶²

With the Young Turks coming to power, the pan-Islamic movement was soon organised on more efficient and aggressive lines. In India too the French occupation of Morocco, with British blessings, and the Anglo-Russian Convention over Iran had made Muslim sentiment still more sensitive and anti-British. The enthusiasm with which subscriptions were raised for the Hejaz railway and the Ottoman navy speaks of the growing concern of the Indian Muslims for their Caliph, and reveals that their allegiance to him was not merely spiritual. Requests were also made to the Sultan's government to export more

59 Sir Edwin Pears, *Life of Abdul Hamid*, London, 1917, p. 150. Also, see De Lacy O'Leary, *Islam at the Cross Roads*, London, 1923, p. 122.

60. L. K. Choudhary, *India and Turkey: a Phase in their Relations (1899-1924)*, (unpublished Ph. D. thesis of the Patna University, 1963), pp. 30-34. *Kajser-i-Mumbai*, 16-1-1895 and 12-6-1896; *Native Opinion and Mahratta*, 9-6-1895; *Champion and Poona Vaibhab* 18-10-1896.

61. *Native Opinion*, 27-5-1897; *Akhwar-i-Islam*, 23 and 27 May 1897. *Mahratta* 30-5-1897. Also, V. Chirol, *India, op. cit.*, p. 219.

62. Secy. of State to Viceroy on 2-5-1911, H. P. 1911, 126-131B. Also, Commissioner of Lucknow to Chief Secy., U. P. on 14-6-1912, H. P. 1913 August 43-44B.

Turkish goods to India, and to assist Indian Muslims send their sons to Istanbul (then known as Constantinople). Schools and *takkias* for Indians were actually opened at Mecca, Beirut, Jerusalem, and Istanbul.⁶³

But, it was the Tripoli War and the Balkan Wars that gave shape and force to Muslim bitterness. Now they were convinced that the Christian powers were in an unholy alliance to bring the entire *Dar al-Islam* (World of Islam) under their heels. Protest meetings against the alleged British connivance at these took place in the big towns of India, and the leading Muslim journals spat venom at Britain.⁶⁴ The Red Crescent Society was formed to organise help for Turkey in her hour of need, and on 15 December 1912, a medical mission under Dr. Ansari left Bombay for Turkey.⁶⁵ The Anjuman-I-Khuddam-I-Kaaba too was formed in May 1913, with its headquarters at Lucknow, and it collected money for the hard-pressed Turks.⁶⁶ Many highly incriminating pamphlets were published, and Turkish agents roamed the country.⁶⁷ The feeling spread fast that it was no longer possible to live as a true believer under British rule. Many from among this medical mission and other volunteers from India

63. British Ambassador, Istanbul to Foreign Secy., Britain on 9-10-1910, H. P. 1911 January 15-16B. British Agency, Cairo to Home Secy., India on 13-12-1910, H. P. 1911 April 79-80B. Report from Cairo, dated 21-6-1915, to D. C. I., H. P. 1916 January 33 Dep. Note by Home Secy., India, dated 10-6-1912, H. P. 1912 July 16 Dep. Also, R. Burns to Home Secy., India on 10-6-1913, H. P. 1913 July 7 Dep. Also, Commissioner of Police, Calcutta to Chief Secy., Bengal on 23-10-1916, Foreign 1912 February 265-317 Secret E. Also, Foreign 1912 July 479-552 Secret E. Also, *Comrade*, 17, 24, 31 May, 7 June, and 3 August 1913; *Muslim Gazette*, January 1913; *Al-Hilal*, 4-12-1912; *Zamindar*, 11-12-1912.

64. History Sheet of Muhammad Ali, H. P. 1913 November 149B. The Medical Mission "consisted of ten male nurses, seven dressers and five doctors... and they expect to be joined at Constantinople by three more Indian doctors from Edinburgh." Lord Hardinge to Secy. of State, 14-12-1912, Hardinge Papers, Vol. II, Part II, No. 525. Rs. 30,000, raised by subscription, was donated by Muhammad Ali for the Turkish sufferers at Adrianople. Hardinge to Secy. of State 13-4-1913, Hardinge Papers, Vol. III, Part II, No. 238. Also, Muhammad Ali, *My Life A Fragment*, Lahore, 1944, p. 37-39.

65. Asstt. D. C. I. on 20-2-1914, H. P. 1914 May 46A.

66. H. P. 1913 October 1-3A. Also, H. P. 1914 December 195-214A.

67. British Vice-Consul, Konia to British Ambassador, Istanbul on 7-6-1913, H. P. 1913 August 43-44B.

decided to settle down in Turkey, and on 1 June 1913 three members from the Red Crescent Society actually visited Konia, to explore the possibility of settling three hundred Indian Muslims there.⁶⁸ Plans were also made to settle a few hundred Indians near Adana.⁶⁹ Though nothing positive came out of these projects, a hundred or so Indian pan-Islamite zealots and adventurers actually settled down in and around Istanbul. The Ottoman Government too needed them to convince their countrymen that their policies were a success and that they enjoyed the moral allegiance of the entire Islamic world. So most of them were given small jobs or pensions. The more ambitious and abler among them did propaganda work among Indian pilgrims and traders or assisted in publishing and distributing such pan-Islamic journals, the *Jahan-i-Islam*.⁷⁰ The leader of the politically active Indians there was Abdul Jabbar, and they retained contact with pan-Islamites and Indian revolutionary groups elsewhere. When, with the outbreak of World War I, Turkey acquired a new importance in the context of India's fight for freedom, these Indians, having formed an 'independence committee' of their own, could play their part more effectively.⁷¹

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68. Report from Cairo, dated 21-6-1915, H. P. 1916 January 33 Dep.

69. Har Dayal, *Forty-four Months in Germany and Turkey, February 1915 to October 1918*, London, 1920, pp. 36 and 45. Also, Bhupendranath Datta, op. cit., pp. 43-44. While travelling through Turkey in September 1957, the author met two of them, and heard their story.

70. An Urdu Weekly of Istanbul, started by Muhammad Yusuf, alias Abu Sayed Arabi, of Gujrat (Punjab) on 18-4-1914. It was banned in India with effect from 22-8-1914. H. P. 1914 December 80-81A.

71. See pp. 185-187.

CHAPTER—IV

INDIAN REVOLUTIONARIES AND GERMANY DURING WORLD WAR I

For the Indian revolutionaries, at home and abroad, the pre-war years had been, more or less, years of preparation. Revolutionary emissaries had been sent out, fresh revolutionaries had been recruited abroad, and revolutionary movements among Indians in various countries and continents had been set on foot. But as long as Britain was not involved in a major war their efficacy was strictly limited. They could, at best, occasionally scratch the British Lion, keep up the tempo of the revolutionary movement, and inspire their countrymen through a saga of sacrifice.

But the outbreak of the First World War altered the situation completely. For the Indian revolutionaries it was at the same time a signal and a hope. For years they had believed that "England's difficulty is India's opportunity".¹ Now, Britain was matched against the most powerful military machine of the time, and India was soon to be almost completely denuded of British and even Indian soldiers more urgently needed in the actual theatres of war. Moreover, in place of irregular secret supply of small quantities of arms and ammunitions, purchased in most cases at exorbitant price, there was now the prospect of the coffers of a major power being thrown open for their cause.

Earlier Contacts

The prospect, however, was not an unexpected one. Almost from the very beginning Indian revolutionaries had toyed with the idea of securing foreign help in the hour of Britain's difficulty. But there had been little clear thinking, even among the more favourably placed Indians abroad, on relevant questions, such as with whom Britain was most likely to be in difficulty in the near future, from and through whom help might be secured, and what prior prepara-

1. Barakatullah is believed to have been the first to use this expression. Circular No. 5, op. cit.

tions should be made for that purpose. In November 1909, for the first time, Germany was referred to by them as the chief enemy of Britain,² and much later, of course, *Ghadar* literatures of 1913-14 were replete with references to an approaching Anglo-German war and possible German help in their revolutionary struggle.³ But little effort was made by those abroad to establish contacts in Germany and to prepare themselves for the expected eventualities.

Even within India some of the revolutionaries were convinced by 1908 that an Anglo-German war was in the offing, and that they should prepare themselves in advance to make full use of the war-time opportunities.⁴ Many of them went abroad to establish useful contacts and to organise revolutionary centres, which might be used as relatively safe shelters for the revolutionaries and their arms, and also as valuable *points d'appui* for armed infiltration into India. But, even they concentrated their attention primarily on the U.S.A. and the South-East Asian countries, and Germany was long neglected.⁵

However, the year 1911 saw a new leaf turned in the history of the relation between Germany and the Indian revolutionaries. As the probability of a clash with Britain appeared increasingly certain, some in the influential circles of Germany began taking a fresh interest in the political situation in India. In October that year came out Friedrich von Bernhardt's book, *Germany and the Next War*, where he spoke of a possible war-time entente between Germany and the Indian revolutionaries against Britain.⁶ This book, immediately translated into English, was widely acclaimed by Indian revolutionaries as a sure sign of German willingness to help, and urged some of them to establish contacts in Germany.⁷ Dharendra Nath Sarkar went there from the U.S.A. in the winter of 1911-12.⁸

2. First issue of the *Talwar*. See p. 42. In February 1910, the *Bande Mataram* (Geneva) also expressed the same view. History Sheet of Cama, op. cit.

3. See pp. 265-266.

4. Jadugopal Mukherjee, op. cit., pp. 27 and 281.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.

6. Friedrich von Bernhardt, *Germany and the Next War* (translated by Allen H. Powles), 7th impression, London, 1914, p. 96. Also, Rowlatt, p. 82.

7. Rowlatt, p. 82. Also, George Mac-Munn, op. cit., p. 116. Also, the *Ghadar*, 1-11-1913, cited in H. P. 1914 January 32-43A.

8. Statement of Jadugopal Mukherjee.

and Kedareshwar Guha arrived there from India a year later.⁹ In the meantime, we have it on the authority of Abinash Chandra Bhattacharya that some business magnates of Hamburg, such as the famous Albert Ballin and Niedermeyer, had, since July 1911, begun entertaining Indian students and encouraging them in revolutionary work against Britain.¹⁰ Later, they even expressed their eagerness to help the Indian revolutionaries with arms.¹¹ Towards the middle of 1913, Dhirendranath sent news to the Yugantar group in Bengal that German help against Britain could be relied upon.¹² Hardly anything is known of the contacts he could establish or the assurance, if any, he received in Germany. But the fact that the *Berliner Tageblatt*, on 6 March 1914, in an article, entitled "England's Indian Trouble" spoke of the revolutionary societies in India and the foreign help they received¹³, suggests that many influential Germans were well aware of Indian revolutionary activities and the clandestine shipment of arms from abroad.

Contacts with the German Foreign Office

However, the senior revolutionaries abroad were either unaware of or disinterested in these developments in Germany, and no organised centre of Indian revolutionaries was established there. Even Kedareshwar Guha left for the U.S.A. in February 1914.¹⁴ So when the war broke out, Virendranath Chattopadhyaya was the only Indian revolutionary of eminence present in Germany. He too had come only in April, and was staying at Halle. Very few Indians in Germany were even aware of his presence there, and Abinash Chandra Bhattacharya was one of his few acquaintances.¹⁵ However, soon after Britain declared war on Germany both of them took the lead by issuing a statement condemning the Allied Powers and assuring the German Government of their full co-operation.

9. Statement of Kedareshwar Guha, quoted in Nalini Kishore Guha, *Banglape Viplab Bad* (in Bengali), 3rd edition, Calcutta, 1954, p. 138.

10. Abinash Chandra Bhattacharya, *Bahirbharate Bharater Mukti Proyas* (in Bengali), Calcutta, 1962, pp. 99-101.

11. *Ibid.*, pp. 101-102.

12. Jadugopal Mukherjee, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

13. Rowlatt, p. 82.

14. Statement of Kedareshwar Guha, quoted in Nalini Kishore Guha, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

15. *Europe Bharatiya Viplaber Sadhana*, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

This was a political kite-flying, and as it was well-received in important circles they thought of following up their initial success by arranging a war-time agreement with Germany in India's interest.¹⁶

Fortunately, Bhattacharya had a close friend in Helmuth Delbrueck, whose uncle, Klement von Delbrueck, was then the Minister of Interior in Prussia. This friend arranged a meeting between Chattopadhyaya and Baron Bertheim of the German Foreign Office on 31 August 1914. Bertheim immediately put Chattopadhyaya and Bhattacharya in touch with Max von Oppenheim, the well-known expert in Middle Eastern affairs in the German Foreign Office.¹⁷ On 3 September, it was agreed between them that Germany would give the Indian nationalists all necessary assistance, and enable the Indians in Europe to carry on an effective propaganda campaign against Britain and to secure training in the use and preparation of arms and explosives. This set the ball rolling, and for the next few weeks the Indians and the representatives of the German Foreign Office met almost daily to discuss ways and means to help the Indian revolutionaries effectively and to create trouble for Britain in India.¹⁸

In the beginning, many in the German Foreign Office were not quite enthusiastic over the Indian request for co-operation. They were still confident of a successful *blitzkrieg* in the West.¹⁹ But, "after the battle of Marne it became clear that the war was going to last a long time," and the German Government began paying greater attention to the Indian proposals.²⁰ This shift in emphasis was indeed a triumph for the Oriental experts in the German Foreign Office, particularly Rudolf Nadolny, who from the beginning had advocated the closest possible co-operation with the Indians.²¹

The broad policy pattern that emerged out of these discussions between the German and Indian representatives was commonly known

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 133-135.

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 135-140.

18. *Ibid.*, pp. 144-147.

19. Statements of W. O. von Hentig (hereafter referred to as Hentig) and Herbert Mueller.

20. Franz von Papen, *Memoirs* (translated by Brian Connell), London, 1952, pp. 36-37.

21. Statements of Herbert Mueller, Hentig, and Helmuth von Glase-napp (hereafter referred to as Glase-napp).

as the Zimmermann Plan.²² Because of the huge distances involved and the complete British mastery of the seas, a direct German attack on India could not obviously materialise in the foreseeable future. So it was decided that an indirect offensive should be taken by inciting the Amir of Afghanistan and the frontier tribes to attack India at that opportune moment and by assisting the Indian revolutionaries with money and munitions to raise the standard of revolt.²³

For her designs on India's western frontier, Germany had an obvious strategic advantage. Turkey was her ally, and was expected, sooner or later, to join the war on her side. That would, in any case, enable the Germans to have their bases of operation on the Persian Gulf and the frontier of Iran, within fairly close range of India and Afghanistan. In fact, German and Turkish authorities had been discussing, since the outbreak of the war, ways and means of fomenting trouble in India and her western neighbours.²⁴ A diplomatic-cum-military mission under the legendary Wilhelm Wassmuss was then leaving for Iran and Afghanistan, and it was decided that a few Indian revolutionaries should accompany it for more effective propaganda among Indian soldiers in Iran and the frontier tribes, and to establish contacts with their comrades at home for some co-ordinated action. It was even suggested that Chattopadhyaya himself should accompany the mission. But the idea had to be given up as his presence in Germany was considered essential in the interest of Indian revolutionary efforts there.²⁵ Some Indians, however, joined Wassmuss in West Asia, and his mission was followed by further efforts by Indian revolutionaries and their Turkish and German friends in creating disturbances in Iran and India, and in undermining British war efforts.

At the same time, arms were to be sent to revolutionaries within India. But because of an effective British blockade, it was obviously not possible to send arms direct from Germany. So it was decided that arms should be purchased with German money in some neutral

22. George Lenczowski, *Middle East in World Affairs since 1918*, New York, 1960, p. 39. Also, statements of Hentig and Glasenapp. Alfred Zimmerman gave this project his personal attention. *San Francisco Chronicle*, 8-7-1917, p. 1.

23. Statements of Bhattacharya, Herbert Mueller, and Glasenapp.

24. See pp. 156-157.

25. Report from the German Embassy, Istanbul, ⁿ dated, 16-9-1914, DAA. Reel 397, files 1 to 11. Also, statement of Bhattacharya.

country whence those could be secretly sent to appointed places in India. From more than one point of view the U.S.A. appeared particularly suited to be the base for such clandestine shipment of arms. She was a neutral power with large Irish and German minorities, and there also flourished the well-organised Ghadar movement with its branches and contacts in India and many East Asian countries. In the U.S.A. the Germans too had already formed their own organisations for propaganda and other conspiratorial work,²⁶ and secret operations relating to India could be financed and directed from there with relative ease.

However, the effective execution of these plans in complete secrecy presumed a high degree of mutual understanding and co-ordination of efforts among men dispersed over many countries and continents. So emissaries had to be sent soon to all major centres of Indian revolutionaries to inform them of the plans chalked out in Berlin and to make necessary arrangements in that light. Dhirendranath Sarkar and Narain S. Marathe left Germany for the U.S.A. on 22 September,²⁷ and Abinash Chandra Bhattacharya for India on 1 October.²⁸ From the U.S.A. Marathe, Kedareshwar Guha, and Bhupendranath Mukherjee in one ship²⁹, and Satyendranath Sen and Vishnu Ganesh Pingley in another sailed for India in the second half of October.³⁰ *En route*, Marathe got down in Japan to explore the possibilities of securing arms there,³¹ while his two other companions came direct to India. Satyendranath and Pingley halted in China for a few days to meet the Ghadar leaders there to discuss the latest developments and their future plans. They even met Dr. Sun Yat-sen and sought his advice and co-operation.³² Thus

26. J. P. Jones and P. M. Hollester, *The German Secret Service in America, 1914-1918*, Toronto, 1918, pp. 8, 21, 22, 29, 31, 47-49, 52 and 84.

27. Oppenheim's note, dated 20-11-1914, DAA, Reel 397, files 1 to 11. Also, Chandra Chakravarty, *New India*, Calcutta, 1950, pp. 18-19. Also, *Europe Bharatiya Viplaber Sadhana*, op. cit., pp. 163-164.

28. *Europe Bharatiya Viplaber Sadhana*, op. cit., p. 168.

29. Statement of Kedareshwar Guha, quoted in Nalini Kishore Guha, op. cit., p. 140.

30. Rowlatt, p. 82. Also, Jadugopal Mukherjee, op. cit., p. 384.

31. See p. 224.

32. Jadugopal Mukherjee, op. cit., p. 383. Also, statement of Khagendra Chandra Das, who heard these from Satyendranath Sen himself. Kedareshwar Guha reached India on 20-12-1914. File No. 2667 of 1915

before the year was out Indian revolutionaries all over the world had been informed of the new plans and possibilities. *

In the meantime, the German Foreign Office had, as early as 7 September, made contacts with three reputed banks for carrying on secret correspondence and monetary transactions through their branches in Asia.³³ Since Holland was a neutral neighbour of Germany, and Java was a Dutch possession not far from India, the latter was selected as the regional base for the proposed arms deal and secret communications between India and Germany. However, lest the German Legation in Java should get too obviously involved in these unlawful activities on a neutral soil, some German firms with branches there were entrusted with these clandestine operations.³⁴ In fact, towards the middle of September, Ernst Neunhofer of the German Foreign Office had asked M/s. Egmond Hagedorn to remit DM 250,000 to India, in October or November, preferably through some bank in Java.³⁵ The first instalment of German money, however, reached India not before June 1915.³⁶

But it was not in Germany alone that Indian revolutionaries had approached the German authorities for help. Even in distant San Francisco the Ghadar leaders had, by the middle of September, approached the German Consulate for help. By early October, they had even established contact with certain American firms, who promised to supply them arms worth 60,000 dollars.³⁷ Freeman, in the meantime, had put Barakatullah in touch with George von Skal of the *Berliner Lokalanzeiger*, who considered it fairly easy to get

in H. P. 1916 September 16 Dep. Pingley and Satyendranath were sent to forge a union between the American Ghadarites and the revolutionaries of Bengal and the Punjab. Statements of Pingley and Mula Singh to Cleveland, H. P. 1916 May 436-439B.

33. Note from the German Foreign Office, dated 7-9-1914, DAA, Reel 397, file 1 to 11.

34. Letters from Emil Helfferich and Erich Windels to author, dated 17-9-1956 and 1-11-1956, respectively.

35. Oppenheim to Wesendonck on 21-9-1914, DAA, Reel 397, file 1 to 11.

36. Statements of Harikumar Chakravarty and Atulkrishna Ghosh. Also, D. C. I. on 21-9-1915, F. P. 1917 June 1-46.

37. Albert Bernstorff, German Ambassador at Washington to Foreign Office, Berlin on 30-9-1914 and 17-10-1914, DAA, Reel 397 file 1 to 11. Also, Oppenheim's reply from Berlin on 29-10-1914, *ibid.*

30,000 rifles and 5000 automatic pistols smuggled into India.³⁸ The German Embassy at Washington was immediately approached for the necessary money. But, without waiting for any reply from Berlin, Bhagwan Singh left San Francisco, on 21 October, for preparatory work among Indians in East Asia.³⁹ It cannot be said with certainty how the Germans responded to this particular proposal. However, it is a safe presumption that it further convinced the Germans of the strength of Indian demand for arms and of the value of a working agreement with the Ghadar leaders in their efforts.

It was expected that the planned efforts through various channels should not be just isolated moves but a well-concerted campaign directed against the British rule in India, like a gigantic pincer movement, both from the east and the west. The German Embassy at Washington, as the paymaster and purchaser of arms, was naturally in overall control of the plans directed from the east. The German Consulate in Shanghai was in immediate charge of affairs in East Asia. But the actual bases of operation were in Thailand and Java.⁴⁰ For better co-ordination of efforts between the two wings, the German Consul at Djakarta was instructed, on 12 November, to get in touch with his Turkish counterpart there, and to try to establish contacts with Bengal and North India through Singapore and Penang.⁴¹ At the same time, a senior diplomat was sent to Istanbul, and he was expected to establish contact with India by sending couriers through Saudi Arabia, obviously, in company with the *hajj* pilgrims.⁴² Furthermore, Heralbalal Gupta was sent to the U.S.A. at the end of December as the official representative of the Indians in Berlin to co-ordinate their work with the Ghadarites and the German Legations there.⁴³

38. Oppenheim's note, dated 9-1-1915, *ibid*

39. *Ibid.*

40. D. C. I. on 3-8-1915, H. P. 1915 August 552-556B.

41. *Ibid.* Note by R. Otto of the Colonial Institute, Hamburg, dated 12-11-1914. DAA, Reel 397, file 1 to 11. It was suggested that DM, 20,000 should be sanctioned for these enterprises. *Ibid.* Also, letter of Erich Windels to author, dated 1-11-1956.

42. Note by R. Otto, *op. cit.*

43. Zimmerman to Bernstorff on 27-12-1914, cited in Henry Landau, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-30. This cable was intercepted and decoded by the British.

These plans were, obviously, based on a highly optimistic assessment of the Indian situation. It was but natural that young revolutionaries would sincerely believe that their countrymen were as impatient with foreign rule as they themselves were, and that ship-loads of arms and bold leadership were enough to set the whole of India ablaze. Their leaders, though often better informed of the correct situation, deliberately drew a rosy picture of their preparedness to sustain the enthusiasm of their comrades and to convince the Germans that the assistance given to them was a worthwhile venture.⁴⁴ But, what is really surprising is the blissful ignorance of the German authorities and the naive credulousness with which they swallowed highly exaggerated stories about widespread rebellions and the approaching collapse of the British rule in India.⁴⁴ Writing in 1952, with all the advantage of hind-sight, Franz von Papen might say, "We did not go so far as to suppose that there was any hope of India achieving her independence through our intervention, but if there was any chance of fomenting local disorders we felt it might limit the number of Indian troops who could be sent to France or other theatres of war."⁴⁵

44. "The Indian revolutionaries with their tall talk would probably assure the Germans that if the arms could only be got near India they would do the rest, and on this promise the Germans might think the scheme good enough. I do not wish to under-rate the German's sense, but they have often shown that they understand the Indians not so well as we do." File No. 921 1915 of I. B. Records, West Bengal, cited in Uma Mukherjee, op. cit., p. 205.

44(a). Note from Count Thurn, former Austrian Consul-General at Calcutta, dated 5-12-1914, DAA, Reel 363, file 50-51. Telegram from Von Berchem, German Ambassador at Stockholm, dated 2-11-1915, DAA, Reel 364, file 52-58. Note by Dr. Lerchs of German Foreign Office, dated 19-5-1915, *ibid.* A member of the Reichstag to Von Jagow, Secy. of State, Berlin on 16-11-1915, *ibid.* Bernstorff to German Foreign Office on 31-3-1915 and 5-4-1915, *ibid.* Also, *Koelnische Zeitung*, 24-11-1914 and 12-12-1914; *Neue Zuercher Zeitung*, 4-12-1914; and *Neue Freie Presse*, 13-12-1914. D. C. I. on 20-4-1915, H. P. 1915 April 416-419B. *Berliner Tageblatt*, 5-6-1915, D. C. I. on 20-7-1915, H. P. 1915 July 516-519B. *Berliner Morgen Post* wrote on 20-10-1914, "Revolts in India raise confidence in Germany". J. & P. 739, Vol. 918 of 1909.

45. Franz von Papen, op. cit., p. 40. But, even Papen himself had written to the German Foreign Office in summer 1915, "Since October 1914 there have been various local mutinies of Mahommedan troops, one practically succeeding the other. From the last report it appears that Hindu troops are going to join the mutineers." J. P. Jones, *The German*

This indeed appears to be quite a sensible attitude. But Rudolf Nadolny's belief that 20,000 rifles and two to three thousand automatic pistols would do the job in India,⁴⁶ and the plans of the German Foreign Office to win over the Gurkhas by bribing them and offering the throne of India to the King of Nepal,⁴⁷ and the hope they reposed on princes and landlords⁴⁸ confirm that few in the higher echelon of the German Government, in those days, really shared the cynicism subsequently expressed by Papen. However, it was fortunate for the Indians that the feeling developed that India was ready for a revolt, and, as often in history, it was not facts but feelings that determined the course of events.

Obviously, these war-time plans and efforts in collaboration with foreign powers lacked an exclusively Indian character. Rather, they were part of the changing political and military situation, and could be discerned as ripples between the waves raised by the war. However, details of these attempts at organising revolts in India will be told in subsequent chapters.

Indian Revolutionaries in Germany

By early 1915, Indian revolutionaries in Germany had formally organised themselves into an Indian Independence Committee with headquarters at 38 Wieland Strasse, Charlottenburg, Berlin.⁴⁹ It was an absolutely autonomous body in regular receipt of a specified monthly amount and occasional *ad hoc* grants from the German Foreign Office. It was to take care of the Indians living under the Central Powers, establish contacts with Indian revolutionaries else-

Spies in America: The Secret Plotting of German Spies in the U. S. and the Inside story of the Sinking of Lusitania, London, 1917, pp. 81-82.

46. Note by Oppenheim, dated 24-11-1914, DAA, Reel 397, file 1 to 11.

47. Note by Bernstorff, dated 19-12-1914, *ibid*.

48. See p. 169.

49. J. & P. 43255 kith 5784, Vol. 1542 of 1918. Though it is not yet possible to be certain about the exact date of the establishment of the Indian Independence Committee it appears that it was formally organised sometime in February or March 1915, after Har Dayal's arrival in Berlin. Henry Landau, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-29. Indian Independence Committee will be hereafter referred to as Indian Committee. In fact, this committee had no fixed official name and used to be often referred to as the Indian National Committee. Here, however, the name used by Zimmerman, the Secy. of State of Germany, has been used.

where, and to advise the German Government on Indian affairs. Muhammad Mansur became its first Secretary. Chattopadhyaya took over from him towards the middle of 1915, and served in that capacity for a year. From 1916 to its dissolution in December 1918, Bhupendranath Datta was its Secretary.⁵⁰ But, strictly speaking, this post was devoid of much actual significance. The central figure among the Indians there was Chattopadhyaya, in whom his other comrades and the German Foreign Office had the greatest confidence.⁵¹ Har Dayal too was equally prominent in 1915. But gradually he fell out with the Germans and with many of his Indian comrades, and faded out of prominence.

In the beginning, Indians in Berlin were short of men of stature, who could add to the moral authority of their committee. Champak Raman Pillai joined them in October and, barring Chattopadhyaya, he was the only one among them who was at all known. The rest were just students, who with mixed motives had responded to the call to serve their motherland. Most of their senior leaders were in the U.S.A., and Har Dayal was for some time at Istanbul and then at Geneva. But the logic of the situation made it inevitable that Indians in Berlin, in co-operation with the German Government, would have a controlling voice in directing and financing the war-time revolutionary endeavours of Indians all over the world. It was quite natural that the senior leaders would like to be present at the nerve-centre of their war-time efforts and to participate in the vital deliberations in Berlin. The German Foreign Office, too, in September-October 1914, had sought to establish contact with them through Herbert Mueller and his old friend, Dr. Jnan Chandra Dasgupta of Basle.⁵² As a result, many of them like Taraknath Das, Barakatullah, Jitendranath Lahiri, and Birendranath Dasgupta came over to Germany from the U.S.A. by the end of January.⁵³ Har Dayal too, at Barakaullah's suggestion, came to Berlin from Geneva on 27 January 1915⁵⁴. Bhupendranath

50. Bhupendranath Datta, *op. cit.*, p. 32. Also, statement of Glasenapp.

51. Statements of Glasenapp and Herbert Mueller.

52. Herbert Mueller's letter to author, dated 18-3-1956.

53. H. P. 1916 September 16 Dep. Also, Oppenheim's note, dated 9-1-1915. DAA, Reel 397, file 1 to 11. Also, statement of Birendranath Dasgupta (hereafter referred to as Dasgupta).

54. See p. 168.

Datta came from the U.S.A. in May 1915.⁵⁵ Obviously, the Indian Committee could now speak with greater authority. The Germans also, after their naval defeat at Dogger Bank on 26 January and the failure of the submarine offensive, unleashed on 18 February 1915, began paying them greater attention, and consulted their senior leaders on almost all questions relating to India.⁵⁶

Still, it was felt that they were too young and unknown to claim to speak for India. The presence of some well-known figure among them, they thought, would strengthen their moral position, raise their bonafides above doubt, and convince their countrymen that the Germans could be trusted as their sincere friends. That is why, as soon as it was known that Raja Mahendra Pratap of Hathras had reached Switserzerland, Chattopadhyaya hurried down to Geneva and literally hustled him to Berlin. Mahendra Pratap was no well-known figure. Still, here was a Rajput feudal chief with a commanding presence, and he could be used to impress both the Germans and the Indian princes and landlords. He reached Berlin on 10 February 1915, and was received in audience by the Kaiser himself, who conferred on him the Order of Eagle (2nd class). In fact, he was always shown special courtesy and consideration due to a prince.⁵⁷

Efforts, however, were still made to get any of the well-known nationalist leaders to join them in Germany. Lala Lajpat Rai was a hero of the Indian extremists, especially after his deportation in 1907, and he was in the U.S.A. when the war broke out. More than once he was requested, in March and April 1915, to come to Germany and to accept the leadership of the Indians there. But he categorically refused to join hands with Germany.⁵⁸

In the meantime, some of the Indians were sent to the munition factory at Spandau and other places to have training in the preparation

55. Bhupendranath Datta, op cit., p. 12. He was the youngest brother of Swami Vivekananda.

56. Statements of Hentig, Glasenapp, and Dasgupta.

57. Mahendra Pratap, *My life story of Fifty-five years*, Delhi, 1947, pp. 39-42.

58. German Foreign Office to Chandra Chakravarty on 13-7-1916. J. & P. 43255 with 5784, Vol. 1542 of 1918. Chakravarty's reply, J. & P. 16027 with 5784, Vol. 1542 of 1918. Also, *Lajpat Rai Autobiographical Writings* (ed. V. C. Joshi), Delhi 1965, pp. 201-202.

of explosives and sabotage work.⁵⁹ Some others were engaged in visiting Indian prisoners—deliberately kept separate from the White prisoner—in their camps at Ruhleben, Doebritz, and Zeessen to win them over to their revolutionary cause. Here, of course, the pan-Islamic appeal for *jihad* was deliberately blended with that of anti-British nationalism, and Egyptian revolutionaries were invited from time to time to meet and harangue the Muslim soldiers.⁶⁰ Though some of these soldiers, especially Pathans, joined the revolutionaries and even took part in some of the missions to distant lands, the response on the whole was unsatisfactory. With most Indian soldiers loyalty to their master and pride in their colour still counted for more than appeals in the name of their country or the Caliph.

Indians in Germany were not alone in their attempt at utilising the war and securing German assistance against Britain. The Iranian and Egyptian nationalists too had formed their own Independence Committees in Berlin. Ever since their early contacts before the war they had been quite friendly with the Indian nationalists in Europe and now they were all eager to unite their forces against their common enemy.⁶¹ But, to co-ordinate their work more effectively for a concerted propaganda campaign against Britain and her allies, the German Foreign Office, early in 1915, formed an autonomous body, the Nachrichtenstelle fuer der Orient. Oppenheim was first elected its President. But, as he soon left for work in Turkey, Dr. Eugen Mittwoch, Professor of Arabic at Berlin University, used to officiate as its actual head and Herbert Mueller was his deputy there. Von Wesendonck of the German Foreign Office used to look after its financial position and efficient working. Others associated with it included Graetsch, a former missionary in India, Heinrich Jacoby, Director General of the Persian Carpet Society, Ernst Neuenhofer, formerly a businessman and the honorary German Consul at Karachi, Miss Ruth Buke, an Arabic scholar, and Helmuth von

59. *Bahirbharate Bharater Mukti Proyas*, op. cit., p. 47.

60. D. C. I. on 22-6-1915, H. P. 1915 June 549-552B. D. C. I. on 17-8-1915, *ibid.* D. C. I. on 15-7-1916, H. P. 1916 July 441-445B. D. C. I. on 2-12-1916, H. P. 1917 January 270-272B.

61. Bhupendranath Datta, op. cit., p. 36. Har Dayal, op. cit., p. 60. Sayed H. Takizade's letter to author, dated 11-6-1958. Also, D. C. I. on 27-7-1915. H. P. 1915 July 516-519B. Statement of an informer, H. P. 1916 February 201A.

Glasenapp, later Professor of Indology at the Universities of Koenigsberg and Tuebingen. It used to bring out the weekly, *Der Neue Orient*, as well as propaganda pamphlets in various Eastern languages. After a couple of years the name of this Nachrichtenstelle was changed to Deutsche Orient Institut.⁶²

It was in co-operation with this Nachrichtenstelle and the German Foreign Office, and through its control over the all-powerful purse-string, that the Indian Committee, as the self-appointed 'supreme general staff' of the Indian revolution, soon arrogated to itself the necessary co-ordinating and supervisory authority.⁶³ In July 1915, as a gesture of sheer psychological significance, it announced on behalf of their enslaved countrymen that India was in a state of war with Britain. The declaration ended with a solemn undertaking, "We have a right to fight for freedom and we will not stop till India is free."⁶⁴

Soon after its formation, the Indian Committee realised the necessity of having its branches in some neutral countries, from where it might be easier to establish and maintain contact with their comrades in countries under Allies' control. By the middle of 1916, something like branch offices of the Indian Committee had been set up in Zurich, Amsterdam, and Stockholm, and Dasgupta, Champak Raman Pillai, and Chattopadhyaya, respectively, were placed in charge of these centres.⁶⁵

However, with the advance of the year 1916, the Indian Committee gradually lost some of its former influence over the German Government. The main reason was that, like most revolutionary organisations, it was not always a happy family of like-minded, self-effacing

62. Helmuth von Glasenapp, *Meine Lebensreise*, Wiesbaden, 1964, pp. 71-72. Also, Herbert Mueller's letter to author, dated 18-3-1956. The author had seen bound volumes of *Der Neue Orient* at Herbert Mueller's residence at 19, Cranachstrasse, Hamburg-Gr. Flottbeck.

63. Testimonies of Daus Dekkar and Yodh Singh, cited in G. T. Brown, *Pacific Historical Review*, op. cit., p. 300. Also, J. W. Preston's statement, cited in *San Francisco Chronicle*, 8-7-1917, p. 1, and 23-11-1917, p. 2.

64. U. S. Ambassador, Berlin to Washington on 13-8-1915, Records, Dept. of State, Index No. 84500/183 in the National Archives, Washington, quoted in D. P. Singh, op. cit., p. 216. Partly corroborated by D. C. I., on 21-9-1915, H. P. 1915 September 582-585B.

65. Statements of Dasgupta and Glasenapp. See also p. 155.

idealists. To start with, Chattopadhyaya—he of course retained the confidence of the Germans till the end—was the sole and undisputed leader of Indians in Germany. Most of the senior revolutionaries who came from the U.S.A., though well-known figures, were not leaders of any active movement, and did not demur at Chattopadhyaya's leadership. But, Har Dayal's position was somewhat different. His name, as the founder of the Ghadar movement, was already one to conjure with on both sides of the Pacific. Moreover, his political background and affiliations had been completely different from those, primarily Bengalees, who controlled the Indian Committee. Petty personal jealousies as well as group and regional rivalries were certainly not absent. These largely explain why Har Dayal remained in Switzerland till he was invited to Germany by Barakatullah, in January 1915, while the Indian Committee was being formed and vital decisions regarding the nature and mode of German help were being taken. When at last he joined the Indian Committee, he was no doubt a valuable moral asset. But, temperamentally, he was authoritarian and uncompromising. His experience had been in organising and leading the uneducated Indian immigrants in North America, and he lacked the suavity necessary to get on with equals often of opposite views.⁶⁶ That is why he fell out in rapid succession with the Germans and the Indian pan-Islamites at Istanbul and then with the Indian Committee in Berlin.⁶⁷ By November 1915, his dissociation from the Indian Committee was almost complete,⁶⁸ and this was indeed a serious blow to the reputation and solidarity of Indian revolutionaries in Europe.

Taraknath too, in the meantime, had written to the Indian Committee from Palestine, in August 1915, questioning some of its decisions, and this appeared in the eyes of many as wilful insub-

66. Telegrams, dated 15-10-1914, 20-10-1914 and 27-11-1914, cited in Horst Kruger, "Har Dayal in Germany," (paper read before the 26th International Congress of Orientalists at New Delhi in January 1964). The proceedings of this Congress have not yet been published. But the author has a typed copy of this article.

67. Indian Committee, Berlin to German Foreign Office on 2-11-1915, DAA, WK II, Vol. 22, folio 131-132, cited in Horst Kruger, op. cit., end note no. 20.

68. Har Dayal, op. cit., p. 73. Also, Chandra Chakravarty, *New India*, Calcutta, 1950, p. 28. It will be referred to hereafter as only *New India*,

ordination.⁶⁹ Even its representative, Herambalal's relations with the Ghadar leaders were far from cordial. All these only exposed ugly fissures in the former facade of unity. No wonder, the Indian Committee, as a result, lost considerably in moral authority, and the Germans began to rely increasingly on Chandra Chakravarty, the man of their choice, who was made the new representative of the Indian Committee in the U.S.A., in February 1916.⁷⁰ Even then, it should be remembered, the German Foreign Office never took any important decision affecting Indian affairs except in consultation with the Indian Committee or at least with Chattopadhyaya.⁷¹

However, with the departure of many other senior leaders, like Mahendra Pratap, Barakatullah, and Taraknath, for other theatres of activity, and Har Dayal's virtual retirement from active work, it was increasingly felt in Berlin that the presence of an eminent nationalist leader would add to the moral authority of the Indian Committee and counteract the anti-German propaganda in India. Lajpat Rai was still in the U.S.A., and on 13 July 1916 news was sent to Chakravarty from Berlin asking him to persuade Lajpat Rai once more to come to Germany. But, unfortunately for them, he again refused to associate himself with German militarism, and the attempt had to be given up.⁷²

In the meantime, after the initial attempts at massive arms supply to revolutionaries in India and armed attacks on her frontiers had fizzled out, and the German emissaries had left Afghanistan in disappointment—the Amir still remained neutral—members of the Indian Committee increasingly realised the necessity of fresh contacts with their countrymen and other possible allies for exploring fresh opportunities. This called for greater emphasis, since the end of 1916, on work through its branches in neutral countries, and Stockholm

69. Indian Committee, Berlin to Taraknath Das on 10-8-1915, and the latter's reply on 28-8-1915, DAA, Reel 398, files 12-13. Also, statement of Dasgupta.

70. D. C. I. on 25-11-1916, H. P. 1916 November 452-453B. Also, M. N. Roy, *Memoirs*, Bombay, 1964, pp. 31-32 and 34. He will be referred to hereafter simply as Chakravarty.

71. Statements of Glasenapp and Bhupendranath. Partly supported by M. N. Roy in his *Memoirs*, op. cit., p. 291.

72. Indian Committee, Berlin to Bernstorff on 4-12-1916, DAA, Reel 399, file 31 to 38. Also, *Lajpat Rai, Autobiographical Writings*, op. cit., p. 216.

under Chattopadhyaya's personal direction—this possibly explains why he gave up the secretaryship of the Indian Committee in late 1916—soon became the Indian Committee's most important centre for international contacts. After the treaty of Brestlitovsk the Stockholm branch became virtually the most important centre of Indian activities in Europe,⁷³ and it was through Stockholm that contacts were established with the Bolsheviks which opened up for the Indian revolutionaries fresh possibilities after the war.⁷⁴



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73. Helmuth von Glasenapp, *op. cit.*, p. 86. Also, Bhupendranath Datta, *op. cit.*, pp. 240-41. Chattopadhyaya went to Stockholm on 26-1-1917 to take charge of the affairs there. Note by German Foreign Office, dated 3-2-1917, DDA, Reel 399, file 31-38. The *Social Demokraten*, on 30-1-1917, published Chattopadhyaya's letter to Wilson, dated 27-1-1917, *Ibid.*

74. See pp. 294, 317.

CHAPTER—V

ATTEMPTS AT INTERVENTION THROUGH THE WFST

The Ottoman Government, since the last years of the 19th century, had been actively organising the pan-Islamic movement to use it as a political lever to put pressure on her European opponents, and the coming of the Young Turks to power only infused into the movement greater drive and an aggressive zeal.¹ There were at Istanbul, in those days, dozens of pan-Islamic adventurers from India and other Muslim countries to proclaim loudly the strength and preparedness of their followers at home.² The Turks themselves and even their German friends were considerably carried away by their own propaganda and expectations, and gradually came to believe that the Caliph's call for *jihad* would lead to widespread disturbances in the Muslim world against their Christian rulers.³ In fact, such were their expectations that on 2 August 1914, the day the Turko-German Agreement was signed, Generaloberst von Moltke wrote to the German Foreign Office, "Attempts must be made to raise a revolt in India in case England becomes our opponent. The same should be done in Egypt... Persia has to be asked to use this good opportunity to get rid of the Russian yoke and to proceed together with the Turks."⁴ In distant Istanbul, Enver too was thinking on the same line. On 10 August, Amir Chekib Arslan, a deputy in the Ottoman Parliament, informed the German Ambassador, Baron von Wangenheim, of Enver's proposal "to organise the revolutionary movements in North Africa and

1. British Ambassador, Istanbul to Foreign Secy., Britain on 9-10-1910, H. P. 1911 January 15-16B. Also, from British High Commission, Cairo to Home Secy., India on 13-12-1910, H. P. 1911 April 79-80B. Also, Secy. of State to Viceroy on 2-5-1911, H. P. 1911 June 126-131B.

2. Har Dayal, *op. cit.*, p. 36. Also, Bhupendranath Datta, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-44.

3. C. H. Sykes, *Wassmuss, 'the German Lawrence'*, London, 1936. p. 43. Also, statements of Glasenapp and Guenther Voigt.

4. Ulrich Gehrke, *Persien in der Deutschen Orientpolitik*, Vol. I, Stuttgart, 1961, p. 22.

Afghanistan by sending suitable German officers to those places.”⁵ The famous Swedish explorer, Sven Hedin, too, in the meantime, had informed the German Foreign Office that “the Amir of Afghanistan was burning to break away from British control”, and should be helped to make use of the war.⁶ Oppenheim too held the same view, and Enver’s proposal was discussed and approved by the German Foreign Office on 12 August.⁷

Whether it was due to Enver’s suggestion or not, the Germans immediately set about opening a disguised second front against the British in India and West Asia. For that Iran was to them of vital strategic importance. In those days, when diplomatic negotiations or propaganda work from a long distance could not be carried on over the wireless radio, and military assistance could not be air-dropped, any effort at influencing the course of events on India’s western frontier had to be made primarily through Iran. There, the Germans, of course, had some positive advantages. The Iranian intelligentsia naturally hated the British and the Russians. The Democratic Party and the Swedish-officered gendarmerie were definitely pro-German, and some semi-independent tribal chiefs and provincial governors too might be won over. German legations and business houses in Iran were instructed to assist and organise anti-British forces, and to put pressure on the Iranian Government to join the Central Powers. A few quasi diplomatic-cum-military missions were also sent from Germany to help them in their task.⁸ On 26 August, Oppenheim wrote to Enver that a fifteen-man mission would soon be leaving for Turkey,⁹ and on 6 September 1914 the first such mission started from Berlin under the leadership of Wilhelm Wassmuss.¹⁰

5. Wangenheim to German Foreign Office on 10-8-1914, quoted in Ulrich Gehrke, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 10. Also, Oskar von Niedermeyer, *Unter der Glutsonne Irans*, Dachau, 1925, p. 16

6. Ulrich Gehrke, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 23.

7. *Ibid.*

8. Sir Percy Sykes, *History of Persia*, Vol. II, London, 1930, pp. 443-447.

9. Ulrich Gehrke, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 23.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 24. Wilhelm Wassmuss to be referred to hereafter as Wassmuss.

NOTE—On 9 September 1914, the Kaiser issued a proclamation that Muslims in the Entente armies would not be treated as belligerents, and would be sent to the Caliph in Turkey, when taken prisoner. George Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 51.

Some Indian revolutionaries too were then thinking of utilising the situation by approaching the Indian frontier from the west. Towards the middle of September 1914, Har Dayal himself came to Istanbul from Geneva for consultation with the German Ambassador there, and succeeded in impressing upon him the necessity of sending a "number of determined young Hindus" through Turkey for revolutionary work in India.¹¹ In the meantime, Capt. Kadri Bey of the Ottoman Ministry of Defence, then on a tour of the U.S.A., had told some Indian revolutionaries there that they should try to reach the Indian frontier through Turkey.¹² Pandurang Khankojé and Agache were impressed by this advice and they left New York for Turkey early in September 1914.¹³

Fortunately for them, the Wassmuss mission was held up at Haleb (then known as Aleppo) due to inner dissensions and differences with the local authorities,¹⁴ and the three Indians, Pandurang Khankojé, Agache, and Promothonath Datta (the last-named had come to Turkey from the U.S.A. in March 1914),¹⁵ could join the mission there.¹⁶

Work in Iran

The immediate destination of Wassmuss was the south-west of Iran, where he expected to incite the local tribes he had long been friendly with, and destroy the British oil installations. The three Indians with him hoped that they would be able to conduct revolutionary propaganda among the Indian soldiers there, and establish contacts with their comrades at home through the Indian merchants in the Gulf ports.¹⁷ But many Turks in authority looked upon these mis-

11. Wangerheim to German Foreign Office on 20-9-1914, D.A.A. WK, 11 F, Vol. 3, fol. 24, cited in Horst Kruger, *op. cit.*, end note no. 3.

12. Statement of Chakravarty, dated 15-11-1917, Roll 5, Record Group No. 118. Pandurang Khankojé could vaguely remember this incident when interviewed by the author.

13. Bhupendranath Datta, *op. cit.*, pp. 232-233.

14. C. H. Sykes, *op. cit.*, pp. 53-56.

15. D. C. I. on 7-9-1915, H. P. 1915 September 582-585B. Also, file no. 856 of 1914-1915, H. P. 1916 September 16 Dep.

16. Statements of Pandurang Khankojé (hereafter referred to as Khankojé) and Guenther Voigt.

17. Dagobert von Mikusch, *Wassmuss, der Deutsche Lawrence*, Leipzig, 1937, p. 65. Also, Wassmuss Report, pp. 2-3.

sions with suspicion as these necessarily meant an extension of German influence in Iran, which they considered as belonging within their own sphere of influence.¹⁸ The Turkish opposition had convinced Wassmuss that to function properly on foreign soil his mission required proper credentials and a recognised diplomatic status, and he wrote to Berlin to that effect from Haleb.¹⁹ Enver too must have felt that a better-equipped and a more high-powered mission was needed for the job, and wrote to the German Foreign Office accordingly on 27 October 1914.²⁰ In these letters, to a large extent, lay the origin of the future so-called Hentig-Pratap mission, which shall be dealt with later.

Events, however, were moving fast, and by the first week of November 1914 Turkey found herself at war with Russia and Britain. Britain, to protect her interests in the Persian Gulf and to engage the Turks in the rear, landed troops at Fao, on the estuary of the Shatt al-Arab, on 6 November, and captured Basra on the 23rd of that month. That indeed was the time for the Caliph to exert his spiritual authority. On 12 November, he declared a *jihad* on all Christian powers opposed to Turkey. On the 14th, the Sheikh al-Islam through a *fatwa* endorsed the Caliph's declaration. The Shia divines of Najaf and Karbala also issued statements in support of the *jihad*.²¹ But these had little visible effect in the Muslim world. In fact, the promoters of pan-Islamism had largely mis-judged the situation and had failed to realise that pan-Islamism was at best a feeling but not a force that could be effectively used in politics. Besides, the Iranians looked upon the Turks as their traditional enemy, and viewed with apprehension any extension of Turkish influence in their country. Moreover, many pious Muslims actually questioned, how could a *jihad* be waged against the British and the Russians in collaboration with the German infidels, and how in time of such a holy war they could welcome the idolatrous Hindus, who were not even the 'the people of the Book'.²²

However, the Germans had, in the meantime, sent another mission under Capt. Oskar von Niedermeyer to escort Prince Reuss, their am-

18. C. H. Sykes, op. cit., pp. 55-56 and 60. Also, Sir Percy Sykes, op. cit., p. 442.

19. Statements of Hentig and Guenther Voigt.

20. Ulrich Gehrke, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 31.

21. *Ibid.*

22. *Ibid.* On 1-11-1914, the Shah of Iran affirmed his government's determination to remain neutral. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

bassador-designate, to Tehran, and then to proceed to Kabul to persuade the Amir of Afghanistan to invade India at that opportune moment. The Niedermeyer mission left Istanbul on 5th December 1914, and reached Haleb on the 13th.²³ Wassmuss was still there, and from there the two missions set out after Christmas to reach Baghdad towards the middle of January 1915.²⁴ There also the Germans had a difficult time with the local Turkish Governor.²⁵ However, the two missions now parted company. The Wassmuss mission, including the three Indians, left for south-western Iran on 28th January.²⁶ Niedermeyer waited at Baghdad for some time more to complete his preparations, and left for Tehran early in February. On its arrival at Daulatabad in the middle of April the Niedermeyer mission too was split into two. The main body under Seiler left for Ispahan, on 21 April, to make it their centre of operations in central Iran, while Niedermeyer, Prince Reuss, and Guenther Voigt went direct to Tehran, primarily, to build up pressure on the young Shah to take the German side.²⁷ Von Kanitz, the German Military Attache at Tehran, and a few other German missions were also busy in different parts of Iran organising local forces against the British and the Russians.²⁸

Wassmuss and his Indian companions had, in the meantime, advanced towards Bih Bahar near Bushire, via Dizful and Shuster. From Bandar Dilain, on their way, the three Indians with one of their Iranian comrades made a dash for Bushire by boat, and distributed incriminating leaflets among Indian soldiers there.²⁹ Then the entire party moved towards Shiraz, which was the centre of Amba Prasad's activities, and whose Governor, Mukhbir-e-Sultaneh, was actively pro-German. However, in the night of 5-6 March, the entire party was captured, on their way, by the pro-British tribal chief, Haider Khan of Bandar Rig. Of course, Wassmuss and a few others including the three Indians soon succeeded in escaping, and reached Shiraz to-

23. Ulrich Gehrke, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 146. Also, C. H. Sykes, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

24. Ulrich Gehrke, *op. cit.* Vol. 1, p. 24.

25. *Ibid.* Also, C. H. Sykes, *op. cit.*, 61-62.

26. Ulrich Gehrke, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 77.

27. Statement of Guenther Voigt.

28. For details see Wipert von Blucher, *Zeitenwende in Iran*, Biberbach an der Riss, 1949, pp. 27-51.

29. Ulrich Gehrke, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 77-82. Also, Wassmuss Report, pp. 8-13.

wards the middle of March. But most of their papers, including their secret code, fell into British hands.³⁰

Wassmuss and his party stayed at Shiraz for a couple of months, regrouping their forces and chalking out plans for future action. Only Agache secretly left for India to seek useful contacts with comrades at home. However, on 19 May 1915, Wassmuss and Khankoje once again left for Tengistan. Promothonath Datta too left for Ispahan to join the German Consul, Seiler's group there.³¹

By then German influence in Iran, particularly in the south and east, was definitely in the ascendant. The gendarmerie and the Democratic Party were active in their hostility against the British and the Russians, while Mukhbir-e-Sultaneh, the Governor of Fars, was openly pro-German. Even powerful tribal chiefs, like Mulla Khan Muhammad and Bahram Khan Bampur, were carrying out occasional raids on British positions in south-east Iran and even inside Baluchistan.³² So it was felt that the time was ripe for the Germans and the Indian revolutionaries to proceed towards India through the deserts of Kerman and Mekran at a time when a larger group consisting of Hentig, Mahendra Pratap, Barakatullah, Niedermeyer, and others was moving towards Afghanistan across central Iran.

Kerman was the natural choice as their centre of operations, and Promothonath reached there in June 1915 with an advance party. He was enthusiastically welcomed by the local people. The main body of the Zugmayer-Griesinger mission, however, reached there on 4 July,³³ and they were soon joined by Khankoje from Tengistan, and Agache, who in the meantime had returned from India. They began raising and training a revolutionary militia with the help of the local Democrats, and entered into friendly negotiations with certain tribal

30. Wassmuss Report, pp. 3-13. Also, Khankoje's letter, quoted in Bhupendranath Dutta, *op. cit.*, p. 235.

31. Sir Percy Sykes, *op. cit.*, pp. 444.

32. For details please see Sir Percy Sykes, *op. cit.*, pp. 442-450, and *Summary of the Administration of Lord Hardinge of Penhurst* (Foreign and Political Dept.), Delhi, 1916, p. 103.

33. Promothonath Datta from Kerman to Freeman on 3-8-1915. H. P. 1915 September 582-585B. Also, Ulrich Gehrke, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 158-159. Also, Sir Percy Sykes, *op. cit.*, pp. 446-447. Also, British Consul, Kerman to Secy., Foreign and Political, India on 1-12-1915. Zugmayer and Griesinger left Ispahan on 6-6-1915. Note by A. H. Grant, dated 21-6-1915, F. P. (War) 1916 January 1-202.

chiefs.³⁴ Then, in January 1916, an advance party under Khankoje, Dr. Biach, and Wedig went ahead to Bam and then to Bampur to negotiate with Bahram Khan Bampuri a joint expedition against the British in Baluchistan. On 6 February, the main body of the Zugmayer-Griesinger mission, which obviously included Agache and Promothonath, also left Kerman for Baluchistan via Bam.³⁵

But the British, since autumn 1915, had started a counter-offensive with bullets of gold, and had, in the meantime, won over some local chiefs, like Qawan al-Mulk, Sirdar Zafar, Muhtassim, and Bahram Khan Bampuri himself. When, possibly in the beginning of April 1916, the advance party under Khankoje, Dr. Biach, and Wedig had reached Bampur for negotiations they were treacherously attacked by Bahram Khan Bampuri and were forced to retreat. The main body of the mission too was similarly attacked at Bam by pro-British tribes, and fell back on Baft.³⁶ There they were looted by Sirdar Zafar, and on 10 April Khankoje was captured, while escaping to the west. Zugmayer, Agache, Promothonath and others in the main party were also treacherously captured at Niriz. All the three Indians, however, managed to escape, and retired to safety at Shiraz.³⁷

By then the evolution of events in Iran had gone against the Germans and their Indian friends. On 8 August 1915, British troops temporarily occupied Bushire, and put sufficient pressure on the Iranian Government to force Mukhbir-e-Sultaneh, the anti-British Governor of Fars, to resign on 16 September 1915. By early November 1915, the Russian army also had advanced up to Karaj, within twenty-five miles of Tehran, and in the trial of strength that took place in the capital on 15 November the pro-Allied party had scored some

34. Ulrich Gehrke, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 160-161. Also, Khankoje's letter, quoted in Bhupendranath Datta, op. cit., pp. 236-237. Also, Zugmayer to Niedermeyer on 5-2-1917 (enclosure no. 2), F. P. 1920 June 534-537.

35. Khankoje's letter, quoted in Bhupendranath Datta, op. cit., p. 235. Also, Sir Percy Sykes, op. cit., pp. 449-450.

36. *Zugmayer Report*, pp. 12-13, cited in Ulrich Gehrke's letter to author, dated 25-2-1958. Also, Khankoje's letter, quoted in Bhupendranath Datta, op. cit., pp. 236-237. Also, Wassmuss to Wustrow, German Consul at Shiraj, on 20-2-1916, F.P. 1920 June 534-537.

37. Khankoje's letter, quoted in Bhupendranath Datta, op. cit., pp. 236-237. Also, Zugmayer to Niedermeyer on 5-2-1917 (enclosure no. 2), F. P. 1920 June 534-537.

success. The Shah was prevented from joining the plenipotentiaries of the Central Powers at Qum. The advancing Russians also defeated their forces and occupied Kashan by the end of 1915. Nearer to the scene in South-East Iran, a British military expedition under Sir Percy Sykes had landed at Bandar Abbas in March 1916. He immediately began raising, what later came to be known as, the South Persian Rifles, and set out for Kerman on 17 May 1916. Another British expedition, under Major T. H. Keyes, had also set out in April from Gwadar in Baluchistan (then belonging to Oman) for South-East Iran. The British now received considerable assistance from local chiefs, like Qawam al-Mulk, Sirdar Nasrat, and Sirdar Zafar, and reached Ispahan, on 11 September 1916, where they met the Russians under Gen. Baratoff.³⁸ Though anti-Allies elements still remained active at certain places they had, by summer 1916, definitely lost their ground in Iran, and all that the Indian revolutionaries there could do then was to lie low in secret shelters or among friendly tribes. However, Amba Prasad and Kedarnath Sondhi, the latter had come from the U.S.A. only the year before, were soon captured by the British and executed, probably, early in 1917.³⁹

Mission to Kabul

In the meantime, the letters of Wassmuss and Enver, and the difficulties experienced by the former and Niedermeyer had persuaded the German Foreign Office to organise a properly equipped Turko-German diplomatic mission, which could successfully persuade the Amir of Afghanistan to invade India at that critical moment.⁴⁰ The Ghadar leaders in the U.S.A. were also interested in going to Turkey to reach the Indian frontier from the west. They

38. For details see Sir Percy Sykes, *op. cit.*, pp. 447-448 and 452-461. Also, *Summary of the Administration of Lord Hardinge* (Foreign and Political), *op. cit.*, p. 108.

39. Bhupendranath Datta, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-40 and 237. Uma Mukherjee in her *Two Great Indian Revolutionaries*, Calcutta, 1966, p. 88, says that Amba Prasad committed suicide the day before he was to have been executed, in January 1917.

40. The German Foreign Office, between 16 and 19 September 1914, discussed the necessity of strengthening the ill-equipped mission under Wassmuss. Ulrich Gehrke, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 24. The letters of Wassmuss and Enver only strengthened their sense of urgency. Statements of Hentig and Guenther Voigt.

thought that, apart from their influence in the court of Kabul, it would be relatively easy to get into contact with their comrades in India and to send them arms from there. On 24 November 1914, Barakatullah wrote to Har Dayal in Switzerland indicating his willingness to go to Kabul via Turkey, and he actually reached Berlin *en route*, on 9 January 1915.⁴¹ Har Dayal too was interested in revolutionary work in West Asia, and came to Berlin on 27 January.⁴² Their proposal naturally impressed the leaders of the Indian Committee, and on 21 February Mahendra Pratap personally called at the German Foreign Office and suggested that he, Barakatullah, and a few Indian prisoners-of-war should be included in the mission that was to leave shortly for Kabul.⁴³ Rudolf Nadolny, the representative of the Foreign Office in the German General Staff, welcomed the proposal, and it was accepted by the German Foreign Office.⁴⁴ Even well-known industrialists, such as Albert Ballin and Mannesmann, strongly supported this idea. They all felt that the fact that Mahendra Pratap was a well-known landlord of the *Kshatriya* caste and Barakatullah, a renowned revolutionary and a *maulvi*, would inspire enthusiasm in Indian princes and Muslims alike. It was further decided, obviously with an eye on Indian sentiment, that Mahendra Pratap would be the formal head of the mission, while Dr. W. O. von Hentig of the German Foreign Office would be in actual charge of its affairs.⁴⁵ The German Chancellor, Bethman-Hollweg, gave them official letters, addressed to twenty-six Indian princes and the King of Nepal, professing German friendship and exhorting them to rise in revolt against the British. They were to smuggle those to the different courts through couriers from Kabul.⁴⁶ The German Government was requested to

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41. See pp 146, 159. Also, Barakatullah to Har Dayal on 24-11-1914, DAA Roll 397 files 1 to 11. Also, note by Oppenheim, dated 9-1-1915, *ibid.*

42. Horst Kruger, *op. cit.*, foot note no. 11.

43. Ulrich Gehrke, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, p. 146. Mahendra Pratap had reached Berlin on 10-2-1915. Mahendra Pratap, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

44. *Ibid.* Also, Hentig's letter to author, dated 7-4-1956.

45. Statement of Guenther Voigt. Also, Mahendra Pratap, *op. cit.*, pp 43 and 49. Also, Mahendra Pratap's letter to author, dated 14-11-1959.

46. Mahendra Pratap, *op. cit.*, p. 41. Copies of these letters are there among MSS.EUR., E. 209 in India Office Library and with Dr. Hentig at Bettinastieg 10, Hamburg-Nieustedten, West Germany.

sanction £100,000 for this mission, and to deposit it in Hentig's account with the Deutsch Bank at Istanbul.⁴⁷

Ultimately, the so-called Hentig-Pratap mission left Berlin on 9 April 1915.⁴⁸ Another mission composed of Taraknath Das, Birendranath Dasgupta, Tirumal Achari, L.P. Verma, Rajab Ali, and a few others also accompanied them up to Istanbul. They were to proceed towards the Suez Canal to work in co-operation with Egyptian nationalists, and to make contacts with Indian soldiers in the British line.⁴⁹ Their activities, however, will be dealt with later. Har Dayal accompanied these missions up to Istanbul to work, more or less, as the representative of the Indian Committee in Berlin.⁵⁰

At Istanbul the Indians were honourably received. Mahendra Pratap was received in audience by the Prime-Minister, Hilmi Pasha, the all-powerful Enver, and the Sultan himself. Dr. Fuad Bey was put in charge of the Indian revolutionaries, and Ali Bey of the Oriental Department of the Ottoman War Office was asked to do liaison work between them and the Turkish authorities. Kazim Bey of the War Office was attached to the Hentig-Pratap mission as its Turkish member. The Sultan also gave the mission a letter of introduction for the Amir of Afghanistan. Hilmi Pasha also gave them a few letters addressed to a few Indian princes. The Sheikh al-Islam gave Barakatullah a written *fatwa* urging Hindus and Muslims to work together against the British. The Indian revolutionaries from Berlin, all of whom except Barakatullah were Hindus, were highly impressed with Enver's statement that he kept politics and religion in two different pockets.⁵¹ This was indeed in pleasant contrast to the rigid and often hostile attitude of some Indian pan-Islamites, they had to work with in Turkey.

Necessary arrangements having been made, the Hentig-Pratap mission left Istanbul on 20 April, and reached Baghdad on 27 May and Kermanshah on 7 June. While the party rested there for a couple

47. Ulrich Gehrke, op. cit., Vol. 2 p. 141. Also, statement of Hentig.

48. Dr. Becker's diary, F. P. 1920 July 376. Also, Ulrich Gehrke, op. cit., p. 36. Also, statement of Dasgupta.

49. Bhupendranath Datta, op. cit., p. 36. Also, statement of Dasgupta.

50. D.C.I. on 28-9-1915, H.P. 1915 September 582-585 B. Har Dayal's letter dated 15-5-1915, published in the *Ghadar* on 1-8-1915.

51. Bhupendranath Datta, op. cit., pp. 41 and 45. Also, Mahendra Pratap, op. cit., pp. 44-45.

of weeks Hentig alone went to Tehran for discussions with Prince Reuss and Niedermeyer. Others left Kermanshah on 20 June and reached Ispahan on the 28th. Hentig joined them there, and the entire group moved from Ispahan on 1 July. They advanced towards Kabul via Amarak, Nain, and Rabatgur. It was at the last named town that Niedermeyer too joined them on 22 July.⁵²

But, by then, the British and the Russians had come to know of their movements. Early in August, the news was passed on to the Amir of Afghanistan, and the East Persian Cordon was alerted and strengthened to prevent the mission from getting through it. The members of this mission too had learnt that both the roads leading to the east were being guarded by Russian soldiers. So from Charch a small group under Dr. Becker, including three Afridi prisoners, was sent towards Turbat as a decoy party to attract the Russians to the south. By 3 August, the Russians had been successfully misled, and the main body of the mission reached Bushrujeh. Thence they advanced through Kain and Birjand, and entered Afghanistan on 9 August. On 2 October 1915, they ultimately reached Kabul.⁵³

In the meantime, the Amir, in reply to the letter of Lord Hardinge, had assured him that all aliens on entering his kingdom would be immediately disarmed. So, the members of this mission too were treated likewise, and were lodged in quarters within the famous Babar Gardens. But they went on hunger-strike in protest, and the restrictions on them were soon removed.⁵⁴ It was so easy for them because, though Amir Habibullah himself was a peaceloving man, well disposed towards the British, his brother, Nasrullah Khan, and the crown-prince, Inayetullah, were strong supporters of an alliance with the Central Powers and an attack on India. There was in the country considerable anti-British feeling and sympathy for the Turks and the Germans. The *Siraj al-Akhtar*, a leading newspaper of Kabul, usually breathed venom against the British, and members of this

52. Mahendra Pratap, op. cit. pp. 45-47. Also, Dr. Becker's diary, F.P. 1920 July 376.

53. *Summary of the Administration of Lord Hardinge of Penhurst*, op. cit., p. 98. Dr. Becker's diary, F.P. 1920 July 376. Also Ulrich Gehrke, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 148-149. Also, Mahendra Pratap, op. cit., pp. 46-48.

54. *Summary of the Administration of Lord Hardinge of Penhurst*, op. cit., p. 98. Also, Mahendra Pratap, op. cit., p. 49. Also, statements of Hentig and Guenther Voigt.

mission were cheered whenever they went out.⁵⁵ So the Amir had to accede to their request, and granted them an interview on 24 October 1915. There, in presence of the Amir's ministers, it was agreed that the Germans would train the Afghan army, and that the blue-print of a German-Afghan treaty would be prepared in time. The Afghan Government appointed Haji Abdulla Razak for liaison work with the Indian revolutionaries there.⁵⁶

Work in Afghanistan

In the meantime, Muslim nationalists and pan-Islamites within India were also busy establishing contacts and discovering possibilities across the western frontier. The frontier tribesmen were almost perpetually restive, and the declaration of *jihad* naturally provided them with further excuse and enthusiasm. There was also among them the colony of Indian *mujahids* (commonly known in English as the Hindusthani Fanatics) in the Chamla-Amazai border, known for their zealous hatred for the British, and from December 1914 the latter were getting ready for another attack on British India.⁵⁷ Obviously, many in India were in touch with them and other tribal chiefs. In January 1915, Abul Kalam Azad, the well-known editor of the *Al-Hilal* of Calcutta, and Maulana Obeidullah Sindhi (hereafter referred to as Obeidullah) of *Dar al-U'lum* at Deoband had a secret meeting at Delhi with Abdul Ahmad, the leader of these Indian *mujahids*.⁵⁸ What actually transpired among them is not known. But soon afterwards contact was established with Kabul, and early in February 1915

55. Entry for 30-10-1915 in N.W.F.P. Diary, F.P. (War) 1916 May 1-288. Statements of Hentig and Guenther Voigt. Also, *Siraj al Akhvar*, 7-11-1915.

56. Statements of Hentig and Guenther Voigt. Also, Mahendra Pratap, op. cit., p. 51. Entry for 8-11-1915 in the diary of the British Agent at Kabul, F.P. (War) 1916 May 1-288.

57. D.C.I. on 6-4-1915, H.P. 1915 April 416-419B. Also, Asst. D.C.I. on 21-8-1915, F.P. (Frontier) 1915 October 81-83B. In fact there were seven tribal raids between 29-11-1915 and 5-9-1915. Lord Hardinge, *My Indian Years*, London, 1948, p. 131. For details of tribal attacks just before the war see *Summary of the Administration of Lord Hardinge of Penhurst*, op. cit., pp. 99-100.

58. Entries for 20 and 27 March 1915 in N.W.F.P. Diary, F.P. (Frontier) 1915 October 81-83B. Also, note by V. Vivian on 13-10-1916 (appendix 1).

fourteen Muslim students from Lahore left for Kabul via the colony of the *mujahids*.⁵⁹ In August 1915, Obeidullah himself went to Kabul with Abdullah, Fateh Muhammad, and Muhammad Ali, and formed the nucleus of an Indian revolutionary movement there.⁶⁰ He was, however, a zealous pan-Islamite; but in those hectic days of adventure and hope, it was quite common for fanatic pan-Islamites and virulent nationalists to work together against their common enemy.

The presence of so many Indian revolutionaries and the friendly environment inspired Mahendra Pratap to take a rather bold decision of considerable symbolic value. In the evening of 1 December 1915, he announced the formation of a Provisional Government of Free India at Kabul, with himself as its President, Barakatullah as its Prime Minister, and Obeidullah as the Minister for Home Affairs.⁶¹ Those Indians, who had been under detention, were now released, and some of them took up various secretarial jobs under this provisional government.⁶² In February 1916, Mahendra Pratap and Obeidullah sent a secret invitation to Abul Kalam Azad to join them at Kabul.⁶³

In the meantime, the Germans, according to the agreement already arrived at, had started training the Afghan army units at Kabul. The timely arrival of some Austrian soldiers, who had escaped from the Russian prisoners-of-war camps in Turkistan, was of immense help to them.⁶⁴ Obviously exaggerated rumours about increased German activities in Iran and the disturbances in the Punjab were then in the air in the *bazars* of Kabul.⁶⁵ In Iran the Nizam es-Sultaneh had already announced the establishment of a separate government at Kermanshah, and had entered into a friendly treaty with Germany in December 1915. Obviously, the pressure on the Amir from anti-British elements was mounting, and in January 1916 he called a

59. Entries for 15-5-1915 and 19-6-1915 in N.W.F.P., Diary, F.P. (Frontier) 1915 October 81-83B.

60. Rowlatt, p. 125. For details about tribal unrest during World War I see *Summary of the Administration of Lord Hardinge of Penhurst*, op. cit., pp. 101-103.

61. Mahendra Pratap, op. cit., pp. 51-52.

62. *Ibid.*, pp. 50-51.

63. Report by C.E.W. Sands, cited in Material, paper 74.

64. Statements of Hentig and Guenther Voigt. Also, Ulrich Gehrke, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 291.

65. *Siraj al-Akhbar*, 5-2-1915 and 6-3-1916. Also, statements of Hentig and Guenther Voigt.

meeting of the leading chiefs of the realm to discuss the situation. He agreed to a friendly and commercial treaty with Germany, whereby the latter would recognise the complete independence of Afghanistan. But, on the vital question of waging war on Britain, no decision could be taken.⁶⁶ The Amir still had faith in friendship with Britain, and assured the Government of India, at the end of January 1916, of continued Afghan neutrality. Gradually, however, the situation in the Punjab and Iran improved for the British, and in April 1916 the Amir tactfully told the anti-British elements that he was ready for a military alliance with Germany if only an effective contingent of the German or Turkish army came to Afghanistan.⁶⁷

Both the Amir and the Germans knew that such a force could not reach the Afghan frontier in the foreseeable future, and it was clear that as long the former had his way Afghanistan would not join the war on the German side. Naturally, the German members of the mission felt that it was fruitless to stay there any longer.⁶⁸ It was then that Hormusji Dadachanji Kersasp, alias Hasan Ali, Basanta Singh, alias Aziz Ahmed, and D. Mahmud (possibly an alias) also reached Kabul,⁶⁹ with some information and instructions for this mission. Whether their arrival had anything to do with the departure of the Germans cannot be ascertained. However, the Germans, in spite of Nasrullah's request to stay on, left Afghanistan in May in three different groups, taking three different routes. Kersasp, Basanta Singh, and D. Mahmud also decided to return, and joined Guenther Voigt's group, that left Kabul on 25 May 1916. Fortunately

66. Ulrich Gehrke, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 291. For details see Wipert von Bluecher, op. cit., pp. 40-94, and 120-127. Also, *Summary of the Administration of Lord Hardinge of Penhurst*, op. cit., pp. 98-99.

67. Ulrich Gehrke, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 291. Also, *Summary of the Administration of Lord Hardinge of Penhurst*, op. cit. on 29-10-1915. Hardinge forwarded to the Amir a letter from King George V, appreciating his neutrality, and also assured him of an increase in his annual subsidy by Rs. 200,000. *Ibid.* "A jehad would have been popular in Afghanistan. But the Amir's loyalty helped us." Lord Hardinge, op. cit., p. 131.

68. *Ibid.* According to Sir Louis Dane, "Northern India must have (been) lost for the time," if the Afghans had attacked and incited the frontier tribes to revolt, "as there were signs of mutiny in some regiments left there". Sir Louis Dane Papers, MSS. EUR., D. 659.7. Also, Lord Hardinge, op. cit., p. 117.

69. Statements of Guenther Voigt and Hentig. Also, Mahendra Pratap's letter to author, dated 14-11-1959.

for D. Mahmud he was sent back to Kabul from Herat. The rest were captured by the British in Iran between Kain and Birjand, early in August, and were brought to Nasaratabad in chains. There Kersasp and Basanta Singh were shot by order of a British military tribunal.⁷⁰

Mahendra Pratap and Barakatullah, however, stayed behind at Kabul in the hope that they might still be of some use there. They decided to find out if any useful contact could be made with the Russian Government. They hoped that, though Russia was an ally of Britain, some sympathy or support might be found there as in Japan. So, in March 1916, Mathura Singh alias Shamsheer Singh and Mirza Muhammad Ali left for Turkistan with a letter for the Czar from Mahendra Pratap in his capacity as the President of the Provisional Government of Free India. But, contrary to their expectations, they were arrested and handed over to the British.⁷¹ In autumn, Mahendra Pratap made another effort, and sent Kal Singh alias Gujar Singh to Turkistan. But he was told by the local authorities that it would not be safe for Indian revolutionaries to enter Russian territory.⁷²

Contacts in Arabia

In the meantime, Muhammad Hasan, a well-known pan-Islamite, had left Bombay for Jedda, *en route* to Istanbul, on 18 September 1915 with ten of his followers, including Muhammad Mian Ansari, ostensibly to attend the *hajj* festival.⁷³ But at Mecca he had differences with the local authorities, which prevented his departure for Istanbul. However, he could meet Enver and Jemal Pasha, when they visited Hejaz towards the end of the year, and managed to get a few appeals to Indian Muslims signed by them and Ghalib Pasha, the Governor of Hezaj.⁷⁴ These were known as the *Ghalibnama*, and, before the

70. Ulrich Gehrke, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 292. Also, statements of Guenther Voigt and Hentig. Habibullah's assassination and the subsequent declaration of war by Afghanistan suggest that the Germans there had underestimated the strength of those opposed to the Amir. Sir Louis Dane Papers, MSS. EUR., D. 659|7.

71. D.C.I. on 27-1-1917, H.P. 1917 February 397-400 B. Also, Mahendra Pratap, *op. cit.*, pp. 55-56.

72. Mahendra Pratap, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

73. D.C.I. on 28-9-1915, H.P. 1915 September 582-585 B. Also, Maulana Husain Ahmed, *Naqsh-i-Hayat*, Vol. II, Deoband, 1954, p. 221. Also, Rowlatt, pp. 125-126.

74. Maulana Husain Ahmed, *op. cit.*, p. 221.

year was out, Muhammad Mian Ansari came to India with these and a few other propaganda leaflets, which were distributed among pan-Islamic groups and the frontier tribes. Then, early in 1916, he went to Kabul.⁷⁶ There his comrades felt it necessary to re-establish contact with Istanbul. But it was no longer possible to send emissaries through Iran. So, it was decided to establish contact through Muhammad Hasan at Mecca. Sheik Abdur Rahim secretly left for India, *en route* to Mecca, with letters from Muhammad Mian Ansari and Obeidullah, dated 9 July 1916. But in August he was, unfortunately, caught by the British police, and their plans regarding an understanding with Turkey and a pan-Islamic rising in India fell into British hands.⁷⁸ Since these letters and a few other instructions for their comrades in North India were sewn with the silk lining of the bearer's coat the whole affair thus brought to light came to be known as the 'Silk-Letter Conspiracy Case'.

Obviously, this affected quite seriously the morale and organisation of pan-Islamites in India. Individuals and small groups, however, still moved across the frontier from time to time. But after two such emissaries were caught in the North-West Frontier Province in March 1917, with Rs. 8000 in ready cash,⁷⁷ contact between revolutionary groups across the frontier was snapped for the time being.

Contacts with Russia

By then, the March revolution had taken place in Russia, and Kerensky had come to power. Once more Mahendra Pratap tried to explore that quarter for a friendly response. But in reply to his query he was informed that there would be no change in Russian foreign policy under the new regime, and that Indian revolutionaries should not expect any help from Russia.⁷⁸ Mahendra Pratap, however, was desperately trying to make some useful contacts, and sent Kal Singh to Nepal, possibly in late June 1917, with Bethman-Hollweg's letters. Helped actively by the Governor of Khanabad, Kal Singh could

75. Rowlatt, p. 126. Also, Material, paper 74.

76. Rowlatt, p. 126. In July 1916, Abdur Rahim and his associates were planning to start a press in the tribal areas of the N.W.F.P. Money and munitions to start a tribal revolt were also collected. Material, paper 74.

77. Rowlatt, pp. 124, 126 and 127.

78. Mahendra Pratap, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

secretly enter India, and reached Nepal. But the Government of Nepal could not be so easily weaned away from their long friendship with Britain,⁷⁹ and no one except the King of Nepal ever received those letters.⁸⁰

This, obviously, could not have borne any other result. By then the tide of war had definitely turned in Britain's favour, and within India revolutionary activities had been more or less suppressed. To the Indians at Kabul it was clear that though their personal relations with the Amir were excellent, and Mahendra Pratap had been given even Afghan citizenship, their stay in Afghanistan could no longer be of any use, and that they should look elsewhere for aid and intervention.

However, an opportunity soon came. The Bolsheviks, soon after assuming power, took up the threads of the previous negotiations, and invited Mahendra Pratap to visit the U.S.S.R. He reached Leningrad early in March 1918, and had an interview with Trotsky.⁸¹ But Soviet Russia herself was then too involved in her own troubles, and could offer India nothing more than moral support. So he returned to Berlin on 28 March 1918,⁸² exactly three years after he had left it with high hopes. That was the end of the first contact between the Bolsheviks and Indian revolutionaries. More important and sustained contacts could take place only after a couple of years, in somewhat changed circumstances. However, that is a different story to be recounted later.

Mission to Suez Canal

As stated earlier, members of a separate revolutionary mission had reached Istanbul from Berlin along with that of Hentig and Mahendra Pratap. They were expected to proceed towards the Suez Canal and assist the Turkish offensive in that region. When Jemal Pasha

79. *Ibid.*, pp. 56-57. Since Mahendra Pratap wrote personal appeals to the princes on the back of these letters, and gives 12-6-1917 as the date of his signature, it is a safe presumption that Kal Singh must have left Kabul by the end of June.

80. Note by Sir D. Probyn, dated 28-2-1921, MSS. EHR., E. 204.

81. Mahendra Pratap, *op. cit.*, pp. 57-58. Also, F. M. Bailey, *Mission to Tashkent*, London, 1946, pp. 7-8. Also, telegram from the Hague, dated 29-3-1918, P. & S. (India Corr.), 1913 of 1918.

82. Mahendra Pratap, *op. cit.*, p. 58. Also, press cable from Copenhagen on 30-3-1918, P. & S. (India Corr.) 3641 of 1918.

had launched his offensive in the Gaza-Beersheba front, on 14-15 January and then on 2-3 February 1915, he had tried to send armed bedouins behind the British line to destroy the lines of communication and, if possible, to damage or block the canal itself.⁸³ But that offensive had failed, and it was felt that better arrangements should be made to foment troubles within and behind the British lines.

Egyptian nationalists, unlike the Arabs within the Ottoman Empire, were bitterly anti-British. Besides, there were large numbers of Indian troops in the British army there. To make contacts with them and to utilise the situation against the British, it was realised that experienced revolutionaries should be entrusted with the job.⁸⁴

As soon as news reached Berlin that a few Indians might be of use in the Suez sector, the Indian Committee selected Taraknath Das, Birendranath Dasgupta alias Ali Haidar, Tirumal Achari alias Muhammad Akbar, L. P. Varma, and Rajab Ali to go to Turkey for the job. Some Indian prisoners-of-war also accompanied them from Germany, and a few more joined them at Istanbul. There the local Indian Committee put them in touch with the Ottoman Ministry of War, and they set out for their base of operation near Jerusalem soon after Mahendra Pratap and his party had left for the east.⁸⁵

They were equipped with propaganda leaflets in Hindi and Urdu, which were to be smuggled to the Indian soldiers. They had also with them two Egyptian revolutionaries, Muhammad Husni and Muhammad Abd al-Halim Bey, as well as some useful references for making contacts with the Egyptian nationalists to organise sabotage work, if not a general rising, behind the British lines. They were to work in close co-operation with the pro-Turkish Arab leader, Halim Bey and his followers. Early in summer 1915, they advanced towards the British lines across the desert of Kantara, and succeeded in making some useful contacts with some Egyptian revolutionaries and bedouin tribes, and in distributing propaganda leaflets among the

83. For details see Gen. Kress von Kressenstein, *Mit den Turken zum Suez Kanal*, Berlin, 1938, pp. 85-91.

84. Bhupendranath Datta, op. cit., p. 36. Also, statement of Dasgupta.

85. Statement of Dasgupta.

Indian soldiers.⁸⁶ The British officers, however, had by then become watchful, and stringent measures were adopted to prevent revolutionary propaganda among the soldiers and any desertion by them. Besides, most of the Indian soldiers were Hindus, and they obviously did not feel much enthusiasm to escape to *Dar al-Islam*. So the revolutionaries were not particularly successful in fomenting trouble among them. They could, however, do some sabotage work behind the British lines, in co-operation with their Egyptian friends.⁸⁷

But within a couple of months Taraknath became disappointed with their work and opportunities there. He questioned the utility of risking their lives in the far away desert of Sinai. Active revolutionaries, he argued, were few in number, and they should seek death only when effectively serving their national cause or where their martyrdom would leave an impression on their countrymen; so why face death without much purpose in that desert corner of the world?⁸⁸ Early in August 1915, he started corresponding with the Indian Committee in Berlin to relieve him from his duty there. This, quite naturally created some unpleasantness among his comrades. However, he was allowed to leave the mission at the end of the year, and he went to Hebron to recuperate his broken health.⁸⁹ Other members of the mission, however, remained at their post till the final failure of Gen. Kress von Kressenstein's planned offensive in August 1916. It was then that Dasgupta, for reasons of health, was allowed to retire to Istanbul, while others were sent to Baghdad to work among the Indian soldiers taken prisoner at Kut el-Amara, and to incite them to join the Ottoman forces.⁹⁰

Indians in Turkey

At Istanbul, in the meantime, relation among the Indian leaders of

86. *Ibid.* Also, Bhupendranath Datta, *op. cit.*, p. 37. For details about their raids and sabotage work, see Indian Committee's report to Wesendonck, dated 12-10-1915, in DDA. Reel 398

87. *Ibid.*

88. Statement of Dasgupta.

89. Indian Committee to German Foreign Office on 10-8-1915, DDA. Reel 398 files 12-31.

Also, Taraknath to German Foreign Office on 28-8-1915, *ibid.*

90. Statement of Dasgupta.

different schools of thought had not been quite happy. The local Indian leaders were all Muslims, and it was but natural that operations directed from the Caliph's capital, seeking to utilise pan-Islamic sentiment, would have a certain Muslim character. Considering this, it was unfortunate that Har Dayal was sent there in April 1915 as the Indian representative from Berlin. He was a rabid nationalist and by temperament domineering, and neither in the past nor now could he work in harmony with the Muslim elements there.⁹¹ In May 1915, their leader, Abdul Jabbar, complained in Berlin of the growing estrangement between them.⁹² The German Foreign Office, which realised that nothing effective could be done in West Asia except in co-operation with the Muslims, persuaded the Indian Committee in Berlin to declare "that the Indian nationalists have no anti-Islamic tendencies, but desire to overcome any difference in order to liberate India jointly".⁹³ But things did not improve, and Har Dayal in despair left for Budapest at the end of August 1915.⁹⁴ Still, the Indians there could not work in unison. In fact, Abdul Jabbar was not the man who could unite and lead an odd assortment of people. He was disliked even by many nationalist Indian Muslims for his fanatical pan-Islamism, and did not enjoy the confidence of even Dr. Fuad Bey.⁹⁵ Abdul Hafiz was sent from Berlin in September 1915 to look into the situation there and to tone up their revolutionary endeavours.⁹⁶ It was then that Chait Singh and Basanta Singh were sent to Baghdad, and, Kersasp, Kedarnath Sondhi, Amin Sharma, and Abdul Aziz were sent to Iran and Afghanistan. But in Istanbul

91. German Ambassador, Istanbul to Bethman-Hollweg on 15-10-1914, DDA, Welt Krieg 11 f., Vol. 4, folio 22, cited in Horst Kruger, op. cit., end note no. 5.

Also, German Ambassador, Istanbul to Bethman-Hollweg on 27-11-1914, DAA., Welt Krieg 31 f., Vol. 6, folio 59, cited in Horst Kruger, op. cit., end note no. 10.

92. Bhupendranath Datta, op. cit., p. 44. Also, Tel. dated 23-5-1915, DAA, Welt Krieg 31 f., Vol. 13 folio 99, cited in Horst Kruger, op. cit., end note no. 16.

93. Tel. dated 23-5-1915, DAA, Welt Krieg 31 f., Vol. 13, folio 99, cited in Horst Kruger, op. cit., end note no. 17.

94. DAA, Welt Krieg 31 f., Vol. 19, folio 131-132, cited in Horst Kruger, op. cit., end note no. 18.

95. Bhupendranath Datta, op. cit., pp. 44-47*

96. D. C. I. on 14-10-1916, H.P. 1916 October 406-408 B.

mutual recriminations flourished as before, and in November 1915 Taraknath went to Istanbul to meet Abdul Jabbar, and to iron out differences.⁹⁷ Obviously, his efforts did not succeed, and Abdul Jabbar had to be ultimately removed from the Indian Committee there. Late in November 1915, Abdul Hafiz came to Istanbul and took up his post as the representative of the Indian Committee in Berlin.⁹⁸ This had a soothing influence on the situation, and soon, as stated before, attempts were made to establish contacts with their friends in India and Afghanistan through the Indian pan-Islamites and traders in Hejaz.

The situation again appeared encouraging when, on 25 April 1916, Gen. Townshend surrendered to the Turks at Kut el-Amara with thirteen thousand soldiers of whom the vast majority were Indians. It was not only a major defeat for British arms, but it also opened the prospects of enlisting the service of so many thousands of Indian prisoners-of-war in their national cause. Chait Singh was already at Baghdad, and some of the Indian members of the Suez Mission were also brought there to meet and influence the Indian soldiers there.⁹⁹ But the Turks were, obviously, not very interested in organising them as a revolutionary army and, whether deliberately or not, treated the Muslims and non-Muslims differently. While the former were sent to the relatively better prison camps in Asia Minor, the latter were made to work on railways in Iraq. Even the officers were separated; the Muslims were taken to Eskisehir, and the rest were sent to Konia. After some time Chattopadhyaya and Bhupendranath came from Berlin to meet them and discuss their plans and objectives. Dasgupta, then convalescing at Istanbul, also joined them.¹⁰⁰ But they soon found that there was no love lost between the Muslim and non-Muslim soldiers, and once in *Dar al-Islam* the Muslims often treated others in a haughty insulting manner. Even the Turks themselves practised discrimination, and sought to use the non-Muslims primarily as labourers. Even their German military advisers felt that it was no

97. German Embassy, Istanbul to Foreign Office, Berlin on 18-11-1915, DAA, Reel 398 files 12-3f.

98. Circular no. 3 of the C. I. D., dated 1-8-1916. Also, Bhupendranath Datta, op. cit., p. 48.

99. Bhupendranath Datta, op. cit., pp. 48-49. Also, statement of Dasgupta. Also, Indian Committee, Istanbul to Berlin on 4 and 22 July 1916, DAA, Reel 398.

100. Bhupendranath Datta, op. cit., pp. 49-50.

longer practicable to re-equip and send these Indian prisoners towards India as independent army units. So the hope of forming a revolutionary Indian army in West Asia was finally given up, and the Indian Committee at Istanbul was for all practical purposes wound up by the end of 1916.¹⁰¹



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101. *Ibid*, p. 56. Also, letter to Wesendonck from Istanbul, dated 8-7-1916, DAA, Reel 398.

CHAPTER—VI

ATTEMPTS AT ORGANISING AND AIDING A REVOLT IN INDIA DIRECT FROM THE U.S.A.

(*Ghadar exodus to India*)

Only a few days before the First World War broke out the Ghadar leaders had decided that their men should be sent home in batches, like revolutionary commando, to win over the Indian soldiers and to organise a revolt. The war, it seemed, only made their work easier. India was soon going to be almost denuded of troops and, more than ever before, they were hopeful that the return of a few thousand of them under the covering fire of the inky guns of the *Ghadar* would cause India burst into flames.¹ They were men eager and impatient, and were not worried over negotiating with the Germans and waiting for their help.

The first batch of sixty Ghadarites under the leadership of Jwalla Singh and Nawab Khan left San Francisco for Canton by the *Korea* on 29 August 1914. To them Ramchandra's last instructions were: "Your duty is clear; go to India, stir up rebellion in every corner of the country, rob the wealthy and show mercy to the poor. In this way gain universal sympathy. Arms will be provided for you on arrival in India; failing this you must loot rifles from police stations." They were further asked to confer at Ladhival in the Punjab and decide their future course of action, which included sabotaging the lines of communication and procurement of arms.² It is not known what arrangements, if any, for their arms had been made by Ramchandra and his colleagues.

At Canton many others from China also joined them, and they took a Japanese ship for Calcutta. Nawab Khan conferred with the local German Consul, and claimed to have secured from him the as-

1. The Ghadar leaders confidently expected a revolt in the Indian army. Governor-General, Canada to Secy. of State for Colonies, Britain, and received by Home Secy., India on 9-9-1914, H.P. 1914 June 110-111 A.

2. Testimony of Nawab Khan, cited in *Pacific Historical Review*, op. cit., pp. 300-301.

surance that German raiders in surrounding waters would not attack their ship. When they reached Calcutta their leaders were immediately arrested, but the rest were set at liberty. They assembled at Moga in the Punjab to discuss their future course of action, but in the absence of proper leadership and arms the group soon disintegrated.³

It was then decided that in order to elude British vigilance Ghadar volunteers from North America should first come and assemble in China, whence they could come to India in small batches, preferably via Colombo. For more than a couple of months ships carrying hundreds of Ghadarites from China continued to arrive at the ports of India and Ceylon. But hardly any step had been taken to keep their movements secret, and the British authorities had prior information about their arrival. As a result, their leaders were easily arrested on arrival, and the rest met the fate of their predecessors coming by the *Korea*.⁴

The failure at exporting revolution to India through the *Korea* and such other ships clearly revealed that the organisation of a revolt involved problems other than merely sending ship-loads of excited, but mostly unarmed, revolutionaries. The German Foreign Office and the Indian Committee, who after the September agreements had established a loose authority over the widely-separated centres of Indian revolutionaries, through their control over the purse-string, were now keen to prevent any repetition of the previous fiascoes.⁵ These had also taught the Ghadar leaders that it was of no use sending so many of their followers in a single ship. But they obviously remained emotionally committed to their programme of conducting a virulent propaganda campaign and sending home volunteers for organising a revolt. So they now decided that Ghadar volunteers in future should return to India in very small groups, disguised as ordinary passengers, by almost every available ship. This tactics proved relatively

3. *Ibid.*

4. Statements of Amar Singh and Sundar Singh, H P. 1918 September 55-77 A. Also, Chief Secy., Hongkong to Home Secy., India on 8-12-1914, H P. 1915 March 282-316 A. Also, George MacMunn, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

5. Zimmerman to Bernstorff on 27-12-1914, quoted in Henry Landau, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-30. Also, Preston's statement, cited in Giles Tyler Brown, *The Hindu Conspiracy and the Neutrality of the United States, 1914-1917* (unpublished M. A. thesis of the University of California 1941) (hereafter referred to as Brown), p 12.

more effective, and, in spite of the arrangements under the Ingress into India Ordinance hundreds of Ghadarites succeeded in eluding the police and reach the Punjab to create trouble.⁶

On 31 December 1914, Zimmermann wired to Albrecht von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador at Washington, asking him to provide the returning Ghadarites with training in explosives and sabotage work.⁷ Taraknath soon afterwards left for the west coast of the U.S.A. to distribute bomb manuals.⁸ What sort of training they were actually given and where cannot be said with certainty, but it is known that back in India these people indulged primarily in sabotage work and raids for arms.

In the meantime, early in December 1914, it had been decided at a meeting in Shanghai, attended by Tahal Singh, Santosh Singh, Shiv Dayal Kapur, A. M. Nielson, and the local German Consul, that returning Ghadarites in future would first assemble there, and then proceed to Swatow, where a local Indian merchant by the name of Haroon was to arrange their passage to Bangkok. From Bangkok many of them came to India by ship, via Penang, posing as Indian settlers in South-East Asia, while many others preferred to wriggle across the practically unguarded frontier of Burma from Rahaeng in western Thailand. This system worked well for nearly a year, and thousands succeeded in reaching their destination in the year and a half since the outbreak of the war. Tahal Singh and Nielson in Shanghai were believed to have spent thirty-thousand dollars on those passing through this China-Thailand route.⁹

6 Out of the eight thousand, who returned in the first two years of the war, some four hundred were interned in jail, two thousand five hundred restricted to their villages, and the remaining five thousand were discharged. Michael O'Dwyer, *India as I knew it, 1885-1925*. London, 1925, p. 196. Ramchandra said that they had sent about five thousand Ghadar volunteers to India and elsewhere. D C I on 25-11-1916, H.P. 1916 November 452-453 B.

7 Henry Landau, *op. cit.* p. 30.

8. Testimony of Mrs. W. B. Gillingham, in whose house the undistributed bomb manuals were kept, cited in Brown, p. 16.

9. Testimonies of Shiv Dayal Kapur and Tahal Singh, cited in Brown, pp. 16-17. Tahal Singh is usually misspelt in official records as Tehl Singh. Also, British Charge d' Affaires Bangkok to Home Secy., India on 2-4-1915, H. P. 1915 January 60-68 B. Nielson was a German pharmacist in Shanghai, living at 32 Yangtseppo Road. Rowlatt, p. 85.

Obviously, these men reaching India without arms and any co-ordinated plan of action could not be as effective as Ramchandra might have expected them to be. But it was a fact that these people, mostly ex-service men, brought the message of revolution to the barracks of the army and the police, as well as to the remotest villages of the Punjab, 'the sword-hand of India'. It was from October 1914 that the number of those returning to India really became formidable, and the Government of India was obviously worried over the danger latent in this movement. The Ingress into India Ordinance was passed on 5 September 1914, and all arrivals from the east came to be carefully screened in the ports before being allowed to proceed to the Punjab. The known leaders and those possessing arms were generally interned immediately at the ports while the rest had to appear before the Central Enquiry Office, Michael O'Dwyer had established at Ludhiana. There a dossier was prepared for each one of them on the basis of which it was decided whether one was to be (1) put behind bars, or (2) restricted in his village, or (3) discharged with a warning, while the local authorities would keep an eye on him. According to O'Dwyer, out of the eight thousand who came back in the first two years of the war four hundred were put in goal, twenty-five hundred confined to their villages, and the rest sent home and kept under observation. But some of the most determined ones passed through undetected, and some of the apparently innocuous ones proved to be the most dangerous.¹⁰

Ill-equipped they indulged in sporadic acts of violence and sabotage, and kept alive in the Punjab for the major part of the war-period a spirit of defiance and lawlessness. Most of them soon got mixed up with the local revolutionaries, thus strengthening their ranks, and often succeeded in establishing dangerous contacts with the students and soldiers. Large number of outrages were committed between October 1914 and September 1915, forty-five of them taking place before February was over. "In fact, the Government was, it has been said, seated on a rumbling volcano."¹¹ As a result, O'Dwyer proposed in December 1914, that a new Ordinance be passed to deal with these revolutionaries, and pressed upon the Government of India again, in February and March 1915, to take special steps to meet the

10. Michael O'Dwyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 196-197.

11. *Ibid.*, pp. 197-200.

situation. The Defence of India Act was passed on 19 March 1915, but according to O'Dwyer it was passed a little too late.¹²

By then, effective contact had been established between the returning Ghadarites and the revolutionaries led by Rashbehari Bose, and a large section of soldiers in the north-west of India were obviously disaffected. By the end of January, the revolutionaries (including the Ghadarites) had received favourable response to their overtures from a good many army units in that region, and it was planned that the soldiers in the major cantonments of the Punjab and the U. P. would rise simultaneously in revolt on 21 February. It was a bold and elaborate plan which, in fact, covered the whole of northern and eastern India.

Even the disaffected Sikh regiment at Dacca and the revolutionaries in Bengal knew of it, and it was expected that as soon as the signal was received there would be mutinies and popular risings from the Punjab to Bengal. However, the British intelligence was successful, and the plan was betrayed almost at the last moment.¹³ But it is significant that though Rashbehari was the leader of this planned revolt, forty-eight out of the eighty-one accused in the Lahore Conspiracy Case, including his close associates like Vishnu Ganesh Pingley, Mathura Singh, and Kartar Singh Sarabha, were recent arrivals from North America.¹⁴ In fact, most of the Punjab revolutionaries, even those who had not been abroad, were in close touch with the Ghadar leaders in the U.S.A., and the plans for the army revolt were given shape only after Pingley and his friends had reached the Punjab, early in December 1914, with the latest information and instructions from the U.S.A..¹⁵ That is why it was said, "This conspiracy for the overthrow of British rule in India was in fact planned, organised and financed in the D.S.A."¹⁶

12. *Ibid.*

13. See pp 248-250

14. Memo by Sydney Brooks, captioned 'Indian Revolutionary Movement in U.S.A.," dated 25-1-1916, cited in Roll 2, file no. 9-10-3, section 1, and also quoted in D. P. Singh *op. cit.*, p 203.

15. Sachindranath Sanyal, *Bandi Jeevan* (in Hindi). 4th edition, Delhi, 1963, p. 47. Also, Jadugopal Mukherjee, *op. cit.*, pp. 392-393. Also, Nalini Kishore Guha, *op. cit.*, pp. 129-130. Also, George MacMunn, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

16. Memo. by Sydney Brooks, *op. cit.*

Besides conducting an effective anti-British propaganda campaign, the Ghadar members in the U.S.A. were also engaged in smuggling arms to India, and in preparing and learning the use of various explosives. A substantial part of the arms used by revolutionaries in India actually came from the U.S.A. and Canada.¹⁷ Because of their success in disturbing the Pax Britannica Sir T. Holderness, Permanent Under Secretary of State for India, said, "Infinite harm is being done to British rule in India by the shelter given to this revolutionary society (the Ghadar party) and its organ in the State of California."¹⁸

Obviously, it cannot be over-emphasised that with a little more realism, patience, and a spirit of compromise on the part of the Ghadar leaders, the human material involved in this ill-organised movement could have been put to more effective use. That is why the Indian Committee and the German Foreign Office wanted, and plans were soon drawn up, to get together in Thailand the available Ghadar volunteers for an organised armed raid on India. Still it cannot be denied that theirs was in a limited sense a genuine mass movement. These wild, impatient men, mostly poor and uneducated, passed in thousands through various Pacific ports, and brought the message of revolution and defiance to their kinsmen in East Asia and to their village homes;¹⁹ and in India it is among the Punjabees alone that the revolutionary movement found heroes and martyrs from among the humble village folk. Considering the threat they posed for a year and the measures adopted to deal with them, the U. S. Asst. Attorney General wrote to Preston, "that the activities of the Indians connected with the Ghadar have given the British authorities grave concern."

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17. Chakravarty's dateless letter to the Indian Committee, cited in Brown, p. 64. Also, statements of Bhagwan Singh, Chakravarty, and Jadugopal Mukherjee.

18. Quoted in the memo by Sydney Brooks, op cit

19. "... some thousands in India rose due to Ghadar call. Ghadarties caused risings in Singapore, Penang and Hongkong." Memo by Sydney Brooks, op cit." "... the Ghadar movement, once started in America, spread through the Far East" Supplementary Lahore Conspiracy Case, pp. 23-24. quoted in D. P. Singh, op. cit., p. 223.

20. Roll 4, file no. 9-10-3, Section 2.

(ADVENTURE OF THE ARMS-SHIPS)

While the Ghadar leaders in the U.S.A. were engaged in exporting revolutionaries, the German Government and their Indian associates in Berlin were trying to send ship-loads of arms for the planned revolt in India. As stated before, it had been decided that arms should be purchased in the U.S.A. with German money, and then secretly sent to India. Accordingly, towards the middle of September 1914, the German Foreign Office sent instructions to their Embassy at Washington to purchase arms and arrange for their secret shipment to India. The German Military Attache there, Franz von Papen, asked Capt. Hans Tauscher, the New York agent of the Krupp, and a few other munition-makers, to purchase arms on his behalf, and to send those secretly to San Diego in California. Thereupon the following were purchased: 8080 U.S. Springfield rifles of 45/70 calibre, 2400 carbines of the same make and calibre, 410 repeating rifles, 39,04,340 cartridges, 5000 cartridge belts, 500 Colt revolvers of 45 bore and 100,000 cartridges for the same.²¹ For a couple of months these were kept in the warehouse of Baker and Williams at 20 West Street, New York, whence those were moved to San Diego towards the beginning of January 1915.²²

Almost at the same time Von Schack, the German Vice-Consul at San Francisco, and Frederick Jebsen, an influential German businessman of California, went down to San Diego to make the necessary arrangements. To avoid arousing suspicion and to prevent the German Government, as far as possible, from getting involved in these affairs Von Schack requested Gustav N. Koepfel, head of the Marine Department of the National Bank of San Diego, to take care of the proposed secret shipment.²³ On 30 January 1915, the German Consulate at San Francisco credited fourteen thousand dollars to the account of J. Cyde Hizar, an attorney, who posed as an agent of President Carranza of Mexico. He made the necessary arrangements with

21. Statement of Capt. Hans. Tauscher on 8-2-1915, cited in E. E. Sperry, *German Plots and Intrigues in the United States during the period of our Neutrality*, Washington, 1918, pp. 43-44. W. C. Hughes and Henry Muck corroborated him. Brown, pp. 32-33

22. Statement of Henry Muck on 19-7-1917, Roll 4, file no 9-10-3, section 10, recorded group no. 118.

23. Testimony of Gustav N. Koepfel, cited in Brown, p. 33.

Marcus Martinez, a customs-broker at San Diego,²⁴ and on 8 March the *Annie Larsen*, a schooner belonging to the Olson and Mahony of San Francisco, sailed with arms, officially, for the Mexican port of Topolobampo. Once on the high sea her course was changed towards Socorro, and she anchored there on 18 March. Since the schooner was not fit for a trans-pacific voyage it had been planned beforehand that she would wait there for a bigger ship, which would carry her cargo to the Indian coast.²⁵

Frederick Jepsen, in the meantime, had arranged for the purchase of an old tanker, the *Maverick*, of the Standard Oil Company, for carrying the arms across the Pacific. It remains a mystery why it took such a long time. On 20 March, it was purchased for thirteen thousand four hundred dollars, and soon thereafter the *Maverick* Steam Ship Co. was formed at Los Angeles. It was given out that the American Asiatic Oil Co. would charter her for trade with East Asia. After the necessary repairs were completed the *Maverick*, according to plan, sailed for San Pedro, where bundles of Ghadar literature were put into it. Five Ghadarites, including Hari Singh, also boarded the ship for India in the guise of Iranians. Then on 23 April, forty-five days after the *Annie Larsen* had left for Socorro, she too sailed in the same direction with fuel for eighty-three days and provisions for six months. It was this inexplicable delay of the *Maverick* that apparently spelt disaster for the entire plan.²⁶

The *Maverick* reached Socorro, on 29 April, only to find that the *Annie Larsen* had already left the place on the 17th leaving the following note for her with the crew of another schooner, the *Emma*: "I have been waiting for you a month and am now going to the Mexican west coast for supplies and water. I will return as soon as possible. Please await my return."²⁷ In the meantime, the *Annie Larsen* had reached Acapulco on 23 April. After securing stores she once again sailed in search of the *Maverick*, but could not make headway against strong adverse wind. Ultimately, she was driven back to the port of

24. Testimony of Marcus Martinez, cited in *Pacific Historical Review*, op. cit., p. 302.

25. P. H. Shultar, Captain of the *Annie Larsen* to M/S Olson and Mahony on 18-4-1915, quoted in E. E. Sperry, op. cit., p. 44.

26. *Pacific Historical Review*, op. cit., p. 303.

27. E. E. Sperry, op. cit., p. 46.



Virendranath Chattopadhyaya



Gul Harrow Institute



Dr. Jadugopal Mukherjee



Jyotindranath Mukherjee
(nicknamed Bagha Jyotin)



Dr. Pandurang Khankhoje

Gul F... ute



Mahendra Pratap before the flag of the Provisional Government of Free India at Kabul, in December 1915.



Sitting (L. to R.) Kazim Bey from Turkey, Henting, Mahendra Pratap, Niedermayer and Barakatullah.

Standing (L. to R.) Roehr, Kurt Wagner and Guenther Voigt at Kabul in 1915-16.



(from left to right) 1. Champak Raman Pillai; 2. V. D. Savarkar;
3. V. Chattopadhyaya (probably); and
4. an unidentified revolutionary.

Hoquiam, in Washington, where on 29 June her cargo was seized by the U.S. Customs.²⁸

The *Maverick*, in the meantime, waited at Socorro for about four weeks and then on 25 May sailed to reach Coronado on the 29th. There she received instructions from Von Schack to sail for Hilo in the *Hawaii*, and there to await further instructions.²⁹ Accordingly, she sailed on the 30th and reached Hilo on 13 or 14 June. Since the Germans there had no information about the *Annie Larsen*, the *Maverick*, on 21 June, sailed for Johnston Island in search of her. After waiting there in vain for some time she proceeded towards Java.³⁰

But no information about the frustrations the ship had faced had yet reached either Shanghai or Djakarta, and in March 1915 the Germans in Java had set up an apparently innocuous commercial organisation, the Deutschen Bund, to provide their secret activities with a safe business cover.³¹ Then in June the German Consul in Shanghai sent a message in connection with the *Maverick* to his counterpart at Djakarta with a request to hand over some coded instructions to her captain. There too the German Consulate had been kept deliberately in the background, and the actual control of affairs was in the hands of the two Helfferich brothers, Emil and Theodor.³² They considered it wise to meet the *Maverick* outside the territorial waters of Java. According to instructions received, the ship was expected off the coast of Java in the beginning of July. So Emil Helfferich and a few others hired a motor boat and kept vigil in the Strait of Sunda for over a week. Yet there was no sign of the

28. *Pacific Historical Review*, op. cit., pp. 304-305.

29. *Ibid.* Also, testimony of Miss S. Clark, Secy. to Fredrick Jebson, cited in *San Francisco Examiner*, 16-2-1918, p. 5.

30. E. E. Sperry, op. cit., p. 47.

31. British Minister, Djakarta to Foreign Secy., Britain on 6-4-1915, F.P. (War) 1915 October 59-61 B.

32. Letters of Emil Helfferich and Erich Windels to author, dated 17-9-1956 and 1-11-1956, respectively. The two brothers, Emil Helfferich and Theodor Helfferich, were at the outbreak of the war managers of the Djakarta branch of the Straits and Sunda Syndikat and the Behn, Meyer and Co., respectively. Erich Windels was the German Vice-Consul at Djakarta. But, as the new German Consul-General could not reach Java because of the war, Erich Windels acted in that capacity till the war was over.

Maverick, and the waiting was given up. At last she reached the port of Anjer in the night of 20 July without the expected cargo,³³ and the first round in the game to secure arms for revolutionaries in India was over.



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33. Emil Helfferich's letter, op. cit.

CHAPTER—VII

ATTEMPTS AT SECURING ARMS AND ORGANISING ARMED RAIDS FROM THE SOUTH-EAST

Situation in East Asia

With the outbreak of the war neutral countries bordering on India, like China and Thailand, acquired an added importance for anti-British operations. Both the countries by then had well-organised centres of Indian revolutionaries, and the latter were in close touch with the local German Legations as well as with the Ghadar leaders in U.S.A. The Ghadar exodus had started with the outbreak of the war, and hundreds of them were coming there every month from the U.S.A. and Canada on their way to India. This meant that there were in these countries large concentrations of Indian revolutionaries eager for action, which was an opportunity that should not be missed. Besides, it was felt that arms for a revolt in India could be either secured locally in these countries or sent there from the U.S.A. with relative safety, to be ultimately smuggled overland to India. Moreover, the failure of attempts at igniting a revolt in India by sending home ship-loads of almost unarmed revolutionaries had convinced the Germans and many Ghadar leaders that those returning home should better assemble somewhere close to the Indian frontier, from where a regular armed raid into India might be organised.¹ Both China and Thailand had obvious advantages as *points d'appui* for such raids into India and for smuggling arms across her long and practically unguarded frontier.

China in those days lacked a strong central government, and the governors of her southern provinces were virtually independent. In

1. "The situation created by the rise of the Ghadar Party in India, though serious, is not such as the Government of India cannot cope with, so long as party members continue to arrive in isolated groups... But a new and more difficult situation may arise if the Ghadar party after assembling in some adjacent country are in a position to collect sufficient of their members to make an armed incursion into India." British Minister, Bangkok to Foreign Minister, Thailand in September 1915, quoted in H.P. 1915 October 242-247 B.

fact, a rebellion was expected in South China towards the end of 1914, and, since Yuan She-kai was known to be friendly with the British, the Germans and the southern governors looked upon one another as natural allies. Moreover, Barakatullah and some other Indian revolutionaries in Japan were on friendly terms with Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and it was expected that his followers would have sympathy with India's aspirations. Even Yang Ch'eng, the Chinese Commissioner in Shanghai was friendly towards the Germans and Indians there.² So it was hoped, not unreasonably, that once arms were brought to China it would not be very difficult to carry those across the Indian frontier.

Then, early in November 1914, Satyendranath Sen and Vishnu Ganesh Pingley came from the U.S.A. with assurances of German assistance for their planned revolt. *En route*, they had discussions with Tahal Singh, and had also met Dr. Sun for his advice and co-operation.³ But it was soon realised that British control over China's sea-customs would make impossible large-scale shipment of arms to her ports.⁴ Moreover, as was realised later, Dr. Sun with his base of authority and operations close to Hongkong, though generous with advice, was not willing to antagonise the British.⁵ Still the Indians in East Asia began getting ready for concerted action, and, soon after Satyendranath and Pingley had left for India, Tahal Singh sent Atmaram Kapur, Santosh Singh, and Shiv Dayal Kapur to Bangkok to make the necessary arrangements.⁶

In Thailand, the Germans and the Indians had already started working with certain positive advantages. Thai public opinion was

2. German Foreign Office to Bernstorff on 13-12-1914, DAA, Reel 397, files 1-11. Also, Ruedinger's statement, H. P. 1917 July 52 Dep. Also, German Consul, Canton to Berlin on 15-10-1914, DAA, Reel 398, files 12-31.

3. Jadugopal Mukherjee, *op. cit.*, p. 419. Also, the statement of Khagendra Chandra Das, who had heard these from Satyendranath Sen himself.

4. Note by Bernstorff, dated 18-1-1915, DAA, Reel 397, files 1-11. Also, Chakravarty to Berlin on 21-11-1916, cited in *San Francisco Chronicle*, 28-2-1918, p. 9.

5. See pp. 233-234.

6. Notes on the accused, Tahal Singh, Roll 6, Record Group No. 118.

definitely anti-British, at least in the early months of the war,⁷ and Thai officials were expected to keep their eyes deliberately shut to Indian revolutionary activities. Even the Indian Muslims there had recently been stirred by the anti-British propaganda of Col. Niazi Bey, a pan-Islamic emissary from Turkey. He had come to Bangkok from Saigon towards the middle of August 1914, and had become an effective emotional link between the Indian revolutionaries and pan-Islamites there.⁸

The Germans there, too, were not sitting idle. Even before the war had actually broken out Dr. Hertzka, Press Attache at the German Embassy at Bangkok, had planned a propaganda offensive against Britain by offering handsome bribes to a few Thai newspapers. They also began publishing at Bangkok, from the beginning of October 1914, a German newspaper, the *Unshan*.⁹ Almost at the same time Dr. Voretzsch, formerly German Consul at Hongkong, was sent there with DM 100,000 to take charge of the preparations in Thailand for organising a revolt in India.¹⁰ Special arrangements were also made with three business houses for carrying on secret correspondence and financial transactions. Orders were also placed through various agencies, and the next few months saw an unprecedented increase in the number of shot-guns imported into Thailand.¹¹ Moreover, as stated before, it had been arranged by December 1914 that the returning Ghadarites from North America would first disembark in China, preferably in Shanghai, and then proceed to Bangkok via Amoy and Swatow.¹² Soon large numbers of intending invaders of India had assembled at Bangkok, and it was felt by many that instead of encouraging them to

7. British Consul, Chieng Mai to Chief Secretary, Burma on 17-2-1916, F.P. 1916 April I. Also, British Charge d'Affaires, Bangkok to Foreign Secretary, Britain on 26-11-1914 H.P. 1915 June 60-88 B.

8. British Charge d'Affaires, Bangkok to Secy., Foreign and Political, India on 15-12-1914, H.P. 1915 June 60-88 B. Also, British Charge d'Affaires to Foreign Secy., Britain on 26-11-1914, Foreign (War) 1915 252-259.

9. *Ibid.*

10. Report from German Consulate, Canton, dated 15-10-1914, DAA, Reel 398, files 12-31.

11. Report from German Charge d'Affaires, Bangkok, dated 29-10-1914, DAA, Reel 397, files 1-11. Also, D.C.I. on 25-8-1915, H.P. 1915 October 43 Dep.

12. See 1230.

return to home in small batches they should be advised to wait in Thailand and organise themselves for a well-timed armed incursion into India. It is said that even tunnels were dug near Pakoh in the north-west of Thailand for secret collection of arms.¹³

However the King and the Crown-prince of Thailand were firm in their friendship for Britain,¹⁴ and did not view Col. Niazi Bey's activities and these Indo-German intrigues with pleasure. So, when Britain requested the Thai Government to put a stop to Col. Niazi Bey's activities, he was forthwith deported on 18 November 1914.¹⁵ Obviously, the anti-British elements had overplayed their cards. So, to allay the suspicion of the Thai Government, Dr. Voretzsch was transferred to Shanghai in January 1915.¹⁶ Henceforth it became the controlling headquarters of Indo-German conspiracies in East Asia, under the general supervision of the German Embassy at Washington. For the proper co-ordination of effort, the German Consulate in Shanghai used to be kept informed of all decisions arrived at in Germany or the U.S.A. as well as of the work being done in West Asia.¹⁷ However, Thailand was then an immediate neighbour of India, and considerable preparations had already been made in collaboration with the Ghadarites for organising raids from there. So Bangkok remained the advance base of the planned Ghadar attack on India.

Hitherto these plans had been discussed and formed primarily by the Ghadarites and German officials, and the Indian Committee was not very interested in these endeavours. They were primarily interested in establishing contact with their comrades in Bengal, and, for the time being, were mainly concerned with sending them ship-loads of arms. But their attitude changed with the arrival of Barakat-

13. Shiv Dayal Kapur's statement, cited in *San Francisco Examiner*, 29-11-1917, p. 3, and in Brown, p. 18. Also, J. W. Spellman, op. cit., p. 39.

14. See foot note no. 7, p. 133.

15. D.C.I. on 26-1-1915 H.P. 1915 January 278-282 B. Also, British Charge d'Affaires, Bangkok to Secy., Foreign and Political, India on 15-12-1914, H.P. 1915 June 60-88 B.

16. Report of the German Charge d'Affaires, Bangkok, dated 17-11-1917 DAA, Reel 400, files 39-46.

17. Washington centre of the plot. German Consulate, Shanghai in charge of work in Asia. Actual work done in Thailand, Java and Iran. D.C.I. on 3-8-1915, H.P. 1915 August 552-556 B. Also, report from German Ambassador, Peking, dated 3-2-1915, DAA, Reel 397, files 1-11.

ullah in Berlin on 9 January 1915.¹⁸ He had been closely associated with the Ghadar group in the U.S.A., and knew of their plans and preparations. So, with his immense prestige, he could soon convince the Indian Committee of the desirability of adapting the Ghadar plan with their own so that the arrival of arms and the planned revolt in India could be properly synchronised with the armed expedition from Thailand to achieve the maximum effect. The German Foreign Office too looked upon the proposed armed incursion into India with favour. So Barakatullah had a meeting with Daus Dekker of Java in the third week of January,¹⁹ and plans for an armed expedition into India from Thailand were slowly drawn up.

In Burma too, which occupied an important strategic position in the context of this proposed raid, the activities of different groups of revolutionaries had already started bearing fruit. Rangoon, even before the war, was a centre of pan-Islamic activities, to which Tewfik Bey's visit in 1913 had lent fresh impetus. Even the new Turkish Consul there, Ahmed Mullah Daud (a local merchant), was known for his active sympathy for the pan-Islamites.²⁰ The Bengal revolutionaries too, in the meantime, had extended their activities to Burma. Khirodgopal Mukherjee, an elder brother of Jadugopal Mukherjee, had gone to Burma in 1908, and had established a revolutionary base at Meiktila. Early in 1913, Jatindranath Hui too was sent to Rangoon for revolutionary work, and he soon established friendly contacts with the Turkish Consul and the local pan-Islamites.²¹ Then, with the outbreak of the war, hundreds of Ghadarites began passing through Burma, on their way to India, and these had visible effect on sections of the Indian army and armed police stationed there.

In November 1914, the 130th Baluchis had been moved to Rangoon from Bombay as a punishment. A month later, two pan-Islamic agents, Hakim Faim Ali and Ali Ahmed Siddiqui, also came from Istanbul. It cannot be said with certainty whether they had anything to do with the Baluch regiment. The latter, however, planned to mutiny early in 1915. But the authorities had prior information,

18. Openheim's note, dated 9-1-1915, DAA, Reel 397, files, 1-11.

19. Note by German Foreign Office, dated 18-1-1915, *ibid.*

20. Rowlatt, p. 121.

21. Jadugopal Mukherjee, *op. cit.*, pp. 29, 30-40 and 383. Also, statement of Jatindranath Hui.

and the planned rising was nipped in the bud on 21 January 1915.²² At about this time, two revolutionaries from Thailand, Sohonal Pathak and Hassan Khan, also came to Rangoon, whence after some time they moved towards the Chinese frontier to establish contacts with the Indian soldiers and policemen posted there.²³ Muhammad Shah Jilani too was then active in Burma and Singapore forging an alliance between the Ghadarites and the pan-Islamites.²⁴ Unfortunately, not enough is known about their work in Burma.

At Singapore too the Malaya State Guides were restive with disaffection, and had to be dealt with accordingly in December 1914.²⁵ when they refused to embark for East Africa. But the really serious outbreak took place there on 15 February 1915, when the 5th Light Infantry, composed mostly of Punjabee Muslims, and a detachment of the 36th Sikh regiment posted there mutinied. They had been, for some time, exposed to sustained pan-Islamic propaganda, and two local Indian merchants, Jagat Singh and Kasim Ismail Mansoor—the latter was in secret correspondence with the Sultan of Turkey and his consul at Rangoon—were befriending many of them and inciting them to revolt.²⁶ Exaggerated reports about German victories in Europe and the exploits of the *Emden* near at hand—she shelled Madras on 22 September and Penang on 8 October 1914, torpedoing a Russian cruiser and a French destroyer anchored at the latter harbour—created the impression that the British Empire was falling to pieces. Even when the *Emden* was sunk, one of her officer, Oberlieutenant Julius Lauterbach was kept in Tanglin barracks, Singapore, as a prisoner-of-war, and he lost no opportunity to stir up anti-British feeling among the Indian soldiers there.²⁷ The disaffected soldiers found their leaders in Jamadar Chisti Khan, Jamadar Abdul Ghani, and Subedar Daud Khan, and they broke into mutiny the day before the 5th Light

22. Rowlatt, p. 121.

23. *Ibid.*

24. D.G.I. on 30-3-1915, H.P. 1915 April 412–415 B.

25. Rowlatt, p. 121. They were strongly pro-Turkish in their sympathy. D.C.I. on 26-1-1915, H.P. 1915 January 278–282 B.

26. *Straits Echo*, 16-9-1915, and *Singapore Times*, 22 and 23 April 1915.

27. Lowell J. Thomas, *Lauterbach of the China Sea*, New York, 1930, p. 109.

Infantry was to have been despatched to Hong Kong.²⁸ They killed their British officers and freed about three hundred German prisoners. But the German refused to join them, and the leaderless mutineers were ultimately subdued or driven into the forests with fresh reinforcements and Japanese help, after four days of fighting.²⁹ One hundred twentysix of them were tried, of whom thirtyseven were executed, fortyone transported for life, and the rest sentenced to various terms of imprisonment.³⁰ These naturally created an impression among the Indian revolutionaries and the Germans that Indian soldiers, especially those stationed in South-East Asia, were ready for revolt, and that the revolutionaries were only to cross into Burma in force to give the signal.³¹

Preparations for an attack from Thailand

However, it appears that by early March 1915 Herambalal Gupta had come to know of the preparations under way for an armed raid from Thailand and had felt that those concerned should have more arms and better leadership. So he requested Bernstorff to send another ship with eight thousand rifles, two thousand revolvers, and a few machine-guns for Indians at home and South-East Asia.³² By the middle of March, he had also made contacts with Kurt von Reiszitz, the German Consul at Chicago, and through him with George Paul Boehm, Albert Wehde, Mueller, and Sterneck. Boehm and Sterneck as ex-service-men were to accompany the proposed expedition as military instructors, while Wehde as its treasurer was to go with them, ostensibly, to purchase curios and objects of art for the Chicago Museum.³³ It was also suggested that Prince Myngoon, a descendant of

28. *Ibid.*, p. 111. Also, *Singapore Times*, 19-3-1915, and *Singapore Free Press*, 25-3-1915. Also, R. W. Mosbergen, *The Sepoy Rebellion: A History of the Singapore Mutiny of 1915* (unpublished M.A. thesis of University of Malaya, 1954), p. 10.

29. R. W. Mosbergen, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-21, 40-43, 66.

30. T. M. Winsley, *A History of the Singapore Volunteer Corps*, Singapore, 1937, p. 70

31. Statements of Bhāgwan Singh and Lala Sunder Das.

32. Report from Bernstorff, dated 25-3-1915, DAA, Reel 398, files 12-13.

33. Statement of George Paul Boehm (hereafter referred to as Boehm) on 17-11-1915, Roll 4, Record Group No. 118. Also, Bernstorff to German Foreign Office on 9-4-1915, DAA, Reel 398, files 12-31.

the independent kings of Burma, then living in exile at Saigon, should also be approached to foment trouble when Indian revolutionaries would enter Burma in force.³⁴ On 9 April, Bernstorff recommended to the German Foreign Office that another ship with arms should be sent in time for the proposed expedition.³⁵ On 16 and 30 April 1915, Reiszvitz paid 20,000 dollars each to Wehde and his friend, Wilson Will to make the necessary purchases and arrangements.³⁶ However, it took them more than a month to complete their work at Chicago before leaving for San Francisco *en route* for East Asia.

As soon as it was decided that an armed expedition would be launched from Thailand, Santosh Singh sent Atmaram Kapur to India from Bangkok towards the beginning of March 1915. He first went to the Punjab but, after the betrayal of the planned rising on 21 February, it was not possible for him to make any effective contact there. However, on his way back, he met Jadugopal Mukherjee in Calcutta and told him about the proposed expedition and preparations in East Asia.³⁷

Soon after Atmaram's return, six Indian revolutionaries from Thailand secretly came to Burma in May 1915 to make contacts with the local armed police.³⁸ By then, six to seven hundred armed volunteers had been collected in Thailand, and it was expected that the Indian army and police in Burma, long subjected to pan-Islamic and revolutionary propaganda, would desert their alien masters or, at least, would not put up a stiff resistance when the armed volunteers would cross the frontier.³⁹

34. Note by Franz von Papen, dated 24-3-1915, DAA, Reel 398, files 12-31. Bhupendranath Datta, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-23.

35. Note by Bernstorff, dated 9-4-1915, DAA, Reel 398, files 12-31.

36. *U. S. vs. Jacobson et al.*, in the District Court of the US S. Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. Roll 5.

37. See p. 251.

38. Chief Secy., Burma to Home Secy., India on 1-12-1915, H.P. 1916 March 619-665 A. A plot involving the Military Police was discovered in North Burma. *Ibid.*

39. Statement of an informer (possibly Kumud Mukherjee), H.P. 1916 February 201 A. Sikhs in Shan States were disaffected. D.C.I. on 30-7-1915, H.P. 1915 April 412-415 B. Even four Gurkha soldiers were peaching anti-British sentiment, Chief Secy., Burma to Home Secy., India on 17-12-1915, H.P. March 619-665 A. *

However, reports had already reached the U.S.A. that Indian leaders in Thailand lacked unity and initiative, and that the progress of preparations there was far from satisfactory. So it was felt that a few efficient people should be sent there to infuse dynamism and to get everything ready in time.⁴⁰ In the meantime, Yodh Singh had reached New York on 24 or 25 April with some instructions from Berlin for Herambalal and Ramchandra. Herambalal was, obviously, impressed with him and, on the 30th, sent him to Ramchandra suggesting that he be sent to Bangkok to tone up the movements there.⁴¹

Boehm and his German associates connected with this expedition also reached San Francisco on 9 May, and on the 14th they sailed for Honolulu on their way to Thailand. Dhirendranath Sen (possibly an alias of Dhirendranath Sarkar) alone among the Indians accompanied the Germans in their voyage.⁴² Only a few days before their departure, Jnanendra Chandra Som, alias Nripendranath Chatterjee, had left for Manila on 8 May with Ramchandra's message for Bhagwan Singh.⁴³

The day before Boehm and his group sailed from San Francisco, Jnan Sanyal had come there with Herambalal's final instructions. According to these they were first to proceed to Honolulu, and then act according to the advice of the local German Consul. Yodh Singh was to follow them a few days later.⁴⁴ But the German Consul there had no information about the expedition when they reached Honolulu, and they had to wait there for a few days till Sukumar Chatterjee brought for them fresh instruction from San Francisco.⁴⁵

As desired by Ramchandra, Sukumar Chatterjee and Darisi Chenchhaya also agreed to accompany Yodh Singh to Thailand to activate revolutionary work there, and they all sailed from San Francisco on 22 or 23 May 1915 with coded letters for the German Consuls at Honolulu and Manila, as well as for Bhagwan Singh, who was then believed

40. Report by German Charge d' Affaires, Bangkok, dated 17-11-1917, DDA, Reel 400, files 39-46. Also, the statement of an Indian informer, H.P. 1916 February 201 A.

41. Yodh Singh's statement, on 15-11-1915, Roll 4, Record Group No. 118.

42. Boehm's statement, *op. cit.*

43. Sukumar Chatterjee's statement on 13-11-15, Roll 5, Record Group No. 118.

44. Yodh Singh's statement, *op. cit.*

45. Boehm's statement, *op. cit.*

to be staying in the latter city.⁴⁶ On receipt of this letter the German Consul at Honolulu advised both the parties to proceed to Manila, which they reached on 19 June.⁴⁷ But unfortunately for them, Bhagwan Singh had already left for Japan only two days before.⁴⁸

In the meantime, the Manila branch of the German firm, Behn, Meyer and Co., had advanced forty thousand dollars to Wehde—the money was actually paid by the German Consulate in Shanghai—who chartered the *Henry S*, belonging to a local German merchant, F. K. Schmutzler, for carrying arms to Thailand and India.⁴⁹ Her hold was filled with one hundred sixty four packages containing five thousand rifles, five hundred revolvers, and the requisite ammunition from two war-bound German vessels, the *Sachsen* and the *Sueva*. It was decided that she would first go to Bangkok to disembark Boehm and five hundred revolvers, and then push forward to the appointed place near Chittagong.⁵⁰ Dhirendranath and the Germans proceeded with the ship while Yodh Singh, Sukumar, and Chenchhaya, according to the original plan, left Manila on 26 June and reached Amoy in South China on 2 July.⁵¹

The *Henry S* sailed from Manila in the second week of July 1915 and set her course for Pontianak on the western coast of Kalimantan then known as Dutch Borneo. But on the third day her engine broke down, and she could reach Paleleh in the north of Sulawesi (then known as Celebes) only with difficulty. There the customs authorities scented something suspicious in the ship, and following a thorough search her entire cargo was confiscated.⁵² The expedition was naturally given up. Boehm still tried to reach Bangkok, but was captured by the British and confessed everything. Wehde and Dhirendranath, however, managed to return to Manila.⁵³

46. Yodh Singh's statement, op. cit. Also, Sukumar Chatterjee's statement, op. cit.

47. Sukumar Chatterjee's statement, op. cit.

48. Yodh Singh's statement, op. cit.

49. German Charge d'Affaires, Bangkok, dated 17-11-1917, DAA, Reel 400, files 39-46.

50. Rowlett, p. 84. Also, Boehm's statement, op. cit.

51. Yodh Singh's statement, op. cit. Also, Sukumar Chatterjee's statement, op. cit.

52. Rowlett, p. 84. Also, Boehm's statement, op. cit. Also D.C.I. on 3-8-1915, H.P. 1915 August 552-556 B.

53. Boehm's statement, op. cit. Also, U. S. vs. Jacobson, Roll 5.

In the meantime, Yodh Singh and his friends had reached Swatow on 4 and 5 July. There they met Thakur Singh and Balwant Singh, and Yodh Singh set out with them ahead of his two companions to reach Bangkok on 17 July. There they stayed with Shiv Dayal Kapur, who was the local treasurer of the planned expedition. Sukumar and Chenchhaya also reached Bangkok on 22 or 23 July. But the Thai Government had already been alerted by the British, and on 1 August 1915 most of the prominent Indian revolutionaries there, including the few newcomers, were taken into custody. Other arrests were made later, and restrictions were imposed even on the free movement of Indians in Thailand with effect from 15 October 1915.⁵⁴ These virtually destroyed the chief centre of Indian revolutionary work in South-East Asia.

However, the Indians living at a distance from Bangkok escaped immediate arrest, and according to previous arrangements forty of them well-equipped with arms and thirty mules started from Chieng Mai, on 3 August, for the southern Shan States. They were to meet a party of armed Germans and Indians from Yunan at an appointed place in the Sino-Burmese frontier. But the former group lost their bearing among hills and forests, and failed to effect a meeting. So they returned to Thailand, and that was the end of attempts at organising armed expeditions into India.⁵⁵ Sohonal Pathak and Narain Singh too were arrested near Maymo in Burma on 15 and 19 August 1915, respectively.⁵⁶

Planned expedition from Sumatra

In the meantime, one Vincent Kraft of the 14th Corps of the German Army had forwarded to their Foreign Office, on 12 April 1915, a fresh proposal for helping the revolutionaries in India. He had long been in Indonesia, and believed that the mixed population of North-

54. Yodh Singh's statement, *op. cit.* Also, British Minister, Bangkok to Secy., Foreign and Political, India in October 1915, H.P. 1915 October 242-247 B. Also, D.C.I. on 10-8-1915, H.P. 1915 August 552-556 B.

55. Report from German Charge d'Affaires, Bangkok, dated 17-11-1917, DAA. Reel 400. files 39-46. Also, D.C.I. on 7-9-1915, H.P. 1915 September 582-585 B.

56. Rowlatt, p. 122. Also, D.C.I. on 17-8-1915, H.P. 1915 August 552-556 B. Also, C.I.D., Punjab to D.C.I. on 5-8-1915, F.P. 1917 June 1-46.

West Sumatra and the co-operation of the Sarikut Islam would make it easy for him to keep contact with the revolutionaries in India from there.⁵⁷ On 4 May he reinforced his earlier proposal with the suggestion that German vessels lying war-bound at Sabang in the North of Sumatra could be used for a surprise dash for the Andamans to liberate the political prisoners there, and then to land them with arms on the coast near Rangoon. He estimated that the entire venture would not cost more than DM 100,000. His proposals were accepted by the German Foreign Office, and he was engaged with effect from 15 May 1915 to organise the expedition.⁵⁸ After the necessary preparations he left Berlin for Java towards the end of June. The Germans had with them even the names of the political prisoners at Port Blair.⁵⁹

In the meantime, the German Embassy at Peking had been informed of Vincent Kraft's plan, and a trusted Chinese, by the name of Li Chao, was sent to Sumatra, towards the end of May, to prepare the ground in advance for Kraft and to give him the necessary co-operation.⁶⁰ Deli in Sumatra was to be the base of this expedition.

Since sufficient arms were not available locally, it was decided that the *Djember* should bring fifty boxes of munitions from the U.S.A. As the two earlier attempts had been detected in the Pacific, it was considered safer this time to send the ship round the Cape of Good Hope. So the ship sailed from New York on 15 June for Deli, where it was believed seventy-six thousand rifles could be collected for the naval expedition. But, since the British were already on the alert in the Bay of Bengal, it was feared that the route of the ship might have to be changed for some Indian port, preferably Goa, on the Arabian Sea. So it was suggested that Diaz—who had already come over to Germany from the U.S.A.—should go to Goa via Lorenzo Marques ahead of the ship to warn the revolutionaries there

57. Vincent Kraft to German Foreign Office on 12-4-1915, DAA, Reel 398, files, 12—31. Also, Emil Helfferich's letter to author, dated 17-9-1956.

58. Home Secy., India to Secy. of State on 20-8-1915, H.P. 1915 September 484—503 and k.w.A. Also, D.C.I. on 17-8-1915, H.P. 1915, 552—556 B. Also, note by Erich Windels, dated 6-10-1915, DAA, Reel 398 files 12—31. Report by Military Attache, German Embassy, Washington, dated 31-5-1915, *ibid.*

59. D.C.I. on 25-8-1915, H.P. 1915 October 43 Dep.

60. Report from Military Attache, German Embassy, Washington, dated 31-5-1915, DAA, Reel 398, files 12—31.

of her possible arrival.⁶¹ But, unfortunately, it is not known what happened to the ship or how far Diaz could proceed towards India. It was rumoured in Berlin in those days, and many Indians connected with these arms-deals still believe that the ship was actually sunk by a British man-of-war in the Indian Ocean.⁶²

In the meantime, Kraft had reached Medan on 11 July and Djakarta on the 25th,⁶³ a few days after the arrival of the *Maverick* without arms. A month later, Narendranath Bhattacharya and Phandranath Chakravarty came from Calcutta to negotiate for more arms. They readily welcomed the plan to equip a few war-bound German ships for a dash for the Indian coast with arms. It was even decided that while one such ship would head for the Balasore coast another would raid the Andamans, release the political prisoners, and land them on the coast near Rangoon. A third ship was to come with arms from China and proceed to the island of Hatia,⁶⁴ in the main estuary of the Ganga. In course of a few weeks the necessary preparations were made for the planned naval expedition from Sumatra, and even code words for secret communication with Calcutta were arranged. But, from the very beginning, Kraft could not get on well with the Helfferich brothers or Erich Windels. In fact, they suspected him to be a British spy. These must have hampered their preparations, and almost at the last moment the planned expedition was given up.⁶⁵ Possibly, the Germans felt that such a blatant violation of Dutch neutrality would seriously antagonise the Dutch Government and jeopardise the larger war-time interests of Germany.

In the meantime, Champak Raman Pillai, who was in charge of the Indian Committee's contacts with the outside world through Holland, had thought out a fresh plan for resuscitating Indian revolutionary activities in East Asia. At Zurich, he was known to the Indonesian

61. *Ibid.* Also, Bhupendranath Datta, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

62. Bhupendranath Datta, *op. cit.*, pp. 25 and 169.

63. British Minister, Djakarta to Secy., Foreign and Political, India on 30-7-1915, F.P. 1917 June 1-46.

64. Rowlatt, pp. 84-85. The rumour that convicts would be liberated had reached India and the Andamans. Upendranath Banerjee, *Nirvasiter Atmakatha* (in Bengali), Calcutta, 1960, pp. 113-114.

65. M. N. Roy, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-5. Also, Emil Helfferich's and Erich Windels' letters to author, dated 17-9-1956 and 1-11-1956 respectively.

nationalist exile, Dr. Daus Dekkar, and the latter had come to Berlin, early in January 1915, at Barakatullah's request. Champak Raman Pillai at first requested him to arrange for the distribution of propaganda leaflets through Holland. Then in July he suggested that Daus Dekkar should go to Thailand to set up a centre of Indian propaganda. It was hoped that he would be able to ensure friendly understanding and co-operation between Indian and Indonesian nationalists. Champak Raman Pillai and Daus Dekkar jointly discussed their plans with Wesendonck, and on 8 September 1915 Daus Dekkar left Rotterdam for the U.S.A., on his way to Thailand. He met Ramchandra at San Francisco on 28 September, and reached Tokyo on 20 October. Bhagwan Singh was then away in Korea. However, he met Rashbehari Bose and left for Bangkok via Shanghai and Hong Kong. At Hong Kong he was arrested, and confessed everything.⁶⁶ By then Indian revolutionary activities in Thailand had been virtually suppressed, and the plans for sending ships with arms from Indonesia had been given up. Coming on the heels of these setbacks the fiasco of Daus Dekkar's mission practically marked the end of Indian revolutionary efforts in South-East Asia.

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66. Dr. Daus Dekkar's statement, Roll 6, Record Group No. 118. Also, Bhupendranath Datta, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-31. Dr. Daus Dekkar was to get £600 *per mensem* for his work in connection with smuggling of arms. D.C.I. on 1-2-16, H.P. 1916 February 515-518 B. He even explained to the British the use of their secret code. Brown, p. 19.

CHAPTER—VIII

SEARCH FOR ARMS AND ASSISTANCE THROUGH JAPAN AND CHINA

Indian revolutionaries in Japan

Though the fiasco of the *Maverick* and the *Henry S.* actually made the Indian revolutionaries turn seriously to China and Japan for arms, attempts were being made to tap these sources even from the beginning of the war. As stated before, large-scale smuggling of arms through China was at first considered impossible due to British control over her sea-customs and for quite some time no attempt was made in this direction.¹ Narain S. Marathe, however, visited Japan in October and November 1914, on his way from U.S.A. to India, and tried to explore sources of arms there with the help of the influential friends of Barakatullah. He was assured by them that sixty thousand rifles might be had for ready payment.² But Japan was then a war-time ally of Britain, and it was not made clear to him how the arms could be secretly shipped to India. So Bernstorff, though obviously encouraged by the news, had to request the German Consul-General in Shanghai to make a detailed report on Marathe's information.³ But ultimately nothing came out of it, and Marathe returned home after a couple of months.

However, Indian revolutionaries never really gave up their hope of securing help from Japan. It was widely believed that, though she was officially an ally of Britain, a large segment of effective Japanese opinion was anti-British and therefore sympathetic towards India's struggle for freedom.⁴ In fact, the bitter competition that started in 1914 between the *Nippon Yusen Kaisha* and some British shipping lines over the coastal trade of India, the conquest of the German pos-

1. See p. 206.

2. Bernstorff's telegram, dated 20-11-1914, DAA, Reel 397, files 1—11.

3. Oppenheim's note, dated 20-11-1914, *ibid.*

4. *Lajpat Rai Autobiographical writings*, pp. 209—210. Also, note by British Ambassador, Tokyo, dated 16-4-1916, AC 21/5/-75. Memo. by the Imperial General Staff, dated 14-5-1916, AC 21/88.

session in Samoa and New Guinea by the Australians and New Zealanders, and Britain's opposition to Japan's 'Twenty-one Demands' on China had put serious strain on Anglo-Japanese relations since the outbreak of the war.⁵ So it was hoped that in spite of the pro-British attitude of the Prime Minister, Shigenobu Okuma, it would be possible for Indian revolutionaries to operate in Japan with relative safety.

The first revolutionary emissary to visit Japan after the outbreak of the war was Abani Mukherjee of the Dacca Anushilan Samity. He left India towards the end of April 1915 and reached Japan on 17 May.⁶ According to his statements to his comrades in 1922, he had been sent to Japan by Jyotindranath Mukherjee himself to meet Rashbehari Bose and to make a few other contacts.⁷ Apparently, his statement appears as absurd. Why should he be sent to Japan in April to meet Rashbehari when the latter himself left India on 12 May? But it is also quite likely that Jyotindranath was under the impression that Rashbehari, who was in hiding since February, had already reached Japan. In that case his mission speaks of a fresh attempt at securing help from or through Japan. Abani Mukherjee, however, had gone to Japan ostensibly as the business representative of H.S. Bishnue and Co., coal merchants at 101, Clive Street (now Netaji Subhas Road), Calcutta, and soon established there a few useful contacts.⁸ But Japan did not become a really important centre of Indian revolutionary activities till the coming of Rashbehari and Bhagwan Singh.

Soon after the outbreak of the war Rashbehari had thought of going abroad in search of foreign help. But the prospect of a concerted revolt in the army garrisons of North India had held him

5. Memo. by J. D. Gregory, dated 19-5-1916, AC 21/88.

6. Abani Mukherjee's first statement, dated 13-10-1915, H.P. 1916 November 44 Dep. Also, Rowlatt, p. 82.

Bhupendranath Datta, op. cit., pp. 20-21 and 174. Also, statements of Jadugopal Mukherjee and Bhupati Majumdar.

7. Unfortunately, Jyotindranath's name is usually mis-spelt as Jatin-dranath. The memorial, dated 2-9-1911 (vide, H.P. 1911 September 124--125 B), contains his signature, indicating the correct spelling. Jadugopal Mukherjee and Bhupendra Kumar Datta in their letters to the author, dated 13-11-1968 and 5-11-1968, respectively, admit that Jyotindranath was obviously his real name, though in their own writings they themselves have followed the popular distortion.

8. Abani Mukherjee's first statement, op. cit.

back.⁹ So, after the planned revolt had been betrayed, he remained in hiding for a couple of months, and then escaped to Japan, where both shelter and assistance might be available. Rabindranath Tagore was to visit Japan in 1916, and Rashbehari, posing as his nephew and secretary, sailed from Calcutta on 12 May by the *Sanuki Maru* with the alias, P. N. Tagore. He reached Japan early in June,¹⁰ and Bhagwan Singh too came from Manila on the 26th of that month.¹¹ Soon they were in friendly terms not only with militant nationalists such as Mitsuru Toyama but also with Dr. Sun Yat-sen and his followers then in exile there.

It is not known what actually transpired between Dr. Sun and the Indian revolutionaries. However, James Dietrick, a San Francisco engineer holding power of attorney from Dr. Sun, approached Herambalal with a proposal to sell to the Indians in China one million old rifles for ten dollars each. The proposal was referred to Von Brincken, Military Attache to the German Consulate in San Francisco, for his expert opinion. He, however, did not approve of the proposed deal as the rifles were old flint-lock muzzle-loaders, which were not likely to be of much use in a revolt in India.¹²

In the meantime, Rashbehari and Bhagwan were doing their best to influence Japanese public opinion in India's favour.¹³ The arrival of Lajpat Rai from the U.S.A. gave their propaganda campaign a fresh impetus and added weight. Herambalal, too, reached Japan, early in September, for an on-the-spot enquiry into charges of incompetence against Indian revolutionaries in East Asia, and to explore fresh sources of arms and assistance.¹⁴ Their presence naturally made Japan a very important centre of Indian revolutionary activities.

9. Statement of Rashbehari Bose, cited in Kokko Soma and Yasuo Soma, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

10. See, p. 164.

11. British Ambassador, Tokyo to Viceroy on 1-7-1915, H.P. 1915 October 205-238 B. Also, Governor of Hong Kong to Viceroy on 12-7-1915, H.P. 1915 October 205-238 B.

12. James Dietrick's testimony, cited in *The Pacific Historical Review*; *op. cit.*, p. 301.

13. Bijonbehari Bose, *Karmabir Rashbehari* (in Bengali), Calcutta, 1956, pp. 121-124. Also, the statement of Bhagwan Singh.

14. Informer's report, H.P. 1916 February 201 A. Also, Indictment charges against Herambalal Gupta and Chakravarty, dated 7-5-1917, Roll 4, Record Group No. 118. 9-10-3, section 3. Also, *The Pacific Historical Review*, *op. cit.*, p. 301.

Plans for an arms-ship from China

However, a few days before Herambalal's arrival Tahal Singh had come to Tokyo from Shanghai with Nielson's request that Rashbehari and Bhagwan Singh should go there for some urgent discussion.¹⁵ Indian revolutionary work in Shanghai was then in the hands of the trio, Tahal Singh, Abinash Roy (possibly an alias of Jnan Sanyal), and the German pharmacist, Nielson.¹⁶ Having discovered the possibility of securing large stocks of arms in China they needed the co-operation of Rashbehari and Bhagwan Singh for their proper disposal. Rashbehari immediately came down to Shanghai. But Bhagwan Singh had some prior engagements in Korea and Manchuria; so he sent Abani Mukherjee to Shanghai on 9 September, with some instructions for Abinash Roy, and himself came there early in October 1915.¹⁷

In the meantime, Abani Mukherjee had received through Abinash Roy a few thousand dollars from the local German Consulate, and had arranged for sending some arms to Calcutta by the *Fook Soong*. She was to sail from Shanghai sometime after Abani Mukherjee himself had left for India on 19 September by the *Yasaku Maru* with five hundred dollars and some instructions for Motilal Roy.¹⁸ Abani Mukherjee was also given a list of names with whom the Bengal revolutionaries should establish contact. It was this notebook that fell into the hands of the British police, when he was arrested at Singapore, and led to many unexpected disclosures and arrests.¹⁹ Because of these disclosures, and the prevailing situation

15. Notes on the accused, Bhagwan Singh, Roll 4, Record Group No. 118, file no. 9-10-3, section 10. Also, Bhagwan Singh's statement.

16. Rowlatt, p. 85. Also, Abani Mukherjee's first statement, op. cit. It appears from certain evidences that Abinash Roy was, possibly, an alias of Jnan Sanyal, who might have come to China in summer 1915. Dudley Ridout to Petrie on 11-5-1917, J. and P. (5) 1556 of 1917 and 5784, Vol. 1542 of 1918. Their surviving contemporaries, however, have failed to throw any light on who this Abinash Roy was.

17. Abani Mukherjee's first statement, op. cit. Also, Rowlatt, p. 85.

18. Abani Mukherjee's first statement, op. cit. Also, Rowllat, p. 85. Chakravarty wrote to Berlin on 5-19-1916 that the German Ambassador at Peking had given 50,000 dollars to Rashbehari Bose. *Christian Science Monitor*, 5-1-1918, quoted in J. and P. 43255 with 5784 Vol. 1542 of 1918.

19. Nalini Kishore Guha, op. cit., pp. 241-242. Also Bhupendranath Datta, op. cit., pp. 21-22. Also, statement of Bhupati Mazumdar.

in China and her adjacent waters the attempt at sending arms by the *Fook Soong* was given up at the last moment. Rashbehari made some arrangements with his agent, Waicy, (possibly an alias) for regular smuggling of small quantities of arms.²⁰ The large stock of arms collected in Shanghai, however, remained in the custody of the local German Consulate, and plans were drawn up to send those to India towards the end of November for the proposed revolt on the Christmas Day. But the Government of India once again had prior information about the proposed shipment of arms and the Christmas Day revolt and the entire project relating to it was given up.²¹

Japanese attitude towards Indians

In the meantime, having made the above arrangements, Rashbehari had left Shanghai for Tokyo towards the middle of October with fifty thousand yens from Nielson.²² In Japan, Rashbehari and Herambalal started a vigorous propaganda offensive against Britain with Lajpat Rai as their leader. They approached various Japanese newspapers with requests to write against the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and British imperialism in Asia, and to advocate India's claim to freedom. The following newspapers, *the Mayu*, the *Yamato Shinbun*, the *Nichi Nichi Shinbun*, and the *Osaka Mainichi*, assured them of their support.²³ Then on 27 November 1915, the Mikado's coronation day, Rashbehari and Herambalal, in collaboration with their friend, the noted Japanese historian, Dr. Shumei Ohkawa, organised a banquet at the Seiyokin Hotel in Tokyo. It was attended by many eminent people from various walks of life, and there anti-British and pan-Asian sentiments were given free expression. This was indeed too much for the British Ambassador to bear, and the following day he approached the Japanese Foreign Office with a request for the extradition of Rashbehari and Herambalal. The Japanese Government with unexpected docility obliged their ally by immediately asking

20. Abani Mukherjee's second statement on 17-9-1916 H.P. 1916 November 44 Dep.. Also, notes on the accused, Bhagwan Singh, Roll 4, Record Group No. 118.

21. Note by C. R. Cleveland, dated 23-9-1915, F. P. 1917 June 1-46. Obvious reference to this arms-ship from Shanghai in Rowlatt, p. 84.

22. Notes on the accused, Gopal Singh, Roll 4, Record Group No. 118.

23. Lajpat Rai reached Japan on 19 or 20 July 1915, and left for the U.S.A. on 12-12-1915. *Lajpat Rai, Autobiographical Writings*, pp. 207-209 and 212.

these two Indians to leave Japan by 2 December.²⁴ Fortunately for them Mitsuru Toyama, in his own way, took up the challenge, and on 1 December they were given shelter in the house of Aijo Soma, the owner of the Nakamura Bakery in Tokyo.²⁵

This decision to deport two Indian patriots at the behest of the British Government raised a furore in the Japanese press. Their young friend Kitasata paid thirty-thousand yens to the *Yamato Shinbun* and the *Osaka Mainichi*, and through their columns organised a sustained campaign against their government's decision and friendship with Britain.²⁶ It was suggested even by many other newspapers that Japan in her own future interest should pursue a more friendly policy towards the Indian nationalists and scrap the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, if necessary. Such an honourable and assertive policy alone, in their opinion, would become the leader of Asia.²⁷ Then in March 1916 the forcible seizure of nine Indians from a Japanese vessel, the *Tenyo Maru*, by a British warship caused a near-crisis in Anglo-Japanese relation. Many in Japan looked upon it as a national insult. Takashi Hara, President of the Seiyukai Party, spoke to the Foreign Minister, Kikujiro Ishii for these nine Indians. The cause of the Indian nationalists became increasingly popular in Japan,²⁸

24. Bijonbehari Bose, op. cit., p. 124. Also, *Lajpat Rai, Autobiographical Writings*, pp. 210-211.

25. Statement of Mrs. Kokko Soma, the mother-in-law of Rashbehari Bose, cited in Bijonbehari Bose, op. cit., pp. 134-140. The Japanese public were relieved to learn of their safety. *Lajpat Rai Autobiographical Writings*, p. 211.

26. Chakravarty's statement on 15-11-1917, Roll 5, Record Group No. 118.

27. Former Deputy Minister, Baron Den's article in the *Saturday Review*, December 1915, and J. Suehiro's article in the *Taiyo*, January and April 1916 July 6 Dep. Also, Capt. Cardew to the D.C.I. on 9-5-1916, H.P. 1916 July 6 Dep.

28. The *Japan Advertiser* on 2-4-1916 asked the Japanese Government to behave better with Indians and to think of the Indian market in future. The *Jiji Shimpō* took strong exception to the removal of these nine Indians from a Japanese ship. The *Japan Times* on 18-3-1916 supported *Jiji Shimpō's* criticism of British action, and on 24-3-1916 said that Japan must never help Britain in suppressing the Indians. H.P. 1916 July 1-3 B.

and under pressure of public opinion restrictions on Rashbehari and Herambalal were withdrawn by the middle of April 1916.²⁹

Herambalal, who had been replaced by Chakravarty in February 1916 as the Indian Committee's representative in the U.S.A., returned there in July.³⁰ But Rashbehari stayed behind in Japan and made it the most important centre of Indian revolutionary work in East Asia. Of course, he had to work rather quietly so as not to embarrass the government of his host country in time of war.³¹

Plans to utilise the situation in China

In the meantime, friendly contacts between Indian and Chinese exiles in Japan had borne fruit, and new developments in Chinese politics offered the former fresh opportunities to tap possible sources of arms. On 25 December 1915, a serious revolt broke out in Yunan led by Ts'ai Ho, head of the Ho Kuo Cheuen (National Protection Party). Dr. Sun immediately advised Narendranath Bhattacharya, who had reached Japan from Java by the middle of December, to go to Peking to secure for him a loan of five million dollars from the local German Ambassador for the purchase of arms for these southern rebels. He proposed that after the overthrow of Yuan She-kai these arms would be smuggled across the Himalayas to the Indian revolutionaries with the help of the Abhors and other semi-independent hill-tribes. Narendranath went to Peking early in January 1916, but the German Ambassador suspected Dr. Sun of pro-British sympathies and refused to trust him with such a huge loan.³²

29. Bijonbehari Bose, op. cit., pp. 151-152 C.R. Cleveland, on 9-9-1915 and 1-10-1915, spoke of the unfriendly attitude of the Japanese Government, H.P. 1915 October 205-238 B.

30. D.C.I. on 20-7-1916, H.P. 1916 July 441-445 B.

31. The Pro-Indian party in Japan is quite strong and shelter Rashbehari Bose. British Ambassador, Tokyo to British Ambassador, Washington on 16-4-1917, J. and P. 1555 of 1917 with 5784 Vol. 1542 of 1918. "Intercepted letters to Bose show conclusively that he is still in close touch with the heads of the conspiracy in America such as Narendranath Bhattacharji [M. N. Roy] and Ram Chand [Ramchandra], and that he is still devoting himself to revolutionary work, so far as the disabilities imposed by his position will permit." Report of D. Petrie, dated Shanghai, 10-1-1918, cited in Uma Mukherjee, *Two Great Indian Revolutionaries*, Calcutta, 1966, p. 144.

32. M. N. Roy, op. cit., pp. 7, 11-12. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, with his base of operation near Hong Kong, was really unwilling to antagonise Britain. *Ibid*, p. 6.

However, the political picture of China had, in the meantime, changed considerably. The Governors of Kweichow and Kwantung had joined the rebels in January and early April respectively, and on 21 April 1916 Yuan She-kai had revoked the decision to declare China a monarchy. So the revolt lost its main *raison d'être*, and most of the rebel leaders were now in obvious hurry to pay off their troops and to meet their other commitments. So at the end of April it was discussed in a meeting at Hangkow, attended by the local German Consul, a representative of the rebels, and Narendranath that the Germans would pay the former rebels direct for the arms, they would deposit at Chengtu, the capital of the Chinese province of Szechwan, whence those could be smuggled into India.³³ But at the last moment the German officials in China appeared reluctant to undertake such an expensive hazard on their own responsibility and instead advised Narendranath to go to U.S.A. to secure the approval of the German Ambassador there.³⁴ So he left Shanghai for the U.S.A. via Japan on 18 May, and reached San Francisco on 15 June 1916.³⁵

However, the changed situation in China once again prevented arms were causing considerable worry to the Indian revolutionaries and their German friends. In May 1916, Chakravarty sent to Japan his American friend, Rogers—who had old and useful contacts there—and three Japanese students with anti-British propaganda literature. Then followed a series of remittances to the extent of fourteen to sixteen thousand dollars for purchase of arms in Japan.³⁶ But they could not do much about it except sending small quantities of arms from time to time through foreign sailors or with general merchandise. Indian revolutionaries were, obviously, worried over their repeated failures at rendering effective assistance to their comrades at home. So in June and July, both the Germans and the Indian Com-

33. M. N. Roy, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

34. *Ibid.*

35. Roll 3, file nos. 9-10-3, section 3. Also, D.C.I. on 9-9-1916, H.P. 1916 September 652-656 B. Also, DAA, Reel 398, files 12-31.

36. Letter dated 2-5-1916 at Copenhagen, among 'cipher letters' in Roll 5, Record Group No. 118. Also, Chakravarty's letter, dated 16-5-1916, cited in *Christian Science Monitor*, 5-1-1918, J. and P. 49255 with 5784 Vol. 1542 of 1916.

mittee exhorted everyone concerned to explore all possible ways of smuggling arms to India.³⁷

However, the changed situation in China once again prevented the Indian revolutionaries with fresh opportunities. Li Yuar-hung, who became the President of China after the death of Yuan She-kai on 6 June 1916, and the new Foreign Minister, Wu T'ing-fang, were known to be sympathetic towards Indian aspiration. The President's private secretary, W. T. Wang, was an old acquaintance of Chakravarty, and was in the U.S.A. in August and September on an official tour. He told Chakravarty that the new Government of China would be willing to receive arms from Germany and deliver those to the Indians at the border provided they were allowed to retain ten per cent of the arms thus safely transported. Germany, of course, would have to guarantee military assistance to China for at least five years after the end of the war.³⁸ But, by then, increased British vigilance and the co-operation they received from Thailand had made any large-scale shipment of arms even to China almost impossible,³⁹ and this project was given up at the outset.

Repeatedly disappointed in their expectation, revolutionaries in India had to depend on meagre supplies of arms, that reached them through various clandestine channels. We have it on the authority of Chakravarty himself that only two hundred pistols and three thousand shots could be sent to India in the six months since the end of March 1916.⁴⁰ A few more might have come through individual sailors and Arab smugglers.

By early September 1916, Chakravarty himself had come to the unpleasant conclusion that arms-ships could no longer be sent either

37. See pp. 271-272.

38. Chakravarty to German Foreign Office on 6-9-1916, cited in *The Pacific Historical Review*, op. cit., p. 307. Also, J. P. Jones and P. M. Hollester, op. cit., pp. 277-78

39. Special precautionary measures had been adopted by the British navy in Indian waters since August 1915. Note by C. R. Cleveland, dated 21-9-1915, F.P. 1917 June 1-46. Also, Naval Intelligence Officer, Shanghai to the Government of Hong Kong in October 1915, H.P. 1916 July 16 Dep. Also, British Minister, Bangkok to Foreign Office, London on 8-9-1916, H.P. 1917 April 34-40 B.

40. *San Francisco Examiner*, 11-1-1918, p. 5. Also, Chakravarty's statement to author.

to India or to China, and that efforts should be made instead to secure arms in China herself.⁴¹ Already, since July 1916, he had been trying to influence Chinese public opinion, especially the southern war-lords, in India's favour through Chinese students in the U.S.A. But close collaboration between the Indians and the Chinese might arouse suspicion, and the American official attitude was hardening against the Germans and their Indian friends; so, on 18 August 1916, he founded in New York the Pan-Asiatic League, where all Asians were expected to assemble, ostensibly, for cultural pursuits.⁴² The most important emissary, Chakravarty sent to China, was Ching Su-chen, a student of Columbia University. He was personally known to some of the southern war-lords, and was expected to induce them to co-operate with the Indian revolutionaries. Early in November 1916, he wired to Chakravarty from Shanghai, "My marriage settled. Dowry needed. Wanted twenty million dollars."⁴³ Since news, deliberately optimistic no doubt, had already reached Chakravarty that a general rising was imminent in Bengal and that the administration there could be paralysed with only one thousand additional pistols, this wire from Ching Su-chen made him frantic to secure the necessary money.⁴⁴ But even Bernstorff was reluctant to take such an expensive hazard as this. Instead, he suggested that M. N. Roy (Narendranath Bhattacharya, on reaching the U.S.A., adopted the name Manabendra Nath Roy, and is usually known since then as M. N. Roy) should go to Germany with Prince Hatzfield by the submarine, *Deutschland*, and try to persuade the German Government there to sanction the necessary amount for this project.⁴⁵ Unfortu-

41. Chakravarty to Eisenhuth in Copenhagen, cited in *The Pacific Historical Review*, op. cit., p. 307. Also, Chakravarty's dateless letter to Luxborg in Buenos Aires, cited in *San Francisco Examiner*, 28-2-1918 p. 3.

42. D.C.I. on 13-1-1917, H.P. February 397-400 B. Also, Chakravarty to Olifiers on 2-8-1916, among 'cipher letters' in Roll 5, Record Group No. 118.

43. Chakravarty to German Foreign Office on 17-9-1916, cited in *San Francisco Chronicle*, 19-12-1917, p. 11. Also, Chakravarty's dateless letter to Luxborg, cited in *San Francisco Examiner*, 28-2-1918.

44. Chakravarty's dateless letter produced in court and cited in *San Francisco Bulletin*, 10-1-1918, p. 8, and *San Francisco Examiner*, 11-1-1918, p. 5.

45. M. N. Roy, op. cit., pp. 33-35 and 67. Also, Chakravarty's statement on 15-11-1917, op. cit.

nately, these negotiations took much time, and Chakravarty either could not or did not inform M. N. Roy in time of these developments.⁴⁶ However, M. N. Roy could not go to Germany, and was arrested shortly thereafter.⁴⁷

Further efforts in China

However, the Indian revolutionaries were not to give up hope so soon, and fresh efforts were made to explore other possibilities of securing arms in China. As early as April 1916, it had been decided in Berlin that Taraknath Das should go to China and Japan to tone up Indian revolutionary activities in that region and to explore local sources of arms. But it was not possible for him to leave Germany before the end of July, and he reached Peking in the beginning of October 1916.⁴⁸ Early in November, he came down to Shanghai and met Shantipada Mukherjee, who too had arrived there from Java on 1 September. At Taraknath's suggestion, Santipada left for Java on 26 November to start an export-import agency under the business cover of which arms might be sent to their comrades in India. Taraknath too left for Japan in search of assistance.⁴⁹

Although the cabinet of the pro-British Shigenobu Okuma had already been replaced by that of Masatuke Terauchi on 9 October 1916, and anti-British feeling was quite strong in Japan, it was not possible for Taraknath to do anything more than carrying on propaganda in India's favour. So he again returned to Shanghai at the beginning of March 1917. Santipada too had discovered, in the meantime, that it was no longer possible to carry on clandestine transac-

46. M. N. Roy says Chakravarty played false with him, vide his *Memoirs, op. cit.*, pp. 33-35 and 67. But according to Chakravarty M. N. Roy was arrested before the voyage could be arranged, vide his *New India*, Calcutta, 1950, p. 34. Also, Chakravarty's statement, cited in *The Pioneer Mail*, 17-5-1918, J. and P. 2450 with 578 Vol. 1542 of 1918. However, it is a fact that Chakravarty had written to Berlin in September 1916 that M. N. Roy would be shortly going there. Notes on the accused Chakravarty, Roll 4, Record Group No. 118.

47. M. N. Roy, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

48. Zimmerman to Bernstorff on 15-5-1916, and 26-5-1916, Roll 3, file 9-10-3, section 7.

49. Notes on the accused, Chakravarty, *op. cit.* Taraknath Das reached New York on 17-7-1916, and spent the whole of August with Chakravarty at San Francisco.

50. Santipada Mukherjee's statement, *op. cit.*

tions in arms in Java, and returned to Shanghai in disgust towards the end of February or the beginning of March 1917. There he soon met both Taraknath and Ching Su-chen. They decided that, since it might not be safe any more to operate in the U.S.A. and the German Government was then making special efforts to win over Mexico, either Atmaram Kapur or Ching Su-chen, should go there to re-establish contact with Berlin. But both Atmaram and Ching Su-chen were arrested before they could even start for their destination. Taraknath returned to the U.S.A. in August 1917, and was immediately arrested.

Events now moved fast and unfavourably for Indian revolutionaries. The U.S.A. declared war on Germany on 6 April 1917, and in May, China too followed suit. Obviously, the two most important centres of Indian revolutionary activities on both sides of the Pacific were destroyed, and most of the Indian revolutionaries in the U.S.A. were taken into custody. Only a handful of Indians could escape to Mexico, and towards the end of the war it became a new centre of clandestine Indo-German collaboration.⁵²

Negotiations in Mexico

The Germans were then desperately trying to organise trouble and sabotage in the U.S.A. and anywhere in the British Empire. Zimmerman had wired to Von Eckhardt, German Minister in Mexico, on 19 January 1917 to do his best to foment a U.S.-Mexican war and to arrive at a friendly agreement with Japan through the good offices of the Mexican Government.⁵³ Now that the U.S.A. was

51. *Ibid.* Germany had been trying to persuade Mexico, since January 1917, to adopt an anti-U.S. posture and to use her as a new base for anti-British intrigues. Atmaram was charged with the murder of Harnam Singh, a suspected police informer, and was executed in Shanghai on 2-6-'17. D. Petrie's Report in Material 68.

52. The *New World* (San Francisco), 16-9-1917, cited in Roll 3, file no. 9-10-3, section 3. M. N. Roy, Jnan Sanyal, Sailendranath Ghosh, and Dhirendranath Sen could reach Mexico. Bhupendranath Datta, *op. cit.*, p. 68 (foot note). Also, D. Petrie to British Minister, Peking on 14-9-1918, H.P. 1919 March 165 B.

53. Albrecht von Bernstorff, *My Three Years in America*, London, 1920, p. 97. The whole telegram is quoted in E. V. Voska and W. Irwin, *Spy and Counter-spy*, London, 1941, p. 180. Also, Zimmerman's speech in the Reichstag on 5-3-17, cited in the *New York Herald* on 7-3-1917, J. and P. (S) 1308 of 1917 with 5784, Vol. 1542 of 1918. *

virtually lost for that purpose Mexico was to take her place as a centre of anti-British conspiracies. It was decided in January by the Indian Committee and the German Foreign Office that Hideo Nakao (a converted Muslim), a former official in the Japanese Embassy at Istanbul, would soon leave for New York on way to Mexico and China. In New York he was to meet Swami Bodhananda of the local Ram Krishna Mission and through him Srinivas Wagel and Pagar. Fifty thousand dollars were sanctioned for his work. But, for reasons not clearly known, he failed to reach Mexico.⁵⁴

The German Government, however, sent one of their privy-councillors to Mexico towards the end of summer 1917 for their international intrigues. M. N. Roy too, in the meantime, had escaped and reached Mexico City on 15 June 1917.⁵⁵ There he soon came in contact with two Germans (one of them, possibly, was Vincent Kraft) he had previously known in Java. They soon put him in touch with Von Eckhardt and the visiting German privy-councillor, and a fresh scheme to help the Indian revolutionaries was soon devised. It was suggested that a Chinese businessman with good connections in, what was then, French Indo-China would soon leave for Japan with Roy's letter for Rashbehari, while a German officer would proceed to East Asia ahead of Roy to do the preliminary work. Within a week Roy was given fifty thousand *pesoes* in gold, and was assured of an additional fifty thousand dollars before actually sailing for Japan. It was further suggested that a part of the frozen assets of the Deutscho Ostasiatische Bank would be sold to finance this new enterprise. The equivalent of Rs. 20,000 was actually sent through this Chinese merchant, but it appears that the money never reached its destination.⁵⁶

54. Zimmerman to Bernstorff on 4-1-1917, cited in J. P. Jones and P. M. Hollester, *op cit.*, p. 280. Also, Bhupendranath Datta, *op. cit.*, p. 69. Also Chakravarty's statement on 15-11-1917, *op. cit.*

55. Military Attache, U. S. Embassy, Mexico to Chief Military Intelligence Branch, Washington on 4-5-1918, Roll 4, file 9-10-3, section 9. Two German officials, Capt. Berke and an expert in sabotage, Heinrich Bode, were in regular contact with the Indians at Mexico City. *Ibid.* M. N. Roy is in possession of considerable money. U. S. Attorney to U. S. Attorney General on 26-3-1918, Roll 4, file 9-10-3, section 8.

56. M. N. Roy, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-67 and 88-97. One of these two Germans from Java was, probably Vincent Kraft, Bhupendranath Dutta, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

Roy soon made preparations for his voyage back to Japan. But he was wanted by the American Police, and so had to wait for a Japan-bound ship that would not touch any port in the U.S.A. He first went to the Pacific port of Manzanillo and then to Salina Cruz. But as he says, the Japan-bound ship rather unexpectedly failed to touch Salina Cruz, and the next ship was to come after a month. From the very beginning Roy was never sufficiently enthusiastic about the whole enterprise, and was more interested in the revolution than going on in Mexico itself. So he gave up the project and returned to Mexico City to begin a new chapter in his political career.⁵⁷ No more was heard anything of attempts at sending arms to India through China or Japan.



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57. M. N. Roy, *op. cit.*, pp. 98–103. Also, Military Attache, U. S. Embassy, Mexico to Washington on 4-5-1918, Roll 4, file 9–10–3, section 9.

CHAPTER—IX

PREPARATIONS AT HOME TO AVAIL OF THE WAR-TIME OPPORTUNITIES

While the aforesaid attempts were being made abroad to send arms to India and to organise raids on her frontier, revolutionaries within the country were busy preparing themselves to receive the promised help and to stage a successful revolt. Although many of them had for years eagerly looked forward to an Anglo-German war, they had actually expected it a few years later. So the war came, in terms of their calculations, a little too early and caught them somewhat unprepared.¹ However, the Indian revolutionaries, particularly in Bengal and the Punjab, the main centres of revolutionary activities, set about making the necessary preparations with alacrity.

Bengal in those days had over half-a-dozen revolutionary secret societies, and the two best known among them were the Dacca Anushilan Samity and the Yugantar group. While the former was a highly disciplined, close-kint group, the latter was a rather loose association of groups, that usually worked together.² There was not much of contact or understanding among these different groups—which is always difficult in case of secret societies—and co-ordinated planning or action was hardly possible. The Damodar flood of 1913, however, was to them a blessing in disguise. Revolutionaries from different parts of Bengal came together for relief work, and also came to know one another better. Jyotindranath Mukherjee was by common consent the most outstanding figure among them, and most revolutionary groups informally agreed to work together for their common cause.³

By then, the Dacca Anushilan Samity, who were extremely conscious and careful about their own identity and independence, had

1. Jadugopal Mukherjee, *op. cit.*, pp. 35—36. Sachindranath Sanyal, *op. cit.*, p. 12. Bhagwan Singh's letter to author, dated 27-10-1960.

2. Nalini Kishore Guha, *op. cit.*, p. 318. The term 'Yugantar Group' was first officially used in connection with the 'Howrah Gang Case', in 1910-11.

3. Nalini Kishore Guha, *op. cit.*, p. 315 (foot-note). Also, statements of Jadugopal Mukherjee and Bhupati Majumdar.

established a close link with the Chandernagore group of Motilal Roy and Shrish Chandra Ghose, mainly through the efforts of Amrita Lal Hazra alias Sasanka Hazra.⁴ Rashbehari was one of the original members of this Chandernagore group, and had already established himself as the leader of the revolutionaries in the Punjab and the U.P. After the Delhi Bomb Case he usually stayed in hiding at Varanasi (formerly known in English as Benares), and a close link was maintained between the revolutionaries of Bengal and North India through him and Sachindranath Sanyal.⁵ Asutosh Ghose and Bejoy Krishna Roy of the Yugantar group also had their separate channels of communication with North India.⁶

Similar links were also established between the Yugantar group and the Maratha revolutionaries through Benoy Bhushan Datta, Narayan Savarkar (the younger brother of V. D. Savarkar and then a student of Campbell Medical School, Calcutta), and Bhim Rao.⁷ There was a close understanding, although not much is known about it, between the Yugantar group and the revolutionary groups in South India.⁸

Plans for an army revolt

However, when the war broke out, the situation in the Punjab was the most explosive. It was, so as to say, the homeland of the Indian army, and the revolutionaries had already started establishing contacts with the soldiers in the major cantonments of North India. The returning Ghadar volunteers, mostly ex-servicemen, further stirred their emotion, and Bhai Paramanand was an effective link between the disaffected Hindus and the Sikhs. Late in November 1914, news was sent to Rashbehari at Varanasi that he should come to the Punjab to

4. Nalini Kishore Guha, *op. cit.*, pp. 126-127.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 127. Also, Radhanath Rath and Sabitri Prosanna Chatterjee (ed.), *Rash Behary Basu: His struggle for India's Independence*, Calcutta, 1963, p. 538. Also, the note by the Additional Sessions Judge of Delhi, H. P. 1915 January 134-137 A.

6. Jadugopal Mukherjee, *op. cit.*, p. 385.

7. *Ibid.*

8. Satishchandra Chakravarty's letter to author, dated 7-11-1967. Also, the statement of Atulkrishna Ghosh.

take charge of the situation there. Rashbehari, however, instead of going there personally sent Sachindranath with necessary instructions.⁹

Satyendranath Sen and Vishnu Ganesh Pingley also reached Calcutta at the end of November with the news of the expected German help.¹⁰ Though it was not yet known how and when German help might be coming, Yugantar leaders decided to keep themselves in readiness for any emergency. Almost all the revolutionary groups in Bengal, except the Dacca Anushilan Samity, soon came together and agreed to work under the leadership of Jyotindranath. Even with the Dacca Anushilan Samity the Yugantar leadership maintained contact through the Chandernagore group, and it was believed that in the hour of reckoning they would all come forward to fight together for their motherland.¹¹

Pingley had long talks with Jyotindranath, and left for Varanasi towards the third week of December to pass on the necessary information to Rashbehari. From there Pingley and Sachindranath were immediately sent to Amritsar, where they had discussions with Mula Singh of Shanghai.¹² Preparations for an army revolt had by then

9. Michael O'Dwyer, op. cit., pp. 197-198. Sachindranath Sanyal, op. cit., p. 17. Rowlatt, p. 92. Some Ghadarites on return even succeeded in joining the Indian army. D.C.I. on 31-8-1915, H.P. 1915 August 552-556 B.

10. Rowlatt, p. 82.

11. Jadugopal Mukherjee, op. cit., pp. 382-383.

It appears that the first attempt at bringing the Yugantar group and the Dacca Anushilan together, was made by Jadugopal Mukherjee, Ashutosh Das, Benoybhusan Datta, and Atulkrishna Ghosh on the one hand, and Amritalal Hazra and Birenranath Sen on the other.^a This having failed, Nalini Kishore Guha, Pratulchandra Ganguly, and Rabindramohan Sen met Jyotindranath Mukherjee in Calcutta in August 1914. But no progress could be made as Nalini Kishore Guha, Troilokyonath Chakravarty, and Pratulchandra Ganguly were arrested within a few days. Afterwards, Narendranath Sen, chief of the Dacca Anushilan, held the view that a union between the two groups need not be hurried through, and that they might work together in the time of need even without a formal union.^b

(a) Statement of Jadugopal Mukherjee.

(b) Nalini Kishore Guha, op. cit., pp. 322-33.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 392. Also, Rowlatt, p. 107. Also, Sachindranath Sanyal, op. cit., p. 47. Kokko Soma and Yasuo Soma, *Aziya no Mezame—Indo-shishi Rashbehari Basu to Nippon* (in Japanese), Tokyo, 1953, p. 165, Mula Singh had reached Colombo en route to India on 18-11-1914. Cleveland's note, dated 31-3-1915, H.P. 1916 May 436-450 B.

made considerable progress, and no sooner had they returned from the Punjab than Rashbehari sent Pingley to Calcutta to request the Yugantar leaders to meet him at Varanasi for co-ordinating and finalising their plans. Pingley succeeded in meeting Atulkrishna Ghosh through Motilal Roy, and early in January 1915 Jyotindranath, Atulkrishna, and Narendranath went to Varanasi for discussion.¹³ The Yugantar leaders, for obvious reasons, wanted the planned army revolt to be postponed by at least two months.¹⁴ There could not be an effective army revolt in Bengal—though the 16th Rajput Rifles, then in garrison in Fort William, had been successfully approached through Havildar Mansha Singh—and they knew that some kind of German help might be coming within a few months.¹⁵ So the planned revolt should best be synchronised with the arrival of German assistance. But the soldiers, ready for revolt, were impatient, and ultimately 21 February was selected as the date of rising.¹⁶ Kedareshwar Guha who had reached Calcutta on 20 December 1914,¹⁷ had already met Rashbehari at Varanasi, and the latter had sent him to Dacca with the news of the planned army revolt.¹⁸

Soon after the Yugantar leaders had left for Calcutta, Rashbehari went to Amritsar with Pingley on 25 January, leaving Priyanath Bhattacharya and Bibhuti Bhusan Haldar at Varanasi, Damodar Swarup Seth at Allahabad, Vinayak Rao Kaple at Kanpur and Nalini Mukherjee at Jabalpure to lead the revolt and to sabotage the means of communication.¹⁹ Nagendranath Datta alias Girija Babu and Anukul Chakravarty, who had come to meet him at Varanasi, were

13. Nalini Kishore Guha, op. cit., p. 320. Also, Jadugopal Mukherjee, op. cit., p. 393.

14. Sachindranath Sanyal, op. cit., pp. 60-61.

15. Statement of Phanindranath Chakravarty, summary signed by the Home Secy., India on 11-1-1917, H.P. 1917 January 299-301 and k.w. A. Also, Jadugopal Mukherjee, op. cit., p. 400. Also, Nalini Kishore Guha, op. cit., pp. 320-321.

16. Sachindranath Sanyal, op. cit., pp. 60-61.

17. See p. 139.

18. Kedareshwar Guha's statement, quoted in Nalini Kishore Guha, op. cit., 141-142. References to Mansha Singh in the confidential booklet, *Connections with the Revolutionary Organisations in Bihar and Orissa, 1906-1916*, p. 62, section 114.

19. Sachindranath Sanyal, op. cit., p. 63. Also, Kokko Soma and Yasuo Soma, op. cit., p. 166. Also, Rowlatt, p. 33.

sent to Calcutta and Dacca respectively, with instructions regarding the planned revolt.²⁰ Instructions were also sent to the districts of North Bengal to get ready to attack the police lines and government treasuries on the appointed day.²¹ Revolutionary emissaries were also sent even to distant cantonments such as Peshawar, Noushera, Banu, and Hoti Mardan, and by the end of January favourable reports had been received from most Indian garrisons west of Varanasi. Even the Sikh regiment in distant Dacca was in collusion with the revolutionaries. Of course, Lahore, Ferozapore, and Mian Mir were to be the main centres of this revolt.²² "He [Rashbehari] also tried to organise the collection of gangs of villagers to take part in the rebellion. Bombs were prepared; arms were got together; flags were made ready; a declaration of war was drawn up; instruments were collected for destroying railways and telegraph wires."²³ A few political dacoities to collect money were also committed at Jhanir, Rabhon, Sahnewal, Mansuran, and Chabba, at the end of January and beginning of February. On 2 February, Rashbehari shifted his headquarters from Amritsar to Lahore.²⁴

The Yugantar leaders, too, after Jyotindranath's return from Varanasi, set about making hurried preparations for the planned rising. While Jyotindranath remained the overall leader of the rebel organisation, various duties were divided among the higher echelon of their leadership. In their so-called 'war cabinet' Jadugopal Mukherjee was in charge of intelligence and foreign contacts, Narendranath of arms and insurrection, while Atulkrishna and Satishchandra Chakravarty looked after finance and shelters respectively.²⁵ Bipinbehari Ganguly of the Atmonnoti Samaj, Amarendranath Chat-

20. Uma Mukherjee, op. cit., p. 128.

21. Satish Pakrasi, *Agnidiner Katha*, Calcutta, 1947, pp. 46-47.

22. Gulab Singh, *Under the Shadow of Gallows*, Delhi, 1964, pp. 14-15. Michael O'Dwyer, op. cit., pp. 201-202. Also, Sachindranath Sanyal, op. cit., pp. 41 and 64. Also, Nalini Kishore Guha, op. cit., pp. 129-130.

23. Rowlatt, p. 108.

24. Uma Mukherjee, op. cit., p. 121.

25. Statements of Jadugopal Mukherjee and Atulkrishna Ghosh. The Sramajibi Samabaya was established in 1908 by Amarendranath Chatterjee, Ramchandra Majumdar, Khirode Ganguly etc. in Calcutta at the crossing of the Harrison (now Mahatma Gandhi) Road and College Street.

terjee of the Sramajivi Samabaya, and Motilal Roy were also among the top leaders. Even orders were placed for military uniforms for the revolutionaries so that the Government might not succeed in spreading the rumour that common bandits had been killed or captured.²⁶ All these preparations required large sums of money, and from the middle of February 1915 there took place a series of armed holdups to obtain the necessary fund as quickly as possible.²⁷

The planned revolt, however, was betrayed. An agent of the police, Kripal Singh, had managed to wriggle into the confidence of the rebel leaders, and passed on valuable information to the authorities. Suspecting that the Government had come to know of their plans, they hurriedly decided to stage the revolt on 19 February. But the Government had prior information of their moves, and in an early morning raid, on the 19th, most of the rebel leaders were arrested and the planned revolt was nipped in the bud.²⁸ Rashbehari and Pingley, however, managed to escape. The latter too was arrested at Meerut Cantonment on 24 March 1915.²⁹ Rashbehari, after remaining in hiding for a couple of months at Varanasi, Navadwip, and Chandernagore, left Calcutta for Japan on 12 May 1915, in search of arms with the alias, P. N. Tagore.³⁰ Mathura Singh and a few others had already left for Afghanistan with the same purpose, in the beginning of March.³¹

26. Jadugopal Mukherjee, op. cit., p. 429. Also, Phanindranath Chakravarty's statement, cited in D.C.I. on 21-10-1916, H.P. 1916 July 16 Dep.

27. Jadugopal Mukherjee, op. cit., pp. 386 and 426. According to Atulkrishna, Jyotindranath told him that he needed Rs. 1,00,000 within a week. Nalini Kishore Guha, op. cit., p. 148 (foot note). Also, Gulab Singh, op. cit., pp. 148-149.

28. Michael O'Dwyer, op. cit., p. 202. Also, Sachindranath Sanyal, op. cit., p. 70. Also, Gulab Singh, op. cit., p. 20. Also, Kokko Soma and Yasuo Soma, op. cit., p. 168.

29. Rowlatt p. 93. Also, H.P. 1916 May 436-439 B.

30. Kokko Soma and Yosuo Soma, op. cit., pp. 180-181 and 190-193. Also Sachindranath Sanyal, op. cit., p. 116. Sachindranath holds that Rashbehari sailed from Calcutta in April. But since the latter himself says that he sailed on the *Sanuki Maru* and specifically mentions the date, his assertion appears more trustworthy.

31. Sachindranath Sanyal, op. cit., p. 94. Also, Mathura Singh's statement on 26-2-1917, H.P. 1918 September 55-77 A.

Preparations for a revolt with German arms

In Bengal, however, the Yugantar leaders received fresh hope and inspiration when, early in March 1915, Atmaram Kapur and Jitendranath Lahiri brought them good news from Thailand and Germany respectively. Atmaram had recently come to Thailand from the U.S.A., after meeting the Ghadar leaders of Shanghai on his way. He gave Jadugopal some information and suggestions about the expected arms-ship. Details about it, of course, were to be communicated later. Sometime after his return to Thailand, Atmaram sent two telegrams to Bijoy Krishna Roy and Bholanath Chatterjee, on 13 and 17 June respectively, informing that the arms-ship was to reach the coast of Bengal by the end of that month.³²

Jitendranath came with the information that the arms-ship, *Maverick*, would be coming via Java, and that an accredited agent of the rebel high command should be sent there to discuss with the German representatives the details regarding the time and place of the disembarkation of arms.³³ The choice fell on Narendranath, who left for Java towards the end of April, with the alias C.A. Martin, and appears to have reached Djakarta on the 30th. Erich Windels, the Acting German Consul at Djakarta, introduced him to the Helfferich brothers, who were in actual charge of the arms deal there.³⁴

In the meantime, it had been arranged that Hari Kumar Chakravarty's Harry and Sons and Sudhansu Bhusan Mukherjee's Bishra Stone and Lime Works would be used for secret correspond-

32. Jadugopal Mukherjee, op. cit., pp. 36-37, 388-389. Also see p. 214. From Bangkok Atmaram went to Djakarta to meet the Helfferichs. Informers statement, H.P. 1916 February 201 A. Jyotindranath was still in Calcutta, and it was decided at a top-level meeting at Uttarpara (about ten miles north of Calcutta), attended among others by him, Amarendranath, Atulkrishna, Motilal Roy, Bipin Bihari Ganguly, and Makhanlal Sen. These two telegrams thus worded: (1) "Goods already despatched. Reach in 10 or 15 days." (2) "Ivory and sandalwood already despatched. Reach in 10 days." File No. 921/1915 of I.B. Records, West Bengal, cited in Uma Mukherjee, op. cit., p. 199, f. n. 65.

33. Rowlatt, p. 82. Also, Motilal Roy, *Amar Dekha Biplab O Biplobi*, Calcutta, 1957, pp. 133-134. Also, the statement of Atulkrishna Ghosh.

34. Also, Jadugopal Mukherjee, op. cit., pp. 34, 36, 37 and 382. Also, British Consul General, Djakarta to Secy., Foreign and Political, India on 30-1-1915, F.P. 1917 June 1-46.

ence and financial transactions between Calcutta and Djakarta.³⁵ As soon as negotiations regarding the *Maverick* were completed Narendranath, using the alias Martin, wired to Harry and Sons, "Sugar business helpful". Then he, probably, paid a short visit to China, after returning from where he wired to Calcutta on 29 May: "Back here. Business good. Sugar contracted shipment after two weeks. Anxious for affairs there."³⁶ He also made arrangements with K. A. J. Chotirmall and Co. of Djakarta for sending money to India under the latter's business cover. A primitive code for telegraphic communication was also agreed upon. On 24 June, Sudhansu Bhusan Mukherjee wired to Chotirmall: "Send 5000 tonnes. Cable quantities already shipped." It may be noted that 'a bag of sugar', in this connection meant Rs. 10 only. Then followed a series of remittances from the Helfferichs through Chotirmall. Between June and August 1915, Rs. 43,000 were remitted, of which Rs. 33,000 were received by the revolutionaries before the British authorities could have any idea of what was actually going on.³⁷

However, early in August 1915, the Government of India was

35. Jadugopal Mukherjee, *op. cit.*, p. 389. The Harry and Sons named after its founder Harikumar Chakravarty, was situated at 41 Clive Street (Now known as Netaji Subhas Road), Calcutta. The Bishra Stone and Lime Works was situated at Sanua in South Bihar with its head office at 101/1, Clive Street, Calcutta.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 36. Also, Rowlatt, p. 83. Also, British Consul-General, Djakarta to Secy., Foreign and Political India on 30-7-1915, F.P. 1917 1-46. Also, D.C.I. on 21-9-1915, F.P. 1917 June 1-46. The Djakarta branch of K. A. J. Chotirmall and Co. was established in 1875.

37. Rowlatt, p. 83. Also, Enclosure to Home Secy., India to Secy. of State on 27-8-1915, H.P. 1915 September 484-503 and k.w.A. Emil Helfferich in his letter to author, dated 17-9-1956, says that over 30,000 guilders were remitted and speaks about the primitive code. According to Uma Mukherjee, p. 194, Rs. 42,892 were sent to the Bengal revolutionaries through these channels, and Rs. 31,546 were actually received by them. For details regarding these financial transactions and related telegrams see Denham's note of August 1915, cited in her book, pp. 188-194. According to Chakravarty's letter to Berlin, dated 25-10-1916, Narendranath was paid 25,000 guilders in cash, while Harry and Sons and Sramajibi Samabaya were paid 20,000 guilders and 14,000 guilders respectively, through the Eastern Bank and the Shanghai Bank. But 50,000 guilders more sent to Harry and Sons through the Shanghai Bank were intercepted by the British. *Christian Science Monitor*, 5-1-1918, J. and P. 43255 with 5784 Vol. 1542 of 1918. The figures cited appear highly exaggerated.

informed through the French police about the activities of the Indian revolutionaries in collaboration with the Germans, and on 7 August the Harry and Sons were searched. So, on the 13th, a telegram was sent to Emil Helfferich from Goa, probably, by Benoybhusan Datta, asking him to be more cautious in his communications. But more money was needed in India, and it was no longer safe to send a big amount through Chotirmall. So a trustworthy Chinese, by the name of Ong Sin-kwie, was sent to Calcutta with ten thousand guilders in cash and ninety thousand more in bank-cheques, in the guise of a trader dealing in *batis* and gunnybags. But somehow the British had prior information about his journey, and he was arrested on his arrival at Singapore.⁸⁸

Having completed the necessary arrangements Narendranath Bhattacharya, in the meantime, had left Djakarta on 7 June 1915, and reached Negapatam on the 14th with details about the *Maverick* and the first bank-draft, worth Rs. 18,292 only, for Amarendranath Chatterjee. The latest information was that the *Maverick* would reach the estuary of the Rai Mangal, in Khulna district, (now in East Pakistan) towards the end of June.⁸⁹

38. Rowlatt, p. 85. Also, Emil Helfferich's letters to author, dated 17-9-1956.

39. Rowlatt, p. 83. Also, statements of Jadugopal Mukherjee and Atulkrishna Ghosh. Also, Atmaram's two telegrams from Bangkok, quoted in p. 165. The draft, dated Medan 8-6-1915, was drawn by the Netherlandsche Handel-Maatschappy on the National Bank of India, Madras. It was presented to Calcutta National Bank, and the money was paid to Amarendranath Chatterjee on 7-7-1915. Notes by Denham, cited in Uma Mukherjee, op. cit., pp. 191-193. "The Commander-in-Chief of the China Station has sent up from Singapore a reproduction of the tracing of the mouths of the Hooghly found on the German Secret Service Agent [possibly Boehm] arrested at Singapore. This tracing shows the Sunderbans from the Cuttack coast practically to the Meghna and gives the position of Calcutta and the railways along the Cuttack coast and to Diamond Harbour and Canning. On the original tracing were found two pin pricks. Of these one marked the North point of the island which we know as 'Raimangal Island', and the other the North point of Dalhousie Island in the Matla River." File No. 921/1915 of I. B. Records, West Bengal. On 31-7-1915, Cleaveland, Director of Criminal Intelligence, wrote to Hughes-Butler, Inspector-General of Police, Bengal "that our information from Batavia was to the effect that the arms were to be landed at a point in the Sunderbans, some 60 or 70 miles from Canning Town." Cited in Uma Mukherjee, op. cit., p. 198.

The Yugantar leaders immediately set about making arrangements for the secret disembarkation and distribution of arms. They had already planned that parts of the arms consignment would be sent to the coastal districts of East Bengal and to Balasore.⁴⁰ Both the coastal districts of East Bengal, swampy and criss-crossed with streams, and the hinterland of Balasore, hilly and forested, were highly suitable for guerrilla activities. But it was necessary for the revolutionaries to have their own hide-outs and bases of operation in those regions. Bengal, particularly the eastern districts, had a well-organised network of secret societies, but there was hardly any in Bihar and Orissa. So, early in 1915, trusted revolutionaries were sent to establish concealed centres of operation. Saileshwar Bose went to Balasore and opened a shop, the Universal Emporium. Bejoy Chakravarty was sent to Chakradharpur, Bholanath Chatterjee further west to Kolunga, and Panchugopal Banerjee to Sambalpur. Everywhere they opened small shops to serve as shelters and as their ostensible means of livelihood.⁴¹ They were also to maintain contact with the Maratha revolutionaries and to sabotage the means of communication. Jyotindranath himself with some of his close associates had gone into hiding near Balasore towards the end of March 1915.⁴²

It was expected that, while the standard revolt would be raised in these relatively inaccessible regions, the revolutionaries in Calcutta, already in friendly contact with the Indian garrison in Fort William, would capture the city under the leadership of Bipinbihari Ganguly and Narendranath Bhattacharya with the arms disembarked at the estuary of the Rai Mangal.⁴³ Since there were not many troops in Bengal and some of them, like the garrison in Fort William, were expected to join them, the revolutionaries hoped that they would be able to overwhelm the Government there with a few surprise attacks. Then, the revolutionaries hoped, if only they could hold out for a couple of weeks the revolt would expand into a general popular rising, and inspire the Indian soldiers and policemen to desert their alien masters *en masse*. So, to prevent troops from being quickly rushed to

40. Rowlatt, p. 83. Also, Jadugopal Mukherjee, op. cit., p. 427.

41. Jadugopal Mukherjee, op. cit., p. 422.

42. Rowlatt, p. 47. He left Calcutta soon after the murder of the police informer, Nirod Haldar at 73, Pathuriaghata Street on 24-2-1915.

Bengal, elaborate arrangements were made to destroy the main railway and road bridges connecting Bengal with the rest of India.⁴⁴

Jadugopal Mukherjee made hurried arrangements for taking delivery of arms at the estuary of the Rai Mangal towards the end of June. He placed himself in contact with Dr. Jatindramohan Ghosal, a physician of Bashirhat, and Raja Jatindranath Roy, an influential landlord of Nur Nagar in Khulna, who assured him of all possible help in the disembarkation and distribution of arms. Some of the revolutionaries under Brajendranath Datta and Satishchandra Chakravarty actually went down to the mouth of the river and waited there for a few weeks with two fast canoes and six large barges.⁴⁵ A few others under Saileshwar Bose (it is not known when he had come back from Balasore) kept watch on the river Dhamra and the adjoining canals.⁴⁶ But, as stated earlier, the *Maverick* never reached her destination, and those who had been waiting for it returned disappointed towards the middle of July.

In the meantime, Kumud Mukherjee had left Bangkok for Calcutta on 17 June with Rs. 2,500 from Atmaram and information about an expected arms-ship. Kumud Mukherjee reached Calcutta on 3 July, and had discussions with Jadugopal, Bholanath, and Narendranath. Narendranath told him that since fifty thousand rifles were expected, and Bengal required only fifteen thousand the remainder should be disembarked near Pondicherry and Karachi. However, the Yugantar leaders, who were still ignorant of the fiasco of the *Maverick*, were not sure whether this arms-ship, mentioned by Kumud, was in addition to in place of the *Maverick* they were waiting for. So they asked Kumud to go to Java and tell the Helfferichs that they were well prepared and the second arms-ship should be sent in addition to the one already arranged.⁴⁷ He was also to request them for one

43. Rowlatt, p. 83. Also, Jadugopal Mukherjee, op. cit., p. 35.

44. Rowlatt, p. 83. Also, Jadugopal Mukherjee, op. cit., pp. 399-400.

45. Rowlatt, pp. 82-83. Also, Jadugopal Mukherjee, op. cit., p. 400. Also, Satishchandra Chakravarty's letter to author, dated 7-11-1967. Also, statement of Brajendranath Dutta.

46. D.C.I. on 21-9-1915, F.P. 1917 June 1-46.

47. Rowlatt, p. 83. Also, Jadugopal Mukherjee, op. cit., pp. 37, 38 and 388. Also, D.C.I. on 21-9-1915, F.P. 1917 June 1-46. Also, testimony of Kumud Mukherjee, Roll 6, Exhibit No. 4.

hundred thousand dollars so that the Indian soldiers could be paid two months' salary in advance.⁴⁸

Since the *Henry S.* was to come to the Chittagong coast, the East Bengal units of the revolutionaries were specially alerted to make the necessary preparations. Narendranath Ghosh Chowdhury and Manoranjan Gupta were in charge of operations there. It was planned that the arms coming with the ship would be first stored in the island of Hatia, and then an armed rising would be organised with the help of German military instructors accompanying the arms.⁴⁹ However, as stated before, the mission of the *Henry S.* also proved abortive.

Kumud Mukherjee left Calcutta for Madras, on his way to Java, on 20 July.⁵⁰ On his way, he read in the newspapers at Penang that the *Maverick* had reached Java empty, and sent to Jadugopal in Calcutta a copy of the *Sumatra Post* bearing this information.⁵¹ Refusing to be downcast Jadugopal asked Narendranath and Phanindranath Chakravarty to go to Java to negotiate for further arms-ships, and they sailed from Madras on 15 August 1915. At Djakarta they had meetings with the Helfferich brothers, Vincent Kraft, and Kumud Mukherjee, and were told that three more arms-ships (referred to before)⁵² might still be sent to India in time for an expected rising on Christmas Day. However, as stated earlier, nothing really came out of these discussions and assurances, and Phanindranath left for Shanghai towards the end of September 1915. Narendranath, still hoping that Kraft's plans for a naval expedition from Sumatra might ultimately materialise, waited for a couple of months more, and then left for Japan disappointed.⁵³ In Shanghai, Phanindranath rather indiscreetly walked into the British zone and was captured.⁵⁴ Narendranath, however, reached Japan safe. There he

48. E. E. Sperry, op. cit., p. 52.

49. Rowlatt, p. 83. Also, Jadugopal Mukherjee, op. cit., 35. Also, the statement of Manoranjan Gupta.

50. Testimony of Kumud Mukherjee, op. cit.

51. *Ibid.* Also, Jadugopal Mukherjee, op. cit., p. 388.

52. See p. 222.

53. Narendranath Bhattacharya alias Jamshed Jehangir reached Manila on 28-11-1915. Memo. by British Vice-Consul, Manila, dated 17-5-1917, J. and P. 109 with 5784 Vol. 1542 of 1918.

54. Rowlatt, p. 85. Also, Phanindranath Chakravarty's statement op. cit., H.P. 1917 January 299-301 and k.w.A.

met Rashbehari towards the middle of December, and was soon introduced to Dr. Sun Yat-sen also.⁵⁵ Fresh schemes, that emerged out of these contacts, to secure arms for a revolt in India have been narrated in the preceding chapter.⁵⁶

Narendranath, in the meantime, had lost contact with his comrades in India. So, towards the end of November 1915, his anxious friends at home sent Bhupati Majumdar in his track with some coded instructions for their comrades in East Asia. Seeing that Narendranath had already left Java and nothing useful could be done there any longer, Bhupati Majumdar too left for Japan to discuss their future course of action with Rashbehari. But he was arrested from his ship in the high sea by the British war-ship, *Famous*, and was brought first to Hong Kong and then to Singapore as a prisoner.⁵⁷

Early in December, shortly after Bhupati Majumdar had left for Java, Jadugopal sent Bholanath to Goa—Benoybhusan Datta was possibly already there—to establish contact with Narendranath, still believed to be in Java.⁵⁸ From Goa he sent a telegram to Djakarta on 27 December, "How doing. No news. Very anxious. B. Chatterton." This was intercepted and led to the arrest of Bholanath and Benoybhusan. The former died in Poona jail on 27 January 1916.⁵⁹

The attempt at establishing contact through Goa having thus failed, and there was no news from Bhupati Majumdar either, the Yugantar leaders sent Santipada Mukherjee to Java to re-establish communication with their friends in East Asia. He left for Java on 21 January 1916 with the alias, Michael Carr. But Abdul Selam had been arrested before he could reach his destination, and the

55 M. N. Roy, op. cit., p. 5.

56. See pp. 233-234.

57. Statements of Bhupati Majumdar and Jadugopal Mukherjee. Also, Bhupendranath Datta, op. cit., p. 173.

58. Jadugopal Mukherjee, op. cit., p. 432. Also, D.C.I. on 11-4-1916, H.P. 1916 April 475-478 B.

A brother of the Goanese revolutionary, Francisco de Braganza Cunha—the latter was then at Zurich working for the Indian Committee—helped them with valuable letters of introduction. D.C.I. on 21-6-1916, H.P. June 470-473 B.

59. Rowlatt, pp. 83-84. The Rowlatt Report (p. 84) says that Bholanath Chatterjee committed suicide by strangulation. But his comrades hold that he died from excessive torture by the police.

Helfferichs told him that arms were there but in future Indians would have to make their own arrangements. This change in the attitude of the Germans was, possibly, due to the fact that the *Maverick* affairs and the disclosures made by Vincent Kraft had made them suspects in the eyes of the Dutch authorities. However, Santipada waited there for four months hoping that Narendranath would return. When the latter did not return (in fact he had reached the U.S.A. in June 1916) Santipada left for China and Japan, towards the end of August, with the alias, Niazullah Khan, and reached Shanghai on 1 September 1916.⁶⁰ There he came across Taraknath Das, and took part in the fresh efforts at securing arms, narrated in the preceding chapter.

Efforts to receive arms from China


Their comrades in Bengal had, in the meantime, lived through a period of intense excitement and hope. Soon after he had discussed with Dr. Sun the possibilities of a German loan for arms, Narendranath, in his enthusiasm, and perhaps taking into account the time usually taken for secret transmission of information, sent news to his comrades in Bengal that arms might be coming soon across the Chinese frontier. This message of hope reached the Yugantar leaders towards the middle of February 1916.⁶¹ They expected the arms to come either through eastern Bhutan or through the north east corner of Assam. So, early in April, a small advance party under Bejoy Chakravarty and Panchugopal Banerjee was sent to Assam for preliminary work in this connection. In April, the main body led by Jadugopal, Satishchandra, Nalinikanto Kar, and Manmathanath Biswas, reached the district of Goalpara in Assam, and established their base camp in the village of Tiplai. There they divided themselves into two groups. The larger group went to Udalgiri in Tezapore district, and from there they sent some of their members to the important places on the route leading to Tibet through the Bumtang valley in eastern Bhutan. The other group went further east, and established their main base of operation near Ledo from where they sent their emissaries to the different passes leading to China. However, as stated earlier, the Germans had refused to comply with the

60. Statement of Santipada Mukherjee, Roll 6.

61. Jadugopal Mukherjee, op. cit., pp. 430 and 433.

request of Dr. Sun and Narendranath, and the expected arms never came. However, the latter's friends, ignorant of the sad developments at Peking, kept watch on the Sino-Indian border till the monsoon came and forced them to return disappointed.⁶²

This practically meant the end of attempts by Indian revolutionaries to secure arms from abroad. They had, by then, lost contact not only with their comrades in other countries but also with their own emissaries, who had left the shore in recent months, as if only to get lost in the blue. British authorities too had become extremely vigilant, and large-scale smuggling of arms were no longer possible. Moreover, the severe measures adopted by the Government, following the murder of a senior police official, Basanta Kumar Chatterjee, in Calcutta on 30 June 1916 had practically broken up the revolutionary groups in Bengal. Most of their leaders, save a hard core of about a dozen, were captured and it was no longer possible for the absconding few to establish contact with any group abroad or do anything effective.



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62. *Ibid.*, pp. 432-433. Also, Satishchandra Chakravarty's letter to author, dated 7-11-1967. Also, the statement of Nalinikanto Kar.

CHAPTER X

INDIAN REVOLUTIONARIES IN THE U.S.A. DURING AND AFTER WORLD WAR I

By the time the war broke out the different Indian revolutionary groups in the U.S.A. had been brought together within the so-called Ghadar movement, and the latter for all practical purposes had become the sole voice of Indian national aspirations there. But the outbreak of the war, and the Indo-German agreements that followed, soon altered the situation. On the one hand, these presented the Indian revolutionaries there with new opportunities, and made the U.S.A. the most important base of operation against the British *raj* in India, while on the other, these introduced among the former fresh elements of tension and discord.

The Indian Committee, through its control over the purse, soon arrogated to itself the overall leadership of Indian revolutionary groups in different countries,¹ and the German Foreign Office, as their paymaster, naturally secured a controlling voice in their affairs. On 7 October 1914, Dhirendranath Sarkar reached the U.S.A. as the first representative of the Indians in Berlin,² and soon established contact with the German legation staff in New York and Washington, which gradually became the chief centres of Indo-German pour-parler in the U.S.A. German money too came through their legations in New York and Washington.

The influence of the Indian Committee was further strengthened with the arrival of Herambalal Gupta in New York, as its official representative, in the beginning of January 1915. Chakravarty too slowly acquired the confidence of the Germans through his personal friend, Ernst Sekunna.³ Thus New York fast emerged as a new centre of Indian revolutionary activities in the U.S.A., even rivaling San Francisco in importance. In fact, it was mainly in New

1. J. W. Preston's statement, cited in Brown, p. 12.

2. File No. 2662 of 1915, H.P. 1916 September 16 Dep. Also, Notes on the accused, Dhirendranath Sarkar, Roll, 4, Record Group No. 118.

3. *New India*, op. cit., pp. 19-21. Also, M. N. Roy, op. cit., p. 34.

York and Washington that major decisions relating to shipment of arms and armed raids into India, narrated before, were taken.

The Ghadar party, however, retained its separate identity as practically the sole revolutionary organisation of Indians in the U.S.A. with its ideological as well as organisational ramifications extending across national frontiers and oceans. In the first year of war and optimism mutual interest accounted for rather harmonious relation between the Ghadar leaders and the Indian representatives from Berlin. The former alone could provide the necessary organisational base and revolutionary volunteers without which it was quite difficult to organise revolt in India from the U.S.A. The Ghadarites in their turn were in need of money, and found in their friendship with the Germans and the Indian Committee its almost unlimited source.⁴

Fissures of discord, however, gradually appeared in the facade of friendship between the Ghadarites and the Indian Committee. In fact, despite their common aims and interests the relation between them from the beginning was one of tension. Ghadar leaders never really liked the dominating role the Indian Committee had suddenly arrogated to itself. The close connection between the German Foreign Office and the Indian Committee and their representatives in the U.S.A. had slowly pushed the Ghadar leaders to a second place even in their home ground. To make matters worse, members of the Indian Committee usually looked down upon the Ghadarites as so many uneducated fanatics to be advised and ordered about,⁵ and whose separate organisation and activities, especially their propaganda work, often inhibited the secret implementation of their global plans for organising a revolt in India. In fact, neither the Indians nor the Germans in Berlin ever liked the Ghadar way of exporting revolution to India, and tried, since the end of 1914,

4. For months even before the outbreak of the war the Ghadar leaders had been openly expecting German assistance against Britain. J. W. Preston's statement, cited in Brown, p. 9. Also, "The Germans have great sympathy with our movement for liberty, because they and ourselves have a common enemy. In future Germany can draw assistance from us and they can render us great assistance also." *The Ghadar*, 15-11-1913 quoted in the History sheet of the *Ghadar*, Roll 3, file no. 9-10-3, section 7.

5. Gathered from conversations with Bhagwan Singh, Chakravarty, and Bhupendranath Datta.

to control and direct their efforts.⁶ Obviously, these were not likely to reduce the tension latent between these two.

The tension also stemmed partly from the fact that while the Indian Committee was controlled primarily by highly educated students and experienced revolutionaries, mostly from among the so-called non-martial races of India, the Ghadar was primarily a party of Punjabee peasants with soldierly traditions and attitudes. The two could rarely understand and appreciate each other.

Still, for nearly a year, the Ghadarites and the representatives of the Indian Committee and the German Foreign Office worked together as a rather happy team. But the rather disgraceful fiascos of the *Maverick* and the *Henry S.*, and his ineffectual mission to Japan soon discredited Herambalal in the eyes of the Germans.⁷ Dhirendranath too, it appears was out of the U.S.A. for a considerable period, and was involved in the disastrous expedition of the *Henry S.* Taking advantage of the situation Chakravarty accused Herambalal for the failures in the past and placed before the German representatives his own plans and proposals. He had an influential supporter in his old friend, Ernest Sekunna, and in November 1915 Franz Von Papen requested him to visit Berlin. He sailed for Germany on 12 December 1915.⁸ There he had discussions with some members of the German Foreign Office and the Indian Committee, and was appointed the accredited representative of the latter in the U.S.A. in place of Herambalal and Dhirendranath.⁹

6. Prince Hatzfield of the German Consulate, San Francisco to (possibly) Bernstorff on 7-4-1916, quoted in Brown, pp. 27-28. Also, Zimmerman to Bernstorff on 27 and 31 December 1914, quoted in Henry Landau, op. cit., pp. 29-30. Zimmerman deprecated the premature Ghadar risings in the Punjab and Singapore. Chakravarty's testimony, op. cit. Chattopadhyaya too asked Ernest J. Euphrat to request Ramchandra to stop his useless propaganda campaign. Notes on the accused, Ramchandra, Roll 4, Record Group No. 118. Also, Chakravarty's statement, op. cit.

7. Herambalal Gupta to Chakravarty on 16-11-1916, Roll 7, Record Group No. 60.

8. Gathered from conversations with Chakravarty, Bhupendranath Datta, and Helmuth von Glasenapp. Also, M. N. Roy, op. cit., p. 34. Also, indictment against Chakravarty by U.S. Attorney, H. Snowden Marshall, Roll 5, Record Group No. 118. Also, *New India*, op. cit., p. 21.

9. Zimmerman to Bernstorff on 4-2-1916, quoted in Rowlett, p. 81. Also, *New India*, op. cit., pp. 25-28.

It was suggested that he would, for better co-ordination, form a small high-powered committee including himself and Ramchandra, and then send emissaries to Guyana (then known as British Guiana) and the West Indies to organise revolts there. Agents were also to be sent to East Asia to explore fresh channels for smuggling arms to India.¹⁰ He returned to New York on 2 February 1916, and established his headquarters in a flat at 364 West, 120th Street.¹¹ It was expected that he would be able to tone up Indian revolutionary efforts in the U.S.A. But the whole affair left a bitter taste in the mouths of many, and ushered in a period of accusations and counter-accusations that lasted till the end of the war.

Worsening of relation

Herambalal's departure for Asia, on 25 August 1915, and the aforesaid developments in New York were of great advantage to Ramchandra. Taking advantage of the fact that there was no representative of the Indian Committee in the U.S.A. from the date of Herambalal's departure to when Chakravarty returned from Berlin in his new capacity, Ramchandra began conducting the Ghadar affairs with complete independence. It was then that his high-handed manners, his almost fanatical obsession with their expensive but largely useless, nay often injurious, propaganda campaign, and above all his alleged tampering with Ghadar funds slowly raised an opposition against him.¹²

In October 1915, Prince Hatzfield of the German Consulate at San Francisco sent Ernst Euphrat to Berlin criticising the way Ramchandra was handling the situation. Euphrat soon returned from Berlin with certain instructions for Ramchandra from Wesendonck and Chattopadhyaya, including a request that he should, at least for some time, suspend his propaganda campaign.¹³ Obviously, these did not have the desired effect on Ramchandra. Probably that

10. German Foreign Office to R. Sachse of the German Consulate, Rotterdam, dated 21-1-1916, cited in Brown, p. 55, and in J. P. Jones and P. M. Hollester, *op. cit.*, p. 271.

11. *New India*, *op. cit.*, p. 28. Also, E.V. Voska and Will Irwin, *Spy and Counter-spy*, London, 1941, p. 122. Also, statement of Chakravarty.

12. Testimony of Harcharan Das, cited in Brown, p. 26. Also, the statements of Chakravarty and Bhagwan Singh.

13. See p. 267, foot note no. 6.

is why Mrs. Marie Leonhauser, wife of a German Buddhist priest at San Francisco, wrote to Har Dayal in Europe, on 11 April 1916, referring to Ramchandra as a "scamp and a traitor", and asking for his removal.¹⁴ But his authority was still strong, though no longer undisputed, among the West Coast immigrants, who instinctively abhorred any outside interference in their affairs, and his co-operation was still essential for any effective revolutionary work in the U.S.A. So, in the summer of 1916, Chakravarty, according to the decisions arrived at in Berlin, formed a committee of seven with himself, S. N. Pagar, Srinivas Waghel, K. Chandra, and a Burmese student, Leoling. Two seats however were kept vacant to be filled with Ghadar nominees in consultation with Ramchandra.¹⁵ He left for San Francisco, towards the middle of August 1916, for discussion with the Ghadar leaders.¹⁶ Apparently he met with some success, and wired to Zimmerman on 15 September that Ramchandra was expected to join their committee. He also added with unconcealed pleasure that the Ghadar group was fast breaking up.¹⁷ But there is an element of irony in the fact that it was the growing internal dissensions within the Ghadar party that apparently obstructed the unity of command he sought to build up. Without the participation of the Ghadar representatives the new committee also proved to be an ineffective and short-lived one, and Ramchandra continued with the publication of the *Ghadar* and his propaganda work in his old way.

Problem of assisting revolutionaries

The arrival of Chakravarty as the representative of the Indian Committee practically synchronised with a change in the policy of sending assistance to revolutionaries in India. By autumn 1915, the Ghadar exodus to India had registered a definite decline, and even in the Punjab the activities of the Ghadarites were no longer a serious problem

14. Testimonies of Mrs. Marie Leonhauser and Von Goltzheim, cited in Brown, pp. 28-29.

15. Chakravarty to Z. N. G. Olifers of the German Consulate, Amsterdam on 2-8-1916, post-marked New York, 25-8-1916, among 'cipher letters' in Roll 5, Record Group No. 118. Obviously, the car accident on 3-4-1916 prevented Chakravarty from taking action earlier. See p. 180.

16. Chakravarty's letter dated 6 August 1916, quoted in Brown, p. 62.

17. E. E. Sperry, op. cit., p. 52. Also, cited in notes on the accused, Ramchandra, Roll 4, Record Group No. 118.

for the Government.¹⁸ So the Germans and the Indian Committee could now afford to pay less attention to Ramchandra and his associates. But other attempts at sending ship-loads of arms and organising raids into India had also failed, and the Indian Committee as well as their German friends felt guilty for their inability to help the revolutionaries in India in their hour of need. So, on 16 June 1916, Bernstorff conveyed to Z.N.G. Olifiers of the German Consulate, Amsterdam Chakravarty's request to take all possible steps for speedy supply of arms to avoid any premature rising.¹⁹ On 6 July, the Indian Committee too advised Chakravarty to expedite shipment of arms, and on the 13th it was announced that Germany was ready with the necessary fund and the Indians were only to tell them how, where, and to whom arms should be handed over.²⁰ But it was clear, by then, that large quantities of arms could no longer be sent direct to India. So attention was now primarily focussed on China and Japan, and attempts at using these countries as possible sources of arms or a channel for their secret transmission have been discussed before.

However, the abortive attempt at organising a revolt in Guyana and in some West Indian Islands—not directly connected with the Indian activities mentioned before—merits separate attention.

The abortive insurrection in the West Indies

Immigrants from India, in fact, constituted about a third of the total population of Guyana and the West Indies, and hundreds of them were also settled in Cuba and Panama.²¹ Though their ancestors had originally gone there as indentured labourers, most of them had, by then, settled down there as independent farmers or small traders, and were fairly well-off. They had their own temples and mosques, and cherished a nostalgic memory of India. The message of revo-

18. Michael O'Dwyer, op. cit., p. 206. Also, Khuswant Singh and Satindra Singh, op. cit., p. 44.

19. J. P. Jones and P. M. Hollester, op. cit., p. 274. According to Giles Tyler Brown this letter was dated 15-6-1916. Brown, p. 60.

20. Notes on the accused, Chakravarty, Roll 4, Record Group No. 118. Also, Indian Committee to Chakravarty on 13-7-1916, quoted in Brown, p. 64.

21. The total populaton fo Guyana in 1909 was about 300,000 of whom 133,000 were from India. Report of the Immigration Agent for 1908-1909, J. and P. 567 Vpl. 983 of 1910.

lution used to reach them through the Arya Samaj and pan-Islamite preachers and revolutionary journals, particularly, the *Ghadar*.²² So, by the second year of the war, the German Foreign Office as well as the Indian Committee had begun thinking that the Indians of that region too should be encouraged to return home in batches, like the Ghadarites, to create trouble. Berlin, obviously, had some contact with Angud Ram, one of the leaders of the Indians in Trinidad, and Chakravarty was advised, during his short sojourn in Berlin, to send two agents to West Indies and Guyana respectively, to put their plans in operation. It was already known to them that Angud Ram had agreed to send fortyfive revolutionary volunteers to India, and wanted two hundred dollars for each one of them.²³

Chakravarty, because of a very serious car accident on 3 April 1916, could not pay enough attention in this direction in the first few months after his return to the U.S.A. except for asking Dhirendranath Sen to proceed to the West Indies.²⁴ The Indian Committee, however, was in close touch with Indian affairs in the Carribean, and on 13 July 1916 Chattopadhyaya wrote to Chakravarty that attempts should also be made to raise a revolt in Guyana and the West Indies, and for that the latter should soon establish contact with F. M. Hussain, a barrister of Indian origin, at Port of Spain.²⁵ It was expected that the militant followers of Angud Ram, known variously as the Gargudas or the Gongoles party and having branches among Indians in

22. It was Muhammad Hasan Shah who can be said to have organised a revolutionary movement among the Indian settlers in Trinidad. He reached there on 19 May 1913 and lived mainly at San Fernando. He and Muhammad Orfy of Demerara visited each other from time to time. Report by the Governor of Trinidad, dated 6-4-1917 and 28-5-1917, H.P. 1917 October 42 Deposit.

23. Cipher letter from Chakravarty to R. Sachse on 21-1-1916, quoted in Brown, p. 55. Also, Chakravarty's letter to author dated 25-7-1965. Leaders of the revolutionary movement in Trinidad were F.M. Hussain, Abdul Ghani, Shaffiq, Allahar, Peter Ramcharan, Muhammad John, Sundar Singh, Abdul Aziz, and Yakub Ali. Report from Trinidad, dated 2-8-1916, H.P. 1916 November 30 Dep. Angud Ram appears to be the alias of some individual or organisation.

24. Brown, p. 57. Also, *New India*, op. cit., p. 30. Chakravarty and many others believe that it was in fact a deliberate attempt on his life.

25. J. P. Jones, op. cit., p. 275.

different Carribean countries, would be able to create widespread disturbances. By the end of July, contacts were established with F. M. Hussain and the militant Indians, and it was felt that the necessary arrangements had been more or less completed and steps should be taken to send arms there.²⁶

In the meantime, Bhagwan Singh had reached Panama on 9 July 1916 at the invitation of the Ghadar group there. Amar Singh and Kala Singh were its president and vice-president respectively, and the local German Consul, Arthur Kohpke, was also closely associated with them.²⁷ Revolutionary activities among the Indians there soon acquired an unprecedented tempo. From there Bhagwan Singh paid a hurried visit to Cuba from 4 to 20 August, and everywhere meetings were organised and subscriptions raised in preparation for the planned revolt.²⁸ At last, he left Panama for New York on 4 October 1916 to discuss with Chakravarty and the German Embassy their future course of action.²⁹ Unfortunately, not enough is known about Dhirendranath Sen's work in the West Indies. He had gone there ahead of Bhagwan Singh, probably in May 1916, and stayed there till autumn organising the local Indians for the expected revolt.³⁰

Reports that Chakravarty received from them or followed thereafter convinced him that the time was ripe for a revolt in the West Indies, and on 21 December he informed Berlin accordingly. He was ac-

26. Chakravarty to Z. N. G. Olifers on 2-8-1916, post-marked New York 25-8-1916, among 'Cipher letters' in Roll 5, Record Group No. 118. Also, J. P. Jones, *op. cit.*, pp. 276-77.

27. Guy Johannes from Balboa Heights, Panama to Secy. of State, U.S.A. on 20-11-1917, Roll 4, file no. 9-10-3, section 8. Also, memo. by G. Mallet, of the British Legation, Panama, dated 30-11-1916. H. P. 1917 March 35 Dep. Also U. S. Intelligence Officer, Panama Canal Dept. to Chief Military Intelligence Branch at Washington, (undated), Roll 4, file 9-10-3, section 9.

28. Chakravarty to Berlin on 5-9-1916, Roll 5. Report from C. Mallet, dated 6-10-1916, H. P. 1917 March 35 Dep.

29. Notes on the accused, Bhagwan Singh, Record Group No. 118, Roll 4, file no. 9-10-3, section 8.

30. Chakravarty to Berlin on 16-8-1916, Roll 5. Also, D.C.I. on 17-2-1917, H.P. 1917 February 552-555 B.

tually in earnest for German arms and officers.³¹ But, to the chagrin of most Indians, the German Government, who were never very enthusiastic about it, refused to initiate such an adventure.³² Perhaps they did not want to provoke the U.S.A. in this way, relations being already quite strained, or it might have been realised that necessary assistance could not be sent there, and the quick suppression of the revolt would have serious demoralising effect. At any rate, no more was heard of attempts at organising an Indian revolt in the Carribean countries.

The Ghadar party and its finance

Petty jealousies and suspicions within the Ghadar group had begun exploding into open differences since the closing months of 1915.³³ Although personal jealousy at Ramchandra's prominence and dislike for his arrogant manners as well as the hatred of the orthodox elements of the Khalsa Diwan Society for the so-called irreligious conduct of Ramchandra's followers mingled their baser elements in the alloy, the chief cause of conflict sprang from suspicions relating to finance.³⁴ As long as the movement depended almost entirely on voluntary donations of local Indians—a little came from outside also—the amount at the disposal of the leaders was too small to arouse any suspicion. In fact, the account sheet of the Ghadar party till 31 August 1914 showed a debit balance of three hundred forty-two dollars and twenty-four cents. But soon after the outbreak of the war a veritable stream of silver began flowing into Ghadar funds from the German Consulate at San Francisco, and it had repercussions on the attitudes of and relations among the Ghadar leaders.³⁵

31. The letter as quoted in Roll 5, Record Group No. 118, F. M. Hussain had gone to Barbados on 16-9-1916, in connection with revolutionary work. He was also in contact with the German Legation in Brazil. Report from Trinidad, dated 2-3-1917, H.P. 1917 October 42 Dep.

32. Bhupendranath Datta, op. cit., p. 65. Also D.C.I. on 25-11-1916, H.P. 1916 November 452-453 B.

33. D.C.I. on 29-2-1916, H.P. 1916 March 667-670 B.

34. Testimony of Taraknath Das, cited in Brown p. 27. Also, D.C.I. on 24-2-1917, H.P. 1917 February 552-555 B. Also, see p. 177.

35. D.C.I. on 15-12-1914, H.P. 1914 December 227-229 B. In June 1914, the total income was 914 dollars while the expense was 881 dollars. D.C.I. on 15-9-1914, H.P. 1914 December 216-217 B. These figures are fairly representative of the rest of the year.

The first treasurer of the Ghadar party in the war period was Munshi Ram. He held that post from the summer of 1914 till he was succeeded by Godha Ram on 27 January 1915. His successor, Nidham Singh, was the treasurer from 8 September 1915 to 20 January 1916, when Bishan Singh took over from him. The latter remained in that post till January 1917, when the Ghadar party finally split into two.³⁶

The Ghadarites had two separate funds for their work. One was for local expenses raised through subscription, while the other was called the National Fund created with German money. The latter was for all practical purposes the personal money of Ramchandra, and none could make any enquiry about it. According to one of his trusted lieutenants, Harcharan Das, the amount usually kept in this account as balance was forty thousand dollars.³⁷

Normally, Ramchandra received from the Germans every month something between one thousand and twelve hundred dollars,³⁸ and it is known that between 24 March 1915—when the first instalment of German money was received—and 19 August of the same year Ramchandra deposited with the Mission Bank at San Francisco twelve thousand five hundred dollars.³⁹ Then Ramchandra, to avoid suspicion, began keeping German money in different safe deposits.⁴⁰ By July 1916—the complete accounts of that month are available—the total monthly income of the party had risen to fifteen hundred dollars.⁴¹ However, the monthly expenses usually were six hundred dollars only, and Ramchandra never permitted any discussion about what he did with the surplus.⁴² But the ordinary immigrants, who

36. An undated resolution of the Pacific Coast Hindustanee Association among 'list of documents found in 1917', Roll 5, Record Group No. 118. Also, Notes on the accuseds, Bishan Singh, Munshi Ram, and Nidham Singh, Roll 4, Record Group No. 118.

37. Testimony of Harcharan Das, cited in Brown, p. 26.

38. D.C.I. on 25-11-1916, H.P. 1916 November 452-453 B.

39. Testimony of F. A. Thayer, Asstt. Cashier of the bank, cited in Brown, p. 26. Ramchandra and Govind Behari Lal had a joint account in that bank. D.C.I. on 1-7-1916, H.P. 1916 July 441-445 B.

40. J. W. Preston's statement, cited in Brown, p. 26 (foot note).

41. D.C.I. on 4-11-1916, H.P. 1916 November 452-453 B.

42. *Ibid.* Also, Bhagwan Singh's statement. Also, testimony of Harcharan Das, cited in Brown, p. 26.

joined the movement, had to suffer much for their sincere enthusiasm. They had sacrificed enough in terms of time and money, and the full-time workers among them used to be paid only two dollars *per mensem*, inclusive of food.⁴³

Troubles within the Ghadar party

Serious differences among Ghadarites first became manifest in December 1915 when the section opposed to Ramchandra sought to replace him by Umrao Singh.⁴⁴ The opposition was led by Karan Singh, Bishan Singh, and Santara Singh, but in the showdown that took place at a meeting on 9 January 1916 Ramchandra managed to hold his own.⁴⁵ Now the opposition sought to utilise Lajpat Rai, who had returned from Japan on 27 December 1915, against Ramchandra and his group.⁴⁶ Though use was made of his name, Lajpat refused to be involved in these personal squabbles, and Ramchandra with the full support of the Muslim members, could command a majority even in the next showdown.⁴⁷ His position, however, was getting increasingly critical as the Khalsa Diwan Societies of both Vancouver and Stockton were now openly ranged against him.⁴⁸ There are reasons to believe that British money and agents provocateur were also active in fanning the fires of dissension.⁴⁹ At the party meeting at Stockton on 13 August 1916 the split between the two sections was virtually complete, and it was clear that the Ghadar party was fast breaking up.

43. Testimony of Taraknath Das, cited in Brown, p. 27.

44. D.C.I. on 29-2-1916 and 14-3-1916, H.P. 1916 March 667-670B.

45. D.C.I. on 14-3-1916, H.P. 1916 March 667-670 B. Also D.C.I. 16-9-1916, H.P. 1916 September 652-656 B.

46. D.C.I. on 9-5-1916, H.P. 1916 May 577-580 B. Also, D.C.I. on 29-2-1916, H.P. 1916, H. P. March 667-670 B.

47. D. C. I. on 9-5-1916, H. P. 1916 May 577-580 B.

48. D.C.I. on 16-9-1916, H.P. 1916 September 652-656 B. Also, D.C.I. on 24-2-1917, H.P. 1917 February 552-555 B.

49. Statements of Chakravarty and Bhagwan Singh. The Maharaja of Patiala proposed sending a delegation of loyal Sikhs to counter the propaganda by Indian patriots in the U.S.A. and Canada. Addl. Chief Secy., Punjab to Acting Home Secy, India on 9-10-1916, H.P. 1916 November 301 A.

50. D.C.I. on 4-11-1916, H.P. 1916 November 452-453 B. Also, Chakravarty to Zimmerman on 5-9-1916, cited in E. E. Sperry, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

The opposition against Ramchandra gained further strength with the arrival of Bhagwan Singh from Central America in October 1916. Complaints were made to him that Ramchandra had embezzled seventy thousand dollars, and the latter was forced to resign in January 1917. Bhagwan Singh now became the leader of the majority group and editor of the *Ghadar*. He also started a new monthly, the *Yugantar*.⁵¹ Ramchandra, however, still retained considerable following and the balance of the German money, and had in his possession both the *Ghadar* buildings at 1017 Valencia Street and 5 Wood Street, San Francisco. He, too, soon started publishing a rival *Ghadar*, and both the groups claimed that their journal was the natural and lawful continuation of the *Ghadar*, originally started by the great Har Dayal. Now their main job was mutual mud-slinging, and the once powerful *Ghadar* movement was now a thing of the past. Ramchandra's *Ghadar* ceased to appear after July 1917, and though Bhagwan Singh still continued with the publication of his *Ghadar* it had ceased to be a journal of any importance.⁵² By then, the U.S.A. too had entered the war against Germany, and most of the Indian revolutionaries there had been either put behind the bars or under police surveillance.

Diplomatic initiative by the Indian revolutionaries in the U.S.A.

Attempts, however, were soon made in a rather novel way to secure moral and, if possible, diplomatic support for India's cause. After repeated failure of attempts at sending arms to India in large quantities, the *Yugantar* leaders decided to establish fresh contacts with their comrades in the U.S.A., and early in January 1917 Sailendranath Ghosh reached New York with messages from Jadugopal for his brother, Dhanagopal Mukherjee, Chakravarty, M. N. Roy, and Ramchandra. But as the U.S.A. soon got involved in the war Sailendranath and M. N. Roy sought safety by escaping to Mexico, late in May 1917.⁵³

Sailendranath, however, came back to the U.S.A. in the third

51. History sheet of the *Ghadar*, Roll 3, file 9-10-3 section 7. Also, D.C.I. on 4-11-1916, H.P. 1916 November 452-453 B.

52. History sheet of the *Ghadar*, op. cit.

53. Indian Nationalist Party Case, Violation of Espionage Act, Roll 2, file 199424.

week of November to start a fresh diplomatic offensive in collaboration with their friends there. By then, the Bolshevik Revolution had provided the world with a new appeal and a vision, and it was felt that appeals to world opinion in the name of liberty and nationality were likely to bear fruit. At a secret meeting, in late November, at Yugantar Ashram, 436 Hill Street, San Francisco, it was decided, mainly by Bhagwan Singh, Taraknath, Sailendranath, and Miss Agnes Smedly (original name Agnes Brundin and later the wife of Chattopadhyaya), that the status of a provisional government should be claimed for an imaginary all-India revolutionary organisation, to carry on negotiations with friendly governments on a quasi-diplomatic level.⁵⁴ It was made out that Rashbehari Bose in Japan was the President of their self-styled Indian Nationalist Party, and Jadugopal Mukherjee, then an absconder within India, was the Chairman of its Committee of Foreign Affairs.⁵⁵ It was further decided that Sailendranath, Taraknath, and Bhagwan Singh would pose as accredited representatives of the Indian Nationalist Party in the U.S.A. To complete their paraphernalia they, on 30 November and 1 December 1917, even purchased high grade paper bearing the watermark, *Agwan Bond*, and two diplomatic seals. Their letters bore the print:

Diplomatic Correspondence, The Indian Nationalist Party,
Department of Foreign Affairs, D. O. No.-----

Even their envelopes bore the print Diplomatic Correspondence.⁵⁶ To prove that their letters to persons like President Wilson or heads of other states or governments had actually been sent from Calcutta they used to write 'Tagore Castle', Calcutta, as the address of origin. Though these letters bore different dates most of these were actually posted in New York in January 1918.⁵⁷ But most of the embassies refused to forward these letters to their respective governments. Copies of their letter to President Wilson were also sent to different journals for greater publicity. Usually, it was Miss Agnes Smedley who signed as R. Bose or J. Mukherjee.⁵⁸ These, however, in time

54. *Ibid.* Also, indictment by J. W. Preston, Roll 2, file 193424, section 1, exhibit 1.A.

55. Indian Nationalist Party Case, *op. cit.*

56. *Ibid.* Also, indictment by J. W. Preston, Roll 2, file 193424, section 1, exhibit 1.A.

57. Indian Nationalist Party Case, *op. cit.*

58. *Ibid.*

of war created little impression on the governments addressed to or on the American public in general. On 26 February 1918, Ramchandra too appealed to Wilson that the subject countries "should be represented in the Peace Conference not by the governments which dominate them but by representatives of their own selection."⁵⁹ But it appears that no cognizance was taken of it.

In the meantime, the well-known anarchist, Miss Bluma Zalazrek, alias Bluma Kraus, had put Sailendranath in touch with the Bolshevik agents in the U.S.A., and had even made arrangements for his going to Moscow.⁶⁰ Taraknath and Sailendranath had also sent an appeal through Trotsky, in the name of the Indian people, to the Workingmen and Soldiers' Council of Russia.⁶¹ Sailendranath, however, was arrested in New York, towards the middle of March 1918, probably, on his way to Russia.⁶²

By then, the Hindu Conspiracy Case was nearing its end. The judgment was pronounced on 30 April, and all the important figures among the Indian revolutionaries in the U.S.A. were sent to prison. By the time at least some of them were again free to resume their activities, the war was over, and they had to begin their work in changed circumstances on different lines.

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59. *San Francisco Chronicle*, 27-2-1918, p. 9.

60. *Ibid.* Chakravarty claims to have been friendly with Bukharin and Trotsky in New York. *New India*, op. cit., pp. 34-35.

61. Quoted in J. W. Preston's letter to Attorney-General, Washington, D. C. on 3-9-1916, Roll 2, file 193424, section 1.

62. Indian Nationalist Party case, op. cit. On 18 March 1918, Taraknath Das wrote to President Wilson against the arrest of Sailendranath Ghosh, "a member of the special Committee of the Indian Nationalist Party and signed as the Chairman of the Special Committee of the Nationalist Party. *Ibid.*

(The Later Phase)

The year 1917 was one of considerable significance for the Indian revolutionaries abroad. Soon after the U.S.A. had joined the war on 6 April 1917, most of the Indian revolutionaries there and their German associates were put under arrest and then brought to trial. To the Indian revolutionaries abroad it meant the loss not only of their best organised base of operation but also of the most effective link between Berlin and Indian revolutionaries at home and throughout East Asia. Moreover it had definitely tilted the balance against their German allies, and had indirectly knocked the bottom out of their war-time strategy.

Indian Home Rule League and the Young India

In these circumstances Indian patriots in the U.S.A., who had not been charged in the Hindu Conspiracy Case, took upon themselves the task of serving their common cause in different ways under different conditions. The undisputed leader among them was Lajpat Rai. His personality and his pronounced dislike for German militarism¹ had already secured for him some influential friends and admirers there. In October 1917, Lajpat Rai, in collaboration with J. T. Sunderland, Keshav Deo Shastri, and N. S. Hardikar, to name the most important few, formed the Indian Home Rule League. Lajpat Rai and J. T. Sunderland became its first president and vice-president respectively, while Keshav Deo Shastri was made its general secretary and N. S. Hardikar, the executive secretary. From January 1918, they also began publishing a monthly journal, *Young India*, with N. S. Hardikar as its editor and D. S. V. Rao as general manager. The office of both Indian Home Rule League and the *Young India* was at 1400 Broadway, New York.² The Hindustan

1. Lajpat Rai in the *New York Times*, 9-3-1917. Also, Lajpat Rai "My Farewell", *Young India*. Vol. II, No. 11 (November 1919) p. 276.

2. *Young India*, Vol. I. no. 4, (April 1918), back cover. Also, J. T. Sunderland, "Mr. Rai's work in America", *Young India*, Rai Number, Vol. III, No. 2 (February 1920), p. 42. Also, D. S. V. Rao to Chandan Singh at Panama on 19-7-1920; and N. S. Hardikar to Chandan Singh on 16-8-1920, H.P. 1921 April 78 B.

Students Association and the Hindu Workers Union of America were also formed after some time, and they too had their headquarters in the same building at 1400 Broadway. The Indian Home Rule League, however, was the parent body and served as the link between the *Young India* and these other societies.³ Their formation was followed within a few months by that of the Indian Information Bureau in New York.⁴

Attempts at influencing American public opinion

As long as the war continued, Lajpat Rai and his associates had to carry on their work with considerable restraint lest their efforts might be misconstrued as pro-German. But with the end of the war the Indian Home Rule League and the *Young India* soon came into their own. The Fourteen Points of President Wilson had already raised new hopes in Indian hearts, and now it was the task of the Indian patriots in the U.S.A. to influence American public opinion and the U.S. Congress in their favour. With that object in view, N. S. Hardikar moved his headquarters to Washington in January 1919, and soon succeeded in "establishing a real relationship with some of the most influential members of both the houses."⁵ Their effort, it seems, bore some fruit. On 20 August 1919, Senator Medill McCormick of Illinois criticised British rule in India.⁶ On 29 August, Lajpat Rai, N. S. Hardikar, and D. F. Malone were allowed to address the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate on behalf of the Indian Home Rule League. Besides pleading for national self-determination for India, they challenged the authority of the Secretary of State for India and the Maharaja of Bikaner to sign the peace treaties and the League's Covenant on India's behalf.⁷ On 8 and 9 October, Senator France of Maryland opposed the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, one of the reasons emphasised by him being

3. *Ibid.* Vol. II. No. 7 (July 1919), p. 152, and No. 11 (November, 1919), p. 242.

4. Ram Kumar Khemka, "A New Development of our Activities", *ibid.*, Vol. II, No. 3, (March, 1918) pp. 59-60.

5. Charles T. Holliman, "India at Washington, D.C.," *ibid.*, Vol. II. No. 2 (February 1919), p. 37.

6. *Congressional Records*, Vol. 58, Part 4, (Washington, 1919), pp. 4042-43.

7. *Young India*, Vol. II. No. 10 (October 1919), pp. 219-20.

that it sought to perpetuate British rule in India.⁸ In fact, the way the *Young India* advocated India's case, and made it popular in the U.S.A., earned the sincere praise of Senators A. J. Grønna and Norris.⁹

In the meantime, N. S. Hardikar, to prepare the necessary base of public support for his work at Washington, had gone on an extensive lecture tour of the Mid-Western States, in March and April 1919. In course of this tour alone he addressed as many as twenty-five different organisations,¹⁰ and by May 1919 the India Home Rule League had its branches even in far off towns like Ann Arbor, Berkeley, Chicago, Cleveland, Columbia, Indianapolis, Kansas City, Philadelphia, Louisville, and Minneapolis.¹¹

Unlike the pre-war years, Indian agitation in the U.S.A. now received considerable support from her working classes. The Labour Conventions, that met at St. Louis and Illinois in 1917, wholeheartedly endorsed the Indian Home Rule League's demands. The Fabian Club of Chicago also gave the Indian Home Rule League its moral support.¹² When in summer 1917 many Indians, connected with the war-time revolutionary activities, were ordered deported, the American Federation of Labour and the Cigar-makers Progressive International Union of Brooklyn denounced those harsh measures.¹³ The British Government was naturally disturbed by these developments, and sought to counteract the Indian Home Rule League's work through its paid agents, like Rustom Rustomji, who even challenged D. F. Malone's depositions before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate.¹⁴

By the end of 1919, Indian nationalist agitation in the U.S.A. had been placed on a sound footing. But, now that peace had been signed and the U.S.A. had cast her dice in favour of isolationism, the scope for useful work there for India was considerably narrowed. India, in the meantime, had become the scene of massacres, martial

8. *Ibid.*, Vol. 58. Part 7, pp. 6607-09.

9. "Some opinions on Young India", *ibid.*, Vol. II, No. 9 (September 1919), p. 214.

10. *Ibid.*, Vol. II. No. 6 (June 1919), pp. 138-39.

11. *Ibid.*, Vol. II. No. 5 (May 1919), p. 120.

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 105, 108-9.

13. *New York Times*, 19-6-19, cited in D. P. Singh, *op. cit.*, p. 254.

14. D. P. Singh, *op. cit.*, p. 247.

law, and a new type of mass movement under Gandhi. Considering that his presence in India at that critical juncture might be more useful, Lajpat Rai left for home on 24 December 1919.¹⁵ On his departure, J. T. Sunderland was elected President of the Indian Home Rule League.

Friends of Freedom for India

In the meantime, most of those convicted in the Hindu Conspiracy Case had been released. Of them Sailendranath, Surendranath Kar, Herambalal and Taraknath took the lead in organising the Friends of Freedom for India to plead for their national cause.¹⁶ Santosh Singh too started reorganising the Ghadarites, and Surendranath was the most important link between them and the Friends of Freedom for India. As usual, they received considerable support from the Irish nationalists, as well as from socialists and anarchists of different shades. As confirmed revolutionaries, most of them looked upon Lajpat Rai and his Indian Home Rule League as too cautious and moderate, and to have a propaganda organ of their own, Surendranath, S. F. Hussain, and Edward Gammons soon began publishing a monthly journal, *The Independent Hindustan*.¹⁷ By the summer of 1920, the Friends of Freedom for India had been fairly well-organised, and on 28 September 1920 Sailendranath wrote to Bhupendranath Datta in Berlin that their organisation should now be expanded to include Indians in different European countries also.¹⁸ He even suggested that Birendranath Dasgupta, then in Switzerland, should be made the treasurer, and gave the assurance that necessary funds would be sent from the U.S.A. He also proposed that a convention of delegates of its branches in different countries should meet in New York that very December.¹⁹ The conven-

15. *Young India*, Vol. III, No. 1 (January 1920), p. 3.

16. Bhupendranath Datta, *op. cit.*, p. 166. In summer 1920 attempts were also made to organise an Indian propaganda centre at Panama under Chandan Singh. But nothing is known about it. H. P. 1921 April 78 B.

17. Mark Naidis "Proaganda of the Ghadar Party," *Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. XX, No. 3 (August 1951), pp. 251-60.

18. D.C.I. on 10-1-1921, H.P. 1921 January 75 Dep.

19. *Ibid.*

tion actually met at Hotel McAlpin on 5 December 1920, and a public meeting was organised at Lexington Theatre that very evening. Moore, President of the Friends of Freedom for Ireland, had helped them with twenty-eight thousand dollars.²⁰

But the members of the dissolved Indian Committee²¹ in defeated and revolution-ravaged Germany had too many problems for the present, and had to be on the look out for fresh opportunities. The U.S.S.R. in those days held out hopes for revolutionaries all over the world, and members of the now-defunct Indian Committee were too busy with their new problems and prospects to respond to Sailendranath's letter with any positive effort. In fact, after the U.S.A. had opted for isolationism in world politics, nothing remained for the Indian nationalists to do there save sustained propaganda for their cause.



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20. D.C.I. on 17-1-21, H. P. 1921 January 75 Dep.

21. The Indian Committee was formally dissolved in December, 1918. Bhupendranath Datta, op. cit., p. 164.

NOTE—Haridas T. Mazumdar, who "did not approve of the method of violent revolution", writes about the Friends of Freedom for India and its successor, the India Freedom Foundation in his *America's Contribution to India's Freedom*, Allahabad 1962, p. 10: "That both these organisations generated a great deal of interest in India's struggle for freedom is beyond question."

CHAPTER XI

INDIAN REVOLUTIONARIES AND SOVIET RUSSIA

Mahendra Pratap was the first among the Indian revolutionaries in this period to seek an understanding with Russia in India's interest. But, as stated before, both the Czarist and Kerensky governments had refused to enter into friendly communication with Indian revolutionaries, and Mahendra Pratap could visit Moscow in March 1918, only after the Bolsheviks had come to power. The Bolshevik revolution had, by then, transformed the situation almost completely. Russia, hitherto the citadel of reaction and conservatism, now became the source of hope and inspiration for anti-imperialist forces all over the world. But the Bolsheviks were then engaged in a bitter struggle for survival, and it was not possible for them in those days to spare any assistance for Indian revolutionaries. So, though Mahendra Pratap had an interview even with Trotsky, nothing tangible actually came out of it, and the former soon left for Berlin.¹ Moreover, the Central Asian Khanates soon rose in revolt, thus cutting off contact between Moscow and the Indian frontier, and more than a year had to pass before the Soviet authorities could seriously turn their attention to Afghanistan and India.

Early contacts between Indian revolutionaries and Bolsheviks in Europe.

However, in the meantime, more fruitful contacts between the Indian revolutionaries and the Bolsheviks had taken place, at an informal level, in distant Sweden. Some Dutch and Swedish socialists took the initiative in organising an international conference at Stockholm, in the early summer of 1917, primarily to find out ways and means for bringing about an end of hostilities. Chattopadhyaya

1. See pp. 178, 180-181. For details about the situation in Central Asia soon after the Bolshevik Revolution, see Sir George Macartney, "Bolshevism as I saw it at Tashkent in 1918," *Journal of the Central Asian Society*, Vol. VII, 1920, pp. 42-55. Also, F. M. Bailey, *Mission to Tashkent*, London, 1946, p. 142.

reached Stockholm at the end of May to attend the conference at the head of a small Indian delegation,² and was soon joined by Bhupendranath Datta, then the Secretary of the Indian Committee. There the Indian delegates met both Karl Radek and Angelica Balabanova, the first General Secretary of the Comintern, and became particularly friendly with K. M. Troianovsky.³ Troianovsky stayed on at Stockholm even after the conference was over, and returned to Russia after the Bolshevik revolution with the request from the Indian friends to do something for them in the changed circumstances. According to Bhupendranath, he kept his word, and informed Chattopadhyaya in summer 1918 that a Russo-Indian Association had been formed in Moscow. That September, he further informed his Indian friends that an Oriental Seminary was going to be established in Moscow, and that they should send some one there to help organise it.⁴

Har Dayal was the obvious choice. He was a good scholar of Sanskrit and Indian Philosophy, and was not pulling on well with his comrades in Germany. So it was decided that he should go to Russia. He went to Stockholm on his way. But there his political *volte face* took place and he formally gave up all connection with the Indian freedom movement.⁵ On 14 March 1919, the *Times* published a letter from him expressing his repentance and faith in the British Empire. So the expected contact with Russia through him could not materialise.

However, the Indian Committee had, in the meantime, on the advice of Troianovsky, put itself in contact with the Soviet Embassy in Berlin.⁶ But, unfortunately for them, the German Government suddenly asked the Soviet Ambassador, Adolf A. Joffe on 6 November 1918 to quit the country on charge of illicit contacts with German communists. He was prepared to take some of the Indians with him to Russia. But it was not possible for any of them to accompany him

2. Note by British Minister, Stockholm, dated 24-5-1917, H.P. 1917 July 41 Dep. Also, Bhupendranath Datta, op. cit., pp. 240-241.

3. Bhupendranath Datta op. cit., pp. 240-242.

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 242-245. For these, of course, there is no other evidence.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 245. Soon afterwards, Har Dayal went to Britain and published his war-time memoirs, *Fortyfour Months in Germany and Turkey, February 1915 to October 1918*, London, 1920.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 245-246.

in such a hurry.⁷ Besides, it appears that they had still some mental reservations about suddenly cutting off their old contacts and casting their lot with the unknown Bolsheviks. At any rate, it was the end of formal contacts between the Bolsheviks and the Indian Committee, and in December 1918 the latter was formally dissolved.⁸

Berlin, however, soon acquired a new importance as a rendezvous of revolutionaries of different countries proceeding to attend the Second World Congress of the Comintern in Moscow. Moscow as the Mecca of a new faith now became to most revolutionaries what Berlin and Istanbul had been for years to anti-British nationalists and pan-Islamites. Soon, a few Indians too reached Berlin on their way to Moscow. The first to arrive was M. N. Roy. He came to Berlin from Mexico with his wife, probably in December 1919.⁹ Abani Mukherjee too, who had managed to escape to Indonesia two years after his arrest at Singapore in the autumn of 1915, now appeared in Berlin with the alias, Dr. R. Sahir. He had with him a letter of introduction from the Dutch Socialist leader, S. J. Rutgers, who was then the head of the West European Bureau of the Comintern at Hilversum in Holland.¹⁰ Roy left for Russia in May 1920, and Abani followed him soon.¹¹

Before leaving Germany Roy had requested his Indian friends there to accompany him to Russia. But their leader, Chattopadhyaya, was still away at Stockholm, and in his absence the rest were not keen on taking any major decision.¹² Besides, now that their comrades in the U.S.A. had been released, most of them preferred to watch the evolution of events from their familiar surroundings rather than commit themselves to unknown allies.¹³

7. *Ibid.*, p. 247. Also, E. H. Carr, *German-Soviet Relations between the two World Wars, 1919-1939*, London, 1952, p. 3.

8. Bhupendranath Datta, *op. cit.*, p. 248.

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 248-249. Also, G. D. Overstreet and M. Windmiller, *Communism in India*, Berkley, 1960, p. 26.

10. Bhupendranath Datta, *op. cit.*, p. 250. Also, statement of Atul Bose, cited in Nalini Kishore Guha, *op. cit.*, p. 239. Also, M. N. Roy, *op. cit.*, p. 296.

11. M. N. Roy, *op. cit.*, pp. 298, 304-305.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 487.

13. *Statements of Dasgupta and Khankoje.*

Contact through Central Asia and Afghanistan

In the meantime, some Indian revolutionaries¹⁴ operating through Afghanistan had made contacts with the Soviet authorities. A few months after Mahendra Pratap's abortive visit, two college teachers from India, Ahmed Haris and Muhammad Hadi (both are believed to be aliases of two gentlemen from Delhi, Sattar and Jabbar), reached Moscow towards the middle of November 1918.¹⁴ They brought with them a message for the Soviet authorities said to have been passed at a meeting in Delhi at the end of 1917. They had a meeting with Lenin on 23 November, and on the 25th Muhammad Hadi addressed the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. Then at an international gathering on 5 December, he openly requested the Soviet authorities to help India win her freedom.¹⁵ But what actually transpired there has not yet been known. Many, however, believed that Bolshevik money first reached India through Helsingki in January 1919.¹⁶ In March 1919, the correspondent of the *Times* reported from Helsingki that Bolshevik machinations would soon bring about a revolt in India.¹⁷ Something like a revolt did take place soon, but there is nothing to prove that the unseen hand of the Bolsheviks was at work behind the Punjab disturbances leading to the massacre of Jallianwalla Bagh. This much, however, is a fact that in March 1919 Barakatullah and Abdur Rab led an Indian delegation from Kabul to Tashkent where they were given a rousing reception.¹⁸ Barakatullah appealed to all Muslims to rise against

14. Anand Gupta (ed.), *India and Lenin*, New Delhi, 1960, pp. 43-44. Also, radio telegram from Moscow to Tashkent in January 1919, F.P. 1920 February 77-171.

15. Anand Gupta, op. cit., pp. 43-44. The Indians presented Lenin with a sandalwood stick tipped with ivory. *Ibid.*, p. 47. The full text of Muhammad Hadi's speech is there in the *Problems of Orientology* (in Russian), Moscow, 1959, No. 2.

16. J. E. Woolcoat, *India on Trial*, London, 1929, p. 222.

17. X. J. Eudin and R. C. North, *Soviet Russia and the East; A Documentary Survey*, Stanford, 1957, p. 23. *Aman Afqan*, formerly known as *Siraj al-Akhbar*, carried the news on 12-4-1919 that special agencies have been opened in Moscow, Bokhara, and a few other Central Asian towns to conduct anti-British propoganda, F.P. 1920 February F. 17-171.

18. D. Kaushik, "Indian Revolutionaries in Soviet Russia," *Link*, 26-1-1966, p. 72. Also, F. M. Bailey, op. cit., pp. 143-146.

British imperialism, and anti-British propaganda leaflets were widely distributed in the towns of Central Asia.¹⁹ The British were obviously perturbed at the pan-Islamic slant he gave to the usual revolutionary propaganda.²⁰

However, by the summer of 1919, the prospect of Soviet aid for India's struggle became somewhat bright. By then, most of the so-called Russian Turkistan had been brought under Soviet control, and the Afghan Government had started diplomatic negotiations with Moscow. An Afghan delegation, that included Barakatullah, actually reached Moscow in the beginning of May with Amir Amanullah's letter for Lenin, dated 7 April.²¹ Lenin in his reply, dated 27 May, congratulated the "independent Afghan people heroically defending itself against foreign oppressors", and suggested that diplomatic relations would open "wide possibilities for mutual aid against any attack by foreign bandits on the freedom of others."²² This letter was sent to N. Z. Bravin at Tashkent, whence he set out for Kabul on 14 June to formalise diplomatic relations and make arrangements for Soviet aid. Their mission also included a few Germans and Austrians from the Russian prisoners-of-war camps in Turkistan, who were to impart military training and instructions in explosives, and they reached Kabul a few days after the Treaty of Rawalpindi had been signed on 8 August 1919. Barakatullah too returned to Kabul with this mission.²⁸

19. *Ibid.*, p. 72.

20. P. T. Etherton, *In the Heart of Asia*, London, 1925, p. 160. Also, Montague to Chelmsford on 9-9-1920, Montague papers, Vol. IV.

21. *Papers regarding Hostilities with Afghanistan*, London, 1919, p. 18. In an interview with the *Izvestia*, published therein on 6-6-1919, p. 1, Barakatullah was reported to have said, "I am not a communist or a socialist... My political programme has been so far that of driving the Britons from Asia. I am an unreconcilable foe of European Capitalism in Asia, which is represented largely by the British. In this attitude I stand close to the Communists, and in that respect you and I are natural allies." See X. J. Eudin and R. C. North, *op. cit.*, p. 83. Also, see F. P. 1920 February F. 17-171.

22. Louis Fischer, *The Soviet in the World Affairs* (Vol. 1), London, 1930, pp. 285-286. Also, the *Times*, 13-6-1919, p. 12.

23. C. S. Samra, *India and Anglo-Soviet Relations* (1917-1947) Bombay, 1959, p. 41. There were already about 150 Germans and Austrians in different factories. Chelmsford to Montague on 20-3-

Shortly before Bravin's mission had left Tashkent a similar Afghan mission under Muhammad Wali Khan had reached there, and on 14 June they too left for Moscow with Amanullah's second letter. They reached Moscow late in September 1919.²⁴ On 27 November, Lenin wrote to Amanullah assuring him of Soviet military aid against imperialism.²⁵ Thus began a series of friendly correspondences and negotiations that ultimately culminated in the Russo-Afghan Treaty of 28 February 1921. The growing friendship between these two countries was, obviously, of considerable importance to Indian revolutionaries operating in and seeking foreign help through that region.

By the time these exchange of missions took place the war situation had considerably improved for the Bolsheviks. The Allied and White Russian troops were almost everywhere on the retreat, and the Soviet authorities were now in a position to take the offensive not only militarily but also politically. A second Soviet mission under Yakov Suritz left Moscow, late in summer 1919. They were delayed on their way due to war situation, and could reach Tashkent in October and Kabul in December the same year.²⁶ Mahendra Pratap, Tirumal Achari, and Abdur Rab also came with this mission to ensure co-operation between the Bolsheviks and the Indian revolutionaries there, and to organise revolutionary work and tribal raids.²⁷

1919, Chelmsford Papers Vol. V. Part 2. Also, F. M. Bailey, op. cit., p. 174. Bravin was forced back from the Oxus by hostile tribes, and then came to Kabul via Mer, and Herat. *Ibid.*, p. 175.

24. C. S. Samra, op. cit., pp. 41-42. Also, F. M. Bailey, op. cit., p. 169. Malleon from Meshed informed the Chief of the General Staff at Simla on 8-5-1919 that the mission of Muhammad Wali Khan had reached Kagan on the 25th, on way to Moscow. F. P. 1920 February 77-171. The Afghan delegation was officially welcomed in Moscow on 10 October 1919. Eudin and North, op. cit., p. 183.

25. C. S. Samra, op. cit., pp. 42-43. Also, Louis Fischer, op. cit., p. 286.

26. Malleon from Meshed to the Chief of the General Staff in Delhi on 28-11-1919, H. P. 1920 February 398-412 k.w.A. Also, vague references in the *Times*, 16-1-1920, p. 12.

27. Also, the *Times*, 17-3-1920, p. 11. Mahendra Pratap, on hearing that Afghanistan was at war with Britain, rushed to Moscow from Berlin, flying part of the way. There he, Barakatullah, Abdur Rab, Tirumal Achari, Dalip Singh Gill, and their servant, Ibrahim, had an interview with Lenin. Then some of them joined the mission to Kabul. Mahendra Pratap in Anand Gupta, op. cit., pp. 32-34.

As to what they did in co-operation with their Afghan and Russian friends we have only to refer to a British note handed over by Sir Robert Horne to Leonid Krassin, the Soviet negotiator in London. It charged Suritz, who had by then succeeded Bravin as the Soviet Ambassador at Kabul, of putting pressure on the Afghan Government to allow passage of arms to the Indian frontier through their country and to facilitate the establishment of a printing press at Kabul for anti-British propaganda. It further added that Indian revolutionaries in Afghanistan were active among "the tribes along the Chitral, Wakhan, and the Pamir", and "have urged the formation of a military centre on the Chitral-Pamir frontier", and that according to Suritz himself "Tashkent is only a *pis aller*' . . . that the base will have to be removed to Kabul as soon as circumstances permit."²⁸

It is not yet possible to determine how far these charges are true. At any rate, these appear highly probable and certainly not wholly false. The Bolsheviki, then flushed with success, were obviously keen on putting all conceivable pressure on Britain, short of war, to persuade the latter to agree to trade negotiations. Elated by the news of disturbances in the Punjab a few months before and the India-wide agitations that followed, the Indian revolutionaries at Kabul too were naturally eager to organise tribal raids and smuggle arms across the Indian frontier.

But attempts on this line made little progress. The main reason was that the Afghan Government, despite professions to the contrary, was not prepared to invite further risk by helping the Bolsheviki or the Indian revolutionaries openly. Besides, none of the Indians there was in contact with any revolutionary group within India to whom arms might be sent. Even the Soviet leaders themselves were still not clear about the policy to be pursued towards India. So, though some arms appear to have reached the Indian frontier,²⁹ nothing

28. As cited in C. S. Samra, op. cit., pp. 58-59.

29. One Madam Das came to Chandernagore and in December 1920 asked Atulkrishna Ghosh and Bhupendra Kumar Datta of the Yugantar group to bring the arms from the north-west frontier. But the latter on the advice of Jadugopal Mukherjee, refused to get involved in such clandestine affairs on the eve of the nation-wide Non-co-operation Movement. But Abdul Kalam Azad sent Fazlul Karim to N.W.F.P. where he was eventually arrested. Some arms, however, reached different revolutionary groups. See Bhupendra Kumar Datta, *Viplaber Padachinha*, (in

spectacular could take place in the existing circumstances. Still, commenting on the Suritz mission, I. Andronov admits that it "benefited the Indian revolutionaries as well as the Soviet Embassy in Afghanistan."³⁰

However, the prospect of Soviet aid for a revolution in India became brighter after the Second World Congress of the Communist International, that met at Moscow from 19 July to 7 August 1920. Here it took upon itself the militant task of organising and aiding anti-imperialist revolutions in other countries.³¹ The stiff resistance, the Red Army faced as it approached Warsaw, and the absence of the desired response among the workers of Poland and Western Europe had disappointed the leaders of World Communism and persuaded the Comintern to pay greater attention to the neglected East.³² But, as far as India was concerned, what perhaps influenced its decisions most was the arrival of M. N. Roy, and his admission to the higher echelon of the Comintern, subsequent to the adoption of his thesis on the national and colonial question by the Second World Congress as supplementary to that of Lenin himself. Roy declared : "In most of the colonies there already exist organised revolutionary parties which strive to be in close connection with the working masses. (The relation of the Communist International with the revolutionary movement in the colonies should be realized through the medium of these parties and groups, because they are the vanguard of the working class in their respective countries). They are not very large today, but they reflect the aspirations of masses, and the latter will follow them to the revolution."³³ It was a clear sugges-

Bengali), Calcutta, 1953, pp. 245-248. Also, Jadugopal Mukherjee, op. cit., pp. 480-481.

30. I. Andronov, "Awakening East", *News Times* (English edition), 8-3-1967, p. 8.

31. *The Second Congress of the Communist International, Proceedings*, Moscow, 1920, pp. 167-172.

32. M. N. Roy, op. cit., p. 390. Also, R. Fischer, *Stalin and German Communism*, Cambridge, Mass., 1948, p. 136. The Red Army met with a disastrous defeat on 15th August almost at the gates of Warsaw, and began rolling back. Leon Trotsky, *My Life*, London, 1930, p. 391.

33. *The Second Congress of the Communist International, Proceedings*, op. cit., p. 578. Perhaps referring to M. N. Roy's presence in the Comintern, Georg Safarov wrote in the *Pravda*, on 16-7-1920, p. 1, "The Indian revolutionaries have already made contact with the Communist Interna-

tion to establish contacts with and to help the revolutionary groups within India. Lenin, in fact, favoured still greater co-operation, at least for the time being, with the bourgeois nationalists.³⁴ Thus the stage was set ready for organised Bolshevik assistance in India's struggle for freedom.

To help organise revolutions in Asia it was decided that the First Congress of the Peoples of the East should meet at Baku, and that a Central Asiatic Bureau of the Comintern should be established at Tashkent.³⁵ Roy, Georgi Safarov, and Grigori Sokolnikov constituted this bureau, and its primary aim was to organise a revolution in India. Sokolnikov, who was then the Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army in Central Asia and the Chairman of the Turkistan Commission of the Central Soviet Government, was elected its chairman.³⁶ The possibility of Roy going to Kabul as the Soviet Ambassador was then being discussed. So he stayed behind in Moscow for some time while his colleagues left for Tashkent. The idea was that from the vantage point of Kabul, as the Soviet Ambassador, he would be better able to organise propaganda and revolutionary operations against the British in India.³⁷ But the Afghan Government was already getting apprehensive of too close an association with the Bolsheviks,

tional...Although their organisation is mainly of a national revolutionary nature, the left radical movement has also taken root." As cited in X. J. Eudin and R. C. North, op. cit., pp. 82-83.

34. *Second Congress of the Communist International, Proceedings*, op. cit., p. 478. Both Mrs. Ellen Roy and Alfred Rosmer told the author that M. N. Roy in those days was primarily interested in sending help to the revolutionary groups in India, and in influencing them in favour of communism. Only through these groups, he thought, the Indian national movement could be given a sharper edge and gradually deepened into a social revolution.

35. M. N. Roy, op. cit., p. 391. Lenin said "...on the basis of demands for national independence it would be possible to organise large masses." Alfred Rosmer, "In Moscow in Lenin's Days 1920-1921," *The New Internationalist*, XXI (Summer 1955), p. 109, cited in G. D. Overstreet and M. Windmiller, *Communism in India*, op. cit., p. 32.

36. M. N. Roy, op. cit., pp. 392-395.

37. *Ibid.*, pp. 395 and 420. Abani Mukherjee too suggested that Afghanistan should be used as a base of propaganda and, if possible, of military operations against the British in India. Leo Pasvolosky, *Russia in the Far East*, New York, 1922, p. 75. Also, George, Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948*, New York, 1948, p. 6.

and had begun secret talks with the British. So they cold-shouldered the idea of Roy going to Kabul as ambassador. As a result, F. F. Raskolnikov was selected to go there as Soviet Ambassador,³⁸ and Roy left for Tashkent with his men and equipment, in all probability towards the end of August 1920.³⁹ Abani Mukherjee, however, went to attend the Congress at Baku, that met from 1 September to 8 September, 1920. It was attended by fourteen Indians, mostly deserters from the Indian army.⁴⁰ But, apart from its propaganda significance, it had no direct bearing on the efforts of Indian revolutionaries. From Baku Abani went to Tashkent at the end of the Congress.

The advent of the muhajirs and the formation of the C. P. I.

In the meantime, a new situation had been created by the unprecedented *hizrat* in summer 1920, which substantially influenced Indian revolutionary work in that region. This sudden exodus to Afghanistan was the result of reports, not wholly false, that the Allied Powers were contemplating a partition of Turkey herself, which would obviously reduce the position of the Caliph to virtual impotence. As the Khilafat movement gained momentum some of their more fanatical leaders began exhorting their co-religionists to escape British tyranny by migrating to some *Dar al-Islam* and, if possible, to Turkey

38. M. N. Roy, op. cit., pp. 414-415.

39. M. N. Roy in his *Memoirs*, p. 121 says that he left Moscow soon after the celebrations of 7 November. But on his own admission in p. 499 he was present at Bokhara, when a Soviet republic was established there on 14-9-1920. Moreover, Rafiq Ahmed in Muzaffar Ahmed, *The Communist Party in India and its Formation Abroad*, Calcutta 1962 p. 28, and Shaukat Usmani in *Peshawar to Moscow*, Benaras, 1927, pp. 98-99, say that they met M. N. Roy on their arrival at Tashkent at the end of September. Perhaps M. N. Roy tells the truth when he says in p. 371, "Immediately after the Second World Congress, I left for Central Asia . . ."

40. Robert Payne, *Red Storm over Asia*, New York, 1951, p. 8. Also, A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, *Russia and Asia*, Michigan, 1951, p. 282. The Congress held its sessions from 1 September to 8 September, and was attended by 1891 delegates. See X. J. Eudin and R. C. North, *Soviet Russia and the East, 1920-1927*, Stanford, 1957, p. 80. A so-called Indian Revolutionary Organisation in Turkistan sent a petition to this Congress seeking help in their struggle for freedom. E. H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923* (Vol. III, paper back), London, 1966, p. 265, foot note

to fight for their Caliph. We have it on the authority of Rafiq Ahmed that the first four *Muhajirs* including himself reached Kabul sometime in May 1920.⁴¹ They were well received, and were lodged at Jabal us-Shiraz, at some distance from Kabul. Others, who came after them, were also brought there, and by the beginning of July there were about a couple of hundred at Jabal us-Shiraz.⁴²

Some well-known Indian revolutionaries also, such as Mahendra Pratap, Barakatullah, Tirumal Achari, Abdur Rab, Obeidullah, and Qazi Abdul Vali, were then staying at Kabul. But there was not much unity among them about their policies and objectives. Some called themselves communists, some were rabid nationalists, while some others like Obeidullah were die-hard pan-Islamites, and they all were eager to influence and assume the leadership of these zealous *Muhajirs*.⁴³ Abdur Rab, Maulana Bashir, and Qazi Abdul Vali advised them to go to Turkistan, and most of them, soon frustrated with their experience in Afghanistan, also decided to leave. The Afghan Government at first raised some objection, but later agreed and a group of eighty *muhajirs* left for Turkistan sometime in July 1920.⁴⁴

But the route beyond the Oxus was not a safe one. Though the Bolsheviks had captured Bokhara, war still raged in adjoining districts, and these *muhajirs* were captured by a rebel Turkoman tribe near Kerki. Eventually, seventy-six of them managed to escape, and some of them actually took part in the defence of the fort of Kerki against the rebel Turkoman attack. From there they went to Chardzhao. But most of them were still pan-Islamites at heart, and

41. Rafiq Ahmed, quoted in Muzaffar Ahmed, op. cit., pp. 14-15. On 11-8-1920 Chelmsford wrote to Montague that about 20,000 *muhajirs* had gone to Afghanistan. Chelmsford Papers, Vol. VI. part 2. But on 15-8-1920 A. H. Grant wrote to Chelmsford that over 30,000 had gone to Afghanistan. *Ibid.* Vol. XXV, Part 1.

42. Rafiq Ahmed, quoted in Muzaffar Ahmed, op. cit., pp. 15-17. Also, Shaikat Usmani, *Peshawar to Moscow*, p. 4.

43. Rafiq Ahmed, quoted in Muzaffar Ahmed, op. cit., pp. 15-16. Also, Shaikat Usmani, *Peshawar to Moscow*, pp. 6-8.

44. Rafiq Ahmed, quoted in Muzaffar Ahmed, op. cit., pp. 16-17. Also, Shaikat Usmani, *Peshawar to Moscow*, pp. 8-14. Also, statement of Fazl-e-Ilahi Qurban, cited in Rahul Sankrityayana, *Naye Bharat ke Naye Neta* (in Hindi), Patna, 1949, p. 302.

wanted to go to Turkey to fight the Caliph's war. Only nineteen of them decided to go ahead to Tashkent, which they reached towards the end of September 1920.⁴⁵ Abdur Rab and Tirumal Achari had already reached Tashkent with their followers, obviously, by a different route.⁴⁶

M. N. Roy, Abani Mukherjee, and their wives too were already there, and preparations were on foot to make Tashkent the centre of Indian revolutionary activities in that region. They had already rented a mansion on Lavmentev Road for their work, and it was called Indusky Doma, i.e. India House.⁴⁷ To make real revolutionaries out of these fanatic *muhajirs*, Roy soon arranged regular classes for their political education. Most of them, without any education or political background, could not make much out of what they were being told. Still, a large section of them soon transferred their fanatical devotion to their vague new ideals, and were quite prepared to swear by Marx and the slogans of social revolution.⁴⁸ But political education and discussions soon brought to the surface the deeper question of political leadership. Tirumal Achari and Abdur Rab, who used to call themselves communists even at Kabul, were not willing to accept the leadership of Roy. They were supported by Khalil Bey, uncle of Enver Pasha. Roy, however, enjoyed the support of Abani and Muhammad Ali. His arguments carried conviction with most *muhajirs*, and they decided to follow.⁴⁹ This

45. Rafiq Ahmed, quoted in Muzaffar Ahmed, op. cit., pp. 18-28. Also, Shaukat Usmani, *Peshawar to Moscow*, pp. 60-91. According to *Fazle-e-ilahi* Qurban about thirty of them went Tashkent, while he and about fifty others went to Baku en route to Turkey, in November 1920. See Rahul Sankrityayana, op. cit., p. 317. This anti-Soviet revolt in Tashkent is known as the Basmachi movement.

46. Rafiq Ahmed, quoted in Muzaffar Ahmed, op. cit., p. 28. Also, Shaukat Usmani, *Peshawar to Moscow*, pp. 98-99.

47. Rafiq Ahmed, quoted in Muzaffar Ahmed, op. cit., p. 28. Also, Shaukat Usmani, *Peshawar to Moscow*, pp. 98-99. Also, Shaukat Usmani, "From Tirmiz to Tashkent", *Mainstream*, 8-7-1967, p. 19. Also, D. Kaushik, *Link*, op. cit., p. 76.

48. M. N. Roy, op. cit., pp. 461-462.

49. Shaukat Usmani, *Peshawar to Moscow*, pp. 98-99. Also, Rafiq Ahmed, quoted in Muzaffar Ahmed, op. cit., pp. 28-29. According to Saumendranath Tagore, *Historical Development of the Communist Movement in India*, Calcutta, 1944, p. 3, the number of inmates in this India House was thirty six.

local success naturally added to Roy's stature and strengthened his position in the Comintern.

Soon it was suggested that a Communist Party of India should be formed there. Though writing thirty years after the event, Roy asserts that he was not willing to take that step at that stage,⁵⁰ the available minutes and correspondence relating to the meeting, where the C.P.I. was formed, prove that he was among those who took the lead in organising it.⁵¹ It was formally established at Tashkent on 17 October 1920, and Muhammad Shafiq Siddiqi was elected its first secretary. To start with, it had only seven members. On 15 December, three others also joined it, thus raising the membership of the C. P. I. at Tashkent to ten, and an executive committee, comprising Roy and Shafiq Siddiqi, was elected.⁵²

But not all Indians in Turkistan had come to Tashkent. Those who had gone to Bokhara also formed an Indian Revolutionary Association there. Soon its branches spread to Samarkand, which had a sizeable Indian population,⁵³ and to Baku where some Indian *muhajirs* and deserters from the Indian army had assembled even before the Congress of the Peoples of the East had given this oil-town a new importance. At Baku, they had even begun publishing, by the end of August 1920, a revolutionary fortnightly, the *Azad Hindustan Akhbar*. Samarkand too was a major centre of propaganda directed against the British.⁵⁴ Tashkent, however, was the headquarters of Indo-Bolshevik activities in that region, and not much is known of the work done in other towns of central Asia.

To a great extent "the arrival of ... *muhajirin* in Russia in autumn 1920 synchronised with the crystallisation of Bolshevik oriental policy into a definite scheme of attacking England in India" and "gave Bolshevism its first great opportunity of exerting its influence

50. M. N. Roy, op. cit., p. 465.

51. I. S. Sologubov, *Inostrannie Kommunisty v. Turkestane*, Tashkent, 1961, pp. 56-57 and 70.

52. *Ibid.* The minutes of the historic meeting, where the C.P.I. was founded, signed by Tirumal Achari and M. N. Roy as President and Secretary, respectively, are quoted there.

53. D. Kaushik, *Link*, op. cit., p. 73.

54. *Ibid.* Also, D. Kaushik, "An obscure journal of Indian Revolutionaries at Baku", *Foreign Affairs Reports*, November, 1964, Vol. XIII, no. 11. p. 177.

in India.”⁵⁵ At last, the Bolsheviks could claim that they had with them a few hundred Indian patriots seeking their assistance and championing their cause, and that was of considerable propaganda value. These young men could be used both in establishing contact with revolutionaries within India, and in organising frontier raids. Moreover, there were about eight hundred Indian merchants in Turkistan,⁵⁶ and it was hoped that secret communication with India could be carried on under their business cover.

The situation appeared still more favourable, when a few batches of Muslim soldiers from the Indian army deserted to the Bolsheviks. Their original intention was to go to Turkey as *muja-hids*, but when the *muhajirs* at Tashkent explained to them the actual situation, most of them agreed to stay behind and join others in an armed struggle against the British. Many of the *muhajirs*, who had earlier gone to Baku to fight for their Caliph, also returned disappointed, and joined their countrymen at Tashkent.⁵⁷ Now that their number had swelled to a few hundred, and they had many actual soldiers among them, the Indians there demanded, probably in late November 1920, that they should also be given arms and military training. Their demands were placed before the Revolutionary Council of Turkistan, and Roy is said to have pleaded for them. The Soviet authorities “decided to give the Indian comrades all possible support without, however, being involved in their plans...” The Indians were allotted a shooting range off the Chirchik highway near Tashkent,⁵⁸ and in January 1921 an improvised military school, named Indusky Kurs, was formally opened at Tashkent with great fanfare. A revolutionary emigre from the U.S.A., by the name of John, was made its first commandant.⁵⁹ Roy tells us that some of the Indian trainees there exhibited considerable proficiency in the use

55. *Times*, 13-10-1922, p. 13.

56. D. Kaushik, *Link*, op. cit., p. 72.

57. Fazl-e-ellahi Quarban, cited in Rahul Sankrityayana, op. cit., p. 318. Also, I. Andronov, “Awakening East”. *New Times*, 5-4-1917, p. 12.

58. I. Andronov, “Awakening East”, *New Times*, 5-4-1967, p. 12. Also, M. N. Roy, op. cit., pp. 436-437. Also, Shaukat Usmani in *Mainstream*, 15-7-1967, p. 27.

59. M. N. Roy, op. cit., pp. 466-467. Shaukat Usmani says in “From Tirmiz to Tashkent”, *Mainstream*, 8-7-1967, p. 19, that Gen. Bluecher was in over all control of the Indusky Kurs. *

of arms. Some of them were even given instructions in flying, and later turned out to be good pilots.⁶⁰ But unfortunately, no authentic information is available about the number of Indians who received training there, and the exact nature of their training.

From among these *muhajirs* and deserters from the Indian and Iranian armies an International Brigade too was formed. According to some this hastily formed army gave a good account of itself against the British expeditionary forces in Transcaucasia and Central Asia.⁶¹ We have it on the authority of an eye-witness, Shivnath Banerjee, that some of its Indian officers were given high ranks in the Soviet army within a couple of years.⁶²

In the meantime, late in autumn 1920, Roy had sent Rafiq Ahmad and Shaukat Usmani to explore any secret route to India across Fergana and the Pamir. But they could not do much in that severe cold, and returned to Tashkent in January 1921.⁶³ By then Roy was losing his former interest in his Central Asian work. He had expected to raise an army of liberation from among the *muhajirs*, who could successfully operate from Afghanistan. But the Afghan attitude had gradually changed, and their representative at Tashkent politely told him that the Afghan Government should be entrusted with the arms to be deposited at the Indian frontier. Roy, however, had reasons to be suspicious of Afghan intentions and their possible intrigues with Enver Pasha, and tactfully refused to step into what might have been a trap.⁶⁴ Now that the road through Afghanistan appeared closed, Roy did not see much point in continuing with their work in Central Asia.

The number of Indians there were too few, and only a few among them showed any promise for future revolutionary work.⁶⁵ The Indian business community in Turkistan was obviously hostile

60. M. N. Roy, op. cit., pp. 470-471. *Ibid.*, pp. 436-437.

61. M. Vistinetsky (ed.), *In Common They Fought*, Moscow, 1951, pp. 73, 75.

62. Statement of Shivnath Banerjee, cited in Jayantanuja Bhandopadhyaya, *Indian Nationalism versus International Communism*, Calcutta, 1966, pp. 131-132.

63. Rafiq Ahmed, quoted in Muzaffar Ahmed, op. cit., p. 30. Also, Shaukat Usmani, *Peshawar to Moscow*, op. cit., pp. 106-107.

64. M. N. Roy, op. cit., pp. 442 and 471.

65. *Ibid.*, 457 & 469-470.

towards the Soviet authorities and their policies, and many of the *muhajirs* too now wanted to get back home.⁶⁶ Besides, there was little love lost between Roy and his ambitious rival, Tirumal Achari. Their quarrel had come to a head in December, and the matter was referred to the Turk Bureau of the Central Committee and the Executive of the Communist Party of Turkistan. At their joint meeting, on 31 December 1920, both Roy and Tirumal Achari were advised to stop mutual recrimination.⁶⁷ Obviously, these damped Roy's enthusiasm, and weakened the Indian revolutionary movement in Central Asia.

The British Government too was naturally allergic to revolutionary activities so close to the Indian frontier. As soon as the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement was signed on 16 March 1921 the British representative, Sir Robert Horne, handed over to Leonid Krasin a note on alleged Soviet activities in India and Afghanistan. The larger interest of Soviet Russia demanded the maintenance of good relations with Britain and the removal of known sources of friction. So, by April, the India House organisation and the military school were wound up,⁶⁸ and Roy left for Moscow. Some of the members of India House, possibly seventeen in number, also came to Moscow and joined the recently founded University for the Toilers of the East.⁶⁹ Thus came to an end the attempts at raising a revolutionary army and fomenting a revolt through direct intervention across the north-western frontier of India.

66. M. N. Roy, *op. cit.*, pp. 434-435 and 476. Also, statement of Jamaluddin Bukhari, cited in Rahul Sankrityayana, *op. cit.*, p. 268.

67. D. Kaushik, "About the founding of the Communist Party of India at Tashkent", *New Age*, Oct. 1964, Vol. I, No. 6 (New Series), p. 53.

68. M. N. Roy, *op. cit.*, pp. 468. While in Delhi on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, Rafiq Ahmed told Dr. D. Kaushik of Kuruksetra University that their organisations at Tashkent were wound up in April and they left for Moscow soon after the May Day celebrations.

69. M. N. Roy, *op. cit.*, p. 528. Also, Shaukat Usmani, *Peshawar to Moscow*, p. 112. Also, Ranq Ahmed, quoted in Muzaffar Ahmed, *op. cit.*, p. 32. For details about this university in Moscow see Shaukat Usmani's *Mainstream*, 5-8-1967, p. 30.

Indian revolutionaries visit Moscow

In the meantime, fresh contacts between Indian revolutionaries and the Bolsheviks had been re-established through Stockholm. There Chattopadhyaya had long talks with L.B. Kamenov⁷⁰ and, probably at the latter's suggestion, sent to the Comintern, in October 1920, a detailed scheme for organising the Indian revolutionaries in Europe for their common purpose.⁷¹ Then towards the end of the year, he personally went to Moscow.⁷² But since Roy, Abani Mukherjee, and Tirumal Achari were then away in Central Asia he could not meet any of his Indian compatriots there. Obviously nothing fruitful could be negotiated with him alone, and Lenin advised him to produce some sort of a mandate signed by the leading Indian revolutionaries. So he came back to Berlin to discuss their future course of action with his friends. But soon the Russians were in earnest, and in February 1921 they gave him necessary money, and requested him to bring to Moscow a representative body of Indian revolutionaries, with whom their future programme of action could be arranged.⁷³

Meanwhile at the end of 1920, Borodin, who was then temporarily staying in Berlin making arrangements for the journey of the delegates to the Third World Congress of the Comintern, had formed there an Indian Revolutionary Committee. Possibly, he believed that such a body would be a useful channel for Indo-Soviet contacts. Gulam Ambia Luhani, who had come to Berlin in January 1921, was formally chosen as its first secretary. Herambalal Gupta and Agnes Smedley also came from the U.S.A. within a few weeks, and joined this Borodin-sponsored committee.⁷⁴ Their presence naturally added to the moral authority and self-confidence of the Indians in Berlin. Besides, the formation of this new committee gave them a further assurance that in their negotiations with the Comintern or the Soviet authorities, as in the past with the Germans, they would be recognised and treated as a body representing Indian revolutionaries. So, towards the beginning of March 1921, thirteen

70. Bhupendranath Datta, op. cit., p. 247.

71. Sir Cecil Kaye, *Communism in India*, Delhi, 1926, pp. 1-2.

72. Bhupendranath Datta, op. cit., p. 263.

73. Sir Cecil Kaye, op. cit., pp. 1-2. Also, Bhupendranath Datta, op. cit., pp. 267-268 and 280. Also, the *Times*, 21-9-1921 p. 12.

74. Bhupendranath Datta, op. cit., p. 270.

members of this new committee, including Chattopadhyaya, Bhupendranath, Dasgupta, Herambalal, Khankoje, Luhani, and Agnes Smedley, left for Moscow. They were also accompanied by Nalini Gupta, who had come to Berlin at the end of 1920, but had not yet joined this new committee.⁷⁵

They came with high hopes, but almost from the beginning disappointment followed their footsteps. They were primarily Indian nationalists, and sought an understanding with Soviet Russia and the Comintern, like what they had with Germany during the war, primarily in India's interest. They could count among them most of the senior Indian revolutionaries abroad, and wanted to conduct negotiations on behalf of the Indian Revolutionary Committee, as representatives of India in exile. The Bolshevik leaders, on the other hand, were primarily interested in utilising them for the spread of their ideology and influence, and insisted that the Indians should give their views and co-operate with them individually and not as a group.⁷⁶ So their first meeting with Chicherin, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, was a disappointment.

Then Chattopadhyaya, Bhupendranath, and Khankoje, as representatives of the visiting Indian revolutionaries, had an interview with Lenin. He, however, advised them to meet and discuss their aims and problems with Karl Radek, then the General Secretary of the Comintern.⁷⁷ Radek frankly told them that if they disagreed with the policy approved by the Second World Congress of the Comintern they should present their own thesis on the Indian situation before the Third World Congress. But, till then, the Comintern was bound by the thesis already adopted, and all policy decisions relating to India would have to be taken in consultation with the Central Asiatic Bureau of the Comintern. In that bureau Roy was the only Indian member, and on issues relating to India he was, obviously, the most important man there.⁷⁸ But, unfortunately, there was no love

75. *Ibid.*, p. 278. Also, M. N. Roy, *op. cit.*, p. 479. The Italian Embassy, London informed the British Foreign Secy. on 5-3-1920 that the Indian revolutionaries in Berlin had already left for Moscow. A wire from Berlin to *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* confirms it. H. P. 1920 April 312 B.

76. Bhupendranath Datta, *op. cit.*, p. 288. Also, M. N. Roy, *op. cit.*, p. 478. Also, statements of Khankoje and Dasgupta.

77. M. N. Roy, *op. cit.*, pp. 481-482.

78. *Ibid.*, pp. 482-483.

lost between Roy and these Indian delegates from Berlin. So there was little possibility of co-operation between the latter and the Central Asiatic Bureau. However, to meet the Indian demand and to explore, if possible, a working agreement, an *ad hoc* commission was appointed with S. J. Rutgers in the chair. Other members of this commission, besides the Indians from Berlin, were August Thalheimer, Borodin, and Anthony Quelch. But the Comintern representatives refused to treat the Indians as a group speaking for the Indian revolutionaries. So after Luhani had presented their point of view, they boycotted the commission in a body.⁷⁹ Then for nearly three months, though the Indian delegation stayed in Moscow, there was little official contact between them and the Comintern or the Soviet authorities.⁸⁰

However, the political situation had, in the meantime, changed to some extent. Soon after the establishment of the University for the Toilers of the East in Moscow, in April 1921, a Communist Party of India was also formed there.⁸¹ Even the Bosheviks, despite the Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement of 16 March 1921, had then renewed their efforts "in exerting pressure upon the political authority of capitalist powers . . . through their colonies . . . preparing the latter to emancipate themselves from an alien yoke."⁸² These, naturally, rendered desirable some sort of an understanding with the Indian revolutionaries, who could certainly influence, or at least establish contacts, with the revolutionary groups in India. So, in August 1921,

79. *Ibid.*, pp. 483-484. Also, Bhupendranath Datta, *op. cit.*, p. 285.

80. Bhupendranath Datta, *op. cit.*, p. 287.

81. Rafiq Ahmed, quoted in Muzaffar Ahmed, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-33. Evelyn Roy wrote to a newspaper correspondent in Paris, "All work is to be carried on by the Communist Party which already exists here. . . . classes have already been opened in the University and we have seventeen students enrolled,—the course will last three months, as they have already had some preliminary training with us". Sir Cecil Kaye, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-7.

82. Quoted from the alleged statement of Stalin on 1-6-1921, and cited in the memorandum headed by A. M. Hodgson to G. V. Chicherin on 17-9-1921. According to this memo. Eliawa too was reported to have said on 5-6-1921 that "in 1921 we are already taking the offensive against the foundations of Capitalism in India itself". *A Selection of Papers dealing with the Relations between His Majesty's Government and the Soviet Union, 1921-1927*, London, 1927 pp. 5-7.

Mathias Rakossi took the initiative, and another commission was appointed to hear the Indian point of view. James Bell and Rakossi were made its chairman and secretary respectively. Besides the Indian delegates, other members of the commission were Borodin, Thalheimer, and Troianovski. Roy too was invited to attend it.

In the meantime, difference of opinion about the Indian situation and their future policy had virtually split the Indians from Berlin into two groups. Chattopadhyaya, Agnes Smedly, Luhani, Khan-koje, and a few others now held the view that India was still not prepared for a social revolution, and that their aim should be to unite Indians of all classes to fight and overthrow British imperialism. But Bhupendranath, Dasgupta, and Abdul Wahed believed, on the contrary, that a social revolution should not be lost sight of as the ultimate goal, and, while for the time being anti-British movements should be conducted in co-operation with bourgeois nationalists without intensifying the class struggle, effort should be continually made to enlighten and organise the peasantry and the proletariat. Their views were very similar to those of Roy except that the latter emphasised the immediate need of proletarian parties, and was unwilling to see any usefulness in or to co-operate with bourgeois nationalism.⁸⁴ But personal jealousies and dislikes were mainly responsible in preventing them and Roy from co-operating for a common purpose. So the new commission, that had met under James Bell, was doomed to failure from the very beginning.

Chattopadhyaya, who was not on good terms with Borodin, walked out of the meeting protesting against the latter's inclusion, and Luhani and Bhupendranath read out their separate theses. Then Roy asked the visiting Indians to join the C. P. I., that had already been formed in Moscow. But they all looked upon this newly formed C. P. I. as a rather personal affair of Roy, and said that a C. P. I. proper should be formed only in consultation and, if possible, co-operation with all Indians present there, especially the senior revolutionaries.⁸⁵ They had, in fact, been piqued at the formation of

83. Bhupendranath Datta, *op. cit.*, pp. 287-289 and 291.

84. *Ibid.*, pp. 288-289 and 292. Corroborated by Khankoje and Dasgupta.

85. Bhupendranath Datta, *op. cit.*, pp. 289 and 293. Also, M. N. Roy, *op. cit.*, pp. 479 and 485. Also, statement of Dasgupta.

the C.P.I. in Moscow without their being informed, when they were present there. As a result, no common platform for co-operation could be devised, and believing that the Bolsheviks were primarily interested in utilising them in their own interest, the Indians from Berlin left for Germany towards the middle of September 1921. Only Nalini Gupta stayed behind in Russia for some time to leave for India after a month as Roy's emissary.⁸⁶ Thus ended in frustration the efforts of the Indian revolutionaries in Europe to seek Bolshevik help for India's cause.

But Chattopadhyaya and his colleagues were not prepared to give up hope so soon. Back in Berlin they started an Indian News and Information Bureau in December 1921. Necessary funds for it were raised by selling the furniture of the war-time Indian Committee for DM. 20,000. Obviously, they still hoped to win the confidence and support of the Comintern. So their Bureau contained two committees, one to direct revolutionary work, the other to work for the formation of a Communist Party within India.⁸⁷ Barakatullah too came to Berlin early in 1922, and organised the Indian nationalists there into an India Independence Party to activate them once again into a political force. They even met Chicherin on his way home from the Genoa conference in April 1922. But the latter disliked Chattopadhyaya, and nothing ultimately came out of it.⁸⁸

M. N. Roy's attempts at establishing contacts within India

In the meantime, it had been decided in Moscow that some of the Indian *muhajirs* should return home to make contacts with the revolutionaries and to establish the foundations of a communist movement there. Shaukat Usmani and Masood Ali Shah were the first to leave. They set off for Baku from Moscow on 21 September

86. Bhupendranath Datta, op. cit., pp. 294, 297-298. M. N. Roy, however, in his *Memoirs*, pp. 489-491, holds that Gulam Ambia Luhani too stayed behind. The Comintern, in the meantime, had decided to place greater emphasis on the Communist parties of subject countries than on nationalist organisations. *Theses and Resolutions Adopted at the Third World Congress of the Communist International (June 22-July 12, 1921)*, New York, 1921, p. 21.

87. Bhupendranath Datta, op. cit., p. 301. Also, G. D. Overstreet and M. Windmiller, op. cit., p. 41.

88. Sir Cecil Kaye, op. cit., p. 75.

1921, and reached India through Iran.⁸⁹ Gawhar Rahman Khan and Mian Mohammad Akbar Shah also followed them soon, and reached India safe. But Meer Abdul Majeed and Firozuddin failed to cross into Iran from Azerbaijan, and returned to Moscow.⁹⁰ Then, towards the end of March 1922, a bigger group of ten, including Meer Abdul Majeed, Rafiq Ahmed, Firozuddin, Habib Ahmed Naseem, Sultan Mahmud, Fida Ali Zaid, Abdul Qadir Sehrai, Sayyed, 'Master' Abdul Hameed, and Nizamuddin, left for India. They took the Pamir route, hoping to secretly cross the narrow strip of Afghan territory separating the U.S.S.R. from Indian territory (now West Pakistan). At Kharog, close to the Afghan frontiers, they divided themselves into small groups, and, barring a couple of them, succeeded in reaching the tribal territories in the north-west of India. But almost all of them were apprehended by the Indian police and were subsequently tried in the Peshawar Conspiracy Case. This trial, the first of communists in India, created quite a sensation. But the hopes of the Indians in Moscow and their Comintern patrons were not realised. Only the first four who reached India through Iran, especially Shaukat Usmani, managed to escape arrest for some time and could do some useful work.⁹¹

While these young men were being sent to India through different routes, Roy was trying to establish his own direct contact with his old associates at home. Berlin in those days was some sort of a centre of Indian political activity in Europe, and all sorts of Indians interested in politics or adventure were to be found there. So Roy and his wife, Evelyn, also came to Berlin, probably, in April 1922, to be more closely in touch with, and to influence, Indian political developments. Roy was well-supplied with Comintern money, and soon began publishing a bi-monthly paper, *The Vanguard of*

89. Shaukat Usmani, *Peshawar to Moscow*, pp. 166-168.

90. Muzaffar Ahmed, op. cit., pp. 34-35. Also, Alexandre Barmine, *One who survived : the life story of a Russian under the Soviets*, New York, 1945, pp. 100-101.

91. Muzaffar Ahmed, op. cit., pp. 35-45. Shaukat Usmani, Ghulam Hussain, and Muzaffar Ahmed were arrested in May 1923 at Kanpur, Lahore, and Calcutta, respectively, *Ibid.*, pp. 84-85. Also, Sampurnanand *Memories and Reflections*, Bombay, 1962, pp. 39-40. In *Mainstream*, 5-8-1967, p. 31, Shaukat Usmani admits having met Sampurnanand.

Indian Independence.⁹² Copies of it and the Comintern's *International Press Correspondence* used to be sent home, usually through Indian sailors, and authorities in India first took notice of these in May 1922. For some time after October 1922, the *Vanguard* was published under the name *Advance Guard* to circumvent police interception. These were quite a success, and an important daily, like the *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, and a few other papers, such as the *Atmasakti* of Calcutta, the *Independent* of Allahabad, and the *Nava Yuga* of Guntur, linked with the extremists, were known to have been considerably influenced by Roy's views.⁹³

In the meantime, Roy had sent Nalini Gupta to India to re-establish contact with his old comrades in Bengal. He reached India via Colombo towards the end of November 1921.⁹⁴ He first met Meghnad Saha (later a physicist of international repute) of the Yugantar group, and then, through Satkari Banerjee, established contact with Bhupendra Kumar Datta, who put him in touch with the Yugantar leader, Jibanlal Chatterjee. The latter was already in contact with a few young communists, like S. A. Dange and S. S. Mirajkar, in Bombay. In the meantime, Nalini had also made acquaintance with Muzaffar Ahmed and Qutabuddin Ahmed, and it was decided that secret correspondence between Roy and his friends in India would pass through Muzaffar and Jibanlal.⁹⁵ So, after many years, Roy was again in communication with his comrades-in-arms at home.

92. *The Vanguard of Indian Independence* (hereafter referred as *Vanguard*) was first published in Berlin in May 1922. See C. S. Samra, op. cit., p. 66.

93. Sir Cecil Kaye, op. cit., p. 36.

94. Bhupendranath Datta, op. cit., p. 303. Also, Sir Cecil Kaye, op. cit., pp. 7-8. Also, M. N. Roy, op. cit., p. 547.

95. Bhupendra Kumar Datta to author on 15-5-1965. Also, Muzaffar Ahmed, op. cit., pp. 114-115. Also, Jadugopal Mukherjee, op. cit., pp. 483-484. Also, statement of Jibanlal Chatterjee. For details about the contacts made by Nalini-Kanta Gupta in India see Soumendranath Tagore, op. cit., pp. 5-6. Jogesh Chandra Chatterjee in his *In Search of Freedom*, Calcutta, 1967, p. 241 says that he too received M. N. Roy's letters through Ramcharan Lal Sharma of Pondichery.

Note—Bhupendra Kumar Datta should not be confused with Swami Vivekananda's brother, Bhupendranath Datta.

Now Roy began exhorting his comrades to accept social revolution as their goal, and to prepare the toiling masses of India for an intensive class struggle. But his comrades in India though keen on having money and, if possible, arms from the Comintern, were not willing to accept his views. After some discussion among themselves it was finally decided at a meeting of the Yugantar group, late in the summer of 1922, that their immediate aim was to seek the co-operation of all classes in their fight against British imperialism.⁹⁶ The decision was communicated to Roy, and this marked the virtual end of meaningful contacts between him and his erstwhile comrades at home. Although Roy had, by then, met with some success in organising communist cells in a few major cities of India and in influencing some ardent nationalists,⁹⁷ his failure at securing the effective co-operation of the 'organised revolutionary parties', on whom he had apparently based his hopes, was certainly a great disappointment for him. Obviously frustrated he wrote to the Communist Party of Great Britain in August 1922 to send two agents to India to activate the communist movement.⁹⁸ However, he continued with his attempt to influence the Congress leaders in India, particularly C. R. Das and Sampurnanand, through his papers and emissaries.⁹⁹ But these were attempts at spreading and strengthening communism, and were no

96. Jadugopal Mukherjee, op. cit., pp. 466, 484 and 499-500. Many Yugantar leaders were arrested on 2-9-1923 because of these correspondences with M. N. Roy. *Ibid.*, pp. 499-500 and 475. Also, statements of Atulkrishna Ghosh and Jibanlal Chatterjee.

97. David N. Druhe, *Soviet Russia and Indian Communism*, New York, 1959, p. 55. Also G. D. Overstreet and M. Windmiller, op. cit., pp. 43-45. Also, L. P. Sinha, *The Leftwing in India*, Muzaffarpur, 1965, pp. 102 and 104. Also, *India and Communism* compiled by the Intelligence Dept. of the Government of India, (1933), p. 110.

98. Sir Cecil Kaye, op. cit., p. 21. Communist parties of imperialist countries were henceforth charged with organising communism in their colonies. Hans Kohn, *A History of Nationalism in East*, New York, 1929, p. 149.

99. G. D. Overstreet and M. Windmiller, op. cit., pp. 44-49. Also, M. N. Roy, op. cit., pp. 547-548. However, there is nothing to confirm M. N. Roy's assertion in p. 547 that the printed appeals brought by Nalini Gupta influenced Hazrat Mohani to move for the first time in the Congress a resolution declaring full independence as their goal. Also, Sampurnanand, op. cit., 40-42.

longer related to the revolutionary struggle for freedom, of which for many years he was a prominent figure.

Then Abani Mukherjee came to Calcutta in autumn 1922, ostensibly, as the representative of the Indian revolutionaries in Berlin. But his main purpose, obviously, was to speak against Roy and to secure some sort of a mandate from the senior revolutionaries of Bengal. In Calcutta he first put up with the brother of Dasgupta, and then made contacts with the Yugantar leaders. But the latter refused to be taken in by his arguments. They still had enough faith in their old comrade, Roy, and suspected Abani of having given out secrets to the British at Singapore.¹⁰⁰ Besides, in October 1922, Otto Kuusinen issued a circular stating that the Comintern had no relation with or confidence in him.¹⁰¹ So, though he received quite a warm welcome from the Dacca Anushilan Samity, his mission on the whole was a failure, and he left for Europe in late April 1924.¹⁰²

End of contacts

A few other Moscow-trained *Muhajirs* were again sent to India in autumn 1922. But most of them were arrested in November on their arrival in India, and almost nothing is known of what they achieved.¹⁰³ Still, the Fourth World Congress of the Comintern that met in Moscow in November 1922, eulogised the work done by Roy and his comrades, and declared, "The Communist International supports

100. See p. 148. Also, statement of Bhupati Majumdar, who met him in Calcutta, in late 1922. Also, Jadugopal Mukherjee, pp. 466, 468 and 469. Also, Bhupendra Kumar Datta to author on 15-5-1965. His meetings with the Yugantar leaders took place at 7, Rammohan Roy Road, Calcutta.

101. G. D. Overstreet and M. Windmiller, op. cit., p. 54. Also, Bhupendra Kumar Datta to author on 15-5-1965. Jibanlal Chatterjee also remembers having heard of this circular.

102. Statement of Atulkrishna Bose, former Principal, Government College of Arts, Calcutta, cited in Nalini Kishore Guha, op. cit., p. 237. Also, *ibid.*, pp. 234-235. According to Sir Cecil Kaye, in p. 135, Abani Mukherjee was back in Moscow by October 1924.

103. *Correspondence between His Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government Respecting the Relations between the two Governments*, London, 1923, pp. 5-6.

every national-revolutionary movement against imperialism."¹⁰⁴ Raskolnikov too was personally interested in maintaining good relations with the Indians, and, according to the British note of 8 May 1923, wrote to Karakhan on 17 March 1923 : "I consider it most important to maintain personal touch with and render at least the minimum amount of assistance to Indian revolutionaries. At the very lowest it would be necessary to assign twenty-five thousand gold roubles."¹⁰⁵ The afore-said note actually claimed that one hundred and twenty thousand roubles had already been allotted for the spread of communism in India.¹⁰⁶

But, in fact, the prospect of effective joint action by the Bolsheviks and their new disciples on the one hand and the revolutionaries in India on the other had for the time being, almost faded away. A working agreement between the two could not be arrived at, and the changed international situation did not permit any effective Soviet assistance for the Indian revolutionaries. According to the *Times*, a secret circular (No. 647/5, dated 25-11-22) of the Political Bureau of the Russian Communist Party, issued under the signatures of Stalin and the Bureau's Deputy Secretary, Ter-Avanesoff, confessed the mistakes committed by "the Communist International in its first efforts to promote a revolution in India," and admitted by implication that the work done till then in and for India had not been quite satisfactory. Moreover, "The Bolshevizing of the frontier tribes was found to be a longer, more uncertain, and more expensive business than had been anticipated. Afghanistan... proved extremely hard to convince that any predominance of Russian influence was for her good."¹⁰⁷ The Russo-Afghan Treaty had already denied free passage of Russian arms through Afghan territory, and even before its conclusion Kabul had begun seeking British support so that she might take a strong attitude towards Soviet Russia.¹⁰⁸ Bra-

104. *Resolutions and Theses of the Fourth Congress of the Communist International*, London, 1923, p. 55. Also, I. Andronov, "Awakening East", *The New Times*, 5-4-1967, p. 11.

105. *Correspondence between His Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government*, op. cit., pp. 12-13.

106. *Ibid.*

107. The Circular as quoted in the *Times* on 1-7-1923, p. 9. Also, C. S. Samra, op. cit., pp. 68-70.

108. Chelmsford wrote to Montague on 12-1-1921, Afghans are asking us to help in taking up a hostile attitude against Russia. Montague

vin was assassinated in Afghanistan early in 1921,¹⁰⁹ and the British protest notes to Russia further helped stiffen Kabul's attitude towards Moscow. After the conclusion of the Anglo-Afghan Treaty on 22 November 1921, Russian consulates at Kandahar, Ghazni, and Jalalabad were also closed down. It was obvious that the Afghan authorities had become apprehensive of the influence of Bolshevism, and were yielding to British pressure.¹¹⁰ To the Indian revolutionaries the final blow came when, in October 1922, Amanullah asked the Indian Provisional Government, then headed by Obeidullah, to quit his country.¹¹¹

Kabul, within close range of the Indian frontier, was then the only organised centre of Indian revolutionaries and the link "through which the Communist International maintains direct communication further south with British India."¹¹² So its break-up virtually meant the end of an era of revolutionary activities abroad for Indian independence. Soviet policy too, had, in the meantime, undergone some change. When the Indians, expelled from Afghanistan, reached Russian Turkistan they were rather coldly received and were asked to take care of themselves. They were, of course, allowed to join the University for the Toilers of the East in Moscow,¹¹³ but no more was heard of active Bolshevik aid for Indian revolutionaries in their fight for freedom.

Without a safe shelter, whence contacts with India could be retained, and without support from any friendly power, Indian revolu-

Papers, Vol. V. Early in summer 1920 an Afghan mission had come to Delhi, and had friendly talks with Sir Henry Dobbs. Rushbrook-Williams (ed.), *India in 1920*, Calcutta, 1921, pp. 5-6.

109. I. Andronov, "Awakening East", *New Times*, 1-3-1967, p. 13. Also, *Times* 16-2-1921, p. 9.

110. L. F. Rushbrook-Williams, *India in the years 1922-1923*, Calcutta, 1923, pp. 29-30.

111. M. N. Roy, op. cit., pp. 491-492. Also, Shivanath Banerjee, cited in Jayantanuja Bandopadhyaya, op. cit., 131-132.

112. Quotation from *A Selection of papers dealing with the relations between His Majesty's Government and the Soviet Union, 1921-1927*, op. cit., pp. 5-6. The Bolsheviks continued their intrigues at Kabul but with extreme caution and little efficacy. Alexander Barmine, op. cit., pp. 100-101.

113. Shivanath Banerjee, quoted in Jayantanuja Bandopadhyaya, op. cit., pp. 131-132.

tionaries, living dispersed in different countries and continents, were no longer able to carry on an organised movement in the relative peace of the inter-war years. They could once again become active, and some Indian patriots could again look across the border with expectation, only after the international situation had been sufficiently changed by the resounding success of the German *whermacht*, and there fluttered, on the Indian frontier, the banner of 'the rising sun.'



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CONCLUSION

Indian revolutionaries at home and abroad, like most nationalists, wanted above all the freedom of their motherland. But their assessment of the situation and of the problems involved differed, and so differed their methods and means. The early leaders of the Congress and the so-called Moderates believed that the safest and the surest road to that goal was through the confidence and good wishes of the British electorate. Indians, they argued, had only to prove their competence for self-government and place their case in the right spirit before the British electorate, and they would get their due in time. Later leaders, extremist in their demands but non-violent in their attitude, lacked the former's burning faith in British sense of justice, and considered it not worth their while to prove that Indians were fit for freedom. They just took the latter for granted, and sought to win their freedom by putting pressure on their rulers through various means short of violence.

The revolutionaries agreed with the latter's diagnosis but not with their treatment. They, in principle, never doubted the efficacy of passive resistance, when practised *en masse*, but felt that their countrymen were not yet ready for such an organised and united mass movement, as would put effective pressure on their alien rulers. A nation crushed and demoralised, and apathetically conscious of their own pettiness, cowardice, and incompetence should be first of all made aware of their rights, honour, and strength. They must feel that they, too, are capable of the highest courage, the noblest sacrifice, and of avenging the wrongs done to them.¹ Most Indian nationalists still asked with Gokhale: "What could we do against Kitchener

1. "You have saved the nation's honour, preserved the national tradition, and kept open the road to independence. You have demonstrated in a way, there is no mistaking, that we are not a nation of willing bond-slaves". Eamon de Valera's cease-fire order after the Easter Rising, quoted in Dan Breen, *My fight for Irish Freedom*, Tralee, Ireland, p. 180. Speaking on his attempt on the life of the Sir Andrew Fraser, Jitendranath Chowdhary said that his purpose was "to encourage Bengal by showing that even Lt. Governor was vulnerable and mortal." Andrew Fraser, *Among Indian Rajahs and Ryots*, London, 1911, p. 300.

and his army.....”² But the revolutionaries believed and sought to demonstrate that even the British Lion could be bearded; and they felt that spectacular deeds of daring and sacrifice were best suited to rouse a nation from its slumber of centuries. Since not many could then be expected to take to that dangerous path, the revolutionaries had little option but to adopt means which enabled the minimum number to produce the maximum effect. Besides, where there were severe restrictions on political propaganda and agitation, bold acts of terrorism would work as propaganda through action.³

Few, however, seriously believed that India could be freed through terrorism alone. In fact, no revolutionary leader, like nationalists of other shades, ever seriously believed, at least till the situation suddenly changed with the outbreak of World War I, that India could be freed within their life-time.⁴ They neither claimed that they alone could do the needful nor did they suggest that other forms of political activity should be suspended. National movement in its comprehensive character should include different groups of people using varied means for a common end. The revolutionaries in

2. W. S. Blunt, op. cit., p. 229.

3. Savarkar wrote in the first issue of the *Talwar*, “We feel no special love for secret organisation or surprise and secret warfare. We hold that whenever the open preaching and practising of truth is banned by enthroned violence then alone secret societies and secret warfare are justified as an inevitable and indispensable means to combat violence by force.” Quoted in Chitra Gupta, op. cit., p. 82. “They die in order to show their countrymen the path to liberation. They die because in their judgement there is no other way now, under the regime of Press and Seditious Meetings Acts, to preach patriotism and to exhort people to love their country.” H. M. Hyndman, *The Awakening of Asia*, London, 1919, p. 248. “The Press had been gagged; the platform had been dismantled. Any vigorous political propaganda, including strong criticism of the Government and its methods, was out of question...In their [revolutionaries] opinion the occasional use of the bomb and the revolver was the only way to assert their manhood and their desire for freedom, and to announce their dissatisfaction and discontent. It attracted attention all over the world. It made people think of India. At home it reminded people of the wrongs they had suffered and were sufferings at the hands of the Government. At first it shocked the people, but then it stirred them to think.” Lajpat Rai, *Young India*, Lahore, 4th Reprint, 1927, p. 223.

their own way only sought to help India move towards their desired goal.

Besides its psychological effect, terrorism, they knew, could be an effective political weapon also. If carried out in a systematic and sustained manner it could effectively weaken the rulers' will to rule by convincing the latter that the cost of administration was more than the value of the country they want to keep under control.⁵ Besides, by making life insecure for those who co-operate with the alien rulers, terrorists could effectively reduce the peoples' respect for authority, and induce the passive majority to non-co-operate with the government;⁶ and in India British rule, in the ultimate analysis, was based on the awe and, at least, the tacit co-operation of the local population.

Terrorism, however, is only the first phase of a revolutionary struggle. As it gains in intensity, and indiscriminate reprisals by

4. "It will be a slight to their intelligence to suppose that they entertain any hope of immediate success. H. M. Hyndman op. cit. Barindra Kumar Ghosh said during his trial, "We never believed that political murder will bring independence." Amallesh Tripathi, op. cit., p. 117. Also corroborated by the revolutionaries interviewed by the author.

5. The *Bande Mataram* (Geneva) once wrote, "Terrorise the officials, English and Indian, and the collapse of the whole machinery of oppression is not far. . . . This campaign of separate assassination is the best conceivable method of paralysing the bureaucracy and of arousing the people." Quoted in William Roy-Smith, *Nationalism and Reform in India*, Yale, 1938, pp. 63-64. About the Jewish terrorists it is said : "Their dramatic struggle eventually focussed the attention of the world upon Palestine, and . . . it did compel Great Britain and indirectly U.S.A. to crystallize their policies towards Zionism." George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*, op. cit., p. 328. "Egyptian terrorism was the principal cause of Britain's decision to withdraw from the Canal Zone." Brian Crozier, *The Rebels*, London, 1960, p. 180. Sir David Kelley, in his *The Ruling Few*, London, 1953, p. 5, holds that nations lose their empires when they lose their will to rule them.

6. Lord Hardinge wrote to V. Chirol on 22-5-1913. "...they (the revolutionaries) do not really mind if Europeans get killed and still less if one of their own people falls a victim. There is, however, a reign of terror in Bengal, and informers are afraid of assassination." Hardinge Papers, Vol. II, Part II. Again on 29-4-1914, Lord Hardinge wrote to V. Chirol that, "thirty witnesses in one of the worst dacoity cases of the last few years have been so terrorised that they have refused to give evidence, and the case has been withdrawn by the Local Government." *Ibid.*

the Government follow, the people, because of conviction or coercion, gradually swing their allegiance and support to the revolutionaries, and the movement that had begun with individual assassinations slowly widens into local insurrections and a partisan war.⁷ Revolutionaries themselves may not succeed in defeating their opponents, but they can put sufficient pressure on them to come to the negotiating table ready for concessions. To put it figuratively, revolutionaries attack the flank to force the enemy to yield ground in their front. In short, revolutionaries do not worry so much to win their struggle as to ensure that their enemies lose theirs.

But a revolutionary movement, to grow and to gather momentum, requires among other things a safe base of operation or hinterland, where the revolutionaries can collect arms, train and organise their recruits, print their propaganda literature, and where they can retire and regroup when hard pressed. Geographical situation, difficulties in communication, and deep discontent of the people may sometimes permit the use of a region within the country as a proper revolutionary base. Even then some assistance from abroad, or some sort of a shelter across the frontier is usually necessary. But in India no region either from the political or from the military point of view could be

7. About the situation in India itself Lajpat Rai wrote in his *Young India*, p. 196, "The country is in such circumstances now that every step which the Government takes to repress and crush the movement or to punish the offenders, strengthens the spirit of revolt, adds to the volume and intensity of the desire for revenge, adds to the number of those who are prepared to suffer or even to die for the cause." In p. 244, too he says, "The people do not argue, they do not reason, they do not analyse: they feel that good, well-connected, healthy, beautiful boys are dying in the country's cause and to get a redress of their country's wrongs. When a bomb is thrown, the people genuinely condemn the bomb thrower, are sincere in their detestation, but when he is hanged or transported, they are sorry for him. Their original abhorrence changes into sympathy and then into love." Barindra Kumar Ghosh said in his trial that they thought that through terror it would be "easy to bring the ideas of revolution home to the common people. . . . We do it because we believe the people want it." Amalsh Tripathy, op. cit., 117. In the opinion of Ernesto Che Guevara, "One does not necessarily have to wait for a revolutionary situation to arise; it can be created." Mao Tse-tung and Che Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare* (translated by S. B. Griffith and H. Peterson), 4th edition, London, 1964, p. 102.

a suitable base for a revolutionary movement. So it was almost instinctively felt from the beginning that the revolutionary movement in India to be effective must be properly supplemented by the efforts of their comrades from abroad. The struggle, however, was to be staged in India, and those abroad were to help their comrades and their cause; and it is in the extent of that help, moral and material, that the effectiveness of the revolutionaries operating from abroad is to be measured.

Attempt has been made in the preceding chapters to demonstrate the efficacy of Indian nationalist propaganda carried on from abroad. The revolutionary journals the Indians published abroad had longer lives than their counterparts in India. These reached Indians in distant countries and continents, and gave them some inspiration, emotional unity, and direction. These young revolutionaries for the first time could make India a live issue in international politics, and made large segments of world opinion aware of India's plight and sympathetic towards her aspirations. They also made valuable contacts with the revolutionary leaders and political figures of other countries, whose sympathy and support were of considerable help in their struggle. Arms, too, used to be sent home from time to time, and the bombs used in India owed their origin to the knowledge of explosives learnt from abroad. With their limited number, resources, and experience anything more could hardly be done before the First World War broke out.

However, as Britain became involved in war, and German help was assured, it appeared for the first time that the revolutionary struggle for India's freedom had a fair chance of success, and Indian revolutionaries abroad sought to make the best use of the situation. Time appeared ripe when the Indian revolutionary struggle could be raised to the phase of insurrections and partisan war. So thousands of Ghadar volunteers were sent home, and arrangements were made to send large quantities of arms for revolutionaries in India. To divert British resources still further, they, in collaboration with Germany and Turkey, sought to create troubles in the sensitive regions of West Asia, and to persuade the Amir of Afghanistan to attack India. In that process they even forged a working agreement with pan-Islamism to fight their common foe. However, their plans went awry primarily due to a series of unforeseen obstacles and accidents. No doubt, the Indian revolutionaries were a little too optimistic, but

that does not mean that they were building castles in the air, or should have allowed the war-time opportunities to pass without a struggle. In a nation's fight for freedom a determined effort itself is half the achievement, and repeated efforts by a resolute group prepare the nation for ultimate success. Besides, achievement itself was not completely beyond their reach during those exciting years of the war. Who can say, with the knowledge of the Mutiny of 1857-58, what would have happened if the planned army revolt had not been betrayed, if ship-loads of arms had arrived in time, and the expected Afghan invasion and the armed raids from the east had synchronised with the expected insurrection by the revolutionaries?

This, of course, does not mean that the fulfilment of the above conditions would have necessarily assured India immediate independence. All the war-time plans and expectations of the Indian revolutionaries were predicated to the assumption that Germany would win the war (and who can blame them for having expected so in the early years of the war?) or would at least shake the very foundations of British imperialism, and all their attempts would inevitably have foundered on the rock of the ultimate German defeat. However, events following World War II have shown that once colonial rule is brought to an end and revolutionary nationalism gathers momentum, it is rarely possible for former rulers to stage a successful come-back.

Prospects of a successful revolt with outside aid were not so bright after the war. Britain was then at peace with the world, and her only antagonist, Soviet Russia, was herself weak and isolated. Still, Soviet assistance was eagerly sought by many Indian revolutionaries. They had reasons to believe that, at a time when the Indian soil was shaking beneath the bare feet of millions following the Mahatma in their non-violent non-co-operation movement, and industrial unrest had assumed threatening magnitude,⁸ and the political temperature of

8 "For a number of years, 1921 remained the most disturbed year. Not until 1937, did the number of workers involved in any one year exceed those involved in 1921." *Bulletin of Indian Industries and Labour*, No. 43 (published by the Government of India), cited by Gautam Chattopadhyaya in the *Mainstream*, 4-11-1967, p. 20. Even in Russia there was a feeling that a rebellion was imminent in India. V. Kerzhentsov, *Anglisku Imperialism* (in Russian), Moscow, 1921, p. 32

the Muslim World was high due to the Khilafat movement, Soviet aid would enable them to intensify their struggle, to put further pressure on their rulers, and to give the entire national movement a more revolutionary and, as they believed, effective orientation.

If, however, Indian revolutionaries could not be more effective it was because, in the first place, they were too few in number and weak in resources. Only a narrow fringe of the *petit bourgeoisie* joined or actively sympathised with them. The proletariat and the peasantry had not yet entered the political arena, and the feudal and moneyed classes usually kept aloof from them. In terms of number alone their situation was far more hopeless than that of the Italian Carbonari, the Irish Sinn Fein, and the Russian Nihilists. According to Charles W. Thayer, Malayan communists failed in their venture, to a great extent, because of "the very small number of guerrillas or bandits involved." Yet he admits that the Communist partisans sometimes had five thousand armed men and five hundred women in their ranks. In their few years of struggle the Malayan communists, according to Thayer's calculations, lost about six thousand dead and about three thousand captured.⁹ If these numbers were too few in the case of a country with a population of about seven million (excluding Singapore) then what chance of success the Indian revolutionaries had before the war, when they could count only a few thousand dedicated and tested workers in their ranks?¹⁰ Still they

9 Charles W. Thayer, *Guerrilla*, Chicago, 1965 pp. 105, 107. By 1945, Vo Nguyen Giap had 10,000 armed men under his control. Brian Crozier, op. cit., p. 34. Luis Taruc, leader of the Hukbalahaps in the Philippines, had in 1948, 25,000 men under arms, and a potential reserve of two million men. *Ibid.*, p. 39. The Hagannah had a field army of 16,000, the Irgun Zvai Leumi had between three to five thousand, while the Stern Gang had a hard core numbering 200 and 350. *Ibid.*, p. 182. The Karen rebels, according to U Nu himself, numbered 10,000. *Ibid.*, p. 85. The Greek E. L. A. S. usually had between twenty to twenty-five thousand men under arms. T. N. Greene (ed.), *Guerrilla and how to fight him*, New York, 1962, p. 73.

10. Satish Pakrashi in his *Agnidmer Katha*, p. 142, asserts that the Dacca Anushilan Samity in 1907, had about 15,000 members on its roll. Obviously, this figure includes all those who were associated with its public activities, such as physical exercise, social service etc. Only a small fraction of them were, in fact, really connected with revolutionary activities. Jadugopal Mukherjee in his letter to the author, dated 13-11-1968,

fought because their immediate objectives were, at least, as much psychological as political.

Even their bases of operation in Europe and America were too far from India to be really useful in time of revolt. Later, similar bases were organised among Indian settlers in countries nearer to India's frontier, but the British had sufficient influence over these weak states to deny the Indians there the desired safety and freedom. So the Indian revolutionaries, unlike the Greek E. L. A. S. and the E. O. K. A., the Algerian F. L. N., or the Vietcong, could rarely find supply and shelter across the frontier, which are essential for the success of a revolutionary struggle.¹¹ The rebel Nagas and the Mizos have demonstrated what a handful of armed men can do with safe and easily approachable bases near the theatre of struggle. Even Indian residents abroad, who were mostly British subjects and had little influence over the governments of the countries they lived in, could never help their brethren at home in the way the Irish, the Czech, and the Jewish residents of the U.S.A. with American citizenship could do. With these advantages Indian revolutionaries could have possibly smuggled larger quantities of arms, organised better-equipped armed raids from across the frontier, and continued

and a few other senior revolutionaries interviewed by the latter put the number of revolutionaries in Bengal, at the outbreak of World War I, at about four or five thousand. Of course, all those associated with the other activities of the revolutionary organisations were looked upon as active supporters of and potential recruits for their cause.

11. In March 1946, Tito assured Nikos Zachariades of all possible help, and a guerrilla training centre was established at Boulkes. D. G. Konoulas, *Revolution and Defeat: The Story of the Greek Communist Party*, London, 1965, p. 237. Nikos Zachariades himself admits in his *Dheka Khrona Palis* (Ten years of Struggle), published by the Greek Communist Party in 1950, p. 40, that help from neighbouring countries is essential for success of a revolution. The E.L.A.S. could operate successfully only as long as they had access to their bases across the frontier. Sealing of the Yugoslav frontier in July 1949 sealed their fate. T. N. Greene, op. cit. p. 74. Even the Mau Mau rebels had easy access to arms before the declaration of emergency. F. D. Corfield, *Historical Survey of the Origins and Growth of Mau Mau*, London, 1960, p. 225 (foot note). The Communist risings in the Philippines and former Malaya failed partly because, unlike the E. O. K. A. and the Vietcong, they had no easy access to bases across the frontier.

on a wider and more effective scale the terrorists' game of hide and seek.

Unlike most western revolutionaries and modern communists, Indian revolutionaries, till the outbreak of war, had no friend among the powers of the world nor an influential organisation to advocate and assist their cause. Even when German help became available, the huge distances involved, and British control of the seas and influence over India's neighbours were too formidable obstacles. With bases nearer home the Jewish terrorists and the Vietcong could bring thousands of men to the scene with arms and equipment. But it was not possible for the thousands, who came to organise a *ghadar* (revolt) in India, to come with arms, and so many of them were arrested in the ports where they landed. Nor did they have anything like the propaganda coverage enjoyed by the E. O. K. A. and the Arab revolutionaries, working under Greek and Egyptian inspiration, respectively.¹² Besides, nowhere in India, to use the expressions of Mao Tse-tung, was the 'temperature of water' high enough to assure the revolutionaries of active popular support or to enable them to move among the people 'like fish in water'. Even in the Punjab, we have it on the authority of Sir Michael O'Dwyer, the common people enthusiastically joined the army, and often helped the police in chasing and capturing the Ghadar rebels.¹³ Elsewhere too the common people remained loyal, though usually sympathetic with the revolutionaries at heart, and those in the army and the police, barring a few exceptions, served the government devotedly.¹⁴ These only

12. Brian Crozier, *op. cit.*, p. 137. The F.L.N. revolt in 1954 was planned in Switzerland and Egypt. The capture of the *Alhos* off Oran, on 16 October 1956, created a sensation, but many such ships with Egyptian arms reached the Algerian rebels. Brian Crozier, *op. cit.*, p. 133. Similarly, many Greek ships, like the *Ayios Georgios* which was captured on 25 January 1955, carried arms to the E.O.K.A. in Cyprus. *Ibid.*, p. 135.

13. *India as I knew it*, *op. cit.* pp. 22 and 225.

14. For revolutionaries to succeed it is essential that some of them should be in different branches of their country's administration through which their enemy operates. Dudley Baker in his *Grass: Portrait of a Terrorist*, London, 1959 p. 157, says that the E.O.K.A. could receive arms by post even after the enforcement of postal censorship, through their agents in the postal department.

prove that India was not yet ready for a more developed phase of revolutionary struggle.

Moreover, in the opportune years of war the help Indian revolutionaries received from their foreign patrons was often ill-co-ordinated and half-hearted. Clash of Turko-German ambitions in Iran and the tense relations between their officials spoilt to a great extent the possibilities of an effective thrust at India through West Asia. German officials entrusted with the task of helping the Indians were also often lacking in seriousness and sincerity. That is why the necessary help was often denied at the right moment, and trivial accidents were allowed to spoil the preparation of months. In fact, though the German Government was generous with assistance, their officials on the spot often did not mean business, and even gave out secrets, without much resistance, when captured by the British.¹⁵ The unforeseen loyalty with which Amir Habibullah stood firm in his friendship with Britain against all pressure did seriously obstruct the efforts of Indian revolutionaries and their friends abroad. After the war, they sought to make use of Bolshevik help in their efforts as they had done with German help during the war, but the former hardly ever went beyond the stage of plans, preparations, and contacts.

This, however, should not be concluded that the disappointing performance of Indian revolutionaries abroad were all due to the objective situation and circumstances beyond their control. Both at home and abroad, Indians were, to borrow an expression of C. M. Woodhouse (head of the Allied mission to the Greek guerrillas during World War II), 'shaggy' revolutionaries. They were mostly, including even many of their leaders, emotional inexperienced idealists, without the necessary political sophistication and awareness of the problems involved and preparations required. Few of them had expected the war to break out when it did, and very little preparation had been done beforehand to make use of the situation. When the

15. J. B. Starnhunt and Boehm made ready confessions. Both Emil Helfferich and Eric Windels, in their letters to the author, expressed their suspicion about Vincent Kraft. Emil Helfferich told the author on 20-8-1956 that a senior official in the Scotland Yard, Oliver Goldman, had admitted to him in 1924 that it was (Vincent) Kraft, who gave out many valuable secrets to the British. Herambalal Gupta wrote to a friend in Switzerland on 16-11-1916, "If we failed to land arms it was due to Germans than to anybody else." E. E. Sperry, op. cit., p. 5.

time came thousands of enthusiastic volunteers were sent home and elsewhere to fight the British, but hardly any of them had the necessary training and discipline. While George Grivas, after his arrival in Cyprus, made thorough preparation for six months before giving the signal for revolt, the Ghadar leaders did nothing of the sort, and relied almost wholly on revolutionary *elan* and the desired response of their countrymen.

Besides, Indian revolutionaries, both at home and abroad, were organised in small groups, and could seldom shed their personal and group rivalries. Nationalist revolutionaries and pan-Islamites had, obviously, too divergent aims beyond their immediate ones, and could hardly be expected to work in harmony for long. But even the former often lacked that unity of command and purpose which is the soul of success. Revolutionaries, it is true, are usually high-strung people working in an atmosphere of fear and distrust, and as such are likely to fall apart soon. Careful screening, thorough indoctrination, and strict party discipline are essential to hold and to make them work together. But, except in the case of the Ghadar party to some extent, little attention was paid to these pre-requisites by Indian revolutionaries abroad.

In fact, Indian revolutionary organisations abroad and their discipline were particularly loose. In the first place, the need for iron discipline, perfect secrecy, and constant caution was never seriously felt at such distance, and for many years their most important task was to recruit workers and to conduct a propaganda campaign for their cause. So hardly any effort was made for screening the recruits and training them properly. Besides, since risks were fewer abroad, all sorts of people joined the revolutionary movement—especially after the war broke out and German money began flowing in—some for easy money, some for a free and comfortable life in an enemy country, and some for the relatively safe sensation of having done something heroic for their motherland. Obviously, conspiratorial efficiency and discipline could hardly be expected of such a motley crowd of so very different shades of background and dedication. Nor could most of them be expected to stand up to the trials and tortures revolutionaries often have to face, and they broke down under pressure.¹⁶ So they lacked the two very important ad-

16. In a revolutionary struggle, according to Terrence McSwiney,

vantages of revolutionaries, secrecy and surprise, and carried on their operations as if from a glass house.

We have it on the authority of E. V. Voska, chief of the unofficial Czech secret-service in the U.S.A. during the First World War, that Indian revolutionaries in New York were very careless about keeping secrets, that there was no night-guard at their office at 364 West 120th Street, and that some of their employees were in fact Czech secret-service agents. The Czechs were naturally keen to help and to ingratiate themselves with the Allied Powers, and had appointed one of their trusted men, Ladislav Urban, to spy upon the Indians in New York. The *Maverick* and the *Annie Larsen* had sailed before the Czechs in the U.S.A. had finalised their espionage arrangements, but since then they had prior intimation of almost all plans and movements relating to organising a revolt in India, and passed those on to the British, usually through their French patrons. The greatest disclosure took place in July 1915 (Indians of course were not to be blamed for that) when one of the Czech agents, Brown, managed to take possession of the portfolio of Heinrich Albert, a senior German diplomat in New York, who was closely connected with German secret operations in the U.S.A. By the end of that month the Government of India had been informed of the Indo-German plans for organising revolt. No wonder, the Thai Government was alerted in time, steps were taken to seize arms expected from China for the planned Christmas Day rising in 1915, and vigorous measures were adopted to stop smuggling of arms and to suppress revolutionaries within India. In fact, the Czech secret-service were pursuing the Indian revolutionaries relentlessly, and even sent one of their emissaries to China to counteract Indo-German manoeuvres there.¹⁷ Further disclosures took place when, in the autumn of 1915, some secret papers of Franz von Papen and the confidential note-book of Abani Mukherjee fell into British hands at Falmouth and Singapore, respectively, and Daus Dekkar explained to the

"Not they who can inflict the most, but who can endure the most, will emerge the victorious." The Yugoslav partisans under Tito succeeded while the Chetniks failed mainly because the latter could not bear the severe German reprisals.

17. E. V. Voska and Will Irwin, op. cit., pp. 98, 108, 120, 122-123, 126-127. Also, T. G. Masaryk, *The Making of a State, Memories and Observations*, London, 1927, pp. 50, 221, 242.

British police the use of the code book he was carrying.¹⁸ The confessions of many Indians and Germans connected with these endeavours also helped the British with further information and clues.¹⁹ Besides, the British could, quite early in the war, crack open the secret German naval code, and could thus secure information through intercepted wires and correspondences.²⁰ As a result, contrary to what should have been, Indian revolutionaries in most cases had to operate as if on a well-lit stage, and the German Consul at Manila admitted in a wire, probably in the beginning of March 1916, "Apparently, the English are thoroughly informed of all individual movements and whereabouts at various times of Hindu revolutionists."²¹ A revolt can never be properly organised or successfully carried out under such circumstances.

One may still put the question, "What did the Indian revolutionaries abroad achieve?" Like many other questions this too can hardly be answered solely with reference to those working abroad, and the entire Indian revolutionary movement has to be taken into consideration. It is asserted by some that the revolutionary movement failed in India, and they state in support of their statement that even during the height of the movement it failed to achieve freedom, and was subsequently discarded as a useful method. This is almost like saying that, teaching of science in schools has failed as it does not produce scientists, and that the games and exercises of boyhood are useless since these are inevitably given up after a certain age. In fact, the Indian revolutionary leaders never believed that freedom was just round the corner, and that they were going to achieve it within a few years. Their aim, as stated before, was to contribute towards the political salva-

18. Henry Landau, *op. cit.*, p. 308. Also, see pp. 144 and 148. Das Dekkar admitted in his confession: "I was in it to knock money out of the Germans...and I decided to make them pay." Brown, pp. 19-20.

19. Yodh Singh, Sukumar Chatterjee, Kumud Mukherjee, Vincent Kraft, J. B. Starburt, and Boehm, in particular. According to Brown, p. 75, these efforts failed mainly due to confessions and disclosures.

20. The British ship, *Telconia*, cut the German cross-Atlantic cables in the beginning of the war, and the Eastern Telegraphs soon refused Germany the use of the American cable via the Azores and South America. Barbara Tuchman, *The Zimmermann Telegram*, New York, 1958, p. 11.

21. J. P. Jones and P. M. Hollester, *op. cit.*, pp. 263-264.

tion of their country, and those operating from abroad sought to help their common cause with their peculiar advantages. It is undoubtedly difficult to measure in concrete terms the political contributions of the Indian revolutionaries as of any other political group of the time. A national movement is like a river to which, like so many tributaries, different groups and schools of thought join their forces, and it is almost impossible to measure exactly the relative contribution of each group towards every political concession earned from the rulers.

But, if attention is focussed on the growth of a national will-to-freedom, the role of the revolutionaries appears highly significant. Few, who have lived in those days, can forget the psychological impact of their heroic deeds and deaths on an almost paralysed population. The effort which young men, even in villages, put in to secure books and pamphlets written by the revolutionaries or about them—it was risky to be found in possession of them—and the alacrity with which the Government proscribed them²² bear eloquent testimony to their immense appeal. The vernacular literatures of certain regions, despite the frowning eyes of the authorities, bear unmistakable impression of the inspiration provided by these young heroes. The tumultuous ovation the martyrs received during their last journey to the cremation ground was something to be envied even by the highest in the land. And after they were dead and gone, many a village beggar would sing songs about them while seeking alms, and the feeling that they were one of them gave pride and confidence to millions, who venerated but dared not imitate the immorals. After India became free, despite the not very friendly attitude of the Congress Government, their statues were erected at many public places,²³ and

22. *The Lists of Proscribed Books*, published by the Government of India between 1934 and 1938, indicate that 2709 books and pamphlets (excluding newspapers) in different languages were proscribed in India between March 1910 and December 1936.

23. Lajpat Rai, who was no admirer of Indian revolutionaries, writes about them in his *Young India*, p. 244. "He may be misguided, even mad, but he is a martyr all the same. The moralist and the legalist, and the loyalist and the constitutionalist, all condemn their deeds, but the doers themselves they adore, and their names they enshrines in their hearts." Again in his *Autobiographical Writings*, p. 5, Lajpat Rai writes, "Certain nationalists, inspired by political sagacity and prudence or by expediency,

parks, streets, and colleges were named after them. Old and poor revolutionaries were honoured in public, and many of them, though no longer politically active, were elected to the upper houses of legislatures, mainly as a mark of respect and gratitude. Then in the hours of national crisis, as in 1962 and in 1965, their names and ideals were constantly invoked, the state-controlled radio blared out patriotic songs written during or about the revolutionary movements, and leaders vied with one another in exhorting their countrymen to recapture the spirit of those heroic days. These speak forcefully of the extent to which the revolutionaries had stirred our imagination and enriched our national memory.²⁴ The apathy of centuries was disturbed, and the diffidence of the nation had largely disappeared. Indian nationalism, which formerly found expression primarily in the group-discussions of the upper classes, received from these revolutionaries a sharp edge and a powerful emotional thrust, and soon emerged in the form of a real movement for national independence. Indian national movement, to use a Churchillian expression, now 'found its soul'.²⁵

If after a generation's struggle the methods of the revolutionaries were given up, it was not because those had been found useless, but because Indian people, by then, had out-grown their use, and were prepared for a different form of political agitation. After all, different forms of struggle are suited to its different phases. If most of

may not look with approval upon the assaults made by youngmen with patriotic motives upon Englishmen or upon Indian traitors. They may disapprove the political conspiracies entered into by them and secret societies organised by them. But in his heart of hearts none can refuse to give them credit for their patriotism, their valour, their sacrifice, and their high character. For fear of Englishmen or even of certain Indians, or for like consideration people may conceal their feelings, but it is impossible to deny that the young Bengalis who conspired to murder Gosain and successfully carried out their resolve have earned immortality. A day will come when people will lay wreaths of homage to their statues. 'The man who threw a bomb on Lord Hardinge on the occasion of the Delhi Durbar... did a memorable deed unique for its valour.'

24. According to the Irish martyr, Patric Pearse. "Patriotism is in large parts a memory of heroic dead men and a striving to accomplish some task left unfinished by them."

25. Winston Churchill used this expression while hailing the Yugoslav revolt against the Germans during World War II.

the revolutionary groups were later wound up—the Yugantar group was formally dissolved in July 1937—and many of the revolutionaries joined the Congress, it was because the Congress itself had, by then, become quite revolutionary in its demands and outlook; and who can deny the fact that the presence of these revolutionaries and their emotional impact on the people strengthened the Indian national movement, and helped it and the Congress acquire a further orientation towards political extremism? If changed times had made the methods of the revolutionaries somewhat out of date, their timeless message of struggle, sacrifice, and complete independence had, by then, acquired a different force and a wider audience.²⁶



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26. Dr. Amalesh Tripathi says in *The Extremist Challenge*, p. 148, "When Gandhi gave his call... India was ready. She rose from her villages and cities, no longer afraid to die, for her men and women had learnt the mystery of life and death from the men of 1905-10." The same could be said of the scores who risked their lives for their country after 1910

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THE FOLLOWING PERSONS WERE INTERVIEWED
BY THE AUTHOR

(in India)

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2. Chakravarty, (Dr.) Chandra, at 81 Vivekananda Road, Calcutta, on 10 October, 1961.
3. Chakravarty, Harikumar, at 6 Raja Basanta Roy Road, Calcutta, on 24 May, 1958.
4. Chatterjee, Jibanlal, at 249 Bipin Bihari Ganguly Street, Calcutta, on 14 May, 1958.
- 4a. Datta, (Dr.) Brajendranath at Alipur Duar on 20 May 1968.
5. Das, Khagendra Chandra, at Calcutta Chemical Works, Calcutta, on 19 March, 1964.
6. Dasgupta, Birendranath, at 45 Girish Bose Road, Calcutta, on 15 May, 1958 and 20 March, 1964.
7. Datta, (Dr.) Bhupendranath, at 3 Gour Mohan Mukherjee Street, Calcutta, on 22 March, 1958.

8. Datta, Bhupendra Kumar, at Sree Saraswaty Press, 32 Acharya Prafulla Chandra Roy Road, Calcutta, many times in 1964-65.
9. Ghosh, Atulkrishna, at 116 Vivekananda Road, Calcutta, on 14 March, 1958.
10. Gupta, Manoranjan, at 60 Raja Subodh Mullick Road, Calcutta, on 24 May, 1958.
11. Hui, Jatindranath, at the residence of Bhupati Majumdar, on 10 June, 1958.
12. Kar, Nalini, at 'Amara', Chhaya Nirh, Dehri-on-Sone, on 10 October, 1958.
13. Khankojc, Pandurang, in his residence behind Law College, at Nagpur on 24 December, 1963.
14. Majumdar, Bhupati, at 1/8 Dover Lane, Calcutta, on 25 May and 10 June, 1958.
- 14a. Mitra, Jatin Lochan, at 2 Jagadishnath Roy Lane, Calcutta.
15. Mukherjee, (Dr.) Jadugopal, at 'Chhaya', Circular Road, Ranchi, many times between 1953 and 1960.
16. Pratap, (Raja) Mahendra, at 105 South Avenue, New Delhi, on 20 October, 1960.
17. Roy, (Mrs.) Ellen, at 13 Mohini Road, Dehradun, on 10 June, 1960.
18. Singh, Bhagwan, known since his return to India as (Dr.) Bhagwan Singh 'Gyani', at 'Gyan Bhavan', in village Saprecon, Simla Hills.

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(in Britain)

1. Aldred, Guy Alfred, at Strickland Press, 104 George Street, Glasgow on 23 June, 1956.
2. Datta, (Dr.) S. S., of Bristol, interviewed at 12 Earle Street, Calcutta, on 28 April, 1958.

(in Germany)

1. Glasenapp, (Professor) Helmuth von, at 1/11, Hausser Strasse, Tuebingen, on 6 September, 1956.

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(In France)

1. Alfred Rosmer, at the office of *Le Contract Sociale*, 165 Rue de L'Universite, Paris-7.


(In Thailand)

1. Pandit Raghunath Sharma at Thai-Bharata Cultural Lodge, 136/1 Siriphongs Road, Bangkok, between 6 and 10 September, 1964.
2. Lala Sundar Das and (3) Gurubaksh Singh, I met at Bangkok accompanied by Pandit Raghunath Sharma on 7 and 8 September, 1964, respectively.

LETTERS TO THE AUTHOR FROM THE FOLLOWING

1. Bapat, P. M., dated 10 March 1958.
2. Chakravarty, (Dr.) Chandra, dated 30 May and 1st July 1965.
3. Chakravarty, Satishchandra, dated 7 November 1967.
4. Dasgupta, Birendranath, dated 21 February 1968.
5. Datta, Bhupendra Kumar, dated 15 May 1965.
6. Datta, (Dr.) S. S., dated 30 March and 7 April 1958.
7. Helfferich, (Dr.) Emil, dated 17 September 1956.
8. Hentig, (Dr.) W. O. von, dated 7 April 1956 and 26 February 1960.

9. Mueller, (Dr.) Herbert, dated 18 March 1956.
10. Mukherjee, (Dr.) Jadugopal, dated 13 November 1968.
11. Pratap, (Raja) Maltendra, dated 14 November 1959.
12. Singh, (Dr.) Bhagwan, dated 27 October 1960.
13. Takezade S. H., (then the President of the Iranian Senate), dated 11 June 1958.
14. Usmani, Shaukat, dated 1 January 1967 (from his present address, 3 Md. Talaat Pasha Street, Cairo).
15. Windels, (Dr.) Erich, dated 1 November 1956.



Gul Hayat Institute

SHORT BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

1. **Aldred, Guy Alfred.** Born in the middle of the eighties of the 19th century, he was one of the few Englishmen to court imprisonment for India's sake. Soon after Krishnavarma had started publishing *The Indian Sociologist*, he became associated with its printing for which he was sent to jail for a year in summer 1908. Later he was closely associated with the publication of *The Herald of Revolt*, *The Span*, and *The Word*. He is widely known as a champion of freedom for all nationalities and individuals as well as for his pronounced atheistic and anarcho-radical views. All through his life he remained an eloquent advocate of India's freedom.
2. **Barakatullah, Maulvi.** Originally an inhabitant of Bhopal and born around the year 1870, he went to the U.S.A. towards the end of the 19th century, and gradually became involved in the incipient Indian revolutionary movement there. After a very active career as a revolutionary leader in Japan, West Asia, and Soviet Russia, he finally settled down in the U.S.A. and died in California, probably, in 1926.
3. **Bhattacharya, (Dr.) Abhinash Chandra.** Born in the District of Tripura, now in East Pakistan, he went to Germany in 1910 to qualify as a chemist. Through his personal friendship with Virendranath Chattopadhyaya and the nephew of the Prussian Minister of Interior, he was instrumental in initiating Indo-German collaboration after the outbreak of World War I. In his old age, till his death in 1967, he lived at Rishra in Hooghly District, West Bengal.
4. **Bose, Rashbehari.** Born on 25 May 1886, either at Subaldaha in Bardwan district or at Parala-Bighati in Hooghly district, West Bengal, he spent his boyhood at Chandernagore. There he joined the revolutionary group of Motilal Roy. In 1906, he went to Dehra Dun, and took up a job in the local Forest Research Institute. Soon, he emerged as the virtual leader of a new revolutionary movement in North India, and was an effective link between the revolutionaries of the Punjab and the U.P. on the one hand and of Bengal on the other. It was he who organised the throwing of a bomb on Lord Hardinge as he entered the new capital, Delhi, on an elephant, on 23 December 1912. He was also involved in the Lahore Conspiracy Case of 1913. Then, after the outbreak of the war, he began preparing for an army revolt to start on 21 February 1915, but it was betrayed at the eleventh hour. Then he escaped to Japan from where he made more than one attempt to send arms to India, in 1915-16. He married a Japanese girl, Toshiko Soma, and was granted Japanese citizen-

ship on 2 July 1923. He founded the Indian Independence League in Tokyo in 1921, and did his best, in the inter-war years, to earn Japan's sympathy for Indian independence. He was the author of a dozen books on India in Japanese, and was a respectable figure in Japanese public life.

As soon as Japan joined the Second World War, he established contact with her government, and came to Bangkok to organise the Indians of South-East Asia and the Indian prisoners of war for an active fight against the British with Japanese aid. Despite initial setbacks he succeeded in giving shape and impetus to the Indian independence movement in South-East Asia. But, he was too old and weak from consumption to effectively lead such a movement for long, and so willingly handed over its leadership to Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, when he reached Singapore, on 4 July 1942. He died in Tokyo on 21 January 1945.

5. **Cama, Madam Vikaji Rustamji.** Daughter of a prosperous Parsi businessman of Bombay, Sorabji Framji Patel, she was born in 1861. She was married to K. Rustamji Cama, a legal practitioner, in 1885. She was moved by the plight of the people and the heartless conduct of the officials during the plague in Bombay in 1895-96. She went to London in 1901, and after visiting the U.S.A. for a few months, settled down in Paris in May 1909. She returned to India in 1934, and died in Bombay in 1936.
9. **Dasgupta, Birendranath.** Born at Jalpaiguri in May 1888, he was a student and active worker of National Council of Education. He also belonged to the revolutionary group of Jatindranath Roy, and went to the U.S.A. in 1911, where he took his degree in electrical engineering from the State University of Indiana in 1914. Then, with the outbreak of the World War, he came over to Germany in December 1914 to take part in the efforts of the Indian revolutionaries there. During the war years he was mainly engaged in their work in West Asia. Later, in 1921, he went to Moscow as one of the delegates from Berlin. On return from there, he lived in Switzerland for about ten years, and then returned to Calcutta, where he still lives. He is one of the founder-directors of the Indo-Swiss Trading Co.
6. **Chakravarty, (Dr.) Chandra.** Born in the middle of the eighties of the 19th century he, quite early in life, became involved in the revolutionary movement then sweeping Bengal. To escape arrest, he left India in the winter of 1908-09, and reached New York after spending a few months in London on his way. He enjoyed the confidence of the German Embassy in the U.S.A., and played an important role in organising revolutionary activities during World War I. He was an accused in the Hindu Conspiracy Case,

and his confessions in the court went against many of his erst-while associates. He was fined five thousand dollars, and was jailed for only thirty days. He returned to India in 1924-25, and still lives in Calcutta. He is the author of a few books on ancient India, especially about her social life and scientific attainments.

7. **Chattopadhyaya, Virendranath.** Eldest son of the well-known chemist, Aghorenath Chattopadhyaya, and brother of Mrs. Sarojini Naidu, he was born, probably, in 1880. He went to London in 1903 to qualify for the bar, and soon became closely associated with the India House movement. He went to France in summer 1910 and to Germany in April 1914, and was the undisputed leader of the Indian Independence Committee in Berlin. He held anarcho-communistic views and, though their mission to Moscow in 1921 failed, he retained close contact with the Comintern in the inter-war years. He was one of the moving spirits behind the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities that met at Brussels in February 1927, and was the first General Secretary of the League Against Imperialism. After 1933 he mostly stayed in Moscow, and was the author of many books and pamphlets on India. He is believed to have died in Russia on 2 December 1942. For some time he was married to the American communist authoress, Agnes Smedley.
8. **Das, Taraknath.** Born at Kathanpara, near Calcutta, on 15 June 1884, he came in contact with Jyotindranath Mukherjee, early in his life. He went to the U.S.A., via Japan, in 1906, where he worked among Indian immigrants in the Pacific coast. He was naturalised as an American citizen in 1914. At the end of World War I he was jailed for twenty-two months for his war-time revolutionary activities. He also studied in the Universities of Washington and Norwich, and received the Ph. D. degree from the Georgetown University in 1924.
Then he settled down in the U.S.A. with a literary career. He was associated with many universities and academic institutions as an expert in contemporary international affairs, particularly, relating to India and East Asia. He was the author of a few books on these subjects, and was an active exponent of India's cause in the U.S.A. He paid a short visit to India in 1952, and died in New York on 22 December 1958.
12. **Dayal, Har.** An inhabitant of Delhi and a brilliant product of the Punjab University, he went to Oxford, as a government scholar, in 1905. But he soon came in contact with the India House movement, and gave up the scholarship. He reached the U.S.A. in 1911, and there he was the real founder of the so-called Ghadar movement. He played a prominent part in the Indian revolu-

tionary movement during World War I, but towards the end of it he lost faith in his former ideal, and confessed his disenchantment in *The New Statesman* on 22 and 29 March 1919, and gave up all connections with the Indian nationalist movement. He spent the rest of his life mostly in Sweden and the U.S.A., and died in the latter country shortly before the outbreak of World War II. He was the author of a few books on Indian philosophy, particularly on Buddhism.

10. **Datta, (Dr.) Bhupendranath.** Born on 4 September 1880, he was the youngest brother of Swami Vivekananda. Along with Barindra Kumar Ghosh he was one of the pioneers of the revolutionary movement in Bengal and the editor of the famous revolutionary weekly, *Yugantar*. He leapt into fame for his defiant attitude during his trial in 1907. He went to the U.S.A. in 1908, and took his master's degree in anthropology. He came to Germany in May 1915, and played a major part in the war time Indian revolutionary activities. After their abortive mission to Moscow in 1921, he stayed in Germany for a few years, and received the Ph. D. degree in anthropology from the University of Hamburg. He returned to India in 1925.

He was then Marxist in his views, but could never get on well either with the nationalists or with the communists. For some time he took part in trade union and peasant movements in Bengal, but he fast drifted away from active political life. He was the author of a few well-known, though controversial, works on Indian society and culture, and was for some time a teacher in Calcutta University. He died in Calcutta on 25 December 1961.

11. **Datta, Promothonath.** Born in the eighties of the 19th century, he went to the U.S.A., probably, in 1911. Thence he came to Turkey in March 1914, and took a major part in the anti-British activities in Iran during World War I. From there he escaped to Russia in September 1921, where he worked in different oriental institutes till his death in 1954. He wrote a few books for those learning Hindi, Urdu, and Bengali. In Iran and Russia he was popularly known by his alias, Daud Ali.

30. **Sarkar, Dhirendranath.** Younger brother of Benoy Kumar Sarkar (a brilliant scholar and Professor of Economics of Calcutta University), he went to the U.S.A. a few years before the outbreak of World War I. Thence he came to Germany in the winter of 1911-12. It was he who sent news to the *Yugantar* leaders in 1913 that German help would be available against Britain. In September 1914, he was sent to the U.S.A. with information about the agreements arrived at between the German Government and the Indian revolutionaries in Berlin. During the war, he is believed to have been active in the Pacific islands

- and the West Indies in connection with their revolutionary endeavour, for which he had to suffer imprisonment in the U.S.A. later on. He came back to Germany in 1923 to start a business, but suddenly died during a short trip to London in 1926.
13. **Ghosh, Sailendranath.** Born at Senhati in Khulna (now in East Pakistan) in November 1892, he topped the list of successful candidates in M.Sc. in Physics of Calcutta University, 1915. He had to abscond in June 1916 for his revolutionary activities, and soon thereafter he escaped to the U.S.A. He stayed there for many years even after the war. Back in India, he was for some time the Education Officer of the Calcutta Corporation, and after 1947 he worked in India House, London, in the same capacity for a few years. He died in Calcutta around the year 1950.
14. **Gupta, Herambalal.** Son of Umesh Chandra 'Vidyaratna', a well-known teacher of Calcutta, closely associated with the nationalists, he was born towards the middle of the eighties of the 19th century, and went to the U.S.A. a few years before the outbreak of World War I. After the failure of their mission to Moscow in 1921, he finally settled down in Mexico, where he died in 1948.
15. **Gupta, Nalini.** Full name, Nalini Kumar Dasgupta, he was born around the year 1890 at Beldakhan in Barisal (now in East Pakistan). During the First World War he was in Britain working in a munition factory. He went to Moscow in 1921, and came to India twice as an emissary of M. N. Roy in 1921 and 1927. During his second visit to India he was involved in the Kanpur Conspiracy Case, and after serving his sentence he again went back to Germany where he used to run a restaurant in Berlin. He returned home at the outbreak of the Second World War, and died in 1957.
16. **Hentig, (Dr.) W. O. von.** As a young officer in the German diplomatic service he accompanied Mahendra Pratap and Barakatullah in their mission to Kabul in 1915. He left Afghanistan in the spring of 1916, and escaped through China. He retired from diplomatic service in early fifties, when he was the German Ambassador in Indonesia. Later, for some time, he was the political adviser to the Government of Saudi Arabia.
17. **Hopkinson, John.** A Hindustani-knowing officer of the Calcutta Police, his services were requisitioned by the authorities at Vancouver, in 1907, to deal with the Indian immigrants in British Columbia. He was murdered by Mewa Singh on 21 October 1914.
18. **Khankoje, (Dr.) Pandurang.** Born at Wardha, now in Maharashtra, on 7 November 1885, he became involved in revolutionary activi-

ties even when in his teens. He went to Japan in 1906, and thence to the U.S.A. in 1907. There he worked among the Indian immigrants, secured some military training, and even secured a master's degree in agricultural sciences. The war years he spent in Iran, whence he paid a secret visit to India in 1919 to meet Tilak. After their abortive mission to Moscow in 1921, he settled down in Mexico, where he made a name as an expert on good quality maize. Soon after Indian independence, he was invited back home to head an Agricultural Policy Commission at Nagpur, where he died on 18 January 1967.

19. **Krishnavarma, Shyamji.** Born on 4 October 1857 at Mandavi in Cutch, he soon made his mark as a Sanskrit scholar, and studied and taught at Oxford University from 1878 to 1883. Then he served different Indian States in important capacities, and also started his own business, which earned him a large fortune. His last years he spent at Geneva, where he died on 31 March 1930.
20. **Mueller, (Dr.) Herbert.** Born shortly before 1890, he got his Ph. D. degree from Berlin University for his thesis on the polyandrous communities of South India. Then the First World War broke out, and he was called to colonise. Towards the end of 1914, he was brought to Berlin to establish contact with the Indian revolutionaries through his old friend, Jnanendra Chandra Dasgupta. The inter-war years he spent mostly in China, and became one of the well-known Sinologists of Germany. In Germany he is looked upon as a true friend of India.
21. **Mukherjee, Abani.** Born in village Babulia in Khulna district (now in East Pakistan), probably on 12 June 1892, he had some training in weaving, and served Mahendra Pratap's Prem Maha Vidyalaya at Brindavan for some time before World War I. He went to Japan in April 1915, was captured by the British in autumn, on his way back, and was then kept in Taughlin barrack, Singapore, with Bhupati Majumdar. According to some, he made some damaging confessions for which he was released on parole. He escaped to Indonesia, whence he came to Berlin in the beginning of 1920, and then proceeded to Moscow. He attended the Second World Congress of the Comintern and the Congress of the Peoples of the East at Baku, and then went to Tashkent to work with M. N. Roy and other Indians there. After his return to Moscow, early in 1921, he was for some time associated with M. N. Roy in writing the book, *India in Transition* (Moscow, 1922). But he soon fell out with Roy, and secretly came to India in the late autumn of 1922, obviously, to secure in his favour some sort of a mandate from the revolutionary leaders of Bengal. He even met S. A. Dange, Singaravelu Chettiar, and Shivaprosad Gupta to establish a communist party in India under his own influence. But he had to return

disappointed in the summer of 1924. Then, for a few years, he was associated with the activities of the Comintern, but he gradually fell out with it. He earned his living for some time in the Statistical Institute at Moscow and then as a teacher of Indian history. He is believed to have died in Russia on 28 October 1937.

22. **Mukherjee, Jadugopal.** Born at Tamluk in West Bengal on 18 September 1886, he was drawn into the revolutionary movement that appeared in Bengal after its partition in 1905. Originally a member of the Calcutta Anushilan Samity, he gradually became one of the top leaders of the so-called Yugantar group. But he was no believer in individual terrorism, and believed in developing mass contact and securing arms from abroad in time of war, which they believed would break out about the year 1917. So he and his small group, comprising Satish Chandra Sen, Ashutosh Das, Benoybhushan Datta, Bholanath Chatterjee etc., were engaged, since 1908, in sending out emissaries and establishing contacts and bases of operation abroad. The attempts at securing arms-load of ships having failed, he, then a final year student of Calcutta Medical College, had to abscond in the beginning of September 1915. After the death of Jyotindranath Mukherjee on 10 September, he emerged as the virtual leader of the Yugantar group. He was in direct charge of intelligence and foreign contacts, and succeeded in evading arrest till the general amnesty of 1920. Then he joined the Congress, and was again jailed in 1923 for a couple of years. While in jail he took the lead in forging a short-lived understanding between the Yugantar and the Anushilan groups. He was, however, exonerated from Bengal in 1927, and that September he settled down at Ranchi, where he still lives as a prominent physician, public figure, and head of many philanthropic organisations. He had, in the meantime, in 1922 taken his degree in medicine and surgery, as a private student, securing the first place in Calcutta University. He was jailed for three years in August 1942, and was a member of the Congress till 1950. Though often requested, he had persistently refused to fight elections or to accept office in independent India.
23. **Mukherjee, Jyotindranath.** Born at Kaya in Nadia (now in East Pakistan) on 8 December 1880, he was famous since his boyhood for his extra-ordinary physical prowess. He is popularly known as Bagha Jyoti, for having killed a tiger single-handed with a sword. He was the real leader of the Yugantar group after 1908, and after the Howrah Gang Case of 1910-12 emerged as the leading figure among the revolutionary leaders of Bengal. He died at Balasore hospital on 10 September 1915, as a result of the injuries he had received the previous day in an open fight with

the armed police near Koptipada in the then princely State of Mayurbhanj.

24. **Niedermayer, Oskar von.** As a young officer in the German Army he had travelled extensively in Iran in 1913. Then, in 1915, he led a mission to Kabul. He is believed to have been killed in Russia during World War II.
25. **Preston, J. W.** He was the chief Government Prosecutor in the Hindu Conspiracy Case in 1917-18.
26. **Pratap, (Raja) Mahendra.** Born on 1 December 1886, he was the landlord of Hathras in Aligarh district, U. P. He opened a few schools in his home district, the best known among which was the institute of technical education, Prem Mahavidyalaya, at Brindavan (estd. in 1908). He was also associated with the Congress. Soon after the outbreak of World War I, he left for Switzerland whence Virendranath Chattopadhyaya brought him to Berlin in February 1915. He offered his service to the cause of India's freedom, and led a diplomatic mission to Kabul. He returned to Germany in March 1918, but again went to Afghanistan through Russia with the mission of Yakov Suritz. Amir Amanullah made him an Afghan citizen, and the inter-war years he mostly spent travelling around the world preaching his new religion of universal love. He returned to India in 1947, and still lives at Dehra Dun. He was an elected independent member of the Indian Parliament from 1957 to 1962.
27. **Ramchandra Bharadwaj.** Born in the middle of the eighties of the 19th century, he was a Hindu from Peshawar. He was a member of the Bharat Mata Society of Lahore, and, between 1907 and 1910, he was the editor of the *Aftab* and *Akash* of Delhi. He left India with his wife in 1911, and reached the U.S.A. via Japan in 1913. During the Hindu Conspiracy Case he was killed in the court room by a fellow accused, Ram Singh, on 23 April 1918. Ram Singh, too, was immediately shot dead by the Marshal, James B. Halohan.
28. **Rana, Sardarsingh Raoji.** Born in the late sixties of the 19th century, he belonged to the princely family of Morvi in Kathiwar. Soon after his arrival in London in 1898, he became closely associated with Shyamji Krishnavarma and his India House movement. During World War I he was kept in internment by the French Government in Martinique. After his release at the end of the war he returned to his old business in jewellery in Paris. However, after 1947, he returned to his home town in India, and died about a decade ago.
29. **Roy, M. N.** Son of Dinabandhu Bhattacharya, a local school teacher, Narendranath (his original name) was born at Arbalia, thirty miles

east of Calcutta, probably, on 22 March 1887. Even as a school student he joined the revolutionary group of Harikumar Chakravarty, and made a name by robbing the railway station of Chingripota (12 miles south of Calcutta). He soon became one of the righthand men of Jyotindranath Mukherjee himself, and figured prominently in the Howrah Gang Case of 1910-12.

Leaving India in August 1915, and visiting many East Asian countries and the U.S.A., in connection with revolutionary activities, he ultimately found himself in Mexico, by summer 1917. There he became associated with the left-wing anti-American agitations then sweeping that country, and became the Secretary of the Socialist Party of Mexico. Then with the help of Borodin, he founded a Communist Party of Mexico in October 1919, and in November he left for Moscow via Spain and Germany as its delegate to the Second World Congress of the Comintern. In the Comintern his career was rather meteoric. In 1922 he was a candidate member of its Executive Committee. Two years later he became its full voting member and joined the Presidium of the Comintern. In 1922 was published his book, *India in Transition*. In 1923, he was in the Colonial Commission of the Comintern along with Stalin, Manuilsky, and Sen Katayama of Japan. In January 1927, he was sent to China as the official representative of the Comintern, though he disagreed with its policy of collaboration with the left-wing of the Kuomintang. That was the beginning of the end. He was accused of showing Stalin's telegram to Wang Ching-wei, who soon joined hands with Chiang Kai-shek and turned against the communists. In March 1928 he had to leave Moscow secretly, and he was finally expelled from the Comintern in December 1929.

Then he decided to return home, and reached India in December 1930, with the alias, Dr. Mahmud. He secretly attended the Karachi session of the Congress, but he was arrested in Bombay on 27 June 1931. He was tried in connection with the Kanpur Conspiracy Case of 1924, and was ultimately sentenced to six years' imprisonment. He was released on 20 November 1936. He immediately joined the Congress, and till 1939 he used to be counted as one of its leftist leaders. He also began publishing the weekly, *Independent India*, with effect from 4 April 1937. In 1939, he formed the League of Radical Congressmen, popularly known as the Royists. Then he began supporting Britain's war efforts against the Nazis, and gradually drifted away from the main stream of Indian nationalism. Then he formed the Radical Democratic Party, and began developing his philosophy of "New Humanism". He disbanded his party in 1948, and from 1949 their weekly organ is being published under its new title, *The Radical Humanist*. He also edited a quarterly, *The Humanistic Way*.

He was a superb linguist and a prolific writer, and wrote, in all, about sixty-seven books and pamphlets. The best known among these are *The Russian Revolution, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China, Reason Romanticism and Revolution, Materialism, New Humanism*, and the posthumously published, *Memoirs*. He married Ellen Gottschalk after his release from jail, and spent his last years at Dehra Dun where he died on 25 January 1954.

31. **Savarkar, Vinayak Damodar.** He was born at Bhagur, near Nashik, on 28 May, 1883. On hearing of the execution of the assassins of the informers in the Rand and Ayerst Murder Case, in May 1898, he took a solemn oath before the image of *Durga* to devote his life to the cause of his country's freedom. In 1900, he founded a revolutionary society, the Mitra Mela, which, in 1904, was renamed the Abhinav Bharat. He graduated from Poona in 1905, and left for London on 9 June 1906. After a short but spectacular career there, and the sensational attempt to escape at Marseille, he was ultimately sentenced to transportation for life by the Bombay High Court on 23 December 1910. He was brought to India in May 1921. In January 1924, he was conditionally released, but was asked to stay within Ratnagiri district without indulging in any kind of political activity. Ultimately, he was allowed full freedom on 10 May 1937. By then, he was in broken health. Still, he took to active politics, and, till his last years, he was the life and soul of the Hindu Mahasabha of which for many years he was the president. He also took part in all the negotiations, since 1942, leading to Indian independence. In 1948, he was unfortunately, tried for his alleged involvement in the murder of Gandhi. However, he was honourably acquitted. He died in Bombay on 26 February 1966. He was the author of a few well-known books in Marathi, e.g. the *Hindutva*, and the *Hindu Padpadsahi*.

32. Seiden, F. German Consul at Isfahan.

33. **Singh, Bhagwan.** Later well-known as Dr. Bhagwan Singh 'Gyani', he was born at Viring near Amritsar, about the year 1880. He took part in the Punjab disturbances of 1907, and left India, the following year, to escape arrest. After spending over a year in the countries of South-East Asia, he reached Hong Kong in March 1910, and became the chief priest in the *gurdwara* there. He was twice arrested in 1911 and 1912 for preaching sedition among the Indian soldiers there, and left for Canada in April 1913. But, he was deported from there on 18 November 1913, and the following two years he spent working for the Indian revolutionary movement in the East Asian countries. He came to the U.S.A. in May 1916, and in 1918 he was sentenced to eighteen months' impri-

sonment for his war-time activities. Then, he settled down there preaching his spiritual ideals and system of training. He returned to India on 10 November 1958, and settled down at Saproon near Simla.

34. Wustrow. German Consul at Shiraz.

35. Zukhmayet, Erich and Griesinger, William. German Consul and Vice-Consul, respectively, at Kerman in eastern Iran.



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