# Talpur Era in Sindh

Edited and Compiled by:

## Sani H. Panhwar

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## Selected Articles and Opinions on the Period of Talpur Rule in Sindh and Wars with the British.

**Compiled & Edited by:**
Sani H. Panhwar
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# THE AMEERS OF SINDE.

## BY JAMES OUTRAM

It appears advisable that I should here introduce, for the benefit of those friends in Europe who may read this journal, some information regarding the Ameers of Sinde, whom I have occasion so frequently to mention, and who, for many years past, have occupied so prominent a place in all proceedings connected with the countries bordering on the river Indus. This I shall abridge from the account given of those Chiefs by my friend Dr. James Burnes, in his "*Visit to the Court of Sinde*." I quote from the 4th Edition of the work published at Bombay in 1839,[1] the last English Edition appearing not to contain the Genealogical table of the Talpoors.

The original Ameers of Sinde were four Chiefs of the Beloochee tribe named Talpoor, who established themselves, towards the end of last century, as rulers of the country, by the expulsion of the previous dynasty of the Kalhoras, which had held the government for nearly a century previous, as tributaries, successively, to the Delhi Emperors, Nadir Shah, Ahmed Shah Douranee, and his son. The eldest and principal of these Ameers, Futteh Ali Khan, whose bravery and perseverance had been chiefly instrumental in effecting the change, was by the general voice called to the direction of affairs, and was shortly afterwards confirmed as ruler of the country, by the patent of the king of Cabul, Timour Shah. On his own elevation, this prince admitted, to a participation in his high destiny, his three younger brothers, Gholam Ali, Kurm Ali, and Mourad Ali; and the four agreed to reign together, under the denomination of the Ameers, or Lords of Sinde. While they all lived, the strong and unvarying attachment they evinced for each other, gained them the honorable appellation of the *Char Yar,* or the four friends.

Meer Futteh Ali died in 1801, Gholam Ali in 1811, Kurm Ali in 1828, and Mourad Ali in 1833. The only one of the four, who did not leave male descendants, was Kurm Ali. The present four Ameers are Meers Noor Mahommed, and Mahommed Nusseer Khan, the sons of the late Meer Mourad Ali, and Meers Sobdar Khan, and Mahommed Khan, the sons, respectively, of Meers Futteh Ali Khan, and Gholam Ali Khan. All the reigning chiefs, with the exception of Meer Mahommed Khan, have male children. The different ramifications of the Talpoor family will be best understood by the subjoined Genealogical Table, in reference to which I have only to remark that the Khypoor Chiefs are the Meers Rustum and Mobaruck; and the Meerpoor prince, Sheer Mabommed, the son of the Ali Mourad, therein mentioned.

[1] *Narrative of a Visit to the Court of the Ameers of Sinde, in 1827-28*, by James Burnes, LL. D., F. R. S., Knight of the Guelphic Order, 4th Edit., Bombay, 1839.

1st. January, 1839. Last night was excessively cold, and the thermometer was said to be down to 35°, though I did not witness it myself. In the afternoon I attended a Durbar, at which the Commander-in-Chief and Colonel Pottinger received a deputation from the Ameers of Sinde, composed of a near relation of theirs, and a representative from each individual Ameer, their professed object being merely to compliment His Excellency on his arrival, but evidently also to seek an explicit declaration of our intentions. After the usual enquiries and congratulations, they had the assurance to express their hope that their Government had amply assisted us with carriage, and all things necessary, and that their people had zealously served us. They also requested a list of our future intended marches, in order, as they said that everything might be prepared at each place for the supply of the force.

## GENEALOGICAL TABLE




In reply to this Colonel Pottinger explicitly stated that no assistance whatever, either in carriage or supplies, had been afforded by the Sinde Government; and that no services had been performed by its officers or people; adding, with respect to the offers to

support our troops, that as he had been accustomed to receive similar promises repeatedly from the Ameers, without finding them followed by assistance of any sort, such proffers on the present occasion could not be relied on, were it even customary to accept provisions for our troops gratis, which it never was. It was useless, therefore, he remarked, to consider, or lay down, our marches; all we required being aid in camels, for which we were ready to pay anything the Ameers should fix, as had been before so repeatedly agreed to. The interview continued nearly an hour, the whole conversation being mere repetitions to the same effect.

Since our arrival here, a large proportion of Nao Mull's camels have deserted, and we are, in consequence, at present totally incapacitated from advancing, and have little prospect of doing so for some time. Many individuals, who have purchased camels, have missed them in the morning, either from their having been stolen, or having made their escape during the night, and if entrusted to natives of Sinde engaged to tend them, they are often carried off when out grazing during the day. — 2d. I accompanied Sir John Keane to a lake about seven miles in rear of the camp, where were many Kullum and wild geese, all too wild to be approached. The lake is of no great extent, and is evidently the remains of the annual inundation: the country appeared generally level and covered with tamarisk jungle, and we saw one wretched village about half way. This day and yesterday were hot, but the nights were very cold.

4th. The arrival of the Semiramis steamer at the anchorage reported, bringing the small steamer intended to ply on the Indus, and six hundred coolies for carrying loads,—a most seasonable aid to the Army. — 5th. Reports have been received of an inroad by the Meerpoor Chief on Cutch, doubtless at the instigation of the Ameers, to whom he is dependant, although they disclaim all control over him. This diversion they hope will call the attention of this army, and retard its advance. The Beloochee army is reported to be re-assembling at the capital. A Beloochee placed in confinement for selling liquors to the soldiers, contrary to orders, broke from his guard, and his sword unfortunately having been left in his possession, he attempted to cut his way through the camp, but was shot: luckily he hurt nobody, several cuts he made, at the corporal and his guard, having been warded off by their muskets.

6th, 7th, and 8th. The days are getting warmer, but the nights are still very cold; no intelligence from Hyderabad.

9th. Excessively hot, thermometer upwards of 90°. Accounts from Hyderabad mention that no extraordinary sensation has been produced at the capital, in consequence of the intelligence from the north-westward of leagues against us, which must by this time have reached the Ameers. Their communications, on the contrary, are more humble and more lavish in professions than heretofore; and appearances would even testify that endeavors are now really being made by their Government to facilitate the advance of the army. These symptoms evince the adoption by the Ameers of a temporising policy in

preference to any further attempt to obstruct or check us; the object probably being to see our armies fully occupied by the Affghans—now that there is a reasonable prospect of the latter seriously opposing us—ere they break with us, and then to attempt to expel the troops left in their country; having accomplished which, they may hope to be able to take measures to prevent our return this way. Heretofore, they had feared that the submission of the Affghans to Shah Shooja would leave Sinde at the mercy of the armies about to assemble at Shikarpore, and their only chance, therefore, was to obstruct our advance; but now that there exists a prospect of our being engaged at a distance, they very wisely bid us good speed and send us on.

10th. The first cavalry joined in good order. It has been decided that, while the Army is advancing, Lieutenant Eastwick on behalf of the resident, and myself on the part of the Commander-in-Chief, shall proceed in advance to Hyderabad to tender the treaty. Under present circumstances it is also determined to bring the reserve force to Vikkur instead of landing it at Kurachee, with a view of preventing a rupture, since it is supposed that its landing at the latter place would be resisted.

11th. Captain Peat, the Chief Engineer, returned from the surveying route to Kurachee. He measured it to be fifty-eight miles, and found the road level, with no obstacle to troops, except a scarcity of water this year, owing to the two last seasons of drought: it is, however, to be found at most places about six or seven feet below the surface, and the soil being everywhere easily dug, an hour or two would suffice to make wells. There is a great scarcity of forage also, in consequence of the unfavorable season, although it is said usually to abound on this road. Captain Peat was not permitted to enter Kurachee, which he found jealously guarded, and the Beloochee garrison seemed well inclined to quarrel, had he given room for it by attempting to enter the place. He entirely agrees with me in opinion of the absolute necessity of maintaining a depot at Kurachee, to secure the communications of the reserved force, and a detachment also at Gharry Kote; (the same place passed by me, on my route from Kurachee to Vikkur,) up to which town a small branch of the Indus is navigable for boats of twenty candies burden. Captain Peat also agrees with me in opinion as to the facility of disembarking and landing stores at Kurachee within command of our shipping.

12th. The rear troops of Horse, and company of Foot Artillery joined, so that no troops now remain at Vikkur, except a small guard of Infantry, and Lieutenant Colonel Cunningham's Horse.—13th. It was finally decided that Lieutenant Eastwick and myself should proceed in the Indus steamer to Hyderabad on the 15th or 16th, sending off our baggage tomorrow overland, and timing our departure so as to arrive at the same time as our servants, and thus prevent any appearance of hurry.

*Taken From the book "Rough Notes of the Campaign in Sinde and Affghanistan, in 1838-9"*

# THE TALPURS

## BY: SUHAIL ZAHEER LARI

The infighting between the Kalhoras and the Talpurs, combined with attempts by the Afghan kings to extract as much money as possible from the contending parties, led to the end of the era of prosperity in Sindh. By 1783, the Talpurs belonging to the Marri tribe of Balochistan, emerged as winners. This was recognised by the Afghan King Timur Shah who issued a *sanad* in favour of Mir Fatah Ali Khan Talpur. However the Kalhoras were not inactive, they were able to persuade the Afghan King to send his generals Nurzai and Bostan Khan to reinstate Mian Abd al-Nabi. Mir Fatah Ali sent the families of the Baloch beyond the desert to the safety of Kutch and Jaisalmer, and faced the forces sent by the Afghan King and defeated them in AH 1202/AD 1787. When Timur Shah heard the news, he immediately started with a large army for Sindh but went back on hearing of rebellion on his northern border.

Talpur princes of Mirpurkhas
Sons of H.H. Mir Fateh Khan Talpur-II s/o Sher-e-Sindh Mir Sher Muhammad Khan Talpur

After suppressing the rebellion in Balkh, Timur Shah sent an army under the Barak chief, Payndah Khan, to Sindh in AH 1205/AD 1790. The Afghans went back after Mir Fatah Ali agreed to pay the tribute that the Kalhoras had paid to Ahmad Shah. Mir Fatah Ali applied to the Afghan King for the return of Karachi from the Khan of Kalat who had occupied it in lieu of payment promised by Abd al-Nabi Kalhora for providing a Brahui army to fight the Talpurs. The Afghan King directed the Khan of Kalat to return Karachi to the Talpurs which he did in AH 1207/AD 1792.

Timur Shah died in AD 1793, leaving twenty-three sons of whom the fifth Zaman Shah ascended the throne with the help of the Barakzai chief, Payndah Khan. The new king sent a fresh *sanad* to Mir Fatah Ali confirming the old one. Mir Fatah Ali divided Sindh into seven parts. He assigned Khairpur to his uncle Mir Sohrab, and Mirpur Khas to his

cousin Mir Tharo. He kept the major part for himself and his younger brothers, Ghulam Ali, Karam Ali and Murad Ali, who jointly ruled from Hyderabad.

Mir Fatah Ali died in AH 1216/AD 1801 and was buried at Khudabad. On his death bed Mir Fatah Ali appointed his brother, Mir Ghulam Ali as his successor.

The Barakzai chief Payndah Khan was executed in 1799, by Zaman Shah. The sons of the Barakzai chief, who were twenty-one in number, fled to Khurasan and persuaded his brother Mahmud Mirza to revolt and depose King Zaman Shah. Mahmud Shah occupied the Afghan throne in 1800. He was in turn deposed by another brother, Shuja Mirza in AH 1218/AD 1803: Shah Shuja invaded Sindh the same year. The people of Sindh were so frightened that most of them deserted their towns and villages and fled to the sandy desert of Thar (Baig, 1902; 209). Mir Ghulam Ali marched to Larkana and sent his envoys who offered to pay one million rupees immediately and a tribute of five hundred thousand rupees every year to the king. The offer was accepted, and the Afghan King marched back to Kabul.

The Khan of Kalat, Nasir Khan died and was succeeded by his nephew Mahmud Khan. Mir Ghulam Ali sent envoys to condole the death of the Khan and to draw up an agreement with the new Khan to remain at peace and to respect each other's boundaries. Mir Ghulam Ali also married the sister of the Khan. He invited forty thousand guests at Bhagnari to celebrate the event. Mir Ghulam Ali sent his army into Bahawalpur to protect the Sayyids of Uch who had sought his help against the Daudpotas. The chief of the Daudpotas, Muhammad Sadiq Khan, sued for peace, which was granted, but was made to cede the district of Sabzalgarh. Mir Ghulam Ali died in AH 1227/AD 1811 of wounds inflicted by a deer that he had shot on a hunt.

Mir Ghulam Ali was succeeded by Mir Karam Ali whose reign was one of peace. He had no children of his own, therefore, he deputed his ambassador to acquire handsome Georgian boys sold in the bazars of Isfahan, the capital of Iran. One of the Georgian boys, called Sydney, was the father of the famous Sindhi writer, Mirza Kalich Beg.

Meanwhile, an European power had emerged as the imperial power in India. Europe slaughtered most of its livestock each winter as the barren fields could not feed them. They required spices from Asia to preserve their stock of meat over the long winter months. After the Ottomans captured the traditional sea and land routes. Europe began to look for new routes. The first European to find the Indian sea-route was the Portuguese Vasco da Gama. He reached Calicut in India in 1498. The first English ship arrived on the Indian coast with Hawkins in 1608. Two British ships defeated a fleet of four Portuguese galleons in an encounter off the west coast of India in 1612. They were recognized as better protectors of pilgrim boats to Mecca, and were accorded trading rights by the Mughal Emperor. After the defeat of the French and capture of Pondicherry in 1761, the British enjoyed unquestioned supremacy at sea. Till the eighteenth century

the military advantage of the Europeans lay in their control of the seas, due to their superior deep-water and ocean going vessels. Therefore, as long as the Mughal Empire was intact, the Europeans had no chance on land.

There was no market in Asia for woolen cloth which was Britain's main export. Therefore the British had to buy spices with silver and gold. India was never a treasure trove for Britain with galleons bringing home gold, as they did from South America to Spain. There was a continuous net drain of silver and gold bullion from Britain to India till the British discovered a more profitable avenue in country trade or carrying. The British made big money from trading with China where they sold Indian opium for tea for sale in Britain. They did not have to enslave peasants to expand production of opium. They willingly responded to price incentives. It was produced in Mughal India as a state monopoly. By the nineteenth century the Company's revenues from opium was second only to land revenue.

In 1739, the Persians sacked Delhi. The Afghans occupied Punjab and captured Delhi in 1757. The Marathas occupied Lahore in 1758. The Afghans reoccupied it in 1759. On 13 January 1761, the Afghans destroyed the greatest army that the Marhattas could muster at Panipat. The Mughal Empire was in no position to defend itself. In 1764, the British won the battle of Baksar and received from the Mughal Emperor the grant of *diwani* (power of collecting revenue and administering civil justice) for Bengal and Bihar. *Diwani* offered a solution to the continuing problem of drain of precious metals to India. This placed at the command of the British East India Company a source for financing the purchase of commodities destined for the European market.

At first what had mattered most to Britain was trade. Now it was the muscle that India provided. The British troops that marched against other Indian and. Asian states were now largely Indians. The British were obsessed with the fear of an attack on India through Iran or Afghanistan by the French, and later by the Russians Accordingly, they sent envoys to Iran, Afghanistan Sindh and Punjab to counter the threat. They entered into a treaty on 12 March 1809 with the Shah of Iran, who promised not to allow any European force to pass through Iran towards India. The British also signed a treaty with Sindh whereby the Talpurs agreed not to allow the French 'tribe' to establish itself in Sindh. In 1814, the British concluded another treaty with Persia whereby the Shah promised to attack the Afghans if they invaded India. This was done to counter the repeated request by the Indian Muslims to the Afghans to invade India and help them to get rid of the British and the Sikhs. Shah Abd al-Aziz, son of the famous Shah Waliullah, and head of the *Madrasa-i Rahimiya* in Delhi had declared that India was no longer *Dar al-Islam* (land of peace) but *Dar al-Harb* (land of war). This was a call to the Muslims all over the world to help the Indian Muslims to get rid of non-Muslim powers occupying India.

Meanwhile, having been denied the opportunity of expansion to the east across the Sutlej by the British, Ranjit Singh, the Sikh ruler of Lahore, secured Attock by defeating the Afghans in 1813, captured Multan in 1818, took Kashmir in 1819 and Peshawar in 1823. He then moved southwards and invaded Dera Ghazi Khan and demanded a tribute of Rs. 1.2 million from the Talpurs. The Talpurs appealed to the British as the Afghans were in no position to intervene. After Shah Shuja was deposed a second time in 1809, the Durrani claimants to the throne had become puppets in the hands of the Barakzai brothers, and anarchy prevailed over most of Afghanistan.

In 1824, the Talpurs used the illness of Murad Ali to request the Governor of Bombay to send an English doctor. Dr James Burnes arrived and cured Murad Ali. Mir Karam Ali entered into a treaty with the British. The treaty allowed the British to survey the river Indus and enter Sindh through Kutch without paying any tax or toll. In 1831, Alexander Burnes, younger brother of Dr James Burnes, journeyed up the river Indus to Lahore to present to Ranjit Singh, the Sikh King of Lahore, a gift of English cart horses and to survey the river Indus. 'Alas', remarked a Sindhi Sayyid, ***'Sindh has now gone since the English have seen the river'.***

In AH 1242/AD 1826, Mir Sobdar, son of late Mir Fatah Ali, rebelled against his uncles, along with his chief adviser Hosh Muhammad Habshi. Mir Murad Ali opened the state purse to those who would defect. Mir Sobdar's army dwindled from 8,000 to 1,200 men in one day, and the revolt ended.

Meanwhile Sayyid Ahmad, a nineteen year old officer in the army of the Nawab of Lucknow, had arrived in Delhi from Rai Bareilli in 1806. He enrolled as a student of Shah Abd-al-Aziz. Having completed his studies, he joined the army of the Nawab of Tonk but when the Tonk state lost its independence to the British, Sayyid Ahmad left and went for pilgrimage to Mecca. He returned with plans to fulfill the dream of Shah Abd al-Aziz with the help of Sayyid Ismail and Abd-al-Hye, the nephew and son-in-law of Shah Abd-al-Aziz.

Sayyid Ahmad and Sayyid Ismail arrived in Sindh in AH 1242/AD 1826 with their Indian Muslim Mujahidin volunteers to fight the Sikhs. The Mujahidin were not allowed to enter the fortified towns of Sindh and word was spread that they were British agents, to create a feeling of hostility against them among the ordinary folk. Pir Sibghat Allah Vilayati who had met Sayyid Ahmad at Mecca and had sworn allegiance to him, was with the Talpur Mirs at Hyderabad. Through his intercession Sayyid Ahmad was allowed to enter Hyderabad with a few of his companions, and to say Friday prayers with the Mirs. The Talpurs allowed the *Mujahidin* to pass through their territory into Balochistan on their way to Afghanistan to persuade the Afghans to fight the Sikhs. On the way, the Mujahidin were welcomed by Pir Sibghat Allah Shah, son of Pir Muhammad Rashid, at Kingri. He promised them volunteers to fight the Sikhs but the differences between the thirteen Rashdi brothers, did not allow his volunteers to join the

*Mujahidin*. The volunteers sided with Pir Sibghat Allah Shah who named them Hurs after the famous Hur who had sided with Imam al-Husain at Karbala and had been killed defending him.

The *Mujahidin* began their infiltration of the Sikh state in November 1826, from Afghanistan and occupied Peshawar in 1830. Sayyid Ahmad and Sayyid Ismail were killed fighting the Sikhs at Balakot on 6 May 1831. After their death, the struggle was continued by fresh volunteers from India and their Pathan supporters. The *Mujahidin* forces were finally destroyed by the British military campaign in 1863.

Mir Karam Ali died in A.H. 1244/AD 1828. He was the first Talpur to be buried in Hyderabad. Mir Murad Ali, the last of the four brothers, took the place of his brother but died three years later in A.H. 1249/AD 1833. After his death, the territories over which he had ruled was jointly ruled by a second group of four rulers who jointly ruled from Hyderabad. They consisted of Mir Nur Muhammad and Mir Muhammad Nasir, sons of Mir Murad Ali, Mir Muhammad, and son of Mir Ghulam Ali, and Mir Sobdar, son of Mir Fatah Ali. However the eldest, Mir Nur Muhammad was considered as chief of them all. Similarly, the territory of the Khairpur Talpurs was jointly ruled by two sons, Rustam and Ali Murad and three nephews, Muhammad Hasan, Muhammad and Nasir, sons of Mir Sohrab. And the territory of the Mirpur Talpurs was divided among the three sons of Mir Ali Murad, namely Sher Muhammad, Shah Muhammad and Khan Muhammad, who jointly ruled in Mirpur.

On hearing of the death of Mir Murad Ali in 1833, Shah Shuja, the deposed Afghan King occupied Shikarpur. The Talpurs organized an army of 18,000 and attacked the Afghan army which consisted of a few thousand men but were repulsed and fled. The Talpurs now sent Agha Ismail Shah to negotiate with Shah Shuja who agreed to leave on payment of 1.2 million rupees. The money was immediately provided and Shah Shuja went back to Ludhiana in Indian Punjab.

In AH 1252/AD 1836, the British decided to install Shah Shuja on the Afghan throne. The reason for this action can be best understood in terms of the arguments presented by the British Prime Minister Palmerston who said that if Russia could alarm the British in India by moves in Persia, why should not the British in India alarm the Russians by moves in Afghanistan? Afghanistan and Sindh had become part of the global strategy pursued by the imperial powers The British who were now masters of all the land east of the Indus river system, like the Mughal Emperor Akbar before them, considered Afghanistan as the first line of defence of their empire in India and wanted the rulers of Sindh to support their enterprise in Afghanistan.

Colonel Pottinger of Kutch was deputed to go to Sindh to request the Talpurs to help the British armies in their passage through Sindh. Whereas the ruler of Bahawalpur and the Khairpur Talpurs cooperated and allowed the Bengal army to enter Sindh through

Bahawalpur on its way to Quetta and Kandahar, Colonel Pottinger was pelted with stones in the streets of Hyderabad. A large quantity of provisions for the British army that had been collected by the Hindu traders was plundered. When the British ship *Wellesley* approached Karachi in February 1839, the Talpur gunners posted at Manora fired their guns. The British ship promptly fired back and leveled the sea face of the fort to the ground and occupied Karachi. The Talpurs, who were under threat from both Ramjet Singh and Shah Shuja, signed a treaty whereby they agreed to pay an indemnity of 2.3 million and an annual tribute of five hundred thousand. They accepted the British occupation of Karachi and appointment of a Resident at Hyderabad. They also agreed to provide transport to the British army at a reasonable pride and maintain the purity of their rupee. 'The assistance which the Mirs secretly withheld was cordially supplied by Hindus who had no cause to love them' (*Aitkin, 1907; 124*).

The British Indian army that invaded Afghanistan consisted of 9,500 men of the Bengal army which took the land route through Bahawalpur and Sindh, and 5,600 men of the Bombay army which arrived in Sindh by sea. Afghanistan was conquered and Shah Shuja entered Kandahar on 25 April 1839 and Kabul on 7 August 1839. While columns of the Bengal army stayed on to mop up the Afghan resistance, the Bombay army returned the way it had come. On their way back they took punitive action against the Nawab of Kalat who had failed to accept the British terms. Mihrab Khan, the Nawab of Kalat, was killed in action on 13 November 1839, and was replaced with Shah Nawaz. The towns of Shal, Mastung and Kachchi were taken from Kalat and handed over to the Afghans. In Sindh the possession of cities on the northern route to Afghanistan, like Shikarpur and Bhakkar, and the southern port city of Karachi were retained and pressure was mounted on the Talpurs to accept the British suzerainty. The Talpurs had survived so long because the British had hoped to install a friendly government in Afghanistan. After Shah Shuja was assassinated in Kabul in April 1842, the British were under no obligation to accept the Afghan claim over Sindh founded on an agreement imposed by the Persian conqueror Nadir Shah on the Mughal King Muhammad Shah. The British, as agents of the Mughal Emperor in Delhi, were in a position to make their own claim over the whole of the Indian sub-continent.

Mir Nur Muhammad died in A.H. 1255/ A.D. 1840, and was buried next to his father. In 1842, Sir Charles Napier was posted as the British Resident in Sindh. He, like the Mughal general, Khan Khanan before him, was an outright imperialist. He believed, as Khan Khanan did in 1590, that the situation on the western border of the Indian empire

required that Sindh must be brought under the imperial rule. Despite opposition from those in the company service who thought that Sindh would be a financial burden, a new treaty was submitted to the Talpurs that required that:

(1) The coins of Sindh should bear the name of the King of England,

(2) The Talpurs should cede Karachi, Shikarpur, Subzulkot and Omarkot to the British,

(3) 100 yards of land on either side of the Indus should be given to the British government.

Ali Murad of the Khairpur Mirs who had fought against his eldest brother Rustam Khan and nephew Nasir Khan defeated them and forced them to cede villages which they had taken over from him during his minority. Rustam Khan sought the help of the Hyderabad Talpurs who sent envoys to Napier saying that they were willing to accept the treaty provided the British helped Rustam Khan to get back his rightful share from Ali Murad. Napier sent Outram to Hyderabad to persuade the Mirs. Outram met the Talpurs on 7 Muharram. The Mirs promised to sign the treaty after 10 Muharram. Instead, they attacked the British camp and Residency on 14 Muharram. The British moved to the two steamers lying along the bank and took off to Sehwan to meet Napier who was camped there. The Baloch plundered the place left by the British and set it on fire. Next morning the two Mirs with over 22,000 men moved to Miani. Napier who had 2,800 men and twelve pieces of artillery marched out at 4 a.m. on Friday 17 February 1843, to confront the Talpurs who had taken position on the dry bed of the river Phulaili near Miani, about nine miles from Hyderabad. 5,000 men of the Talpur army and 25 men and officers of the British force were killed in the battle. Defeated, the Mirs took refuge in the Hyderabad fort, and the British occupied the camps left by the Talpurs. The following day the Mirs surrendered to Napier.

Mir Sher Muhammad Khan, the Lion of Mirpur, who had not been able to reach in time to take part in the battle of Miani, arrived with his army of 20,000 along with stragglers of the battle of Miani. He sent an envoy to Napier with an offer to let him leave the country with his life. Napier's response to the offer was to immediately march out and defeat him on 24 March 1843 at Dabbo (*Do-aba*) six miles from Hyderabad. His African slave soldier Hosho Shidi raised the cry ***'We will die but will not give up Sindh'*** and died fighting. The British occupied Mirpur on 27 March and Omarkot on 4 April 1843. Mir Sher Muhammad fled and took refuge with Shersingh, the Sikh ruler. He returned later to surrender. He was pensioned and awarded KCSI by the British. Napier described the encounter with the Talpurs as an example of superiority of the musket and bayonet over the sword, shield and matchlock. Other accounts refer to the battle as the 'dispersion of what was little better than a vast mob.' The Baloch viewed it as an unfair fight. They said, '*These rascals do not give us time even to steam ourselves with Hookah*'.

According to Alexander Baillie, the Talpur armies were composed of the Baloch and the Pathans, and a few Sindhis who took part in the campaign, fought for the British in the newly created Scinde Irregular Horse. (Baillie, 1890; 10)

The occupation of Sindh by the Persians and Afghans reinforced interest in Persian in the ruling classes during the Kalhora and Talpur periods, who were in any case not themselves Sindhi speaking. The Persian poetic form—Ghazal—which was introduced during the Kalhora period, got further encouragement during the days of Talpurs who prided themselves in their knowledge of Persian and a number of them wrote poetry in Persian. Abd-al-Wahab, known as Sachal (*truth*) Sarmast (*intoxicated*) was born in the village of Darazan in Khairpur State in 1739 and died in 1829. He was only thirteen when Shah Abdul Latif died but Shah is believed to have met him and said that 'Here is the one to take the lid off the cauldron I have set to boil'. Sachal wrote poetry in Persian, Urdu and Siraiki spoken by the Talpurs. While Shah Abdul Latif had meticulously observed Islamic rituals to set an example of good conduct to others, Sachal eschewed all formal religion. Sachal was a rebel. Sachal wrote:

*If I recite the kalma I turn a heretic*
*I shall not get entrapped in this maze*
*I shall not step into Prophet's track*
*For unless I discard the Prophet*
*I may not enter the presence*

At another place he wrote:

*Religions have confused the people*
*So called pious, pundits and pirs*
*Rave perplexed the poor,*
*Some men offer their prayers,*
*And others go to Mandirs*
*But alas! None has bothered,*
*To behold the Eternal Love.*

Sachal's *Kafis* have an ecstatic fervor which have not been excelled. Another important poet of this period is Sami who is believed to have lived for 107 years from 1743 to 1850 or, according to others, 120 years from 1730 to 1850 through the Kalhora and Talpur to the British period. Chainrai Bachumal (or Murlidhar) Dattaramani, known as Sami, belonged to Shikarpur. As a cloth-merchant he travelled between Shikarpur and Amritsar. His earlier *slokas* were composed at Shikarpur and the latter ones at Amritsar. His language is entirely that of Shikarpur and Upper Sindh.

## Three Branches of Talpur Mirs



# RISE AND FALL OF TALPUR RULE IN SINDH

## BY: SAHIB KHAN CHANNO

The Talpur rule began in 1783 A.D., when they overthrew the Kalhoras after a bloody civil war.

During the 82 years (1701-1783 A.D.) of the Kalhora rule, about thirty six years (1701-1737 A.D.) were claimed by their gradual extension of power over different parts of Sindh and about twelve and half were consumed by Persian and Pathan incursions, civil wars and the expeditions against petty states and local uprising.

This insecurity, coupled with the huge booties taken away by the returning armies of Nadir Shah, Ahmad Shah and Madad Khan Pathan told heavily on the economic welfare of Sindh. Thriving cities fell into ruin, trade deteriorated, irrigation suffered and acreage under cultivation shrank sharply with the result that even in areas where settled agriculture was the dominant feature of the economy pastoral system and stock breeding gained greater ground.

One of the factors which contributed directly to this development was the large scale induction of the Siraiki-speaking Baluch tribes, mainly the Talpurs, into the feudal hierarchy. What had hitherto been a largely homogeneous aristocracy came to be dominated by immigrant elements. As the number of these elements rose over the years, the homogeneity of the Sindhi society underwent an ethno genetic transformation. The fact that these elements differed widely from the native people in economic outlook as well as in social make-up was to play a determinant role in the subsequent course of Sindh's history.

The Talpurs formed the nucleus of the Kalhora army, which was in the main composed of the immigrant Baluch elements, from the Siraiki region. With the passage of time, these elements, led as they were by the Talpurs, became entrenched in the ruling aristocracy and acquired the role of veritable king makers. When the last Kalhora rulers tried to outsmart them in the power game, the Talpurs finally over — powered them after a bloody civil war and established their own rule.

True to their tribal traditions, they divided up the country among three branches of Talpur family — the Shahdadani house ruling at Hyderabad, the Manikani house at Mirpur and the Sohrabani house at Khairpur. The head of the Shahdadani house, Mir Fateh Ali, associated with himself in the government of central Sindh his three brothers

— Ghulam Ali, Karam Ali and Murad Ali. Similarly, the Mir of Khairpur, Sohrab Khan, bequeathed "his" to be divided among his three sons, Rustam, Mubarak and Ali Murad.

The purpose of these divisions and sub-divisions appears to have been retention of tribal unity and prevention of internecine feuds. But as subsequent events were to prove, these intentions did not materialize.

Although the Talpur polity was much weakened by these divisions, still they were able to:

(i) Recover in 1975 A.D. the harbour of Karachi, which had been ceded to the Khan of Kelat by their predecessors;
(ii) Recapture in 1813 A.D. the fort of Omarkot, which had been gifted by the last Kalhora ruler to the ruler of Jodhpur in 1782 A.D.;
(iii) Regain in 1824 A.D. the town of Shikarpur from the Pathan rulers; and
(iv) Extend their power over Subzulkot and Bhoung areas then in the Bahawalpur state.

Talpurs relied for their strength and security on two main sup ports. First, the loyalty of most of the Sirai Baloch clans, and, second, the cooperation of the privileged classes, namely, the *jagirdars*, the *pirs*, the *fakirs* and the holymen who held arms and great tracts of cultivable land. Consequently, the regime was not popular outside the privileged classes; for this reason they were unable to rally full strength of masses to meet the challenge of British.

From the first decade of nineteenth century, Sindh was entrapped in rivalries and stratagems of the imperialist powers — the British, the French and the Russians. A series of treaties was imposed on the Mirs by the British to further their imperialist ends. Finally Sir Charles James Napier (b. 1782 A.D.) arrived in Sindh in September 1842 A.D. as the Commander of British force. A fresh treaty, which virtually destroyed the independence of their country, was thrust upon the Talpurs. In censed and provoked, the Sirai Baluch subjects surrounded the British residency at Hyderabad. Sir Charles Napier marched against Hyderabad and after two wars, at Mianee (17th February) and Dubbo (26th March) in 1843 A.D., he annexed the whole of Talpur Sindh except Khairpur whose ruler, Mir Ali Murad (1843-1994 A.D.), had agreed fealty to the British at the opportune time.

An impartial assessment of the events of those fateful days at the beginning of 1843 A.D. would inevitably lead to the conclusion that Sir Charles Napier and Lord Ellenborough were bent upon annexation of Sindh:

> ***"The story of that much discussed event might be taken for a lost chapter from The Prince of Machiavelli. No amount of sophistry can disprove the charge that***

***Ellenborough was determined from the very beginning to carry through the project by fair means or foul, that the treaty engagements with the Talpur Amirs were cynically violated, that the ensuring war was forced upon them. Opinion at home was prompt in denunciation. Mountstuart Elphinstone (ex-Governor of Bombay 1819-1927 A.D.), the nestor of Anglo-Indian politics at that time, gave the best of the many verdicts passed on the subject. 'Coming after Afghanistan it (i.e., the annexation of Sindh) put one in mind of a bully who had been kicked in the streets and went home to beat his wife in revenge'."***

Napier's prejudgment of his own projected action, as recorded in his journal, cannot be improved upon. He had pithily noted: "We have no right to seize Scinde; yet we shall do so, and a very advantageous, useful, humane piece of rascality it would be.

Soon after the conquest, a Martial Law regime was established and Napier was appointed. Civil and Military Governor of Sindh (1843-1847 A.D.) combining in his persons the military command and the civil administration. Sindh was to be administered directly under the Government of India and efforts were to be made to make its administration a model for the rest of Indian empire. The reasons underlying the decision were:

(i) A warlike people were more likely to be disposed to obey the chief who conquered them than any other imperialist officer.
(ii) The man who had conquered Sindh wanted it to be administered separately.
(iii) The unsettled conditions of the Punjab necessitated maintenance of a strong force in Sindh, which in turn made it necessary to administer Sindh independently.
(iv) Strong, independent frontier province of Sindh would be in a better position to help contend apprehended the Russian- backed Afghan encroachments into India.
(v) Napier and Ellenborough had to vindicate their "piece of rascality" for which they had come under heavy fire at home.

Napier's prime duty was to consolidate British rule in Sindh. He expected danger of uprising from the Baloch elite. The Baloch were, however, a tribal community. The division amongst the tribes prevented the Baloch elite from having any national feeling or any intense attachment to the former rulers, for their elitist pride in tribal prejudices transcended their loyalty to Sindh and to its people as a whole; Napier, therefore, maneuvered to conciliate the Baloch chieftains by attaching their interests to the continuance of British rule in Sindh. He did this by letting them retain the jagirs which they held from the former rulers:

> "You Belooch Sirdars are required to present yourselves before the Governor, and make your salams to him, and your jageers and other property will be confirmed to you by the British Government, and no diminution will take place in your rank.

All the *Jagirdars*, nearly two thousand, who tendered allegiance on 24th May 1844, the date fixed for assemblage, were confirmed in their estates. Thus, the 19 lac bigha (about 4 lac hectares) land in *jagir* was confirmed to the title holders. To conciliate the ex-rulers, Napier granted them cash pensions amounting in aggregate to about 3.72 lacs of rupees yearly, and also permitted them to hold lands in *jagir*." A newspaper commenting in 1854, stated that by adopting this policy.

> "all anxiety on the part of the holders of them (lands) terminated, and the increased security and consequently increased value of their lands as property, reconciled the owners in a great degree to the loss of the political power that before attached to them .... the Sovereign was changed, but the possessors of estates under feudal tenure remained in undisturbed possession.

Napier was empowered not only to govern British Sindh but also to exercise control over almost all its former principalities. Thus after a long time traditional unity of Sindh was achieved, in some sense, and it appears that Napier was determined to help unite historical Sindh albeit subservient to British interests.

Napier resigned in August 1847, and was relieved by Robert Keith Pringle. The day (1-10-1847), Pringle assumed charge as "Commissioner for the civil administration" of Sindh, it became an appendage of the Bombay Presidency.

Thus, the shackles that were clamped down upon Sindh in 1843 were, in fact, tightened and hardened in 1847 by making her an append age of the Bombay Presidency. That Sindhis would rise to break these shackles was foreshadowed by their war cry in the battle of Dubbo:

"*Die we shall but give up Sindh we never*." This was indeed an attempt, albeit abortive, to use the name of Sindh as a rallying point. It signaled the subsequent growth of national consciousness among the people of Sindh — a growth in which the alien rulers acted as "the unconscious tools of history."

# THE MIRS AND THE INDUS TOLLS

## By H. T. Lambrick, LC.S.

### *Read before the Sindh Historical Society on 22-10-1942.*

The levy of tools by the Mirs of Hyderabad on boats plying on the Indus, in alleged contravention of the treaty of 1839, though not one of the main grounds on which Lord Ellenborough sought to impose a further and penal treaty on them, was one of the complaints preferred against them by Sir Charles Napier when he visited Hyderabad in September 1842: and being connected with the policy of stimulating trade on the River which, inherited from Bentinek, was the under plot of Lord Auckland's Afghanistan venture, may be considered as directly linking the exclamation of the Syed who witnessed Burnes' survey in 1831—

"*Alas, Sindh is now gone, for the English have seen the river*"—with the Governor-General's notification of March 5th, 1843. "Thus has victory placed at the disposal of the British Government the country on both banks of the Indus, from Sukkur to the sea….. it will be the first object of the Governor-General to use the power victory has placed in his hands in the manner most conducive to the freedom of trade, and to the prosperity of the people of Scinde, so long misgoverned."

The state of affairs on the River, as Napier found it, had prevailed ever since the treaty of 1839 was signed: the Mirs interpreting its XIth clause in one sense, and the British Political authorities in another. The following correspondence extracted from the records of the Commissioner-in-Sindh, describes the first open clash between the two, and deserves record also as illustrating the characters of those who held the stage in the last troublous years of the Talpurs' rule. From captain J. Outram, Political Agent, Lower Scinde to Maddock, Esquire, Secretary to the Government of India.

"Sir—The representation of Meer Sher Mahomed alluded to, in my diary of the 4th instant, regarding subjects of Scinde-evading his dues, obliges me to solicit the instructions of the Rt. Hon. The Governor-General of India in Council, as to how far that Chief is to be restricted by the provisions of the new treaty with the four Ameers of Hyderabad, of 14 articles, to which he is not a party although, as a subject or member of the former General Government of Scinde, he was I presume bound by the former commercial treaties of 1832 and 1834; that chiefs separation from and independence of the others being now virtually admitted by my predecessor having tendered a separate treaty to him, at the same as to the other Ameers.

(2) The former treaties by which the Meerpoor chief considers himself bound relate only to foreign, merchants, the British Government having requested "a passage for the merchants and traders of Hindustan by the rivers and roads of Scinde, by which they may transport their merchandize from one country to another," and Meer Sher Mahomed states, that the scrupulously abstains from interfering with foreign merchants, but that he never agreed to exempt Scinde merchants from what they had always been accustomed to pay, and which in fact is the principal source of his revenue.

(3) Within the last few days Jethanand, my Native agent, has made known to me that the Ameers of Hyderabad also consider, that the same right they have always heretofore exercised, still continues to them, of levying duties from their own subjects transporting merchandise by the *Indus.* He says, that the Ameers have always understood, that the 11th and 12th Articles of the New treaty, merely confirmed the former Commercial treaty which applied to foreign merchants alone for that they never understood the new treaty to interfere in any way with the transit duties they have always been accustomed to exact from their own subjects, and that besides, they read the 11th article as only applying to Merchants entering the river "from the Sea," or from be their own territory "from the northward".

(4) I might have been deceived by this, seeing that the same right over their subjects is exercised by the Khyrpoor and Bhawulpur Chiefs, and believing, that it could not have been the intention of the Right Honourable the Governor-General to enforce harsher terms on the Hyderabad Government—or at least, on Meer Sobdar, who suffers equally with the other Ameers by the Measure in question, than what are exacted from the above mentioned states, similarly situated in their relations to the British Government, had I not found that the late Resident took a very different view of the question and peremptorily directed through Lieut. Eastwick (by private letter of instructions dated 29th November Last) that "no Custom duties of fines are to be levied on any goods, no matter who the owners are, going or coming by the Indus" which, that gentleman must have communicated through the Native Agent, he being then too unwell to visit the Durbar personally.

(5) On my questioning the Native Agent, as to the practice that prevails and what messages he had delivered to their Highnesses, relating to the exaction of duties from their own subjects, he informed me, that the Ameers have continued to levy them as here to fore, although advised by him that it would ultimately tend to their won advantage to abolish these altogether: this he told me, he had been instructed to do, but he purposely concealed from me that besides the orders from the late Resident, to Lieut. Eastwick above a alluded to (which I assume to have been, of course, communicated to Jethanand) he had received *Repeated* and *positive* order from Colonel Pottinger direct, to prohibit the levy of *any duties* from any *person,* and on *any property* whatsoever, in boats plying up and down the river, which I have ascertained to be the case on examining the Native records, since led to suspect the integrity of the Native Agent.

(6) It is evident that the Native Agent endeavored to deceive me, to benefit the Ameers, or the has deceived their Highnesses by omitting to deliver Colonel Pottinger's prohibition to levy duties from their own subjects, which they have continued to do uninterruptedly. The former is most probably the case, as more likely to secure advantage to himself, but in either case, it shows that he is no longer to be depended upon, and the probability that my predecessor's suspicions (which Colonel Pottinger communicated to me) that Jethanand has been tampered with, and gained over to Meer Noor Mahomed's interests, are well grounded. Under such circumstance I can no longer place confidence in this person, or employ him as a medium of intercourse with their Highnesses. I shall consider it my duty therefore to suspend Jethanand from his office of Native Agent, pending His Lordship's instructions, after having confronted him with the Ameers, which I shall have an opportunity of doing on joining their Highnesses at a hunting party on the 15th instant.

(7) It is with much diffidence, but from an imperative sense of duty, that I now beg most respectfully and submissively to offer my opinion on the subject in question. it appears to me very possible that the Ameer may have understood the 11th and 12th Articles of the new treaty to be merely confirmatory of the former commercial treaties, and that they really never did contemplate that these articles had any reference to subjects of Scinde, especially as the 5th article provides for the "absolute" rule of the Ameers over their own subject; otherwise I don not think it possible they would have omitted to protest against such an arrangement, which deprives them of their principal source of revenue, besides in a great measure undermining their authority over their own subjects, when they so pertinaciously persisted in objecting to other, and these to them — for less important provisions of the new treaty: and as far as I can ascertain either from the Native Agent, or from Pitambar the Residency Moonshee, through whom, or in whose presence, all Colonel Pottinger's discussions were carried on, it does not appear that this question was ever mooted even, as if it was never suspected by the Hyderabad Government that such could be the intention of those clauses of the treaty.

(8) Were Commerce on the Indus likely to be much impeded or injured by the same unrestrained control of the Ameers of Hyderabad over their own subjects, which the other states on the Indus maintain, I should be loath to concede this point; but I believe that it would not prove detrimental in the slightest degree, and that on the contrary it would by throwing the whole commerce into the hands of foreign merchants be the means of encouraging the latter and enticing them into this channel, which is the great object to effect in the first instance; after wards, the evil would correct itself, as the Scinde Government could not long remain blind to the loss of revenue, which must soon become apparent, from excluding its own people from participation in the benefits of the trade, which such exactions must effectually do.

(9) The chief objection, to the exercise by the Ameers of the power to taxing their own boats, appears to me, that, pointed out in the 7th para of my letter to your address dated 3rd March last (No. 74)—i.e., the practice I understand to prevail, of taxing empty boats after discharging the cargoes of foreign merchants; but this, I find, could easily be guarded against and pledges to abstain from the practice might be exacted from the Ameers, as the price of the concession, which I beg most respectfully to recommend as just, and politic: Just, because it would place them on a footing with those of Upper Scinde and other States on the Indus similarly situated and Politic, because the interference between the Ameers and their subject, which I deprecate, must at all times be a source of heart-burning to them, especially as they see other and m their opinion inferior States in their immediate neighbourhood exempted from such interference; because it must appear to which they cannot be made to comprehend the possibility of any prospective compensation: because Meer Sobdar Khan, whom it is the object of the British Government to benefit by its protection, will consider himself injured on the contrary, and an equal sufferer with the rest; and because his ally, Sher Mahomed of Meerpoor, whom it is an object to conciliate, must be compelled to the same relinquishment of his dues from subjects of Scinde as the Ameers of Hyderabad have literally bound themselves to, should His Lordship the Governor-General so understand the spirit of the new Treaty, and direct: its enforcement accordingly, which I am convinced would cause extreme discontent, much bickering, and frequent disturbances, more than counterbalancing any advantages that would accrue from granting the freedom of the river to the subjects of Scinde.

(10) In conclusion, and in support of these views, which I consider myself bound in duty to submit for the consideration of the R Hon. the Governor-General of India in Council, I may be permitted to quote the words of the enlightened statesman Franklin:-

"To me, it seems, that neither the obtaining nor retaining of any trade, however valuable, is an object for which men may justly spill each other's blood, that the true and sure means of extending and securing commerce is the goodness and cheapness of commodities, and that the profit of no trade can ever be equal to the expense of compelling it, and of holding it by fleets and armies." —I have, etc.,

***J. Outram, P.A. Lower Scinde.***

P.S.—I beg leave to hand up on this occasion, for the information of the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council, copies of recent correspondence with the P.A., Cutch, displaying a system of illiberality towards commerce in what are here considered British Ports, which cannot fail to be contrasted with the very liberal conceptions in favour of commerce required from themselves by the British Government."

***J.O.***

**The case referred to by Outram was as follows:-**

He had sent to the Political Agent, Cutch a petition received from the Gumashta of a merchant named Mahomed Rahim, requesting the restoration of property taken from him at Cutch Mandvi under peculiar circumstances.

Colonel Melvill, the Political Agent, replied on the 30th April 1840, that the boat in question, bound from Bombay to Shahbandar, had put into Mandvi under stress of weather, and remained there for three or four days. The supercargo took the papers to the Karbari of the Port, expressing his desire to leave as soon as possible without landing any goods. The karbari however said that port and other dues must first be paid, and the super-cargo was compelled to pay them, which he did in bags of sugar at a valuation by local mashirs.

By the laws of Cutch, every boat coming into a Cutch port because liable for Port and Customs Duties on cargo, whencesoever coming, and wheresoever going. Bombay Merchants had petitioned Government in September 1839 and the Resident had been directed to inform the Rao that charging duties on vessels bound Sindh, and entering is ports under stress or weather, "would be considered at variance with the usual liberality of His Highness"; but the Rao, considering the injury to his revenues involved, declined to make any alteration in the ancient land of his country. Melville therefore expressed his inability to interfere.

**Outram to Maddock, Hyderabad, 22nd may, 1840.**

"Sir—I have now the honour to report for the information of the Rt. Hon. the Governor-General of India in Council, the substance of my conference with Meers Noor Mahmoed and Nusseer Khan, on board their Highnesses state barge on the 17th instant, alluded to in my diary of that date.

2. On my presenting His Lordship's letters to the Ameers transmitted with yours dated 13th ultimo, I intimated my wish to converse with their Highnesses for a few minutes, if not inconvenient, to which they most readily assented, and requested me to retire with them to the rear cabin, that we might be more private, and allowing no person to accompany us except Meer Shadad. I de sired, however, that the Native Agent Jethanand might be admitted, and he was called in accordingly. I commenced by informing their Highnesses, "that notwithstanding their agreement by treaty, to exact no duties whatever on boats and goods passing up and down the Indus, that I was well aware that they had continued to do so, as heretofore, ever since the treaty was signed." Meer Noor Mahomed, who acted as spokesman throughout was, or pretended to be, surprised at this accusation, declaring that he had scrupulously adhered to the terms of

the treaty in permitting all foreign goods, belonging to foreign merchants, to pass free, whether entering the river from above or from below.

P. A—Yes! But the Treaty pledges you to exact no Tolls whatever, from any one, passing up or down the River; but your officers do so to this day from all natives of Scinde carrying the products of Scinde.

Ameer.—Certainly, it was never agreed that any alteration should take place regarding our own subjects—--on the contrary, the treaty stipulates that we shall exercise absolute control over our own people.

P. A.—Article Xl of the treaty specifies that no toll will be levied on trading boats passing up or down the river, without any exemption being specified to natives of Scinde, which would have been, had such been intended.

Ameers.—The present treaty merely confirms the former commercial treaties, the new treaty was not caused by these matters calling for any change, on the contrary, not one word was ever said by Colonel Pottinger regarding any alterations being required in the river arrangement, and we certainly never understood that there was to be any alteration—if so, we certainly should have complained against what would deprive us of all our revenues, for if our own people also are allowed to carry goods up or down the river without payment, what will become of our land duties on camels and donkies carrying merchandise, for they will never be used in that case, and we should be great sufferers.

P.A.—The benefit will soon be seen, of opening the river to your own people as well as foreigners, otherwise they will be shut out from the benefit of the trade altogether, for they will be undersold by foreign merchants landing goods, and paying the customary tolls, which would still be much cheaper than what the Scindian merchants could afford to sell it, who is subject to land transit duties besides.

Ameer—That may be, but in the meantime how are we to live? We desire no advantage from foreign commerce, and if what we always got from our own subjects is taken away, how we can exist, for the taxes on Scinde boats, and produce is all our revenue.

P. A.—At first, there might be apparent loss, but ultimate benefit will be great, and is certain."

(4) This their Highnesses did not appear at all to believe, and turning to Jethanand, I asked him, "how he understood the treaty with regard to this point?" He answered most readily, as applying only to foreign merchants, and property coming in from the sea, or down from above.

***P. A.***—"How was it in that case that Colonel Pottinger called upon you to recover, and your did so, the duties which had been levied on indigo by Sher Mahomed some time ago.

***Native Agent.***—That was Mooltan indigo, and therefore foreign.

***P. A***—Have the Ameers continued always to levy duties from Scinde people as before?

Native Agent—No Scinde cargoes of any value are brought down the river, they generally go by land.

***P. A***—But it they can come free by the river, why should they go by land?

***N A.***—They have not been allowed to come free.

***P. A.***—Who has hindered them?

***N. A***—I suppose the Ameers.

***P. A.***—Did you ever report this to Col. Pottinger?

***N. A***—There was no occasion.

***N.A*** — Are Scinde boats always taxed as here before?

***P. A.***—There has been no alteration regarding the Scinde people.

***P. A.***—Did you never covey any positive prohibition from Col. Pottinger to the Ameers against their taxing any boats whatever?

***N. A.***—I advised them that it would be ultimately for their benefit to make the river free to their own subjects."

(5) I then turned to their Highness and asked them, if they were not aware from Jethanand that Colonel Pottinger had positively prohibited. Their levying any duties on any boats passing up or down the river, no matter who their owners are?

***Ameer:***—Most certainly not, had he told me so, I would have written to Col. Poninger about it."

I then said to Jethanand: "How do you account for this? I find letters in the *daftar,* addressed by Col. Pottinger to you, through Petamber Moonshee, reiterating orders

previously given to you personally, to the above effect, dated 26th April, and 27th September last year. Again, the Col. sent some such orders to Mr. Leckie, who must have communicated them to you, and, I see in a letter to Mr. Eastwick, dated 29th November, when that gentleman was at Hyderabad, the same positive prohibition, which he certainly must have mentioned to you. How is it, therefore, that in your daily intercourse with their Highnesses, you never made this known to them and how is it, that when I asked you on several occasions what practice prevailed, that you suppressed your knowledge that it continued, in opposition to Col. Pottinger's order to you to call on their Highnesses to discontinue it? And, that you endeavored to lead me to suppose that such had never been intended? How is this?

> ***Native Agent.***—You say Col. Pottinger wrote the same to Mr. Eastwick; why did he not tell the Ameers?
>
> ***P. A.***—I believe that gentleman had no personal interview with their Highnesses, after that date, as he was obliged to go away sick shortly after wards, and if he had occasion to communicate such a message, he must have done it he had occasion to communicate such a message, he must have done it through you: but Col. Pottinger's letter to Lieutenant Eastwick was merely an answer to a question from that gentleman, whom you may not have made acquainted with the prevailing practice, regarding which you ardently wished to blind me,—and who therefore may not have seen occasion to discuss the matter: but that does not alter your case, who had repeated and positive orders direct from Col. Pottinger on the above subject, as well as through Lieuts. Leckie and Eastwick—what your motive may have been for withholding these orders, and endeavoring to deceive me, is immaterial: Such is the fact."

Then turning to the Ameers, I said: "Your Highnesses, who are now aware of these circumstances, must see, that I can never hereafter place sufficient confidence in this man, to allow him to be the medium of communication between us, consequently I am compelled in justice to you, as well as in duty to my superiors, to suspend Jethanand from all employment, until the orders of the Rt. Hon. The Governor-General are received. In future, I shall always communicate whatever is of importance in person to Your Highnesses, and I request you will have no scruple to send for me whenever you have doubts on any subject, or wish to consult me, it will give me pleasure to visit you at all times, and there can be no occasion to employ third person to pass between us, except in trifling matters—these sort of people too often thrive by making mischief, to render themselves of consequence and necessary: but I trust that Your Highnesses will always place your confidence in me freely, and without reserve declare your sentiments on all occasions, which I will make known to His Lordship if proper if not will candidly give you my opinion to the contrary In this particular case I shall inform His Lordship all that has passed but I will not conceal from you that the treaty most certainly, as it now stands, clearly exempts all boats from tolls; that continuing to exact from your own people will

throw them out of the market, and eventually prove injurious to your revenues, whereas they by throwing the river open to them, you will secure alter advantages. The very letters which I have today delivered to you imply His Lordship's sense of the advantage of total exemption, but you Highnesses ideas on the subject shall be fully communicated, under the impression, that you have been willfully kept in ignorance by the Native Agent of the view of the British Government on the subject, which may excuse you now at this late hour referring the point for the consideration of the Rt. Hon. the Governor-General, although High Lordship will be surprised that the meaning of the article could ever have been doubtful."

(6) That Meer Nur Mahomed, if not the other Ameers, was fully aware of the real meaning of the treaty I have little doubt, but ascertaining from Jethanand that there was no chance of Col. Pottinger ever conceding the point in question, he had purposely abstained from pushing the matter to issue, aided by the Native Agent who, (I find in looking over his letters to Col. Pottinger studiously avoided any mention of the prevalence of the practice or the sentiments of the Ameers on the subject, after one futile attempt to advocate non-interference with subject of Scindes in a latter not dated but received by Col. Pottinger on the 26th April last year, although that gentleman's reiterated orders on the subject ought to have elicited an explicit disclosure of the Ameers' object, had not Jethanand been bribed to their interests; as he could not possibly have been ignorant of it.

(7) Notwithstanding my conviction that the Ameers' assertion, that they never understood the treaty, is false, although such is possible—I am still nevertheless of the opinion which I formerly expressed, and respectfully beg leave here to repeat, that no good can arise from the literal application of the XIth article, as exempting all merchandise and properly from tolls or the river, throughout Lower Scinde, that it is impolitic to bind these chiefs to different terms to what have been required from the other States similarly situated, (with) which treaties were made at the same time, that, no check to general commerce will be the effect of allowing these Ameers to tax their on subjects trading on the river, in the same manner as is allowed to the other chiefs above alluded to, but that by insisting on adhering to the strict wording of the article in question, we should render utterly hopeless the task of reconciling this Government to its connection with the British Power.

(8) Should the Rt. Hon. the Governor-General of India be of opinion that this point should be conceded, I would respectfully suggest that it be granted only as a gracious boon, and on certain conditions calculated to prevent the exercise of the control of the Ameers over their own boats in any way interfering with foreign merchandise embarked thereon.

(9) In conclusion I beg to recommend that the office of Native Agent at Hyderabad be *abolished,* which I consider may be dispensed with advantage, being of opinion that no

verbal intercourse with the Ameers should be carried on except by the P.A. or his Assistants personally, and that where this is not practicable, written "Yads" should be interchanged between the Agent, and their Highnesses to prevent the possibility of misunderstandings and after denials."

***I have etc.,—J. Outram, P.A. Lower Scinde.***

From H. Torrens, Secretary to the Government of India, to J. Outram, P.A. Lower Sindh 382, Confidential Dept:

Fort William, 22nd June.

(Acknowledges letters of 11th and 22nd May *re:* Tolls, and Native Agents' affairs.)

"On the former question, it is necessary in the first instance to remark that the Ameers of Hyderabad are not as a matter of right to be considered as being, in respect to duties on the Indus, in any degree in the same position as the Ameers of Khyrpore or the Nawab of Bahawulpore, and it is of importance to explain the distinction which exists on the subject, as you illustrate your view of the fair pretensions of the Ameers by comparing them with the privileges said to be exercised by the other Rulers referred to; the Khyrpore Chiefs relinquished such duties within their dominions by a voluntary concession, and their intention in the relinquishment may be fairly to be judged from the manner in which the local British authorities have allowed practical effect to be given to the boon.

The Nawab of Bahawulpore retains his right to levy duties on the river within his limits, as it was declared by the treaties of 1833 and 1835, with the modifications to which, for the greater encouragement of trade, he may it is confidently hoped, now agree.

But the Ameers of Hyderabad had, by their conduct, compelled the British Government to regard them as having forfeited its friendships, and one of the conditions on which they were admitted to reconciliation was that the navigation of the Indus in its course through their country, should be rendered perfectly free. Undoubtedly, the understanding of the British Government, in laying down that condition, was that no duty should be levied upon any goods or persons whatever, passing on the Indus. Such also was, as you state, the clear understanding and intention of Sir Henry Pottinger who negotiated the new Treaty. And such, too, is the explicit declaration of the eleventh article of the treaty which is in these words.— "No duty will be levied on trading boats passing up or down the river Indus, from the sea to the northern most point of that stream within the territories of the Ameers of Hyderabad."

(3) It might be apprehended that if the British Government were to concede to the Ameers the indulgence of taxing the products of lower Sinde, room would be afforded

for the most vexatious impediments being interposed to the free transit of foreign goods. For those goods could scarcely otherwise be loaded than on boats owned by subjects of the country, and if the privilege claimed be admitted, these boats will necessarily be liable to detention and search with a view to discover whether any portion of their cargo consists of country goods.

(4) On the whole, the Governor-General in Council is satisfied that such taxes as the Ameers may think it expedient to impose on the property of their own subjects should be levied as the Treaty permits, on shore, and before embarking their goods, or after their disembarkation—and it is especially requisite that the practice mentioned by you, of taxing empty boats after the discharge of foreign cargoes, which is a plain evasion of the most distinct and important agreement of the commercial part of the new treaty, should be wholly abandoned. You will also take every favorable opportunity for pointing out to the Ameers the mischievous consequence to their subjects and territories which must arise from hampering the commercial transactions of their own people by imposts from which those of Foreigners are exempted.

(5) The practice, on the point under consideration, of the Khyrpore Government, is not material to the question which has been decided by the preceding instructions. But copies of the correspondence will be sent to the P.A. in Upper Scinde in order that an authentic report may be obtained of the nature and effects of the practice.

(6) With Meer Sher Mahomed, who is not expressly included as a party to the New Treaty of Hyderabad, the case may appear to be in some respects different, and His Lordship in Council would desire, in the first instance, to be informed of the exact limits within which this Chief exercises authority on both banks of the main course of the River, or any of its Branches, and whether any portion of the rights which he claims may be conceded to him, without the same general inconvenience to traffic which would be caused by such a con cession to the other Ameers: yet his Lordship in Council is not inclined to admit the validity of claim even in his case.

The agreement with Sir Henry Pottinger, on which the treaty was founded, was made by those who had previously exercise the Collective Government of Lower Sinde The condition of the Treaty is that no toll shall be levied from the sea upwards within the territories of the Ameers of Hyderabad, and it could ill be borne that a subordinate chief who at a subject or member of the General Government of Sinde—should now stand upon his supposed independence, and separating himself from the Ameers, impede and impair the beneficial effects of this great public measure.

The subsequent tender to Meer Sher Mahomed of a separate treaty can scarcely be construed as affecting his position in regard to this general emancipation of the river from toll:—for it was only under the Treaty of March 1839, by which tolls, were intended to be altogether abolished, that the separate independence of the Chiefs of Sinde was

established. You will with these considerations before you bear in mind the very great importance which His Lordship in Council attaches to this navigation, and you will endeavor at once to maintain its freedom, and to reconcile the Chiefs of Scinde to conditions which are r for the security of general commerce, and will be most conducive to their own real interests.

(7) The conduct of the Native Agent Jethanand, as described by you, appears open to much suspicion. But before finally sanctioning his dismissal as unworthy of confidence, the Governor-General in Council would think it right that you should require and submit from that person, a written reply to the specific allegations of neglects and violations of duty which you mention. His Lordship in Council agrees that the Office of Native Agent is not now necessary, a British Resident being permanently fixed at Hyderabad."

***H. Torrens.***

But it does not appear that any serious effort was made by the Government of India to induce the rulers of Bahawalpur and Khairpur to discontinue the levy of river tolls in their territories during the next two years and more.

Exactly a century ago, Sir Charles Napier, in the course of his historic review of the situation in Sindh, wrote to Lord Ellenborough:

"The second point to which Major Outram has drawn my attention is a very strong one. He tells me, the tribes on the river, above that part possessed by the Ameers of Scinde, do levy tolls, and that there is not treaty or public document forthcoming in virtue of which we can call on the Ameers even of Upper Scinde not to levy tolls on their own subjects. It is evident therefore that to call on the Ameers of Hyderabad to desist from levying tolls, and to allow the tribes above them on the river to do so, would be unjust; that is to say, it would be unjust to allow the others to levy tolls, but not unjust to prevent the Ameers from doing so. The answer to the argument 'that tolls are levied on the Northern Indus' is just this. Say to those Northern tribes 'We have, with great trouble, secured to your boats a free passage on the river through Scinde; we are resolved to open the commerce of that great highway of nations; and you, who receive benefit thereby, must join in this measure leading to the good of all, and to the loss of none.' Wherefore to excuse the Ameers upon the ground that others are not equally coerced is answered by coercing the others."

But long before such consistency was introduced in this policy, of coercion to enforce freedom of trade on a river in which the real obstacles to traffic are ever sifting sand banks, whirlpools, and the hidden snags of uprooted babul trees, the Mirs' regime had been subverted. In the century which has all but passed since that event, the efforts of

Sindh's rulers have been directed not to the freeing of the Indus, but its coercion, for irrigation: and though the mighty stream may still occasionally burst free from guidance, as we have seen to our cost this year, the collar of the Sukkur Barrage is firmly about its neck, and the taming of the "*Mitho Darya,*" which has so benefitted the people of Sindh, may be held to justify the means by which the power over it was acquired.

***Hyderabad,***
***October 1st 1942***

# THE SINDH BATTLES, 1843

## I. MIANI.

## BY: H. T. LAMBRICK, I.C.S.

With the attack on the British Residency near Hyderabad on February 15th 1843, by some 8000 Baluchis led by Mir Shahdad Khan, the last faint hopes of a peaceful settlement of the affairs of Sindh, till then cherished in spite of all probability by Outram, were finally dispelled. The force which attacked the Residency was detached from the host of the Mirs' feudatories which had already, on learning Napier's preparations to advance from Saeedabad to Hala, moved out from Hyderabad and encamped on the Fuleli to Bar his path, Mir Nasir Khan, the senior Talpur Prince, following them on the evening of the 14th. On Shahdad Khan rejoining him next day, Nasir Khan moved his camp to Lunar, and on the 16th the whole force of the Balochis was in position at Miani.

Outram had reached the British camp at Matiari from his steamer that morning and persuaded Napier to allow him to descend the river again a short distance, to create a diversion by burning the jungles to the left and rear of the Baloch position, taking with him two hundred convalescent sepoy's for the purpose He estimated the strength of the Mirs' lashkar at 18,000 men and warned Napier that the battle would be desperate Napier had other sources of information he had spies who went into the Baloch camp that very day, and returned with a tale of 30,000 The Mirs' munshis and cossids who had constantly been in motion between Hyderabad and the General's camps on his advance, must have given their masters an exact account of his little army: he could bring into line of battle 2,800 men, with twelve guns. this force was made up of four weak battalions of infantry; Her Majesty's 22nd Foot, the 1st (Grenadier) 12th, and 25th Bombay native infantry: two weak Regiments of Cavalry, the 9th Bengal Light Cavalry and the Scinde Irregular Horse, with a detachment of the Poona Irregular Horse; the 22nd Bombay Foot Artillery and 3rd Company Golandaz, with twelve guns; and C. Company Madras Sappers and Miners.

The disparity in numbers was in any case very great: but with every day it was likely to be increased by the arrival of further contingents of the Baloch tribesmen, who were known to Napier to be on the march towards the rendezvous at Miani. It was in the light

of this knowledge that he had precipitated hostilities by continuing to advance on Hyderabad, in spite of Outram's protests: and whatever judgment may be passed on Napier's earlier proceedings in Sindh, he would have risked his army had he given the appearance of hesitation in these last three days. It was a relief to him to end the period of suspense. "Not to be anxious about attack in such immensely superior numbers is impossible; but it is delightful anxiety." Hardly were the words written when Jacob, whom he had sent out that evening to locate the Baloch army, returned to report that he had found them eight or nine miles away. Less than three hours remained for sleep; for at four o'clock in the morning of the 17th February, reveille sounded in the British camp and the little army got on the move for its last march. The Advance Guard was led as usual by the Scinde Horse, under John Jacob: with him were the Madras Sappers under Captain Henderson, and a working party of 100 sepoys, to prepare passages through the numerous canals and nullahs for the guns, of which two nine-pounders proceeded with Jacob.

An hour was spent in forming a road across two large canals not far from the camp, but thereafter the march proceeded without difficulty for about seven miles when, not long after sunrise, the Advance Guard came on the dry bed of the Fuleli, a dry branch of the Indus adapted for irrigation, here running almost due south. The troops followed a track which led along the left bank for a mile or more past several small villages embowered in trees; as they reached the second of these the sound of a distant cannon was heard. The General, who was now with the Advance Guard, formed up his infantry behind a small canal and unlimbered his two guns, shortly afterwards ordering Jacob to detach on squadron to skirt round a dense *shikargahs* enclosed by a mud wall on the further bank of the Fuleli, and to proceed himself to the left front with the rest of his regiment so as to reconnoiter beyond another *Shikargah,* the wall of which stretched away obliquely across the previous line of march.

Jacob soon ascertained that the Mirs army was in front of him, and sent back word to the General who moved forward and somewhat to the left with the remainder of the Advance Guard, until he too came in sight of the Baloch position, at about a mile's distance. Here he halted to await the arrival of the main body of his army, and from the top of a small sand hill scanned the front through his glass: with his Staff he calculated the visible strength of the Baluchis at 8,000 foot and 3,000 Horse. Meanwhile Jacob pushed briskly on over a little plain dotted with low sandy hillocks and camel bushes, bounded on the left by the shallow green bed of a watercourse, beyond which were low brush wood and trees, and on the right by the *Shikargah* wall, which after extending to about 700 yards from the watercourse turned away to the south nearly parallel with it. The narrow corridor thus formed led directly to the Mirs' position. On reaching a point about opposite the angle of the *Shikargah* wall, Jacob formed line from column and halted his regiment about 500 yards from the foremost Baluchis while he moved on himself to reconnoiter. Their main body was obvious enough, between two conspicuous flags, and filling the space between the wall and a grove of trees with enclosed ground to

the left front. Several pieces of artillery were in position in front of the line on each flank, and in rear a large body of horse moved about, behind whom again the tents and flags of the Mirs' camp could just be seen through the dust. As Jacob walked his horse forward, he came under matchlock fire both from the *Shikargah* and the enclosures on his left front, which, he discovered, concealed a village. The Baluchis had thus occupied positions on each flank in advance of their main line. It was very difficult to judge their strength, for any number might be hidden in the wood and enclosure: and though Jacob approached to within two hundred yards from the centre of their line, he could not see that between their guns and the masses visible in rear of them ran the bed of the Fuleli, here at right angles to its former course, concealing large numbers of the Baloch tribesmen. Mr Nasir Khan tried to stop his people from firing, in the hope that a parley to intended. But he soon saw the officer and his escort turn and trot back of their corps; whence Jacob dispatched a note to the General, telling him what he had seen.

The Mir therefore gave the order for his cannon to open fire on the Scinde Horse, who preserved their formation in line, which was soon made more imposing by the arrival of Fatz Gerald s squadron He had seen no enemy, but had ascertained that the *Shikargah* on the right bank of the Fuleli extended downstream for several miles; that it was free from the enemy, and impracticable for troops. The General therefore decided to engage the Baloch army in a frontal attack. But a long hour dragged away without a sign of the main body of his own army: it was delayed by accidents to the ammunition wagons in the nullahs. Meanwhile the Scinde Horse remained exposed to the fire of the Baloch artillery at little more than point-blank range, and the right of their line was annoyed by matchlock fire from the *Shikargah* wall many Baloch horsemen too came here and there to the front and dismounting fired on them with deliberate aim, and from time to time there was some appearance of a general advance being made but on Jacob moving his line forward also they returned to their former position and resumed their artillery fire. Though this was kept up intermittently for over an hour and the guns were in Jacob s opinion, "really not badly directed." — Mr. Howell the Mirs' English artilleryman was forced to point them, with eight matchlocks put to his head — only six of Jacob s horses were killed by the round shot the first casualties on either side. The regiment remained perfectly steady under the ordeal.

At last the head of the main column of the British appeared and the General moving forward as it closed on the Advance Guard the whole wheeled left and when sufficient ground had been taken up countermarched to the right halted and turned left into line some three hundred yards behind the Scinde Horse which Jacob now formed in squadron close column to allow as much room as possible for the infantry whose right flank was at about the same distance from the *Shikargah* wall which was studded with matchlock men. The line was now carefully dressed, skirmishers thrown out, and some brush-wood in front of H. M.'s 22nd cut down. Napier now gave orders for the men to have their breakfast while he continued to examine the position and more the *Shikargah,* through his telescope, and consider his plan of attack. In view of the reports of Jacob and

Fitz Gerald nothing but a frontal assault was possible but he was anxious for his flanks, and his rear The Baluchis continued their cannonade, but the range was long, and only an occasional round shot pitched close to the ranks the matchlock men had gradually disappeared from the top of the *Shikargah* wall, and by the time the General was ready to advance only one was left sitting astride and firing matchlocks passed up to him by men on the other side. The British Artillery were now brought up on the right of the line the Company of Madras Sappers flanking them and Napier gave orders for the advance in echelon of battalions from the right, H.M.'s 22nd leading, and in succession the 25th, 12th and 1st Grenadiers. Napier ordered some men of the 22nd to shoot the Baloch on the wall as they advanced, and he fell. After two hundred yards were covered, the halt was given, and the gunners opened fire with round shot. It was nearly eleven o'clock, and the day was becoming very hot. The range was found too great for the practice of the artillery to be effective and Napier advanced another 250 yards; the guns again unlimbered, and under their fire that of the Baloch cannon was observed to slacken. Again the British line, still in the same formation, was moved to about 300 yards from the Mirs position, and halted: and now at point blank range the artillery began such a fire as silenced the enemy's guns, four of them being withdrawn into the bed of the Fuleli; the howitzers also plied the *Shikargah* with grapeshot. But Napier was still anxious for this flank. He had passed close to a gap in the wall about a hundred yards beyond its first angle, and though a near view confirmed what he had seen through his telescope, that the wall was not loop holed, or provided with any banquette to enable men to fire over it, there remained the danger of a sortie on his rear. The line was now being dressed under a heavy matchlock fire, and the baggage brought up as close as possible behind it. Napier had ordered the kit to be gathered together and surrounded by the camels in a circle; and under the shelter of the infantry line this was done, the animals being made to sit with their heads pointing inwards, and bales in between them and the troops detailed for the guard, four companies of the Bombay grenadiers and the detachment of the Poona Horse, took up their stations. At the last moment it occurred to the General to engage the enemy within the *Shikargah,* and he detached Captain Tew with the Grenadier Company of the 22nd, with orders to defend the opening till the last. By now their comrades had begun to reply to the Baloch musketry, and at length the bugles sounded for the final advances: Napier sending word to Jacob to protect the left of the line, while he kept the 9th Bengal Light Cavalry in reserve behind the right.

The infantry moved briskly forward, and now came the word to charge: the 22nd sprang forward up a slight slope at the line of matchlock men whose heads showed just above it, thinking to break them at once; but eager for close combat though they were, they wavered in astonishment as their eyes fell on the unsuspected bed of the Fuleli, and the host that awaited them there, whose thousand tulwars flashed in the sun. The Baluchis had indeed awaited them in perfect confidence, their front rank posted on a rough firing step cut in the north earn bank of the canal, and masses clustered behind and below them: with all their burning fanaticism, they had not revealed prematurely their strength of numbers and position. But now the time was come: the 22nd fired a volley, and closed

with the foremost Baluchis, who rose to meet them, throwing down their matchiocks, and dashing forward with sword and shield: after a sharp me lee they were thrust back over the edge, yet the 22nd did not plunge-down among them, but came to a stop on the brink. And now the British line recoiled slowly, resorting to a rolling fire, the front rank kneeling and retiring to reload, as the rear rank took their place. They thus avoided the matchlock fire of all but those of the Mir's men who climbed up the bank to take aim, and these they steadily shot down. The 25th and 12th Bombay Native Infantry, coming into action successively on the left of the British regiment, soon followed their comrades example. The troops in fact settled down to fight the battle in their own fashion despite the exhortations of their officers: and their instinct was right. Until the numbers of the enemy had been greatly thinned, and their morale in some degree impaired, it was hopeless for the thin red line, innocent of infantry reserves, to engulf itself in the Fuleli.

Meanwhile on the extreme right the Madras Sappers were well performing their duty of helping to get the artillery into position. This was made more difficult by the fact that the ground here was broken and encumbered with the cannon abandoned by the Baluchis: moreover, the space left between the 22nd on their final advance, and the *Shikargah* wall, which here bent outwards at a slight angle, was insufficient to allow of all the British guns being brought up into line. Only four could be unlimbered at all: the leading horses were shot the moment they showed their heads at the bank of the Fuleli, but Captain Mutt got a twelve pounder howitzer run up by main force, and though at first the Baluchis swarmed about him, they were driven back, and three more guns manhandled into position. Many tribesmen were now moving into the *Shikargah,* with the obvious intention of turning the British right: some approaching under cover of the wall opened a galling matchlock fire on the Sappers, Artillery, and the right of the 22nd. Those of the Sappers who were armed replied with their fusils, while those with tools started breaking down the wall. As soon as the gap was wide enough, Hutt trained a howitzer obliquely backwards into the *Shikargah,* another gun fired across the muzzle of this one, while of the other two, one enfiladed the Fuleli bed and the fourth plied the Mir's horsemen in the rear. By his management of the first two guns, Hutt, in Jacob's opinion, saved the right of the line: for Tew had been killed at the head of the company of the 22nd, which had advanced into the *Shikargah* some distance through the brushwood, and could hardly have sustained a heavy attack without support: but Hutt's grape kept the Baluchis back in the dense jungle. As for the guns which enfiladed the bed of the Fuleli, nothing could have been more effective: yet the Baluchis made no attempt to capture them, though their muzzles were only a few yards from the foremost of the brave men who filled, the river bed close as a field of corn, through which each discharge cut a bloody swathe. Well was it for the British that no such concerted rush, as a handful of Marris had made with fiery impetuosity at Naffusk, was launched against Napier's guns by the Mirs' far more numberous lashkar.

The contracting front, which had crowded the artillery out of the tight of the line in the final advance, had proved even more awkward on the left. Napier's object in adopting

the echelon formation was to refuse this flank, on account of Sultan Shah village and its enclosures being occupied by the Baluchis in front of their main position: he intended that the Grenadiers should attack, and force the Baluchis out of it: and Jacob, with his Regiment drawn up in squadron close column immediately to the north of the enclosed ground, found that the advance of the infantry line was bringing the Grenadiers up straight behind him, while the 12th N. I. passed on, coming up into line with the 25th. Concluding that the task of carrying the village had been allotted to the Grenadiers, he moved left, to fulfill his own orders to protect the flan, which it seemed, might be most effectively done by making a diversion beyond Sultan Shah, and trying to find a way round it. But the Mirs' commanders had foreseen and prepared for such a move. Every nullah, hole, and watercourse had been scarped and lined by numerous matchlock men, firing through thorn hedges; the ground was also quite "blind," uneven and covered with jungle. Advancing at a gallop over these obstacles so many falls occurred that over fifty horses and men were on the ground at once; the fire from the village 60 yards on the right was very heavy, and casualties among Jacob's men and horses began to mount, with no corresponding gain. His own charger was shot dead under him, and in another instant the whole regiment, its formation sadly disorganized, was brought to a stand by a deep and wide cut from the Fuleli, strongly manned by matchlock men, and utterly impassable for cavalry. Jacob accepted the inevitable and ordered the Retire, extricating his men as rapidly as he could.

Meanwhile Major Clibborn, commanding the 1st Grenadiers, had made no attack on the village. He had only 200 bayonets at his disposal, the baggage guard having absorbed twice that number of his men; and to launch such a small force against a village carefully prepared for defence, and held by perhaps five times his strength, may well have seemed to court disaster, which would not be confined to his own unit. He felt bound to maintain contact with the 12th N.I., which had advanced right up to the Fuleli bed, and to do so had to take up a position "*en potence*" facing almost Eastward while the main line faced south. Here he kept up a skirmishing fire on the village and enclosures.

Far different was the action on the brink of the Fuleli. Over it now hung a pall of dust and smoke, through which the flash of matchlock and musket and cannon lightened, and battling forms appeared now clearly, now dimly, as the advantage swung to and from the roar of the musketry seemed continuous, almost drowning the staccato thud of the artillery. It was now past noon and still fresh Baluchis pressed forward to fill the places of those that fell under the musketry, whose bodies began to pile thickly on the ledge below the bank. Ever and anon, driven to desperation by the incessant torment of grape and musket-balls, a band of devoted swordsmen stormed up it and hurled themselves upon the bayonets; but though the British line several times gave ground under the sheer weight of the charges, it remained unbroken; and lapping round their assailants from each flank sepoy and soldier roughly handled them with the bayonet, and drove the survivors back into the river bed. But the troops could not yet be made to counter-attack: as soon as their rans were back in their old position, six or eight paces

from the brink, they halted, the men only advancing to deliver their fire into the dense masses of the enemy, and returning to load. Many of the men were constantly engaged in wiping blood or sweat from the pans of their muskets, or adjusting their flints, defending themselves with their bayonets he while: yet they maintained a rate of fire which gradually beat down that of the matchlocks, for the "old hands" now loaded without the ramrod: the cartridge fitted "Brown Bess" so loosely that the weight of the ball with a smart tap of the but on the ground was sufficient to send it home.

The General, well up in the front with the 22nd, never ceased to urge the men on; and the Queen's and company's officers vied with each other in intrepidity. Major Teasdale, commanding the 25th N. I., and Major Jackson, second in command of the 12th N.I., fell gallantly in the midst of the Baloch swordsmen: Lt. Col. Pennefather, commanding H.M.'s 22nd, was badly wounded: and of those who took their places, few were unscathed, whether rallying their men, or sacrificing themselves in setting an example to engaged the enemy more closely. Mir Nasir Khan, for his part, sent word to his commander in the field, Mir Jan Mohammed Khanani, to lead a general assault. The Sardar made a valiant effort: but just as he had made his way to the front rank and was encouraging his men, Lieut. McMurdo, Napier's Aide-de-Camp, who, on his horse being killed, obtained permission to fight with his old regiment, dashed down into the river bed, with a handful of men, hoping the rest would follow: meeting Jan Mohamed, he killed him and another, fighting hand to hand; but finding himself and his few companion unsupported and all but surrounded, forced his way back, amazed at the conduct of the 22nd, who still kept their ground just behind the brink. In vain he ordered, objurgated, and implored them, to charge; a man shouted "Mr. McMurdo, is you don't leave off we'll shoot you." Up till this moment, in spite of their far heavier casualties, the Mirs' troops and a fair chance of victory: for Mir Jan Mahomed, as a member of one of the senior collateral branches of the Talpur house, known and respected for his bravery by the tribal sardars, might well by his example have got all to combine in a simultaneous onset. However, he fell; Mir Nasir Khan ordered Ghulam Shah Talpur, of the Shahwani clan, to take command in his place, but this chief was also killed shortly afterwards. Had the Baluchis tribesmen possessed the elements of discipline, and their sardars been kept under effective control, with cool and resolute direction, their host must have prevailed: but all three were wanting: the clans mustered together to shoulder along the bed of the Fuleli looked only to their own front. And so, undirected, the desperate velour of the Mir's feudatories spent itself in vain: their rushes were uncoordinated, mere individual efforts of tribal sardars leading a knot of devoted clansmen.

Even so, the slender line of the British was hard put to it to repel these repeated onslaughts: and while the fight was at its hottest the old General had ridden forward through the ranks of the 22nd, and, followed by Majors Waddington and Wyllie, passed slowly down the front of the line; an extraordinary apparition, bareheaded, with spectacles on eagle nose, grey whiskers singled by the wilder firing of his own men, and

stirred by the wind of matchlock balls, waving his jockey cap in the air, yelling and blaspheming. Twice he rallied the 22nd, but he could not make them charge; and he passed on to the 25th N.I.,. here he was almost alone in front of the line when a Baloch came over the bank, and came straight towards him: Napier had Sprained his wrist, punching the head of a delinquent camel man at Daulatpur, nine days before, and could hardly have defended himself: but Lieutenant Marston springing forward attracted the eye of the oncoming Baloch, and received his first cut on his brass palette: a return blow, was parried by the Baloch with his shield, but a sepoy advancing plunged his bayonet into his side, and Marston at the same time got over his guard with a final cut, being saved himself by another sepoy engaging a second Baloch warrior who was about to cut him down from behind. Napier remained where he was, moving down the narrow lane between two fires, and thrice rallied the 25th before returning to his old position. He had recognized that the crisis of the battle had come, and for a final effort sent three successive staff officers to order the cavalry on the left wing to charge.

**Napier at the Battle of Meeanee.**



From a Letter of Sir Charles Napier's.

When in the fight I held my life as gone; for as to escaping, all idea of that vanished when I saw the Twenty-second giving way and was obliged to ride between the fires of two lines not twenty yards apart. I expected death as much from our men as the enemy, and I was much singed by our fire; my whiskers twice or thrice so, and my face peppered by fellows who in their fear fired high over all heads but mine, and nearly scattered my brains. In agony I rode, holding my reins with a broken hand [he had sprained it a few days before] and quite unequal to a single combat, had a Beloochee picked me out, as one was about to do when Marston slew him.

New York Times Published:
January 28, 1900

During the course of the action the 9th Bengal Cavalry had moved over to the support of this flank from their first position behind the right of the line, and they were now about thirty yards behind the Grenadiers. While Sir Charles' messengers were yet on their way, this latter regiment fell into some confusion. Whether some order of Major Clibborn, commanding was misunderstood, or whatever the reason, is obscure: but a bugler was sounding the "retire"— and said he took it up "from someone else." Most of the sepoys went to the right about and it was only by great exertions of their officers that they were rallied and faced the foe again. The Baluchis manning the enclosures and Sultan Shah Village, encouraged by the appearance of a retrograde movement, following Jacob's retirement from his attempt to pierce the line on the other side of the village, showed themselves in numbers, as if about to attack. Captain Tucker, commanding the third squadron of the Bengal Cavalry, which was close behind and to the left of the Grenadiers, urged Napier's second-in-command, Li Colonel Pattle, to allow his squadron to advance and drive the Baluchis backs. The colonel a brave but somewhat unintelligent man hesitated for some time to give permission, not wishing to involve his regiment; that day

commanded by Major Stroey, deeply without orders. But Tucker persisting that a forward movement was essential to restore the fight on that flank, and that Sir Charles would certainly order it if he were aware of the position, Pattle at length acquiesced, and the left (3rd) squadron advanced at the trot and began to force the Baluchis back into the village. The Colonel himself rode towards the infantry line, and was met by Captain Thompson, coming hot foot with his message from the General. "How are you getting on?" asked Pattle: the Orderly Officer however ignored the query and communicated Sir Charles' orders. It seems that Pattle who was rather deaf, could not hear what was said in the din of battle, or thought that Thompson might just as well deliver the order to the Officer Commanding the Regiment as himself and replied: "Tell Storey, Thompson rode on, and communicated the order to major storey, who at once put the second squadron, under Captain Garrett, in motion. On his way back he met Major MacPherson, Napier's Military Secretary, who had just deliver still unsatisfied that Pattle realized that the order comprehended the whole of the cavalry, rode up Jacob, who was endeavoring to reform his men after his abortive attack on the left, still under fire from the village, and on ground which hardly permitted any formation, and shouted that he was wanted in front, and that the 9th had "refused to charge"—or "would not charge"—so the words sounded.

This was an exaggeration which did scant justice to the Bengal Light Cavalry: for their first squadron had now followed the third and second, and while Colonel Pattle, taking command of the two latter, gallantly attacked the enclosures of the village, the first, under Captain Wemyss, filed between the Grenadiers and the 12th N.I, and descending into the Fuleli began to disperse the Baluchis on its further bank.

Jacob, advancing in column at the trot, passed one squadron of the 9th dismounted and firing pistols into the village, while the remainder were driving the Baluchis in rear of it down the river bed to the left. Filing between the Cavalry and the left of the infantry line, Jacob led his men straight across the Fuleli, and deploying into line the further bank, charged full on the Mir's camp half a mile behind it. The camp was strongly manned by foot soldiers, who with sword and shield stood their ground and fought sternly: but the vigor of the charge was irresistible, and in the subsequent mellee the sabres and carbines of the Scinde Horse wrought havoc among the defenders; not till they were almost annihilated did resistance cease, leaving the camp, and Mir Nasir Khan's own standard, in the victors' hands.

The capture of the Mir's camp was decisive. Not only did their horse men, some 4,000 in number, who had been mustered in reserve under the Talpur Chief, quit the field without striking a blow; but the gallant tribesmen who had fought so devotedly in the river bed, not, flinching under the ceaseless scourge of grape-shot and musketry for more than an hour, still thrusting themselves on the bayonets to strike home with their swords, began to look over their shoulders as the direful news spread along their line They hesitated and with a shout of triumph the British, followed by the Bombay Infantry,

swept down into the river bed. Here the struggle still raged hand to hand; no quarter was given or asked but the Baluchis were giving, ground and losing cohesion.

The 9th Bengal Cavalry succeeded in their task—one more appropriate for infantry and artillery—of clearing Sultan Shah and its enclosures, and completely cutting of the right of the Baloch line; but at no light cost to themselves: among their officers, Brevet Captain Cookson was killed, and four others wounded, of whom Captain Tucker was shot in five places; many of their troopers also fell. The first squadron, having chased the retreating Baluchis far down the river bed to the left, now crossed over to join the Scinde Horse in the Mirs' camp: and just at that moment Major Waddington rode up to recall Jacob, who was rallying his men after dispersing the shattered garrison of the camp, to repel an alleged attack on the baggage in the rear. Te trumpets sounded the "retire," but FitzGerald, second in command of the Scinde Horse, could not or would not hear them, continuing in pursuit of the Mirs' retreating horsemen with one squadron, hunting and cutting them down for several miles. The news of the baggage being attacked proved a false alarm, and now the whole British line joined in a final advance. Mirs Nasir Khan and Shahad Khan, who had lingered in the field with a few attendants, saw that the day was lost, and made for Hyderabad; but even now the Baloch swordsmen did not take to flight, but gathering in knots some hundreds strong retired slowly, glaring back on their foes, and daring them to come on. Their right wing, which remained almost unscathed, also showed some disposition to reoccupy Sultan Shah and renew the struggle, and now at last some guns were trained on the village and enclosures to dislodge them. Napier also ordered up the rest of his artillery, which crossed the Fuleli; and as the grape began to play on them once more, the Mirs' levies, broken as a military body, but their individual spirit un-quelled, relinquished the struggle. The field of Miani was lost and won.

**2. *Previous Accounts of the battle.***

The best known accounts of the battle of Miani in published books are in the chronological order of their appearance, those by General William Napier, in "The Conquest of Scinde"; by Mr. Napier Bruce, in 'Life of General Sir Charles Napier": by Mr. Rice Himes, in "Four Famous Soldiers" and "Sir Charles Napier"; by Sir William Butler in "Sir Charles Napier": by Sir John Fortescure, in "History of the British Army," Vol. XII in various Regimental Histories; and by Sir Patrick Cadell, in "History of the Bombay Army."

Of these, the first is prized for its picturesqueness and vigour of style, so characteristic of the author; but it is inaccurate in many respects. Mr. Napier Bruce practically reproduced it, but added some interesting details which he was given by Sir Montagu McMurdo. Rice Hodmes, by making use of Major Waddington's account, of which more below, and consulting other survivors of the battle, drew a much truer picture of the battle, at the sacrifice of some of its romantic colouring; and his account has been the

basis of those given by Sir John Fortescue and Sir Patrick Cadell in their works on the British and Bombay Armies Rice Holmes notes, with some complacency, that when he read his final draft over to Sir Montagu McMurdo, the veteran declared that he was unable to detect a mistake. But no single officer present in the battle could see everything that was going on, and McMurdo was at first close to Sir Charles, and thereafter with his Regiment, constantly engaged, throughout the day. Rice Holmes, a most conscientious historian, also consulted other survivors, General Petrie of the Bombay Artillery, and General Phayre of the 25t Bombay N.I.; but other important sources of information, though available do not seem to have been tapped by him. These will be mentioned below; and of course there may still be first-hand accounts of the battle, in ephemeral publications and scarce volumes of memoirs, or buried in family correspondence, which have so far escaped the notice of authors. But so far as I have been able to ascertain, the available sources on the British side which may be called original are as follows:

(a) Sir Charles Napier's dispatch, with the subsidiary reports of officers commanding units engaged in the action. *(Reproduced in. "The Conquest of Scinde" Vol. II., Appendix VI, and "Records of the Scinde Irregular Horse," Vol. I.)*

(b) Major Waddington's account of the battle, and subsequent reply to the strictures upon it. *Published by Sir W. Napier. (Royal Engineers professional Papers, Vol. IX, 1847, etc.)*

(c) Numerous references by Sir Charles Napier in is Journal and letters, reproduced in "*The Life and Opinions of General Sir Caries James Napier" by Sir W. Napier, (Vol. II., pp. 320-330, 341, 345, 406, 417, 437-38, 442-3; Vol. III. page7, 16-17, 21, 30-31, 40, 80-82, 92, 189, 288, 314, 456; Vol. IV, 108-144).*

(d) Captain Henderson's report to the Adjutant, Madras Sappers and Miners, Bangalore, reproduced in Madras Sappers and Miners Bangalore, reproduced in Madras Artillery Records, Vol. VII, Miscellaneous.

(e) Captain John Jacob's account, in two private letters to his father dated 19th and 23rd February, 1843.

Of these, the first three were made use of by Rice Holmes, and his successors; and Sir Patrick Cadell drew my attention to No. (d). But Jacob's second letter, written less than a week after the battle, supplies much information that no other source gives; for instance, the details of his reconnaissance, of his attempt to turn the Baloch right flank and capture of the enemy's camp: and also gives a fresh view-point for the General picture—particularly the long interval between the arrival of the advance guard and the British attack, and the events on the left wing. He also seems to have obtained from his friend Hutt, of the Bombay Artillery, clearer details of the management of that Arm in the battle than figure in any other account. The original letter, in manuscript, was some

years ago presented by the late Major General A. Le G. Jacob, C.B, C.M.g., C.I.E,, C.B.E., P.S.O., to the officers of the Scinde Horse, of which Regiment he was Colonel. The regiment also possesses a fine picture of their charge at Miani.

Jacob's plan of the battle, which is given in the "Records of the Scinde Irregular Horse," is also valuable in that is shows the position of the Mirs' guns, and the direction in which the four British guns fired; and it seems to be more correct than Major Wadington's in regard to the position of the Mirs' right wing; and the extent to which he (Jacob) had penetrated on that flank. I have, however, reproduced Waddington's plant to accompany this paper, as it gives more details of the battle-field as a whole.

Jacob's account is in fact indispensable for an accurate appreciation of the battle; and it was because he had not read it that Rice Holmes fell into the two real errors that mar his description: one, that Jacob "rode up" and told Sir Charles that the ground on the further side of the "grove" was impassable, when he only found this out after the battle had begun: and secondly, that it was when beginning their charge on the Mirs' camp that the men of the Scinde horse suffered numerous falls, galloping across the nullahs; which in fact took place when Jacob was attempting to get through the impossible country on the further side of the village. Jacob's letter makes this latter point clear, though in his report the occasion of the contretemps might have been either.

***3. The battle as seen from the Mir's side.***

And what of Miani from the Baloch point of view? British authors have been content to build up their narratives from purely British materials; and for the purpose of a biography of Sir. Charles Napier or the History of a Regiment or an Army, this is natural enough. We have brief anecdotes of Mr. Howell, the Mirs' gunner, and of Abdul (Abdullah?) Shah, who fought in the Fuleli bed with his men, and afterwards took service under Napier, in the latter's journal. Sir Richard Burton Recorded the opinion of one Ibrahim Khan on the ineffectiveness of the Baloch artillery, and this finds a place—as a footnote—in Rice Holmes" biography of Sir Charles. And that is all.

In truth, there is no very detailed or scientific description of the engagement itself from the Baloch side; the interest of their chronicles lies mainly in the narrative of the events immediately before and after the battle. Of the actual fighting, their accounts in prose are brief, and are significant mainly in the confirmation they afford of particular incidents observed by British officers. The descriptions in verse are fuller, and of interest as recording the conduct of the various tribes engaged but as might be expected, are concerned chiefly with the deeds of particular warriors.

For these reasons I have not attempted to embody much of the available material from these sources in my own narrative of the battle: but they deserve to be put on record, if

only from the fact that these accounts appear to have been almost completely ignored heretofore.

I have referred to the following:-

(a) Mir Nasir Khan's letter to the Court of Directors, dated Sasur, September 22nd, 1843. (Sindh Blue book, supplementary, 1844: p. 128).

(b) Mir Yar Mahomed Khan's "I," written in 1857, and embodied by Mirza Kalich Beg in his *History of Sind*, Vol. II, Part II

(c) Munshi Awatrai's I; recorded by Rai Saheb Udharam Chandumal and Mr. Parmannand Mewaram.

(d) Seth Naomal Hotchand's I, edited by Sir. Evan James.

(e) Syed Ihsan Ali Shah's poem:

(f) The blind Manghanhar's poem on Miani.

(g) Notes of conversations with Mir Ali Bakhsh Khan Talpur, and other descendants of men who fought in the battle on the Mir's side.

Mir Rustum Khan Talpur

Of these, (a) (b) and (d) and are available in English. Mir Nasir Khan was the only one of the authors actually present in the battle, and his account is of the briefest. Its interest is chiefly in his mention of Jacob's reconnaissance, and his hopes that at the eleventh hour a collision might be averted.

Mir Yar Mahomed Khan, Nasir's younger brother, also mentions the reconnaissance. He gives the names of the commanders of the Baloch army as Ghulam Mahomed and Yakhtiar Lagharis, and Ghulam Shah and Jan Mahomed Talpurs, and declares that they declined to obey Nasir Khan's order that they should beat up Napier's quarters at Matiari on the 16th February. The ruling chiefs present in the battle on the next day were Mirs Nasir Khan, Shahdad Khan, and Husain Ali Khan of Hyderabad, and Mir Rustom Khan of Khairpur. Yar Mahomed gives the Baloch strength as 17,000 men and 11 guns.

Seth Naomal, who was in Karachi at the time of the battle, writes: "The Talpurs collecting their men advanced with an army of 30,000 strong to Miani, about four koss distant form Hyderabad, to check the progress of Sir Charles Napier, who had by that

time arrived at Hala. Sir Charles commanded a force of 2,500 fighting only but they were all well-disciplined and well-trained, while the army of the Amirs was a crowd of hastily collected and ill-experienced Balochis under unskillful generals, unacquainted with the tactics of war. The battle of Miani followed, in which the army of the Talpurs was defeated, and it fled. The Baloochis fought well and used the sword bravely, but they were all untrained otherwise."

The Memoirs of Munshi Awatrai, the Minister of Mir Sobdar Khan, are of extraordinary interest for the brief period in which the tragedy was played out; as he was an important actor in it, though not present in the battle, which he describes as follows:—possible from first hand information given by Hosh Mahomed Kambrani, a fellow servant of Mir Sobdar:—"The Mir' armies stationed themselves in the bed of the Fuleli canal where Napier Saheb launched an attack. This, however, proved abortive, as the bunds afforded full protection to the Baluchis against the bullets. Napier Saheb saw that he would not prevail that way, and that his efforts were in vain, and ordered his Risaldar, Jacob, who had about 1,000 cavalry under his command, to charge the Baluchis from the mouth of the canal. The Baluchis at once faced them, but all of a sudden the sowars stood on the bund, where they were taken by surprise by the troops of Sir Charles Napier, who was only waiting for the chance. Many Baluchis were killed, and others took to their heels."

This is interesting confirmation of Captain Tucker's statement, that the Baluchis appeared about to launch an attack on seeing the confusion in the ranks of the 1st Grenadiers, which we know took place at about the same time as Jacob's retirement from his attempt to penetrate the Baloch position to the east of the village; and agrees with the British view that the result of the battle was doubtful—Jacob says, "worse than doubtful,"—up to that moment.

Syed Ihsan Ali Shah, the author of the longer and better of the two poems, voices the Baloch opinion that they were winning up to the time when Jan Mahomed Khan Talpur fell:—

I am indebted to Mir Ali Bakhsh Khan Talpur, of Tando Nur Mahomed Khan, for so much information explanatory of the poem, with additional details, that these remaining sources may be discussed together.

The Baluchis usually call the battle of Miani, "Jan Mahomed's fight." His descendents, the Khanani Talpurs of Tando Jam, told me that he was shot in the neck by a pistol, though his death in the English accounts is ascribed to the swordsmanship of Montagu McMurdo. The chief who was then ordered to take over the general direction of the Battle, Mir Ghulam Shah, of the Shahwani Talpurs of Tando Mahomed Khan, was the same who had torn up the treaty in the tumultuous durbar of the Baloch chiefs on the night of the 14th February. After his death, which soon followed that of Jan Mahomed, it does not appear from the poem that any other commander was appointed; but when the

lashkar was giving way, Mir Shahdad Khan is said to have urged his uncle, Mir Nasir Khan, to lead a final charge; and the courtly writer describes great deeds of aims thereafter performed by Sahdad Khan. But a cannon ball killed Suleiman *khizmatgar*, who was in attendance on Mir Nasir Khan; and Mir Ali Bakhsh Khan informs me that both Nasir Khan and Shahdad Khan were struck by spent balls, which failed to penetrate the chain mail armour that they were wearing Nasir Khan nevertheless lingered in the field till among the last; with twenty horsemen: young Hussein Ali Khan quitted it about an hour earlier.

Of the minor branches of the Talpur House, the Chakranis Shahwanis, and Khananis were well represented, the former attending on Mir Rustom Khan: but the Bijaranis and Mahomedanis were absent, the latter saying afterwards that they had lost the way to the rendezvous. The Manikani Talpurs of Mirpur took no part.

Among the other Baloch tribes, the Nizamanis won the greatest renown; the Marris (Bagranis), Jamalis and Changs all fought bravely, the chief of the last named clan, Miro, being killed. Others who played their part well, were the Korais, Jatois, Gopangs, Chhalgiris and Lasharis: but the Rinds, Lagharis, Thoras were the first to break the line: and Bahawal Khan, Sardar of the Rinds, a little later snatched the "*Banchi*," a sort of standard, from Sumar, one of the Mir's *Khizmatgars*, and fled, followed by Ahmed Khan Laghari. As to the Bhurgris, the blind "*manghanhar*" who sang of Miani says that they should be given a basket of fish: meaning that they acquitted themselves more like Muhanas than Baluchis.

Of the non-Baloch tribes taking part, the small body of the Mirs' paid troops, the Khatian Pathans, fought stoutly, as did many of their *khizmatgars*, particularly Hosh Mahomed Kambrain. Several well-known Syeds and Pirs also fell honorably in the battle, for instance Fateh Mahomed Shah Lakhiari: and the Sumra and Khokhar tribes both did well.

***4. Anecdotes.***

The poets of Sindh were not alone in celebrating the courage of individual heroes of the fight in hyperbolic strains. Sir Charles Napier himself, though over sixty years of age when Miani was fought, was in some ways a boy at hart, and took the keenest pleasure in the deeds of arms of his officers and men. He had once written a Historical romance ("*Harold" published after his death by his brother*); and one suspects him to have been an enthusiastic reader of Sir Wailer Scott.

Captain Keith Young, who arrived in Sindh in September 1843, wrote after dining at Napier's table "the conversation, during and after dinner, struck me to be a great deal too much about the late actions in Scinde, as to great deal to much about the late actions in Scinde, as to what this man and the other did, and how many Beloochees were cut down.

I understand that the Scinde heroes are very much given to this kind of thing, and that Sir Charles is weak enough to be flattered with this 'Beloochee uniting,' as it is facetiously called here."

In Napier' s journal, this propensity breaks out once or twice: in a letter to his brother William, the skull-splitting feats of Wilkinson, Nixon, McMurdo and FitzGeral are retailed with evident gusto, and from the hands of the magniloquent Historian received fresh color, in "the Conquest of Scinde."

Of the officers of the Scinde Horse at Miani, William Napier wrote: "Captain Jacob, though slight of person, meeting a horseman at full gallop, passed his sword with such a foin through shield and body that the hilt struck strongly against the former. But the exploits of Lieut. FitzGerald of the Scinde cavalry made all who saw him in the fight marvel. Three or four had fallen beneath his tempestuous hand, when a Baloch, crouching as their custom is beneath a shield, suddenly stepped up on the bridle hand and with a single stroke brought the horse down dead. FitzGerald's leg was entangled by the fall, and twice did the elated Baloch champion drive his keen blade at the prostrate warrior: each time the blow was parried, and then, clearing himself from the dead horse, the strong man rose. The barbarian warned by the herculean form and countenance instantly cast his broad shield over his head which was likewise defined with a thickly rolled turban of many folds but Fitz Gerald's s sword in its descent went sheer through shield and turban and skull down to the teeth!"

We know from Richard Burton that there was endless joking among the officers in Sindh about these tales of the paladins; and FitzGerald himself is said to have disclaimed the stories of his exploits at Miani and Dubba.

Jacob whose own anecdotes of swordsmanship at Miani, the cutting off of a mounted Baluchis head at a single blow by one of his sowars, and the cutting in two of the lower jaw of another sowar's horse by a Baloch lying on the ground were told years afterwards, simply in support of his opinion that the curved sabre was far more effective in the hands of cavalry than the straight thrusting sword has some amusing comments on Sir William s stories. "Those anecdotes of FitzGerald and myself at Meeanee are unmixed invention. FitzGerald's horse was never killed or wounded (unless you call a scratch in the skin about 2 inches long a wound), and never fell with him; the fact is that FitzGerald cannot ride a bit, in fact he is an awful suck on a horse and fall off his saddle in the affray on the top of a Belooche on foot whom he was endeavoring to smite; they both rolled over together after which FitzGerald got up remounted and went on, not knowing to this day whether the man was hurt or not. Contrast this with the description in the General's History. As to my slaying a horseman as described it is about equally true I have had lots of fights with Beloochees on divers occasions and did once slay a fellow who was cutting at me something in the manner described, but the man was on foot and it so happened that at the battle of Meeanee I never struck a blow; indeed I do not think

it to be at all the duty of an officer to go about seeking for personal encounters, and think there is little merit shown by any amount of success in them. The value of an officer is shown by his skill and success in leading and directing the efforts of others, not in displaying his own personal prowess. But General Napier appears to suppose his whole merit to consist in cutting and thrusting."

But there was one individual officer's exploit at Miani, the merit and glory of which cannot be gain said and that was the saving of Sir Charles's life by Lieutenant Marston. Sir Charles bade his brother "Remember in your work to mention Lieut. Marston" and gave a vivid description of the incident. But this must have reached William Napier too late for inclusion in the book, in which his mention is of the briefest. As the account in the "Life and Opinions of Sir Charles James Napier" is available to all to read, I shall give here that by the late Mr. Charles Marston, of Nasik, son of Lieut. (afterwards General) Marston, who kindly allowed me to take a copy from his unpublished memoir of his father's life, written for his nephews, grandsons of the hero.

After describing how Marston cut down one Baloch in single combat in front of the line not far from the General, he proceeds: "At the same moment he saw another burly fellow come over the bank and look at Sir Charles, who was alone, and, made for him with long strides but grandfather said he never looked again. He ran and intercepted him just as he was going to cut at Sir Charles, and engaged him, and cut with all his might at his head; but he brought up his shield and guarded the blow, and then he cut at grandfather and he guarded it, and they exchanged one or two cuts: and grandfather then got over his guard and 'opened up,' and then he ran him through the heart and as he fell Sir Charles' remark was 'gallantly done!'; but another man had already come up from behind and had a clean sweep at grandfather's head missed his head and the blow fell on his shoulder, but fortunately his epaulette saved him, for it deflected the sword blade, he turned round to find a friendly soldier who came out of the ranks of the 22nd Regiment pushing his bayonet through his assailant's side, and at the same time he ran his own sword through his heart, and as Sir Charles Napier said 'the sword and bayonet shared the honour'. The only damage done to grandfather on this occasion was that the sword grazed his elbow and cut the cloth of his uniform coat, so he escaped lightly."

Mr. Marston records that after the battle, the henchman of the Bal Chief whom he had killed "brought the fallen hero's sword to grandfather and laid it at his feet and said. You slew my Sardar, this is his sword' it bears the words 'Sarkar Mr. Mahomed Nasir Khan Talpur in inlaid gold on the blade. The hilt is of inlaid gold leaf."

This is not the only sword, won that day by the gallant Marston, which is preserved by is descendants. He was presented with one of the regulation pattern by Sir Charles, with the following the following letter.

*"My Dear Marston,*

*Had you not stepped in front of me and engaged the Beloochee warrior who was about to charge me when I had too much to think of to engage in single combat I should probably have been cut down, and I think so able a swordsman as yourself ought to have a good weapon, one which, like your courage, will never fail in any trial. May you long cut and thrust with it, is the prayer of*

*Your affectionate and sincere fiend*
*C J Napier."*

Nine years later, Marston's father wrote to Sir Charles, then in retirement in England, asking for his help to obtain promotion for his son. The following is an extract from the old General's reply, dated Oak lands 23rd September 1852:

*"There is one claim, that your son has, and I should say that it is a strong one. He saw a huge Belooch with sword rose to fall on me, and attacking the man, received a blow on his shoulder fortunately his grenadier wings saved him. The same blow falling on me would have probably killed me, as I had less protection, and but one hand. Now had I been slain in the middle of the battle, when victory had favored neither side, I may say without disparagement to the second in command, that the result might have carried misfortune. Therefore I must say that in my opinion to have saved the life of his commander in the middle of a battle, or if not, that at all events to have prevented the commander from being disabled or unable to direct the troops, is a deed of gallantry which gives a man strong claims on the Government for the extra rank, a claim of no ordinary nature, and one to which this letter testifies……"*

One of Sir Charles Napier's greatest claims to fame was his constant care of the interests of the private soldier. Fortescue rightly says: "it was no mere accident that made Charles Napier the first general to mention the names of private soldiers in his dispatches." Those published after Miani by Lord Ellenborough, on 15th March 1843, reproducing reports from the officers commanding every unit in the little army, contain many instances of heroism which in these days would have been recognized by decorations. Among many Indian Officers and soldiers mentioned was Subadar Russall Singh of the 25th N. I., who shot three men, cut down one, and showed great zeal in encouraging and leading on his men: and Napier strongly endorsed Captain Hutt's recommendation of the unarmed drivers of his battery. We read also that Drummer Martin Delaney, of H. M's 22nd "shot, bayoneted, and captured the arms, of Meer Whullee Mahomed Khan, who was mounted, and directing the enemy in the hottest part of the engagement." This was probably a Khanani Talpur Sardar, brother of the Mirs' commander, Jan Mahomed. Sir Charles also wrote: "Three times when I thought the 22nd could not stand the furious rush of the swordsmen, Delaney sounded the advance, and each time the line made a pace or two nearer the enemy." Sir William Napier adds: "Here be it recollected that the

fighting was hand to hand, that each advance was under a descending sword and that to sound his bugle Delaney resigned all self defence."

A lighter touch is supplied by Colonel Pattle of the 9th Bengal Light Cavalry, who like his General was over sixty years of age at the time. Sir Charles writes: "He is as brave as a lion, and has all the quaint humor of Munchausen:- for example, he said to Mrs. McKenzie, Madam, at the battle of Meeanee I perpetrated such destruction that Sir C. Napier rode up and said: 'Colonel Pattle, deliver your sword! I cannot allow of such slaughter, even of an enemy.' I did deliver my sword, but continued to do as much execution with the scabbard." The old humorist was afterwards immortalized by "Aliph Cheem" as "Colonel MacMurther;" but as a slight disguise of the prototype's identity, the scene of the incident was transferred in the poem to the Indian Mutiny.

Napier paid high tributes to the courage of the Baloch warriors, "A 22nd soldier bounding forward, plunged his bayonet into the breast of a Beloochee; yet the firm warrior did not even reel; seizing the musket he writhed onwards, and with a blow swept his destroyer's life away: they fell dead together". "No quarter was given on either side, the wounded Beloochees fought as they lay on the ground". "They cannot indeed escape when beaten, but as to running, devil a bit they lounge off, as at Meeanee, slowly and indifferent to your musquetry, though vollied into their backs at five yards' distance! They are most determined fatalists, and most terrible swordsmen; they cut through everything."

Sir Montagu McMurdo also wrote: "The dexterity of the Belooch in parrying with his shield the point of the bayonet; the difficulty of thrusting it home when it did take effect, because of the ample folds of the cummerbund protecting the body almost to the armpits (in some instances the bayonets were twisted by the resistance) and lastly, the quick swinging cut of the sharp curved sword: these made the Belooch no mean antagonist for the single soldier; but in the melee of a charge, or even where two or three soldiers were together, the superior it of the bayonet was unquestionable." Captain Henderson also complained that his men found it impossible to make the bayonet-knife on the end of their fusils penetrate through the clothes worn by the enemy.

According to the late General Marston, "the 17th February 1843 was an abnormally hot day: so much so that many of the European soldiers died of sunstroke." They fought in their winter uniforms. He and the other officers wore forage caps, and he put two pocket handkerchiefs inside the crown of his cap to save himself from sunstroke." Sir Charles Napier wore a turban wound round his helmet. Twice during the battle the troops cheered him when he emerged through the thickest of the fight unharmed.

*5. Controversies about Miani.*

Controversy has raged over almost every act of Sir Charles Napier in Sindh, and the battle of Miani has not escaped. Sir William Napier wrote of the Sindh battles as reviving the glories of Grecy, Poitiers, Agincourt; while at the other end of the scale an author whom I have not been able to identify, but who was probably present in the battle refers to Miani as "a dispersing of what was little better than a vast mob".! "They had no discipline" he continued, "and bands of twenty men rushed out at a time with no order or method, only to impale themselves on the bayonet, or to be swept away by grape". The writer could hardly have been Jacob, for even in the height of his bitter controversy with the Napiers, he did not, so far as I am aware, disparage the battles. At the time he wrote to his father, "No one gave the Scinde warriors credit for so much pluck!" and speaks of Miani as "one of the severest battles on record in Eastern history" and "Altogether it was an honest hard stand up fight, and will not soon be forgotten on either side".

The Mirs' horsemen, indeed, were worse than ineffective: as has already been described, they fled, to the number of four thousand, without striking a blow; thought they may have suffered somewhat from Whitlie's guns. The bolder of those who came mounted to the rendezvous picketed their mares in the river bed, and fought on foot.

The quality of the Talpur Artillery at Maini can be gauged from the description given of each piece in the Return of captured Ordnance. Seven of the fifteen guns measured loss than three feet in length, and the bore of five of these was under two inches. Moreover, it is noted that the whole of the carriages of these canon were in such a state as to render them useless. Four years before, when Kennedy had seen them in the Fort at Hyderabad, in the days of Howell's Greek predecessor, they had appeared as likely to harm the gunners as the enemy, when fired. Mir Ali Baksh Khan Talpur tells me that they were brought out piecemeal, slung on camels like "*chakis*" to Miani and there rigged up in position as well as possible. Considering in addition Howell's unwillingness to fire at his countrymen, the Mirs' Artillery was more effective in the battle than could have been expected.

I am also informed by Mir Ali Bakhsh Khan that comparatively few of the tribesmen had any experience in firing match-locks, which were given out to them from the Mir's armory. They had been told to bring their own swords, the true Baloch weapon; and these they used effectively. But the same number of Afghans assembled at random would probably have done far more damage with their matchlocks.

Sir Patrick Cadell has well said, that the Baluchis lacked almost every military virtue except the great one of undaunted courage: and we need not quarrel with Sir William Napier for classing Miani with the English triumphs in the Hundreds Years' War. The latter were fought on the defensive: but they, like Miani, were won by superior fire-

power and discipline, over clumsy, uncoordinated hosts of individually brave men. On the other hand, the Napiers were in error in instituting comparisons between the comparatively bloodless Sindh victories, and the "butcher's bill" of Gough's hard-won fights that followed in Gwalior and the Punjab. The Marathans and Sikhs brought into the field European-trained infantry, Powerful artillery, and most effective cavalry.

***(a) Numbers engaged.*** — Outram, in his "Conquest of Scinde — a commentary" refrained from criticizing Napier s conduct of the battles in which he was not present but the progressive increase in the numbers of the Mirs army at Miani in the brothers writings, "*a la Falstaff*", provoked him. In a letter to his friend Jacob written on May 2nd 1845, he says" "By the way, how many of the countless host were actually engaged against our troops on that occasion? Cressy!!! Agin-court!!!" and again, on October 2nd, 1847, he speaks of "a little numerical superiority (for the rabble looking on from the other side of the Fullailee ought not to be counted, only the 'Tuggaras' and few others who occupied the Fullailee, who alone fought)." This statement is somewhat wide of the mark: but so was Sir Charles' assertion, adopted by his brother in "the Conquest of Scinde," that his actual order of battle mustered only a seventeen hundred and eighty sabres and bayonets.

Taking the British troops first, Jacob, writing to his father only two days after the battle, says: "Our force was composed as follows, the strengths mentioned are very nearly those of the Corps actually in the fight, after deducting baggage guards, etc:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 2 Comp. foot artillery | | 12 guns. |
| H.M. 22nd Regt. | .. | 526 |
| N.J.: 1st Grenadier | .. | 250 |
| N.J.: 12th Regiment | .. | 487 |
| N.J.: 25th Rest. | .. | 300 |
| 9th Bengal Cavalry | .. | 406 |
| Scinde Irreg. Horse | .. | 483 |
| Total | .. | 2,452 |

These figures he subsequently revised, in the notes on the plan drawn by FitzGerald from a survey by himself, which was published by Jas. Wyld, Charing Cross East, and figures in the Records of the Scinde Irregular Horse, Vol. I:—

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| C. Coy. Madras, Sappers and Miners | | 46 |
| H.M. 22nd Foot | .. | 606 |
| 1st Regt. Bombay N.J. | .. | 256 |
| 12th Regt. Bombay N.J. | .. | 540 |
| 25th Regt. Bombay N.J. | .. | 318 |
| Bengal 9th Light Cavalry | .. | 385 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Scinde Irregular Horse | .. | 395 |
| Total | .. | 2546 |

It should be mentioned that only ten of the British guns are shown in this plan, as drawn up in the first echelon position of the infantry line, in the following order from the right: — two nine-pounders; two twenty-four pounder howitzers; two nine-pounders; two six-pounders; and two twelve-pounder howitzers. There is nothing to show where the other two were, nor are the numbers of the artillery men included in the order of the battle.

Waddington's estimates, admittedly approximate, give the number of bayonets in the line as 1350, to which had to be added Artillery and Sappers, about 150, and 700-800 Cavalry.

It is therefore evident that the strength of the British actually engaged could not have fallen below 2,200 and much more probably reached 2,500.

As to the Mirs' forces, Napier's dispatch gives them as 22,000. Jacob's letter of 19th February, 1843, gives the figures 21,000, and he adheres to this in his notes on his plan. Sir Charles declared that after the battle he obtained "Belooch returns of close upon twenty-six thousand warriors, signed by the Chiefs; each stating his force, and they all try to reduce their numbers to reduce the disgrace." I do not think that such returns were ever published, but Napier in a letter to Lord Ellenborough dated July 1st, 1843, gives the figure of 25,862 Meanwhile "evidence received from the family of the Ameers" — perhaps the statement elicited by Captain Rathborne from Pir Budrudin, Sobdar Khan's confidential servant — gave 35,000 as their numbers at Miani, which, Sir Charles triumphantly declares, is what the best of his spies reported at the time. Nevertheless, the figure given in his dispatch — 22,000 — may well be adopted as most likely to have been correct.

***(b) Losses on each side: —*** The casualties on the side of the British are, of course, exactly known. They amounted to 62 killed and 194 wounded, the total of 256 being a little more than one-tenth of the numbers actually in the fight. Six British officers were killed, and thirteen, with three Indian Officers, wounded. The losses in officers were heaviest in H.M.'s 22nd, the 9th Bengal Light Cavalry, and the 12th Bombay N.I. Among the other ranks, the 22nd had 23 killed and 49 wounded the 9th Cavalry 3 killed and 29 wounded; the 12th, 12 killed and 45 wounded (it is interesting to note that Jacob, writing on the 23rd February says: "The 12th suffered most severely of any, and indeed are said to have borne, the brunt of the fight," and the 25th 16 killed and 28 wounded. The Scinde Horse suffered 17 wounded; Jacob in the letter already quoted, says that several had subsequently died. The 9th Cavalry had nine horses killed and 35 wounded; the Scinde Horse 23 killed and 21 wounded. The difference between the losses of the two cavalry Regiments may be ascribed to the assault by the 9th dismounted on the village, and the slower speed, compared with Jacob's, of their mounted attack.

The losses of the Mirs' host were fearfully severe. The names of nearly twenty chiefs who were killed occur in the poems mentioned above: and at least six of these were Talpurs. Others could probably be found in the "History of Alienations," among the *Jagirdars*" families. As to the rank and the file of the tribesmen, Sir Charles Napier in his dispatch says the casualties were generally supposed to be five thousand, but later, in response to further inquiries from his brother, he wrote "all the Beloochees said, and still maintain, that eight thousand were killed and wounded." Sir William gives the figure as six thousand, in "The Conquest of Scinde", and so does Jacob in the notes to his plan. The latter, writing on the 19th February, says that 1,400 of the Mirs' men were left dead on the field, and that they had about four times that number wounded. Four days later, he writes: "We now know from the Ameers themselves that including those carried away and those who have died since of their wounds, not less than 5,000 were killed". Jacob says he actually counted two heaps of the Baloch dead in front of where the 22nd had fought of 80 and 50 bodies. This agrees fairly well with the observations of "two officers, I think Pelly and Fitz-Gerlad" quoted by Sir Charles, who adduced the gruesome details to confute Major Waddington, whose estimates in his published memoir of the battle were much more modest. Waddington speaks of 400 dead in the bed of the Fuleli, "and probably as many more different parts of the field and the *Shikargah*, killed by the artillery and cavalry;" and adds that as quarter could not be given (the Baluchis, not expecting it, defending themselves to the last, and making it impossible to spare them) the number of wounded did not probably much exceed the number of killed He admits that the Balochi accounts made their loss much greater, and that it was possible that some bodies might have been removed during the night after the battle. Rice Holmes, Fortescue, and Cadell have inclined to Waddington's opinion, taking 2,000 as the probable figure of the Baloch casualties; and we may dismiss the subject with the hope that the lowest estimate may have been the truth.

It must be recorded, to the eternal credit of the Mirs' feudatories that according to Mir Nasir Khan, ten thousand, including many survivors of Miani, rallied to him that very night: and we know that many who had survived the ordeal joined Mir Sher Mahomed, to fight at Dubba.

***(c) Napier's orders to the Cavalry: —*** In adhering, in my account of the battle, to Waddington's version of the order of events, which was the question most keenly disputed between him and Sir William Napier, I may be incorrect in ignoring what Rice Holmes calls evidence which proves that the order was delivered to Pattle before Tucker addressed him." I rely upon the letters of Tucker and Thompson, and the fact that Sir Charles himself declares that he sent three officers with the same order, Thompson being the first of the three. It is clear that the effect of Thompson's communication of the order to Major Storey was to put the 9th Cavalry as a whole in motion: the squadron commanded by Captain Garrett, which is particularly mentioned, being the 2nd Squadron. It is equally clear from Captain Tucker's letter that he obtained Paule's

permission to advance with his own squadron — the 3rd — before any other part of the Regiment moved.

But be the facts as they may, we may agree with Waddington's remark: "I cannot understand how Sir C. Napier is robbed .... of all the merit of the conception of that brilliant movement; for he gave the order in complete ignorance of its having been already partly carried into execution". He held that credit should be given to Tucker for seeing the crisis simultaneously with the General.

In his dispatch, Napier accorded the honour of having decided the battle to "the Cavalry of the left wing." Jacob, in his letter of the 23rd February, says, in reference to his own Regiment, "Our charge decided the battle: the General told me so on the ground." It does seem probable that the capture of the Mirs' camp and the dispersion of their numerous mounted reserves by the Scinde Horse were what finally shook the resolution of the Baluchis in the Fuleli, rather than the penetration of their line, and consequently isolation of their right wing, by the advance of the Bengal Cavalry. But as it was the latter who began the movement, and were the first portion of the British Force to break into the Baloch position, it is but just that they should share the honour equally with the Scinde Horse.

The Napiers' later commendation of Fitz Gerald at the expense of Jacob is an instance of spite overcoming judgment: while Jacob, with the assistance of his Adjutant, Lieut. Russell, reformed greater part of his Regiment after charging through the Mirs' camp, when his men were excited to the highest pitch, and so was ready when required to repel an expected attack on the rear guard, FitzGerald, not hearing the trumpets, went on in pursuit for several miles, until coming on a large body of Horse who had not been engaged he was obliged to retire. It was the difference between Cromwell and Prince Rupert over again.

***(d) Duiation of the battle:—*** Sir William Napier says that the struggle continued for four hours and Sir John Fortescue writing his account after the publication of Rice Holmes work, adheres to this figure But Waddington's calculations are irrefutable considering the battle to have begun when the British Artillery opened fire at about 11 a.m. it lasted for two and a half hours the close fighting being from 12 noon to a little after 1 p.m. These times have been adopted by Sir Patrick Cadell. But taking the time from when the Mirs army opened fire on the Sindh Irregular Horse, on whom they inflicted casualties, four hours would be an underestimate: for the British infantry line was formed at 9 a.m., and Jacob and his men were in position and under fire for at least an hour before that. But this would hardly amount to "three and a half hours of rugged battle".

***(e) Class Composition of H.M s 22nd Regiment —*** William Napier says "This battalion was composed entirely of Irishmen," — a statement perhaps based on a remark of Sir Charles in a letter to Captain John Kennedy written just before the battle "I have one

British Regiment the 22nd, Magnificent Tipperary! I would not give the specimens for a deal just now." 'The Nappiers' predilection for Irish troops is well known, and Sir Patrick Cadell drew my attention to an instance of even greater perversion of the facts by Sir William in Vol. VI of the Peninsular War.

Jacob in a rough sketch-plan enclosed with his letter to his father dated 23rd February shows the guns which could not be brought up to the front drawn up one behind the other along the *Shikargah* wall. A few of them would have been of infinite service on the other flank, where Napier expected the 1st Grenadiers, with less than 250 bayonets, to storm the village and enclosures strongly occupied by the enemy. This was fit work for artillery preparation, and with four guns so employed the battle might certainly have been won sooner, and with less cost to the British infantry and cavalry. But even if Napier had wished to make such dispositions, the paucity of them were with their four guns on the brink of the Fuleili. There was no time to think of improving a position which taxed all their energies and skill to maintain.

Napier fully recognized his debt to the Artillery and Sapers. Writing to Lord Elleborough on September 15th, 1843, he says: "Let me now point out that there are, still un-promoted, to the great regret of everyone Captains Hutt and Henderson. The first, with great resolution, and difficulty got his guns on to a perilous lit rise of ground at Meeanee, the Belooch mass being in a hollow a few yards off: Henderson with his Madras Sappers fought desperately to protect these guns while being so placed. These officers were conspicuously cool and courageous, and very terrible to the enemy, but Hutt was the most conspicuous from the great destruction he dealt. Captain Whitlie's two guns dealt with the enemy in front, but Hutt's guns swept the columns endeavoring to turn our right flank and Henderson's sappers broke down part of the park wall, under cover of which the Baloch columns were getting round us, and through that breach Hurt checked their progress."

Napier has also been criticized for walking into a trap at Miani. Sir John Fortescue, basing his account of the battle on that of Rice Holmes, goes further than that author in his assertions that Sir Charles completely mistook the real nature of the Baloch position. He says "How far Napier was to blame for this it is not easy to say. It seems strange that no guide should have told him of the course of the Fuleli, and considering that he mistook the reserves of the Baluchis for their front line, it is not quite clear why a staff officer or, two or even a line of skirmishers, should not have been pushed forward to examine the ground over which he purposed to advance." This last remark is made obviously in complete ignorance of the fact of Jacob's reconnaissance. But what information did Jacob send back? McMurdo says positively that Sir Charles "was not aware of the existence of the loop, nor even of the exact situation of the Fullaillee in front — till the line got close enough to see the heads of the enemy above the bank" — and this was when the British line was committed to its final advance. The question therefore is, was Jacob at fault? From the letter to his father of February 23rd, 1843, one would infer

that he had realized that the main position of the Balochis was in the bed of the Fuleli. But this may have been wisdom after the event. He says: 'I went myself to within about 200 yards of their line, upon which they fired matchlocks both from the village and *Shikargah,* showing both to be occupied and their dispositions complete; having well observed their position and strength I sent a note back to the General about them."

It should be remembered that the Mirs' cannon were grouped at intervals along their front, and probably had men clustered round them: and though in cutting their firing-stop in the northern bank of the Fuleli the Baluchis probably threw up the earth in front, this channel, being originally a natural branch of the Indus, had not the high spoil-banks which at once indicate the line of an artificial canal. Its line at this point is not doubtless was not at the time of the battle, distinguishable from .a few hundred yards' distance. We do not know the contents of Jacob's note: but he could not have made a closer reconnaissance. On the other hand, one must agree with Fortescue that it was strange that Napier's guides did not tell him of the bend in the Fuleli

***7. Topography of the field of Miani, a hundred years after the battle:***

It is a matter for satisfaction, considering that the battlefield of Miani is in the alluvial plain of Sindh, which has been developed so much by improvements in irrigation during the century of British Rule, that comparatively few topographical changes have taken place since the battle was fought, although no calculated efforts have been made, so far as I am aware, to preserve its character.

Two pillars have been erected to mark the right and left of the British attack. The *Shikargah* on the right was happily retained as a Reserved Forest — Belo Kathri — and its boundary, a trench and raised bank follows exactly the line of the *Shikargah* wall. The pillar on this flank is, of course, where this meets the Fuleli, and the ground where the artillery was brought into position is still somewhat raised above the general level of the plain.

The loop of the canal in which The Baloches took up their position was eliminated by a Chord nearly a mile to the south, as long ago as 1857, when the first improvements to the Fuleli were undertaken its bed has been raised considerably by a century cultivation, but it is still perfectly distinguishable.

The pillar on, the left is on the high bank of the Nao Kamal Wah "karia", now superseded by Barrage system, to the S.S.E. of the village. This must mark the point to which the 2nd squadron of the 9th Bengal Cavalry advanced down the Fuleli.

The actual infantry front along the Fuleli bank measures a mere 200 yards between the village and the *Shikargah:* a convenient length for the 1,400 bayonets which Napier brought into line.

**Mosque built by Talpur family near the grave of Mir Jan Mohomed Khan Talpur.**
***Photo taken by Sani H. Panhwar in January 2009***

The most conspicuous landmark is the tomb and mosque of Mir Jan Mahomed Khan Talpur, which his family erected "with a warlike vanity, where he fell in the bottom of the Fullaillee, but sixty yards beyond the British lines, where he never penetrated." The British monument is an obelisk "Erected by Major-General Sir C. J. Napier, G.C.B., and the Officers, N.C.O's, and soldiers of the British Army under his command, in memory of their comrades, who fell in the battles of the 17th February and 24th March 1843, fought with the Ameers of Scinde." It is a little to the West of the position where the British encamped after the battle, south of the Fuleli, and bears the names of all who fell in the two battles. Here those who were killed at Miani are buried.

The "shallow green bed of a watercourse" which bounded the field to the Eastward is still much as it must have been at the time of the battle. Till recently, the Nao Kamal Wah karia followed it. The jungle and broken ground beyond it are just as impracticable for

cavalry now as then with the addition of a perennial Barrage canal, running from North to South to the East of the village: this roughly follows the line of one of the scarped channels surmounted by Jacob in his abortive attack.

**Graveyard of Talpurs Ameers next to the Mosque above is looked after by Talpurs of Tando Jam.**
***Photo taken by Sani H. Panhwar in January 2009***

Sultan Shah village is surrounded by some magnificent old Nim trees, which must have been in existence in 1843. In fact, the descendent of the owner of the village of those days, one Ali Shah, showed me a mark on the huge trunk of one of the trees which he declares was caused by a cannon ball — presumably when Napier turned part of his artillery on the village to clear it of the last of its defenders, at the end of the battle. There are two more small villages to the north of Sultan Shah, which is now known as Pahilwan Shah, which did not exist a century ago: but with the jungle round them they roughly coincide with the enclosures and jungle shown on Waddington's plan.

Nowadays there is a certain amount of cotton cultivation near the villages, and Jan Mahomed's tomb and wheat is grown in the bed of the Fuleli: but the ground over which the British approached the scene of the struggle is exactly as described by Waddington: "a narrow plain, dotted with low sandy hillocks and camel bushes." I have stood on what I believe to be the very sand hill from which Sir Charles Napier took his first survey of the Baloch position, at about a mile's distance: and hard it is to make out much distinctly, looking into the sun, as one must at that time of day.

The *Shikargah* on the right bank of the Fuleli, where it runs both to south parallel with the original line of advance, is now Miani Forest Reserve: and here, in the Hatri Forest bungalow, originally a hunting lodge of the Mirs, is preserved a plan of the battle by Captain Henderson.

For those curious in matters of detail, I may add that the two canals which delayed the march of the main army from Matiari were the Sarfaraz Wah and the Gurk Wah, now

both superseded by the Barrage Canals: and the village where Napier first formed up the Advance Guard, on hearing the sound of the Mirs cannon — probably a signal to their men to assemble and take up their positions — was Tando Syed Khan Laghari.

To the country people, the battle is know as Jan Mahomed's fight.

*Concluding observations:*

Most of the units engaged on the British side at Miani still remain in the Army Lists, and all added to the laurels won on that memorable day. The 22nd is better known as the Cheshire Regiment, while the 25th Bombay Native Infantry beloved by Sir Charles, has become the 5th Battalion (Napier's) 6th Rajputana Rifles. These two Regiments, which fought side by side in Sindh, have ever afterwards exchanged annual congratulatory messages on Miani day. The 12th Bombay Native Infantry, after various changes in designation, became the 5th Battalion 4th Bombay Grenadiers in 1892, but was disbanded next year. The 1st Grenadier N.I., are now the 1st Battalion, 4th Bombay Grenadiers. The present titles of the Scinde Irregular Horse and the Poona Auxiliary Horse are the 14th Prince Of Wales' Own Scinde Horse, and the 17th Queen Victoria's Own Poona Horse. The 2nd Company 2nd Battalion Bombay Foot Artillery are represented by No. 6 Medium Battery, Royal Artillery, but the 3rd Company 3rd Battalion Golandaz was reduced, with similar units, in 1870. The Madras Sappers and Miners remain, as Queen Victoria's own Madras Sappers and Miners.

**Laurel built by Sir Charles Napier near Miani in the honour of his soldiers who died in the war**
***Photo taken by Sani H. Panhwar in January 2009***

The hours accorded to Sir Charles Napier and the officers who fought at Miani also recognized their conduct at the battle of Dubba, or Hyderabad, and will be more appropriately noticed after giving an account of that battle. So far as the Corps are concerned the Governor General's dispatch of 5th March 1843 authorizes the bearing on their appointments, standards, and colours, of the battle honour "Hyderabad, 1843" (subsequently changed to "Meeanee") by all units except the 1st Grenadiers. This omission may have been due to some unofficial letter from Sir Charles: in his dispatch he merely said: "The Grenadiers under Major Clibborn, owing to a misconception of orders, were but slightly engaged." The omission seems unjust, considering that the Poona Horse, who received the Honour, were not engaged at all, while the Grenadiers suffered five casual ties. In the same order, Ellenborough directed that the Regiment of Scinde

Horse on its existing establishment should be permanently attached to the Army of Bombay.

The same Corps received further honors specifically for Miani, when in separate orders dated 8th March and 13th March respectively, Ellenborough appointed John Jacob as his Honorary Aide-de and requested Napier to present to the Regiment the standard they had taken from the enemy.

This is not the place to consider Miani in its relationship to Napier's diplomacy and Ellenborough' policy. Its glory is the military glory of the General who dared huge odds, and of the troops who met them with unbending resolution. And though defeated, the Baloch Sardars and their men partake in the glory of courage and endurance. More than this:— Whoever Napier's correspondent was who wrote "I wish you had not been opposed to men fighting for their independence," was right; though Napier declared that he fought for the liberties of the people, and that even the Baluchis were glad a good master for a bad one. They found, in the event, that their Jagirs were secured for them: but it was not only to preserve their lands that they drew the sword. They fought for the honour of their Race; to right the grievous wrongs inflicted on the aged Mir Rustum Khan; to break the galling yoke of foreign domination. When the call came, at the eleventh hour, they flocked to their Rulers' standards from far and near: and the loyalty and devotion that evoked such a response is no more to be belittled than the unflinching valour with which they vainly fought. Requiescant omnes in Pace!

***Darang, 12th December 1942.***

# THE SINDH BATTLES, 1843

## II. HYDERABAD

**By: H. T. Lambrick, I.C.S.**

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On the day that the battle of Miani was fought, Mir Sher Mahomed Khan Talpur, the independent Prince of South-eastern Sind, was only six miles away, with a force which amounted probably to seven thousand or eight thousand men. It is unlikely that he had any intention of joining his cousins of Upper and Lower Sindh in opposing Napier, who had no quarrel with him; and he was not on good terms with any of the Hyderabad family except Mir Sobdar, who on the advice of his Minister Munshi Awatrai had determined to adhere to his policy of non-resistance, having nothing to lose by acceptance of the treaty, but on the other hand every hope of being constituted Rais of Lower Sindh. Early on the morning of the 18th February, Sobdar sent Awalrai to Napier's camp to assure him of his friendship and declared that he had taken no part in the hostilities. The General desired Sobdar's emissary to express his satisfaction and to bring in all the belligerent Mirs to surrender in person before noon, failing which Hyderabad itself would be attacked. Meanwhile a vakil arrived from Sher Mahomed desiring to be informed of the General's intentions towards him. After consultation with Outram, Napier wrote in reply. "If you disperse your troops and keep no one with you, I shall reckon you just the same as before". The vakil was still in the camp when Mirs Nasir Khan Shahdad Khan, and Hussein Ali Khan came in and surrendered, and witnessed the release of the last named by Sir Charles, at Outram's instance. He was also aware of the General's direction to Mir Sobdar, sent back with Awatrai, to be at his ease and look after the Fort and town of Hyderabad; and returned with this intelligence to his master. Sher Mahomed withdrew, but decided to watch events a little longer before disbanding his levies.

On the 19th, the British army encamped at the ruined Residency, and here Mir Rustom Khan, one of his sons, and his nephew Mir Nasir Khan also surrendered, and were installed in a walled garden adjoining the ground occupied by the troops, entrenchment of which was immediately begun. Napier had for some time past intended to form a new base on the river Indus; and on becoming assured that hostilities were inevitable, on the 15th February, he had written to Col. Roberts at Sukkur to send reinforcements and supplies down to him by water. On the 21st, immediately after Outram had left for Bombay, the General having ordered Mir Sobdar to send away all armed Baluchis from the Fort, town and suburbs of Hyderabad, sent the 12th N.I. and Captain Hutt's battery,

under the command of Colonel Pattle to occupy the Fort and unfurl the Standard of England on the round tower. This force was accompanied by Prize-Agents, who soon took possession of the Mir's treasures, and proceeded also to lay hands on their personal household belongings, no distinction being made between State and private property. Under Napier's orders, however, the ladies were allowed Jewelry and private property as they could carry in palnquins, without search.

Evidence having been received from Karachi that Mir Mahomed Khan had joined with Mir Nasir Khan in ordering hostilities, and, as it was known that his men had fought in the battle, this Chief was also, on February 23rd, "invited to join his brethren affliction in the garden": and next day the bedridden Sobdar was also conveyed thither, "it appearing from records shown by the other Ameers, that 5,000 soldiers, under the orders of Meer Sobdar Khan, had been present in the fight at Meeanee". Meanwhile, there was considerable looting going on, apart from the ordered proceedings in the Fort, (by the beginning of March regular auctions were being held to convert its miscellaneous contents into cash) and on the 9th March, Napier was compelled to issue orders that any soldier or camp follower found over a mile from the Camp without a pass would be apprehended and treated as a plunderer; observing that such conduct would "not only prevent the Beloochees from becoming our friends, but turn the Scindeans against us."

The fighting men among the Baluchis had, in fact, been rallying to the standard of Mir Sher Mahomed ever since Miani and he was well informed as to the proceedings at Hyderabad. On hearing of the arrest of the Talpurs who had taken no part in the battle, particularly Mir Sobdar, his close friend, to whom a reassuring message had been sent by the General in the presence of his own *vakil,* he felt little disposed to dismiss his followers and make his sub mission as ordered. Sir Charles had written to him on 3rd March "you are rallying the defeated Beloochees: you have increased the number of your troops; and unless you come to my camp at Hyderabad and prove your innocence, I will march against you, and inflict a signal punishment on you." But by this time Sher Mahomed had heard of the seizure of the Mirs'. private property, and the treatment meted out to their protesting servants it must have seemed to him that surrender, and the tendering of innocence, were not likely to secure him from a similar fate. He therefore determined to make himself as strong as possible, and borrowed a lakh of rupees from Mir Nasir Khan's wife (that lady having turned to good account the three days' grace before she left the Fort) in the hope that a non-committal attitude, backed by an imposing force, would obtain for him better terms. The Baluchis were with him to a man, longing for a second trial of strength with the British, and the country-folk his active sympathizers, for Sher Mahomed was the most popular prince in Sindh. Bands of Baluchis successfully attacked the steamer coaling station at Vikkar in the Delta, and the Agha Khan's camp at Jherruck: this Dignitary, lately a guest of Mir Nasir Khan, having made friends with Napier, had been requested by him to secure the communications with Karachi. These later were, in fact, maintained by the agency of Seth Naomal, by a different route: and Napier took occasion to summon from Karachi supplies and every

detachment that could be spared. The daks with Bombay *via* Cutch were however interrupted by Sher Mahomed's men: the Jokhio and Karmati Chiefs did their best to carry out the orders issued by the Hyderabad Mirs before Miani: and guerilla warfare seemed likely to spread.

Napier's position was, in fact, very vulnerable at this time, had his enemies possessed military qualities beyond courage in actual band to hand fighting. He had been forced to divide his little army in order to garrison the Fort his camp was not fully entrenched, and would need a further detachment to guard it if he left it to take the offensive, not only as being his base on the Indus, but owning to the presence of the captive Talpurs. On the other hand, the armed steamers of the Indian Navy secured him command of the River, and he only had to wait for reinforcements from Sukkur and Karachi; having thrown away the opportunity of making use of H.M.'s 41st Regiment, which Outram had halted for him on its way to Karachi it was no longer within reach, but Ellenborough, with equal foresight and promptitude, had sent troops from Ferozepoor to Sukkur as soon as he heard of the outbreak of hostilities.

Sir Charles' chief anxiety was the daily increasing heat; this he had to balance against the advantages of playing the waiting game, which would bring him his reinforcements, exhaust Sher Mahomed's treasury, and encourage him to approach nearer to Hyderabad, when he would be easier to deal with. On the 15th March, Sher Mahomed was in fact within twelve miles of the city, with a very large force: he sent a blustering message informing Napier that if he released his prisoners and disgorged his plunder, he would allow him to evacuate the country unmolested. The evening gun sounded at the moment the Mir's envoy had delivered his ultimatum, and the General told him that was his answer.

In his Anxiety, Napier was exasperated by the complaints of the captive Talpurs, against whom interested parties, seeing the lie of the land, worked upon his credulity with every conceivable allegation. He was led to believe that, though under the strictest surveillance; they were in constant communication with Sher Mahmoed; and on the 18th threatened them in a savage letter that he would put them in irons on a steamer if they did not remain quiet. On the same day he went out on a reconnaissance with the Scinde Horse and the Bengal Cavalry, to divert Sher Mahomed's attention from the approaching reinforcements; and to show him that he was not afraid of leaving his entrenched position — which, indeed, he had not regularly occupied, lest his army should lose confidence in themselves. He found signs that the Mir intended to give battle, and on the 20th again reconnoitered the position that he occupied at Tando Jam. All, which he found very strong, and not unlike Miani. On his return, he received a message from Major Stack, who had reached Hala on his march down from Rohri with a small brigade consisting of the 1st Troop Bombay Horse Artillery, the 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry, and the 8th Bombay Native Infantry. Stack had been ordered to reach Hyderabad with all, possible expedition, and had arrived unmolested at Hala when he received a note from

Clibborn, Napier's Intelligence Officer, sent without the General's knowledge, "Halt for God's sake! You will be attacked by at least forty thousand men tomorrow". Stack sent the messenger back for further instructions. Napier was at dinner with his Staff when the letter arrived, and partly as a rebuke to Clibborn, partly to inspire confidence, scrawled a reply on it and passed it round the table, to the amusement of the company, "Clibborn's men are all in buckram - come on". Nevertheless, he thought it very probable that Sher Mahomed would attempt to intercept Stack, and gave orders for McMurdo, to meet him at Matiari next day with a squadron of cay- airy. That evening he issued a General Order to the troops, announcing his intention to march against Sher Mahomed on the 24th.

On the morning of the 21st, McMurdo left with a squadron of the Poona Horse under Captain Tart Napier had now almost given up hope of the other reinforcements summoned from Sukkur, and from Karachi, arriving in time: but that afternoon to is surprise and delight two fleets of boats came insight from up an down stream almost simultaneously. Those from Sukkur carried the 21st Bombay Native Infantry, with several guns, while from up the river came a reinforcement of Artillery Officers and men exactly what he most wanted.

Meanwhile McMurdo had joined Stack at Matiari, whence the column marched on the morning of the 22nd. In his anxiety to reach Napier, Stack outstripped his baggage: after passing the field of Miani Sher Mahmed's Baluchis were seen on the skins of a Shikargah to his left front, and subsequently advanced on the left rear of the column. McMurdo held them at bay with some of the Poona Horse, and obtained the help of a troop of the 3rd Cavalry: the Baluchis were eventually driven off by a sharp cannonade of Leslie's Artillery, which McMurdo had to call for from the head of the column: for Stack still pressed onwards towards Hyderabad. He had sent word to the General, who dispatched Jacob with the Scinde Horse to reinforce him: they arrived about the time when the firing ceased and formed the rear guard into camp Napier himself met the column before it reached Hyderabad, with a troop of the 9th Cavalry and two nine pounders, and the whole arrived safely in camp late that night.

Sir Charles gave the new arrivals a rest on the 23rd which he employed in rearranging his order of battle. He assigned the care of the Fort of Hyderabad to the recruits and organized sailors and Marines from the Indian Navy ships together with convalescent soldiers, some of Mir Ali Murad s men and the Agha Khan s retainers who had survived their mishap at Jherruck into a garrison about eight hundred eight hundred strong with two guns for the entrenched camp. The captive Talpurs were placed on board the armed steamers, in charge of the Indian Navy

For his Field Force there remained at his disposal some 5,000 men including about 1,100 cavalry, with seventeen guns. When the brigading of the troops was complete that evening. Napier drew up the whole in front of the camp, and put them through a few evolutions. While they were thus standing under arms, vakils from Sher Mahomed

arrived, with a final summons to him to surrender, He led them along the line, and bade them go and report to their master what they saw: but they sought a full hearing, and it was not till 2 a.m. that they were dismissed, with a letter to Sher Mahomed demanding his unconditional surrender, if he chose to meet him as he advanced at the head of 'his army.

Already, on the evening of the 23rd, Napier had moved over the Fuleli an force, consisting of the Madras Sappers and Miners, two regiments of Native Infantry, and two eight inch howitzers: and they were joined by the General with the main body of the army before sunrise on the 24th. He had just received dispatches from Lord Ellenborough announcing the annexation of Sindh, and expressing his thanks to himself and the troops for the victory of Miani, sanctioning Regimental Honors, and promising them to individuals. Napier had the Governor-General's orders communicated to the troops, and felt the assurance of another victory in their cheers.

The troops now marched in order of battle, the Advance Guard, as before Miani, being led by the Scinde Horse. Behind them were the Madras Sappers, to cut down the banks of canals for the passage of the Artillery. Napier's last intelligence of Sher Mahomcd's position was that he was either at Husri, Dubba, or Tando Jam Ali: and the march was first directed on the last named, nearly due east of Hyderabad, all three places being within ten miles. The country beyond the Fuleli was much interrupted by canals cuts from it, running with a general direction from north to south: and these had such high banks that a man on horse-back could not see over them. There were also numerous villages, groves, and gardens: the advance was therefore made with a screen of cavalry to the flanks, as well as in front, of the compact column, of infantry and guns. After covering four miles, a peasant told them that the Baluchis had shifted their position, and were some two miles to the northward. Sir Charles at once sent the Scinde Horse off to reconnoiter, ordered the rest of the Advance Guard to join the column, and changed its direction to the left. Jacob soon discovered Sher Mahomed's position, which ran nearly north and south, and formed line within gunshot, sending back word to the General, who was close on his heels. The Baloch artillery now opened fire with eleven guns, and the Scinde Horse once more had to endure a constant cannonade while the rest of the army came up. The ordeal was not as protracted as at Miani: the head of the column was soon in sight, and Napier himself brought each corps into line, as (he says) even his Brigade commanders were officers of the rank of Major, with limited experience. The position first taken up was about 1,200 yards from that of the Baluchis, and not quite parallel to their line: hardly was the dressing complete when the British left was found to be within range of their artillery, and had to be withdrawn slightly, causing more delay. While thus employed, Sir Charles sent Major Waddington, with Lieutenants Brown and Hill, forward to examine the enemy's position: and they coolly passed along the front from the centre towards the enemy's left at 300 yards distance under matchlock fire. The General meanwhile gave orders for the Madras Sappers to facilitate the advance of his heavy battery for the ground though level in the main was broken by *nullahs* towards the

left and subdivision of the company were attached to each howitzer to assist in unlimbering and getting them into action.

The order in which the army was now drawn up from left to right, was as follows: the Poona Auxiliary Horse; the 9th Bengal Light Cavalry; H.M.'s 22nd Regiment: eleven guns, including the Heavy Battery: the 25 Bombay N.I.; the 21st N.I.; Captain Whitlie's battery; the 12th N.I; the 8th N.I.; the 1st Grenadier N.I.; the Horse Artillery; the 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry; and on the right of the line, the Scinde Horse.

Napier being at length free to make a personal examination of the Baloch position, found it quite as baffling as Miani. The plain on which his army was drawn up was bounded on the left by the bed of the Fuleli, on the further side of which appeared a thick grove of trees. He could also see the tops of some trees on its nearer bank, to his left front; but in front of them, and for more than a mile to the right, extended a high bank, indicated, in Napier's view, the presence of a village like Sultan Shah at Miani: and he determined to launch his first attack here. He ordered the Horse Artillery from the right to the left of the line, supporting them with the Poona Horse and 9th Cavalry On their left, and on their right by the 22nd Queens', who at first were held somewhat retired: Leslie's troop advanced diagonally across the front by "bounds," unlimbering at intervals and firing obliquely on the Baloch centre and left, while the British Artillery of the centre crossed their fire playing on the Baloch line directly in front of them. Sher Mahomed's men were now seen to move from their centre to their right, which confirmed Napier in his first belief that the point he menaced was not strongly held, and that he would be able to penetrate and turn the position by a speedy thrust. He therefore ordered the infantry attack to be launched in echelon from the left, adhering to this formation because he doubted the ability of his battalion commanders to move without confusion in a single line of such length, and also to provide against a counter attack from the wood to the southward. The Scinde Horse and 3rd Cavalry were told off to watch this, and attack the left flank of any body of men that might emerge from it.

As the horse Artillery moved ahead, the 22nd advanced: but when within musket range of the bank both came under a severe fire of matchlocks from the village of Nareja, which was among the trees as expected: but contrary to expectation, was occupied in strength. Half the Light Company of the Cheshires went down; but there was no time to change the plan of attack: and just at this crisis a breathless messenger came up to tell the General that the Cavalry of his right wing were charging: Napier instantly galloped across the front to see what had happened.

The absence of matchlock fire, and of any appearance of turbans or flourished swords above the bank of the water channel where it crossed the front of the ground which the Scinde Horse and 3rd Cavalry had just taken up, had given their officers good reason to suspect that this part of it was not occupied in continuation of the Baloch position: their line could, not, therefore, extend to the wood. If so, it was a matter of small moment

whether the latter was held by the Baluchis or not; for undisciplined warriors, once cut off from the main body of their comrades, would never move far from such shelter to counter attack. Now, as Leslie's shrapnel began to enfilade their ranks, the tribesmen posted to the left front of the Cavalry Brigade began to waver and feel to their left. To a discerning eye, it was a perfect opportunity for throwing the whole Baloch army into confusion.

Major Stack, commanding the brigade, had in John Jacob, and Captain Delamain, an impetuous officer who had seen hard service in Afghanistan, two cavalry commanders of no ordinary caliber. While of the three saw and seized the critical moment for a charge, is open to question: but in an instant it was done; done without reference to the General, who arrived only to see the two regiments irretrievably committed, as they swept forward at speed, the fiery Delamain conspicuous at the head of the whole line which, like a wave, breasted the steep slope, crossed the "karia," and poured over the further bank. Now they came in sight of the real left wing of the Mir's army, posted in and be hind a second scarped and embanked channel running obliquely back from the first; and bearing slightly to the left, charged straight at it. The Baluchis had hardly time to fire their matchlocks before the horsemen were in their midst, leaping the channel or crashing down into it, overturning the defenders right and left: in an instant the tribesmen's formation was utterly destroyed, and the two regiments fell on Sher Mahomed's horsemen, who were posted behind, this wing in reserve.

The General's angry eye followed them through the dust: he recognized that the move was irretrievable; then, that it was likely to be successful, which put an end to his vexation: and he could console himself, as he spurred back to the left wing, with the thought that his echelon attack from that flank was appropriate in the circumstances. Meanwhile, the Horse Artillery having reached the left of the infantry line, Lieutenant Smith spurred up the high parapet of the bank opposite Nareja village, to see where the guns could be brought to bear most effectively; his devotion was not in vain, for before he fell dead he pointed the way for them to pass between the village and the Fuleli.

Sir Charles now galloped up from the rightwing, just as Major Poole, at the head of Her majesty's 22nd,' having fired a single volley at forty yards distance, was on the point of storming the first entrenchment. The General pressed his horse into the foremost ranks with a shout, and amid a hail of matchlock balls from the bank beyond they bore down into the canal to be attacked in flank by knots of swordsmen. On the right of the 22nd the 25th Bombay Native Infantry followed their example; there was no hesitation, and the issue of the hand to hand combat which ensued was not long in doubt: for the striving masses of Baluchis, penned in a trench only six yards wide, and pressed back by the impetus of the charge, lost the advantage of numbers: there was hardly room to wield a sword or parry with their shields the close line of bayonets springing from that living wall of red-coats. Those that fell were trodden, under foot, and served to ease the ascent of the further bank for the assailants who struggled up it, contending every foot with a

fresh line of swordsmen, who slashed at them from above. Once more the bayonet prevailed; and as the surviving Baluchis fell back, pressed on and down into a second far wider and deeper entrenched canal in and behind which the defenders were massed in double strength. Here the fury of the combat reached a yet higher pitch the left and right the Mir's guns continued to fire but everything depended on the outcome of the struggle in the centre. The Baluchis never gained the upper hand, though the British line grew ever thinner: now on the right of the 25th the artillery under Hutt advanced to the edge of the first entrenchment, dealing fearful destruction at point blank range among Sher Mahomed's reserves but the Baloch guns were not silenced till captured by the infantry. To Hutt's right again, the Second Infantry Brigade came into action, supported by Whitlie's battery. Those whose advance brought them opposite the ramps left by the Baluchis for the passage of their own guns soon forced their way over them, penetrating the defenders' last line.

By this time Mir Sher Mahomed had left the field,—to fight again another day—on the advice of Hosh Mahomed Kambrani, who at the head of a devoted band of fellow servants of Mir Sobdar Khan, yielded not an inch of ground, but fighting to the last man, died where they stood.

While this hand to hand struggle raged in the centre, the cavalry of the left wing were ordered by Napier to turn the village, and did so with comparatively little loss; they were followed by the Horse Artillery, for whom the indefatigable Henderson with his Sappers had cut a way down into the bed of the Fuleli.

Nareja Village remained unsubdued: behind breastworks and in its loop holed houses, was a strong force of tribesmen on whom fell back many of those who had been dislodged from their entrenchments by the irresistible 22nd. The latter emerging on the plain, now brought up their right shoulders, and plunged into the village with undiminished resolution. The 25th N.I. conformed to their movement, and on their right again the 21st N.I. swept round in a vigorous charge, marked by heavy carnage.

The Mir's line was now entirely cut in two, and the left offered little resistance to the advance of the 12th 8th and 1st Grenadiers; but the latter had to hold their tire, as the British Cavalry of the right wing were seen immediately to their front, driving the retreating Baluchis in front of them. For the same reason, the Artillery, with the exception of Leslie's Troop on the extreme left flank, were now compelled to cease fire.

The combat in the village was fierce and confused; a magazine blew up close to Napier while he was endeavoring to reform the infantry; thought several were killed around him, he was unscathed. At length the surviving Baluchis were expelled, and fell back sullenly, before the wheeling advance of the 21st could completely surround Nareja. The General emerging at the head of the victorious infantry, now put himself at the head of the Bengal Cavalry and Poona Horse, and pursued the retreating masses for several

miles, inflicting heavy punishment; but not without loss to themselves, Captain Garrett of the Bengal Cavalry being among those killed. This pursuit prevented the defeated Baluchis from gaining the line of the Indus, which they might have crossed to make head again with their brethren, in the hill country: they were driven on the swords of Stack's brigade which, after shattering Sher Mahomed's left wing by their charge, had then chase his horsemen, kept in reserve as at Miani, clean off the field: two of the officers had actually sighted Mir Sher Mahomed himself in full flight, and could probably have captured him, when Colonel Pattle overtook them, and considering that the cavalry had become too dispersed, stopped their pursuit. The Baluchis were by now scattered to the four winds, and Napier returned, to be greeted with three cheers, beginning from the sadly thinned ranks of the 22nd, and taken up by the whole of the infantry who were now drawn up in two lines south of Nareja village, at right angles to the original direction of the attack.

The General sent his wounded into Hyderabad, and ordered injured Baluchis also to be collected and given medical aid: then he sat down to write his dispatch. Its last words read: "I have every reason to believe that not another shot will be fired in Scinde."

But he reckoned without the tenacity and popularity of Sher Mahomed.

## PREVIOUS ACCOUNTS OF THE BATTLE

All accounts of the battle of Hyderabad, in the various Lives of Sir Charles Napier, and histories of Armies and Regiments, follow more or less closely that given by Sir William Napier in "The Conquest of Scinde' which as far as it is possible to ascertain is much more accurate than his deception of Miani.

The battle aroused less interest than Napier's first victory, which had been won against much greater odds, when far more was at stake: and it is natural that there should be fewer first-head accounts of Hyderabad: Major Waddington, for instance, does not seem to have thought it worthy of a companion-pice to his pamphlet on Miani.

I have not been able to find any original sources worth mention beyond the following:-

(a) Sir Charles Napier's dispatch, and subsidiary returns (reproduced in Records of the Scinde Irregular Horse, Vo. I., pp. 30-33).

(b) References in Sir Charles Napier's journal and letters, quoted in "The Life and Opinions of General Sir Charles James Napier." (Vol. II, pp. 350-352, 356, 358-364, 371, Vol. III pp. 89, 110, 155, 169-170, 441, Vol. IV., 109-1 10, 304)

(c) Captain Henderson's account to the Adjutant Madras Sappers and Miners Bangalore, reproduced in Madras Artillery records Vol. VII (Miscellaneous).

I shall add that almost contemporary descriptions or critiques of the battles of Miani and Hyderabad appeared in the Calcutta Review: an article on Miani in 1844 (Vol. 1., page 236) and another dealing both with Dubba and Miani some years later, in Vol. VI, page. 604.

I must admit, with great regret, that I have not seen these, and do not know by whom they were written.

It is very disappointing that the letter, in which John Jacob must have written a description of the battle to his father, does not seem to have been preserved in the family papers. The late Major General A. Le G. Jacob indeed told me that such a letter had in fact survived, until some years ago he sent it in original to Jacob's Horse, unfortunately without keeping a copy; and that it had thereafter disappeared. Neither Colonel K. de L. Young nor Colonel B. M. Mahon, who recently commanded the Scinde Horse, recollect having seen such a letter, and it is possible that the General was thinking of the holograph letter on Miani, presented by him, and preserved in the Scinde Horse Mess.

In the absence of independent accounts, it is not possible to write decidedly on certain derails of the battle: though the general outline is clear enough.

William Napier and his successors all write as if Sir Charles launched his attack almost immediately after the reconnaissance, though between the two there was a cannonade lasting nearly an hour.

## SINDHI SOURCES.

Baloch and Sindhi authors also seem to have taken less interest in the battle of Hyderabad than in Miani.

Mir Yar Mahomed, the author of "*Frerenama*" must have been in confinement in the steamer on the Indus on the day of the fight: his mention is of the briefest.

Munshi Awatrai had no concern with events after his master Mir Sobdar had been imprisoned however, after his description of Miani he added "In the battle with Sher Mahomed, the Mir had also posted his army in a canal bed, but the event was the same. At first he kept the English at bay with his powerful artillery, but after a time Napier treated about 500 of his soldiers to copious draughts of liquor, and ordered them to storm the guns. Fired by this, the men advanced fearlessly and routed Sher Mahmoed's men and captured his artillery. This account of the battle was related to me by the sons of Set Tindanmal Shikarpuri whom Napier Saheb took with him, and were eye witnesses."

This is an amusing counter blast to Napier s assertions that the Baluchis screwed up their courage with bhang!

Seth Naomal Otechand dismisses the battle in a few words.

The poem on Dabba, was probably composed by the same blind minstrel who sang of Miani. On this occasion, however, the author has little good to say of any of the warriors except Sher Mahomed himself and Hosh Mahomed; from internal evidence, the poem must have been composed in 1848. As it is a good example of a Sindhi satirical ballad, I will reproduce it here:-

***The general was a brave soldier and enlarged his camp***

Hearing of Mir Sher Mahomed, he took his guns with him, and gave him battle in the Town of Nareja. Brave men came forth from Mirpur, having well considered the matter; the warlike Chiefs rode along with bold Sher Mahomed, they came to Nareja, and there they fought. Sher Mahomed was a rock, the Mir was a strong mountain! As soon as he came, he killed the English in heaps; settled with the English, did Mir Sher Mahomed. Clouds and waves of swords came on them from above, no one can deny that Sher Mahomed fought a fine battle. Ahdi, son of Ali Murad, who was always successful, was shouting out "Kill them, O kill them." Sher Mahomed overturned the big bed of the English, and the whole bank of the Fuleli ran red with blood. He escaped with his life; the Mir was always successful. Now came Hosh Mahomed the Kambrani, and made an attack; coming into the entrenchments this bridegroom dealt out wounds: the Shidi gave up his breath. The Shidi was killed with one hundred men; no blame can attach to him. Victory is in the hands of God, and he gives it to which he will. The heroes never yielded well done lords well done!

*(Mulraj the Mahter did not fall short: he stood, a man roused to anger. He gave battle at Multan; no one will deny honour to him. Mulraj became famous in the land; and smiling enjoys his fame. I am making known these deeds of Mulraj at Hyderabad).*

Here the Lagharis watched the struggle—observe the conduct of the Thoras! First the Thoro Nawab fled: the wretch's face turned green. He brought dishonor on all the Thoras, the idle evil doer! His effort was not worth a cowrie, though he swallowed the Mir's bounty in lakhs and thousands. As to Ahmed Khan, Laghari's behavior just ask me and I'll tell you. He had neither a moustache on his face nor one hair of a beard. The children of false Ali Murad were sold into the mountains; he had not a scrap of honour, listen to the deeds of this leper! He drove not only his brothers, but his children into exile, poets will speak the truth, although people are moved to wrath.

That a man s promises should not be broken let the ways of disgrace and dishonesty be exposed fully!

Ghulam Mahomed Laghari fled to Kahanbra. Let us give him a red petticoat, and a spotted head-sheet, and a set of ivory bracelets for his arms: let us give him two nose rings, large and small, for his nose. He had made a promise to Mir. Nasir Khan, but the coward absented himself. I, the poet, am speaking the truth to my own Mir.

Khan Mahomed slinks away and flies leaving his palace saying "as long as God gives me life, may he preserve me from girding on the sword!" He jumped down into the tamarisk jungle and never looked behind Dost Ali got stuck in the mud; with drooping lop-ears he said o Ahmed Khan "Uncle, Friend, let us get away! His mother was drowned in the Fuleli at that time.

Dost Mahomed Badhani fled: he floated away in the river. He made an oblation of half an anna, saying "the river God will protect me."

Jahan Khan son of Mahomed ran, saway. These cowards were useless. This crow hid himself and fled crouching; he did not set foot to the ground. He was as pot bellied as a grain-bin; he overate, and wasted good food.

Ghulam Shah Khatian, was in the fight at that time. This good man was with the army when it was broken; when it was carried away like dust.

Here, in the grove of date-plains, the Katanhar flower had opened. The tents pitched were worth seeing, and the garden of flowers. Let us stew the cocking pots, while the brave men tell of their deeds .The Khans take this food in comfort, and make merry.

The fair faced and valiant cavaliers rode their horse. In the camp of Shahdadpur twenty-one thousand men are heard of.

They bring Mir Sher Mahomed, and are taking their daily rations. Seeing the heat of the sword, the cowards are rubbing their noses on the bround. "These men" says Ali, "Why do they not drown themselves?"

For a well-bred filly, one stroke of the whip is enough; but the slow pony gets thirsty. Give praise to the brave, and leave talking of cowards.

God will bind on Sher Mahomed the turban of Sind."

Another ballad by a Manghanhar named Mihru reproduced by Richard Burton in his "Scinde and the races that inhabit the valley of the Indus," which was sung throughout the country, invokes "a hundred thousand curses on the Thoro who set fire to his own

gunpowder. This refers to the universal belief of the Baluchis that the explosion of the magazine at Nareja in the earlier stages of the battle was due to the treachery of Mahomed Khan Thoro, and not, as was almost certainly the case, to a lucky shell from the British Artillery.

The legend persists, for when I last visited the battle field in August 1942, the people of Nareja village said that some traitor in Sher Mahomed's camp had told the British where to direct their fire. Mir Ali Bakhsh Khan Talpur ascribed the disaster to Mir Bijar Khan. The local tradition is that the Baluchis ran out of gunpowder in consequence, whereupon Hosh Mahomed Shidi advised Sher Mahomed to secure his own retreat while he led the defence. The Shidis, Nuhanis, and Bhurgris are sad to have fought well, but the others indifferently. Sir William Napier makes mention only of the Lagharis and Nizamanis, as being entrenched in the village.

Sher Mahomed's vakils, who came to Napier to offer him the Mir's sword when he was on the march to Bahawalpur early in 1846, told him that the Mir had taken up his station, near Nareja village, and that the movement noticed by the British early on in the battle, of crowds hurrying to their right, was of chiefs with their followers hastening to receive their last orders from him.

The Sind Gazetteer quotes a Persian, manuscript by one of the retinue of the Aga Khan, in which the battle is thus mentioned, "When they (the Baluchis) were hemmed in by the British soldiers on the one hand and cannonade on the other, they gave expression to words, of course in their own language, which distinctly his off their character. When translated they stand as follows rascals do not give us time even to steam ourselves with the hookah."

## INDIVIDUAL EXPLOITS

The undaunted courage of Hosh Mahomed Kambrani has already been mentioned. It was warmly praised by Sir Charles Napier and his brother, who in his Life of Sir Charles Napier Writes thus of him; "*Heroic in strength of body and mind this brave man and his brother slaves at Dubba, fighting with unbounded fury, fell to the last man under the bayonets of the 22nd Regiment.*" Sir Charles also alluded to him in his dispatch as "*The great promoter of this war*."

To another soldier of Sher Mahomed—an artillery man—was accorded the honour of being, for aught I know to the contrary, the first "*unknown warrior*." Napier ordered his body to be removed from the battle field to the Fort at Hyderabad and placed this inscription over his tomb: "*This monument marks the last resting place of one of the Ameer's soldiers who was killed in the battle of Hyderabad, whilst bravely fighting the gun placed over his tomb*."

On the British side, there were many gallant exploits. Mention has been made of Lieut. Smith's heroic devotion: and Napier's dispatch also recorded how the intrepid Lieutenant Coote, of Her majesty's 22nd, "first mounted the rampart, seized one of the enemy's standards, and was severely wounded while waving it and cheering on his men." As to feats of swordsmanship, the encounter of Lieut. Nixon with a Baloch Chief, and MacMurdo's three successive triumphs in single combat, in the last of which he was wounded, are described with boyish gusto by Sir Charles. But for cool courage in the midst of the enemy, none surpassed the General himself. As has been seen, he was throughout the heat of the fight with the 22nd, which were the brunt of it. His orderly dragoon's horse was cut down behind him, and the hilt of his sword struck by a ball; in Nareja village a magazine blew up close to him, bringing death to many, but left him untouched no Baloch assailed him, though he was at times almost alone among them. The fortune of Miani followed him.

The best testimony to the magic of Napier's leadership, which bred he roes, was the fact that six men, of the 22nd concealed the wounds they received in the battle, thinking there would be more fighting; they had to fall out in a long hot march, when two of them were found to have been short through both legs.

**NUMBERS ENGAGED AND CASUALTIES ON EITHER SIDE.**

Napier's Army at the battle of Hyderabad numbered about 5,000, but so far as I am aware, no field-state for the 24th March, giving the strength of the units engaged, is available: nor even such unofficial estimates as those of writers on Miani. I have been unable to ascertain even what troops were told off to guard the baggage, which Lieut. Leeson is commended for marshalling close up to the line. Sir W. Napier states that of the 5,000, about 1,100 were cavalry. The newcomers, the 3rd Bombay Cavalry, numbered just under 300 sabres. Of the two infantry battalions that had joined since Miani, the 8th mustered 818 men, and the 21st must have been almost equally strong: it is also necessary to assume that, with the addition of Leslie's Troop and the 2nd Coy. 1st battalion, Bombay Artillery, the gunners were at least double the number present at Miani, to reach the combined total of five thousand. It is evident that Napier deserves great credit for bringing into the field every effective man he could find. One lesson of Miani he had learned "No general ought to detach even a tailor before a battle."

In passing I must call attention to an error in dates by which the simultaneous arrival of the reinforcements from Karachi and Sukkur by river is assigned to the 23rd march. This originated with Sir Charles himself, in a letter to his brother dated 16th April, 1843. Sir William must not be blamed for making the most of this dramatic incident, according to which men guns and stores were landed, organized, and brigaded, and launched against Sher Mahomed all within twenty four hours. But the same cannot be said for latter writers, such as Rice Holmes: for Napier's journal, embodied in the "Life" snows plainly

that these reinforcements reached him on the 21st March, when he was beginning to be anxious about the progress of Stack's Brigade.

The strength of Sher Mahomed's army stated in the dispatch was 20,000. Napier wrote some days afterwards that he gave this figure '*to keep bounds*' but that all his spies concurred in saying that the Mir had more than 26,000: and this figure was without more ado adopted by his brother.

Sir Patrick Cadell; in his History of the Bombay Army, says "*an estimate of 16,000 would seem more nearly correct*"—I do not know on what this is based.

The total British casualties were a little higher than at Miani; but the killed numbered only 39, of whom two were officers, as compared with 62 including six officers in the former battle. Considerably over half the 270 casualties were sustained by her Majesty's 22nd, which had 23 men killed, and five officers and 119 other ranks wounded. The 21st and 25th Bombay N.I. came next, with thirty and twenty-five casualties respectively, only seven being killed between them. Lieut. Burr, of the 21st, who was severely wounded, died some days after the battle and lies buried in Hyderabad Fort. Among the cavalry the Poona Horse had three men killed, and an officer and seventeen men wounded, with seven horses killed and eight wounded; the Scinde Horse had eighteen men wounded and thirteen horses killed. The Bengal and Bombay cavalry came off lightly, with more casualties among their horses than the men; and the losses among the other units were trifling.

These figures sufficiently attest the part played by the Cheshires in the action.

Of the losses of Sher Mahomed's lashkar, it is difficult to speak. In his dispatch, written on the day of the battle, Napier says:—"500 bodies have been counted on the field of battle, and it is said that the neighbouring village are filled with dead and wounded men." Among the chiefs killed were Ghulam Ali Talpur, Ali Khan Talpur and Jaffar Khan Marri. The two Talpurs were, I think, collaterals of the main, line of the Manikanis. Napier says that the learnt from Sher Mahomed's vakils on the occasion already mentioned, that "five princes of the Talpur houses fell at Dubba, with an immense number of minor chiefs." Sir William, with his peculiar flair for improving on the truth, says, "the vanquished lost about 5,000……"

……Eight hundred bodies were lying in the *nullahs* and at Dubba, but all the villages and lanes beyond the latter place were so filled with dead and dying, that to avoid them the army was forced to encamp on the ground it occupied before the action commenced. All the fallen Baloches were of mature age, grim visaged men of athletic forms, the carcases of a youth was not to found."

When some years later Sir William produced a further panegyric of this brother, entitled "The Administration of Scinde," and again gave five thousand as the number of the Sher Mahomed's Army killed at Dubba, John Jacob, who wrote and published "notes corrective of the manifold errors in this work writes laconically in reference to this "more correctly, two thousand." Sir John Fortescue, the Historian of the British Army, on the contrary writes that the Baloch losses at Dubba were twice as great as Miani a most absurd statement which does not deserve discussion. The duration of the close fighting was far shorter than at Miani and it was really confined to only a part of their line.

Among the Baloch losses, whatever they may have been were eight men taken prisoner a matter of satisfaction to Napier who was shocked by the mutual refusal of quarter at Miani.

## QUESTION AND DISCREPANCIES CONNECTED WITH THE BATTLE AND NAPIER'S GENERALSHIP

The principal unsolved question of the battle of Hyderabad is the responsibility for the charge of the cavalry on the right wing, which, though not deciding the victor, undoubtedly opened the way to it Writing in July 1843 to Sir George Arthur, Napier says: "I am sadly vexed at having said in my dispatch that Major Stack led the brilliant cavalry charge at Dubba it was Captain Delamain whose modesty is so great that the never said a word on the subject. I am not in charity with Stack for allowing me to mistake his report is I did mistake on that charge This however does not touch the point who gave the order.
As already observed, no letter of Jacob describing the battle appears to be in existence nor have I knowledge of any other bearing on this particular question. In reporting Jacobs death the Homeward Mail of January 4th 1859, gives the credit of this brilliant movement to him when large masses of the enemy showed an appearance of wavering, Lieut. Jacob seized the critical moment, and charged with such fury as to convert the enemy's movement into a flight and the Scinde Horse and the rest of the cavalry sabred the fugitives for miles. Jacob, says Sir Charles, relying upon gossip at the time when they became estranged, used to say that he had done more: for Napier than Napier had done for him: but Jacob's first public statement of their relations, in a letter to the Bombay, Times, written after considerable provocation: in October 1851, passes over the events of the war in Sindh in a few words, seemingly taking it for granted that his services were too well known to need re-statement.

For the present, then, though perhaps not forever, this interesting detail must remain undecided.

Sir J. Fortescue, though stating that the details of the action are exceedingly obscure, curiously enough missed this point, simply giving the whole credit to Stack; while

puzzling himself over a remark of Sir William Napier's that Leslie's Horse Artillery, on gaining the extreme left flank, were able to enfilade the Baluchis left wing, hitherto concealed "from end to end." Fortescue says: "if his account of the Balochi line be correct, the range must have been very long for round shot, and impossible for grape. Possible Leslie fired shrapnel, but for this he would need howitzers, and there was only one howitzer to each battery." Two eight inch howitzers had in fact reached Napier with his reinforcements, and he had had two 24 pound and two twelve pound howitzers at Miani.

In sober fact, the range from Leslie's position, opposite the right of the Baloch line to their extreme left would have been over a mile and the obvious conclusion, is that Sir William Napier had permitted himself to exaggerate somewhat the effort of Leslie's fire.

## WAS NAPIER AWARE OF THE EXISTENCE OF NAREJA VILLAGE BEFORE HE ATTACKED?

Rice Holmes draws attention to the discrepancy between two statements of Sir Charles on this point, in appendix P. O his book, "Sir Charles Napier"; he might have added a third. on the point. Sir Montagu McMurdo replied "When we formed up on the plain, we judged the situation of the village by the little, if anything at all, of the low mud houses, because of the extraordinarily high bank thrown up in deepening and scarping the double canal."

The strength and difficulty of these natural entrenchments struck Napier particularly on his last visit to the battle field in 1851 although "the ditches and their banks are lessened; they were made up and widened for the battle, and their slopes were steeper I doubt my own resolution had I been aware of their tremendous strength; but I was not, until my horse was on the edge and there was no choice but to shove him down. How we shoved down, or up again on the opposite banks, I know not....."

Of his men, Napier wrote "At Mecanee they showed hesitation and wonder: at Dubba they were like cucumbers. A to myself, I felt a different man, my confidence in the soldiers and in myself being complete; I felt at ease, and could have changed my whole order of battle in the fight had it been wanted."

Fortescue considered that the storming of Nareja village (by him called Dabo) was "quite unnecessary." Napier himself felt that he might have done better as he frankly admitted to is brother: "I will answer your questions about Dubba, namely;—Could you have menaced Dubba with your left, and pushed the cavalry of your right, sustained with some guns and infantry, towards the wood where you suspected the ambush; then passing the *nullah* with your left and centre have driven the enemy in a confused heap on Dubba, where your left was holding them in check?

This is nearly what did happen, but by accident, though I at first thought of it for Blenheim came into my mind where something of the kind happened. While examining the enemy's line I was under fire of guns directed at my large staff, and one shot went close to my face and into the heart of a 22nd grenadier. This did not help thought, though it did not much disturb it; but what most annoyed me was that the men were under a cannonade the moment we formed line, and it would not have done to go back then, no, not for ten yards. Even a seeming hesitation, would have been bad. All the houses of the village were loop holed and perfectly concealed in front, but were open to the river, and by a bold examination of their right, this would have been discovered; an abler man would have done. It was a fault that cost many lives and would have given me deep regret had it arisen from carelessness; but it was only want of experience in command. Henceforth my care shall be to closely examine and enemy's flanks."

Such naiveté really disarms criticism: and casualties at the rate of one in twenty are not a heavy price to pay, for beating odds of four to one. A victory, in which the enemy is scattered to the winds, after suffering severe casualties, and losing the whole of his artillery, is ordinarily to be styled as crushing; and all the more honour is due to Mir Sher Mahomed and the Baluchis who rallied to him thereafter, for continuing the struggle after such a lesson.

The guns taken numbered eleven, of which three were brass, and in good order. One of these latter, nearly six feet in length, had from a good position on the right of the Baloch line, inflicted a good deal of loss on the British. The iron guns were all very inferior, uneven in bore, and much corroded: how ever their carriages showed signs of recent repair, and they were fined with elevating screws. Eight out of the eleven guns had a bore less than three inches, and the remaining three were under four inches.

Among other trophies of the fight, nineteen standards were taken, the majority of them by Her Majesty's 22nd; one is specially mentioned, a silver knobbed standard captured by Corporal Tim Kelly, who shot the defender.

## TOPOGRAPHY OF THE FIELD OF HYDERABAD (DUBBA) A CENTURY AFTER THE BATTLE

Before entering upon a description of the ground where the battle was fought, a word is due to its name.

Sir William Napier says: "This memorable battle, fought thirty five days after Meeanee, and within a few miles from that field, bears three names, Dubba, Naraja, and Hyderabad: the first from the village, the second from the plain, the third from the city near which it was fought. The last is the one by which it must be known, being that

which is inscribed on the colours and medals of the gallant soldiers by whom it was won."

In actual fact, Nareja is the name of the village, while the district is called Duabo *scilicet* two waters, from the streams of the Indus and Fuleli, once a natural branch of the Indus, which pass through it — this name appears to have been corrupted to Dubba by the earlier writers, but refined by Rice Holmes to Dabo. There is a place called Duabo, about three miles E.S.E. from Nareja; it gets its name from two canals from the Fuleli between which it is situated. But it is some distance from the battle field.

Sir Charles wrote "We don't like to call our battle Dubba because the skins of grease in this country are called dubbas. All the boys were horrified at the name, and McMurdo rode about, bleeding like a pig from his wound, after the battle, to find another village to call after: Lord Ellenborough has settled it for us — Hyderabad". In truth, the village which was the key of the Baloch position was at the time, and still is, called, Nareja: there is no village of Dubba, and one wonders why the battle could not have been called by the obviously appropriate name. We call Marlborough's first great victory Blenheim from the village which was included in the French line, though on the continent it is known as Hochstadt, from a town three miles from the field: an analogy for "Hyderabad," but not for "Dubba." The people of Sindh speak of the battle as "Nareja" or perhaps more often "Sher Mahomed's fight".

Another perversion of terminology is that by which the entrenchments occupied by the Baloch army are styled, by all writers including Rice Holmes, as "*nullahs.*" Residents in India do not need to be informed that this word indicates a natural water-course, generally a broken and irregular gash in the soil, or the stony bed of an occasional torrent — with which the officers from the Deccan or Gujerat who formed the bulk of Napier' s Army were familiar: but the extensive artificial irrigation of Sindh being new to their experience, they loosely applied the word they knew best to what were nothing more or less than canals.

This criticism is not made in a spirit of pedantry: for Fortescue, rendering the word "*nullah*" correctly as "ravine" in his description, innocently calls up an entirely erroneous picture of the field.

General McMurdo, as we have seen, uses the correct English word for them; but if we must employ Indian nomenclature, let it be the appropriate Sindhi "Wah" or "Karia."

Since the canals in Sindh are cut out of the dead level plain, the soil originally removed forms no inconsiderable bank on either side of them: but this is added to by the silt which, deposited in them with every inundation, has to be cleared out annually. The older the canal, the higher its banks will be above the general level. The artificial channels dug form the old Fuleli above Hyderabad, which in Napier's own words

"intercept the flat country for miles, and at every mile, like a grating" probably date, many of them, from the time of the Kalhoras. The traveler passing from Hyderabad to Mirpur Khas today will notice them: long embankments of white earth, rising to twelve or fifteen feet above the plain;—doubtless higher than in 1843; the majority of them derelict, superseded by the new Barrage canals and water-courses, which are designed to flow on a gradient which keeps the deposit of silt to minimum, thus eliminating the need for annual clearance.

Another well-known feature of the old irrigation system of Sindh arose from the insistence by large zamindars on having exclusive sources of water supply for their lands. Two or more "karias" will be found running parallel and close together for miles, from the point where they take off from the main canal.

It was two of these that Mir Sher Mahomed selected for his position, the smaller one, known as Khair-Wah, being occupied by the front line as far as the point marked B on Napier's map, and thereafter continuing unoccupied opposite the British right wing. The first mile of Khair-Wah was abandoned as a canal many years ago and now does duty as a cart track. The larger canal running behind it, up to this point B, sheltered the second line of the Baluchis, and from thence bending away at an obtuse angle was held by their left wing: this is called Imam Wah Husri, and was in use until 1932. Even now, it presents much the same appearance as at the time of the battle, deep and wide, with steep banks inside. The country people told me its upper portion was called Sobdar Wah: perhaps in memory of the gallant servants of the Mir of that name who fell there.

The subsidiary defenses of the position, mentioned by Sir William Napier, and shown on his map, were also improvised from smaller channels behind Nareja village, the names of two of them, Boledai Wah and Rind Wah, still surviving. The modern revenue survey map indeed shows a most remarkable resemblance to the contemporary plan: but changes are rapidly taking place. Year by year the local zamindars are cutting away more and more of the bank of these old channels, using the rich silt for leveling and improving their lands, so that identification of ever part of the position may soon become impossible.

The field is also traversed by a new Barrage canal, the Husri Distributary, which cuts into the lower part of the Khair-Wah, and by the main North Western Railway line running West to East about two miles South of Nareja. This latter was about the line of the charge of the Cavalry of Napier's right wing.

The "wood" on this side of the battle field which gave Napier so much anxiety no longer seems to exist: it must have been roughly where Tando Hyder village is now.

The northern end of the battle field has retained its character almost unchanged. The bed of the Fuleli is partially cultivated near the village since its supersession by barrage

canals, but is still well-marked and deep, and about 20 yards wide. There is however no trace of the Shikargah on its further bank, while on the nearer bank a mango grove occupies what was at the time of the battle open lain not far in front of Nareja.

The village itself is said to be smaller than it was century ago. But there are the same low mud houses, interspersed with trees, tucked way behind the high banks of the double canal and invisible from in front of it, though open on the other three sides.

The banks and beds of the canals are much overgrown with jungle, but there are still portions which give a perfect idea of their state at the time of the battle. In one of these, about 400 yards south of the village, is situated the tomb of Hosh Mahomed Kambrani. It is on the further or eastern bank of the larger canal: a plain structure of yellow stone with no inscription, the plinth carved in simple designs. Close by are two tombs made of brick, where men of the Nuhani tribe who fell by Hosh Mahomed's side are buried.

Opposite this point some three hundred yards in the direction from which Napier attacked is the British memorial of the battle. It is plain obelisk, surrounded by guns sunk in the ground. The inscription reads.

**To**
**The Memory**
**of those**
**who fell in the battle of Dubba on the**
**24th March 1843, and who were buried near this spot**.

| | |
|---|---|
| Lieut. J.C. Smith | Horse Artillery |
| Captain Garret | 9th Bengal Cavalry |
| One drummer | 21st Regiment, N. L |

**Rank and File.**

| | |
|---|---|
| 3rd Bombay Cavalry .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 1 |
| Poona Horse .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 3 |
| Her Majesty's 22nd Foot .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 23 |
| 1st Grenadier N.I .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 2 |
| 12th Regiment N.I .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 1 |
| 21th Regiment N.I .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 3 |
| 25th Regiment N.I .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 3 |

Close to the monument are two very large "Kandi" trees, which may well have been growing at the time of the battle.'

## CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS:

The present designations of the units which fought under Napier at Miani have been given in the first half of this paper. Of those which took part only in the battle of Hyderabad, the 8th Bombay Native Infantry later served iii the Afghan War of 1878, the Great War of 1914-1918 and the Arab Rebel lion of 1920. In 1922 it was designated the 3rd battalion 4th Bombay Grenadiers. It was disbanded in 1930.

The 21st Bombay Native Infantry partially mutinied at Karachi in 1857— one of the very few Bombay Regiments to do so and was disbanded next years.

The 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry fought in Persia, the Mutiny, Abyssinia, Afghanistan, China, the Great War, and the Afghan, War of 1919; and from 1921 were merged with their old comrades of Hyderabad as the 17th Q.V.O. Poona Horse.

The 1st Troop Bombay Horse Artillery is with us as N. Horse Battery R.A., and the 2nd Company First Battalion Bombay Artillery is now the 15th Field Battery R.A.

Those corps which under the Governor-General's Order of 5th March, had been permitted to bear the word "Hyderabad, 1843" on their appointments, Standards, and colours were now authorized to substitute "Meanee"; "Hyderabad" being granted to all who took part in the second battle, under a General Order of April 11th.

A special distinction was reserved for Leslie's Horse Battery. The Governor-General having taken into consideration the peculiar merits of the 1st troop of the Bombay Horse Artillery, under Major Leslie, which having participated in the distinguished services of the army of Candahar, under His Excellency Major-General Sir W. Nott, G.C.B., and having returned to India with the troops from Cabool, marched from the camp at Ferozepoor early in January, and joined the Army of Scinde in time to decide, in conjunction with H.M.'s 22nd Regiment, the battle of Hyderabad, is pleased to order that the 1st Troop of the Bombay Horse Artillery shall hereafter for ever be denominated the 1st or "Leslie's" Troop of Horse Artillery, and shall in addition to all other decorations or inscriptions upon its appointments, bear the "Eagle."

The Honours for individuals' service appeared in a Gazette of 4th July, 1843. Napier himself was advanced from a Knight Commander to the Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath.

Outram received the Companionship of the Order, and with him twenty four other officers; of the Staff, Lieut. Colonel Pattle, second-in-command; Majors McPherson and Waddington, Captains Green, Wyllie, and Blenkins: four of H.M.'s 22nd, Lieut. Col Pennefather, Major Poole Captains George and Conway Four of the Artillery: Majors

Lloyd and Leslie, Captains Whitlie and Willogh by; Major Storey and Captain Tucker of the 9th Cavalry; Major Stack and Captain Delamain of the 3rd Cavalry: Major Browne commanding the 8th N.J.; Major Reid and Captain Fisher of the 12th N. I., Major Stevens of the 21st N. I., and Major Woodburn and Jackson of the 25th N I Most of these received brevet promotion at the same time.

It does not seem that these awards were entirely in accordance with Napier's recommendations: he says "there are gross mistakes about the C.B., but it cannot be helped." It was also published in Orders that the conduct of Captains Jacob and Tait was considered to have entitled them to honorary distinction; winch could not be conferred on them at the time on account of their want of rank. "His Grace the Commander in Chief has however announced his intention of recommending both these officers for the brevet rank of Major and for the Companionship of the Order of the Bath, after they shall have been promoted to the regimental rank of Captain."

Tait duly became C.B. in February 1846, and, in the same Gazette, Captain Hutt of the Artillery and Captain Henderson of the Madras Sappers, who had been specially recommended by Napier in a letter to Lord Ellenborough, written in September 1843: but Jacob had to wait till 1850, for reasons which need not be entered into here.

Taking a last view of the battle of Hyderabad, I am inclined to think that Mir Sher Mahomed, or his advisors, made the dispositions far battle in the light of the lessons of the lesson of Miani, to avoid the faults of Nasir Khan's position In the first place, all the guns were placed behind the entrenchments instead of in the open in front of the line as at Miani. They could not, therefore, be put out of action in the preliminary bombardment, but as we know were served gallantly and continued to fire until the British had stormed the first entrenchments with the bayonet.

Secondly, the positing of the Mir's foot soldiers was a great improvement on Miani. At that battle, the Fuleli protected the Baloch host only until the British line reached its edge: there after they were completely open to the British musketry, and had to climb up the bank to counter attack. At the battle of Hyderabad though men were posted in the bed of the first canal it seems that they were a sort of "forlorn hoope" whose duty was to take in flank those who stormed it, the main strength was drawn up behind, so that Napier's men had to do the climbing to get at them.

In his dispatch, Sir Charles wrote: "The Beloochee infantry and artillery fought well; their cavalry made no stand, and 5,000 disciplined soldiers were not to be long resisted by a barbarian force, even though that force was nearly five to one." This puts the business in a proper light. Sir William Napier's estimate of his brother's achievements is vitiated by his tendency to endow the Baloch tribesmen, with all the qualities of Napoleon's "grognards" and to put Sher Mahomed on a par with Massena. Descending somewhat from this pitch of absurdity, (under the influence of which Sir William seems to have

speculated whether Hosh Mahomed could not have been a spiritual, if not a natural, descendant of the French Revolutionary General Hoche. It is a mistake as I have already pointed out, in writing on Miani, to compare Napier's battles with those won—sometimes the winning was doubtful—against European trained Marathas and Sikhs. Once we turn to the pages of Orme, we find truer parallels: if it is suggested that the Baluchis were tougher than the opponents of Clive, Stringer Lawrence, and Forde, we should remember that the hosts they routed generally contained a nucleus of Frenchmen; and if we pass on to Cutwa and Buxar, we find that odds of seven to one, European artillery, positions of immense strength, and Rohilla cavalry who had the courage of charge home were of no avail against disciplined troops, led with the skill and determination of Adams and Hector Munro.

The truth is, that a Baloch Host in the plains was incapable of maneuvering; but if Napier had chosen to lead his army round Sher Mahomed's left flank and fallen on their rear, he would have gained nothing but their artillery: the tribesmen would have dispersed, as soon as they saw their flank was turned, would have plundered the countryside, including perhaps the town of Hyderabad, and would have remained a horn in Napier's flesh. Very properly, he seized the opportunity of attacking them in a position in which he could hope that they would wait for him, and be soundly beaten: and so it fell out; though as Sher Mahomed escaped, and there ware among the Baluchis men of remarkable tenacity and loyalty, the blow was not final.

Let Sir Charles Napier's own words close our account of his two splendid victories—the words of the speech he made when presenting new colours to his own Regiment, Her Majesty's 22nd Foot, at Ambala in November. 1850:

> *"Shall I ever forget the strong and lofty entrenchments of Dubba—where the 22nd advanced in line unshaken, a living wall! and under a murderous fire stormed the works! There those honored old colour of which we have just taken leave; bravely borne forward by their Ensigns Bowden and Blake, one of whom Lieut. Bowden I see Before me bearing them this day, but in higher rank, were in a few minutes seen to wing triumphantly aloft amidst the combatants on the summit.*
>
> *Men of Meeanee! you must remember with exultation and with pride what a view burst upon your sight when under a heavy fire you reached the bank of the river, a hurl of shields and Scindian capped and turbaned heads and flashing scimatars high brandished in the air, spread as a sea before you, and 35,000 valiant warriors of Balochistan threatening you with destruction! The hostile armies closed and clashed together and desperate combats thickened along the line! The superb 9th Cavalry of Bengal and the renowned Sinde Horse—the dark chivalry of India burst as a thundercloud charging into the dry bed of the torrent, driving the foe before them! At that moment at terrible cry arose on the right! It was the dreadful British shout of battle! it began with the 22nd and was reechoed from right to left from Regiment to Regiment along the line! Lines of leveled*

*bayonets now gleamed charging through the smoke, and the well-fought field of Meeanee was your own!*"

## PIR

Napier followed up the victory of Hyderabad by the bloodless capture of Sher Mahomed's capital, Mirpur, and the fort of Omarkot but he was disappointed in his supposition that the Mir being cut off from any "base," in the Desert, would flee to the Panjab. The Mir kept the field, and though he had very little money to pay his men, the country people supplied him with grain of their own free will and moreover kept him perfectly informed as to the proceedings of the British troops, from whom they concealed his plans and movements.

Napier had been allowed to send the captive Talpurs out of the country, and they were removed to Bombay at the end of April, on the last day of which the General leaving troops at Omarkot, Mirpur and Tando Allahyar, the whole under command of John Jacob, took up his quarters in the palace of Mir Nasir Khan. But with Sher Mahomed at large, the conquest of Sindh was by no means complete: and on May 1st he was reported to have collected ten thousand men. He made several offers to come in on such conditions at that his treasure would be spared; but Napier would hear of nothing but unconditional surrender: and his troops being for some time immobilized for want of camels, a deadlock set in. The General was also anxious least his movements should thereafter be hampered by the inundation; and worse than all, the heat was becoming insupportable.

A further unpleasant possibility was that the tribes west of the Indus would cross the river and join Sher Mahomed. As early as march 5th, Napier had received information that the Chandias were crossing the river from Sehwan and Larkana to join the Mir, and he had given orders to Col. Roberts, in command at Sukkur, to "stir up the Chandias at home: if he felt strong enough; while Ali Murad had his order to plunder them. Sometime afterwards Wali Mahomed, Chief of the Chandia tribe, who had been close on Napier's rear before Miani with a large *lashkar*, had been seized by Napier's dubious ally, Mir Ali Murad, and by him sent prisoner to the General. To the disgust of the Mir and the astonishment of Wali Mahomed, Napier told the old Chief that he was free to go home; whereupon he made all speed back to his country under the Western hills, vowing that he would repay Napier's clemency with steady loyalty to the British. This could not have happened at a more opportune time; Wali Mahomed was by far the most influential Chief in North Western Sindh, and many who hither to may have been inclined as a point of honour to strike a blow against the Feringhi was disarmed by such

generosity to a faithful subject of the Talpurs, form the man who had treated the rulers themselves with uncompromising sternness.

Napier says that Shah Mahomed, younger brother of Sher Mahomed sent him a letter some time before the battle of Hyderabad offering to assassinate Sher Mahomed, and that the forthwith forwarded this letter to the intended victim, warning him to be on his guard.

There seems strong reason to doubt whether the letter was authentic: for at some time after the battle, when Sher Mahomed's cause was desperate, he committed his family to the care of Shah Mahomed, who crossed the river and installed them in Rani Kot, a remarkable fortress which Mir Karam Ali Khan had built some thirty years before in an inaccessible gorge in the Lakhi Hills. It now became a first object to Napier to prevent Shah Mahomed from raising the country on that side, as if he was able to gather a strong force together and act in conjunction with his brother, even if he were unable to cross the river to join him, the war might be prolonged for months.

Napier therefore, at the beginning of May ordered Lieut. Col. Roberts to move down the right bank from Sukkur to Sehwan with a column of all arms, meanwhile sending an armed steamer of the Indian Navy, under the command of Captain Nott, up stream to Sehwan to chase away all boats that might be found, to prevent the Baluchis crossing to the left bank, The General had hoped to be able to move against Sher Mahomed by the 15th, but was apprehensive of the inundation from the Indus, which he believed would cut him off from his base: he was at a loss to procure camels to carry five months' provisions, which he thought would have to be taken with the troops.

Meanwhile intelligence was received of more boats being collected by the tribes of the Lakhi hills for their passage and Napier sent the Satellite steamer with a detachment of sepoys under Lieut. Anderson to break up the "concentration." This, as described by Sir William Napier, was a smart little affair.

The steamer reached the point where the river washes the base of a spur of the Lakhi range on the 27th May. Three hundred Baluchis opened matchlock fire on her from the cliff, wounding Commander Miller. The guns of the steamer replied, and a party of sepoys was landed and drove off the Baluchis with heavy loss, at a trifling cost to them. The boats collected by the tribesmen for their crossing were destroyed, and Anderson proceeded to Sehwan, which Colonel Roberts reached on the 29th after an uneventful march, with nearly 1,500 men made up of Captain, Blood's battery of four guns, a troop of the 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry under Captain Walter, and detachments from the 6th, 15th and 20th Bombay Native Infantry.

The blow at Lakhi seems to have caused Shah Mahomed to repent momentarily of his association with the irreconcilables: Napier records in his Journal of June 1st that the he

had written to ask forgiveness, nevertheless the Mir decided to advance:—whether from the impossibility of feeding two or three thousand men in the barren fastnesses of the Lakhi hills or to secure the support of the powerful Rind tribe the hereditary enemies of the Chandias or merely as Napier thought, "to see what Roberts is about and have credit for driving him away when he shall cross the river." Be this as it may, Shah Mahomed moved his *lashkar* down the valley of the Bandhni Nai and encamped at Pir Ari, within 15 miles of Sehwan. Nor was he inactive for he had a successful skirmish with some horsemen of an adherent of Mir Ali Murad, who had been pacifying or taking charge of the country in their won fashion: several of the them were made prisoners. But Shah Mahomed was now within Robert's reach.

Roberts' orders were to cross the Indus to the left bank on the night of the 9th June, to take his part in Napier's enveloping movement against Mir Sher Mahomed. But on the 7th, information was brought in of Shah Mahomed's move to Pir Ari, and was verified by Alif Khan Tehrin, the well-known ex-Rissaldar of the Baluch Levy, who had accompanied the column, from Sukkur. Roberts determined to surprise the Mir, and at midnight on the 7th-8th June marched out to attack Shah Mahomed with Blood's battery, the troop of cavalry, three companies of the 6th Bombay N.I., and two each of the 15th and 20th N.I., about 900 men in all, at daybreak the force was marching south beside the wide sandy bed of the Bandhni Nai, full of south beside the wide sandy bed of the Bandhni Nai, full of tamarisk jungle; to the left the craggy heights of the Lakhi range rose dark against the sun, covering with their shadow some smaller hills to the right, beyond which again swelled up the broad saddle back of Badro, scarred with ravines. Soon they caught sight of the Mir's position, around a large oblong enclosure of fine trees, surrounded by a thick and almost impenetrable hedge. The Baluchis appeared to be retreating, and Roberts ordered Captain Walter to lead his troop to the left to head them off from their retreat southwards, and if possible drive them across to the right, to which side the artillery and infantry were directed. Walter, taking Alif Khan with him, advanced with his handful of horsemen, and noticing large bodies of the Baluchis dispersing to right and left, turned on a party of horse and foot abut 250 strong, strong, who were drawn up in rear of two guns close to the southern end of the grove, before the Balochi gunners fired, the speed of Walter's charge had carried him past them, and plying the sword with vigour the cavalry made havoc of the astonished tribesmen; about eighty of them were killed before the rest, completely dispersed, found shelter in the jungle.

Meanwhile on the right, the infantry advanced steadily in echelon, led by the Light Company of the 20th, then Blood's battery with the right wing of the 15th, the whole supported by the Grenadier Company of the 20th and two companies of the 6th. The Baluchis did not stand, and on gaining their position Roberts halted his main body, only pushing on the light company of the 20th in a vain attempt to establish contact. Meanwhile he ordered a party of the Grenadier Company to search the grove, which was found to be a burial ground: and Mir Shah Mahomed himself was found concealed

with three or four servants in some thick undergrowth. On seeing the sepoys he raised his gun, and one of his followers drew his sword: the sepoys were about to fire on them when Shah Mahomed called out that he was the Mir, and Captain Fraser coming up at the time, delivered up his sword to him. A few minutes earlier, after the firing had ceased, a Baloch had jumped out of a bush and severely wounded Lieutenant Lancaster in the arm, being promptly shot before he could do more damage.

Roberts having thus brilliantly achieved is objects, marched back to Sehwan, taking with him Mir Shah Mahomed, seventeen prisoners, two cannon, a standards, and some horsemen of Mir Ali Murad, who had been captured by Shah Mahomed's men two days previously. The heat was by this time fearful and before the column regained the camp at Sewan, at 1 p.m., two European Artillerymen had succumbed to sun stroke. In the fight the losses of the victors were trifling, and apart from Lieut. Lancaster, fell entirely on the Troop of the 3rd Cavalry, who Had two *havildars* and six troopers wounded, all but one severely, together with one horse killed and seven wounded. This gallant band in their change inflicted the great majority of the casualties sustained by the Baluchis, who left about 90 dead on the field. Four of them fell to the sword of Alif Khan Tehrin, who rode at Walter's side.

## OBSERVATIONS.

There is noting obscure about this little affair, and its results were just what Napier required. The Western tribes were deterred from attempting to join Sher Mahomed, and from any hostile enterprises on their own side of the river.

It remains only to say something of the ground: but first a word as to its name.

Sir William Napier writes of Peer Arres: Rice Holmes, Pir Awes: Sir Patrick Cadell Pir Ares. Fortescue escapes the difficulty by making no mention of the action in his chapter on the War in Sindh.

Having more than once visited the site, I can affirm that the name of the place is as given in this paper: the revenue map of the District shows it correctly. The final Sappended to their various combinations of letters by previous authors, originated simply in an error in transcription, probably of Roberts' actual dispatch. The manuscript of the subsidiary casualty roll seems to have been cleared for it was printed with the name correctly rendered, according to the spelling of the time, as Peer Aree.

The locality remains unaltered in all essentials by the passage of one hundred years. A grove of fine trees mingled with dense undergrowth, still covers the grave yard, and is still surrounded by "an almost impenetrable hedge." Just to the south of it, may be seen the rough graves of the Baluchis killed in Walter's charge.

The grove is watered from a stream flowing from a hot spring in the low hills to the westwards, which irrigates on its way land owned by the Rind tribe. Here the traveler Masson camped with a kafila of merchants on their way from Kalat to Karachi in 1830.

As to the subsequent history of the Units which took part in the engagement, the 6th and 15th Bombay Native Infantry were disbanded in 1882. The 20th is still with us, as the 2nd Battalion (Prince of Wales" Own (6th Rajputana Rifles. The 3rd Company 1st Battalion Bombay Foot Artillery has become the 30th Field Battery, R.A.

Pir Ari was of course too trifling an affair to be made a battle honour; and I have not ascertained whether the troops which took part in it received the Sindh medal. But Napier rightly made it clear, in his Farewell orders, on the departure of the 20th, 10th and 6th Bombay native Infantry from the province in the course of 1844 that they were to be reckoned among the Conquerors of Sindh.

## SHAHDADPUR

On June 1st, 1843, Napier's plans for the reduction of Mir Sher Mahomed were complete, after a month's preparation; they resembled on a small scale, the wide-flung net that Lord Moira spread for the rounding up of the Pindaris in 1817;The Mir was somewhat in the area between Sakrand and Kuhera on the north, and Hala and Shahdadpur on the south; generally keeping not far from the Indus, to the other side of which his family had been evacuated under the care of his brother.

Napier's first care was to secure the river, by patrolling it with the armed steamers of the Indian Navy: not that Sher Mahomed was in a mood to escape to the right bank, but as long as he remained unsubdued, the tribes on that side were likely to cross to join him. We have seen how efficiently the Indian Navy performed its task.

Next, Napier had to provide against the Mir's retreating to the northward: and for this purpose Colonel Roberts was to cross the river opposite Sehwan, while Mir Ali Murad with his own forces operated somewhat further inland, both to move southward.

The General was even more concerned lest Sher Maomed should break through to the south. He possessed considerable territories in the Delta of the Indus, and this region was so far quite unsubdued. Towards the end of April, Jacob had on his own initiative advanced with a squadron of his regiment from Mirpur to quell insurgents in the neighbourhood of Naukot, but had been re called by an express from the General after making two marches.

A similar movement of Police down the Indus without orders a month later had caused the General further vexation, for they had been attacked by the Baluchis and lost six men

killed. He wrote "We had no business to poke our noses into this southern district of Meerpoor, all around which I had made friendly by negotiation—it was thus isolated and sure to fall without a life lost when Sher Mahomed is crushed this disagreeable event has, or may injure my plans much."

Napier reserved for himself the task of preventing the Mir, when pressed from the north passing down southward to establish himself in the marshes of the Poorana river, whence it would be no easy job to dislodge him, even in cold weather."

The last possibility was that Sher Mahomed might escape into the desert, north of the line Hyderabad—Tando Allahyar-Mirpur-Umarkot. The General could congratulate himself that the held the latter and had destroyed Kot Imamgarh another place of refuge but there remained Shahgarh still held by adherents of Mir Mahomed. Hussein, Rustom's son: and it was essential to prevent Sher Mahomed from gaining the desert at all. For this John Jacob was made responsible.

Jacob had been left by Sir Charles to hold down the country east of Hyderabad, with Headquarters at Mirpur and detachments at Umarkot and Tando Allahyar. He was now cast for an offensive role, which the General communicated to him on the second of June; four companies of Infantry were to be sent to enable him to make a demonstration in Sher Mahomeds rear Napier was concerned at the fearful heat: he had already been prostrated himself, and the troops in Hyderabad were suffering. What of those in the outposts—could not Jacob thatch his tents? Jacob wrote back cheerfully. "We have no tents to thatch except a few belonging to some of the Native Officers, but I doubt not but that we shall weather it out." He would be able to make a most effective demonstration against Sher Mahomed from Mirpur; if the General would give him two guns, besides the four companies of infantry he had suggested, the Mir's people would consider the force an army. Meanwhile he had heard that some of that Prince's agents, with a body of horsemen, were collecting men and grain some 25 miles to die north of Mirpur.

On the 4th June, Napier noticed the beginning of the monsoon wind, which encouraged him to move; this date also marked the expiry of his ultimatum to Sher Mahomed. He wrote to Jacob.

"You shall have two six-pounders, they and the four companies of infantry march this evening, and will be with you on the 7th; and on the 8th. I wish you to march in the direction of Kohera, or Koonhera or whatever that rendezvous of the Ameer is called. My reason is this—Colonel Roberts will have the steamers and boats at Sehwan this evening—I think he will cross the river by the 7th bodily, and land somewhere north of Sukkurund (say Doom), and I shall desire him to march against Sher Mahomed on the 8th if he is able to fight him. On the same day (8th) I shall push the 8th Native Infantry towards Aliar ke Tanda, to prevent Shere Mahomed crossing our line and getting down to the south— on the 9th I will move by the north east through Dubba towards Shah-i-

Kaut, which is east of Muttaree, the 8th Native Infantry doing the same to join me: by this I shall be able perhaps to block him, to the south, you will act as you find best on the east." Napier was anxious lest the movements of his troops should produce merely a dispersion of those of the Mir—"which is his game if he knows how to play it I would much rather see him with 40,000 men in one point. I like this fellow for his resolute resistance: I will give him safe conduct if he will come and see me."

Meanwhile intelligence as to Sher Mahomed's movements was perplexing; Napier heard he was making a demonstration towards the south, and halted the infantry and guns at Tando Allahyar, on their way to join Jacob, to whom he wrote on June 6th "Do you also remain quite till you hear from me. I want to see my board a little more clearly before I attack Sher Mahomed: it is no joke hunting him in this weather. I shall wait till I hear from Roberts that he is fairly across the river and on our side. Should anything you hear make you think it right to move, I leave the doing so to your own discretion, but in that case send to let me know as rapidly as you can. Every, account I can get seems to say he has 1,200 people but not above 800 of these are fighting men."

This estimate fell far short of the reality. Jacob knew for certain that 300 men had left Mirpur to join the Mir, and there was talk of five thousand with four guns proceeding to Sakrand. The tale of 2,000 men at Nasarpur however proved to be false, and Napier gave order for the guns and infantry to proceed. On the 9th they joined Jacob at Mirpur; four companies of sepoys and two guns, under the command of Lieutenant Sir Francis Ford, Bart of the 20th Bombay N.I., the whole being placed under Jacob's orders.

The information now was that Sher Mahomed was at Hala: and in a letter telling Jacob that he might now advance, Napier speculates on the reasons for his clinging to the river, and his probable reaction to the' movement of the forces drawing in upon him Jacob must prevent the Mir from escaping into the desert, from which he and his men might disperse and assemble elsewhere.

Before this letter was dispatched Napier was able to add the welcome news of Colonel Roberts' exploit at Pir Ari: which arrived in a steamer bringing down Mir Sher Mahomed. He closed the letter "Roberts will be across this evening and will bother brother Shere, I suspect.....between you and Roberts, Shere Mahomed has a good chance of being picked up." In his journal he wrote: "His great object is to cross the Indus to his family and he will not quit the water for two days; and them probably try to negotiate with Ali Moorad, who has my orders to keep him in play. I have every hope therefore of Jacob getting two day's start."

Jacob marched from Mirpur on the night of the 10th, and Napier spent the next two days passing his own force over the Fuleli, which was now carrying a strong stream. He wrote: "However it is necessary for me to be a day or two in arrears or the Lion would bolt into his den before Roberts or Jacob could reach him. I now leave him quiet to *mamock* Ali

Moorad if he can it will do Ali good thus to pull down his vanity. It is said the Lion has shut him up in the fort of Sukkurunda without any grub: I hope he will not get out until half-starved. Ali assured me, when I told him to be cautious as Sher Mahomed was too strong, that he would capture or treat with him as I wished that the could kill him, or make him prisoner, according to my whishes—anything I liked! If my own arrangements were not so far in blossom, Sher Mahomed should be left to thrash him for his vanity."

On the 13th, Jacob arrived at Shahdadpur with his force. According to information received by Napier that day, Sher Mahomed had moved south to Shah-e-Khaut, east of Matiari, and that evening Napier marched out to Nasarpur hoping to encounter him and end the war at a blow. Jacob's information was that the Mir had moved to a fort called Oocleyra, some 16-17 miles south east of Hala. Meanwhile the General's nephew, William Napier, wrote to him— "You have Sir Charles' permission to rob, murder, steal, hang and anything else to procure carriage; you may do anything if you can but catch Sher Mahomed: do this, and all your crimes will be pardoned Roberts is at Sukkurund today or tomorrow. By tomorrow night you will be not far from Koheran. Shere Mahomed's followers have mostly abandoned him and he will try to bolt to the desert. He mostly abandoned him and he will try to bolt to the desert. He mostly abandoned him and he will try to bolt to the desert. He fears the river and Koheran, and I don't think he will venture Soth." Jacob assumed that the Mir's movement southwards might well be the result of Roberts crossing the river is his rear; he had heard nothing from that Officer, but Shahdadpur seemed the best position from which to intercept the Mir should he move eastward.

He was not mistaken. At 11 p.m. on the 13th June a Brahmin servant of. Sher Mahomed came into his camp and told Jacob that his master was on the march to attack him with his whole force amounting, as he said, to 8,000 or 10,000 men. Jacob pushed his picquets forwards, and about 3 a.m. they sent back word that the enemy was coming on in considerable force. He sent several parties to reconnoiter, and finding that the Baluchis advanced very slowly, determined to attack them. Leaving a troop of the Scinde Horse and a company of Infantry to protect the camp, he marched with remainder, about 800 men of all arms.

The Baloch *Lashkar* on becoming aware of his advance halted and formed on the bank of a *nullah,* horse foot and artillery, in imposing numbers, and opened fire on Jacob's column with three guns: he in turn formed his line and replied with his artillery. Every movement on the powdery white soil raised volumes of dust; Sher Mahomed and his subordinate leaders seem to have lost contact with each other, and somehow a rumour spread that another British force was about to attack them in flank. A sudden panic seized the Baluchis, who broke their ranks and began to with draw from their position. Jacob seeing their irresolution advanced with the Scinde Horse, whereupon they dispersed and fled in every direction. The ground in their front was extremely rugged,

intersected with deep ravines which prevented a charge by the time Jacob had found a way across these obstacles the Mir and his men were well on their way to safety, and among the jungle sand hills and canals running full of water effective pursuit was impracticable: but a few prisoners were taken.

The victory was all but bloodless: five or six Baluchis had been killed by Jacob's artillery fire, and two of his horses by theirs. But the Mir left on the field several standards and three well-equipped brass guns. The prisoners stated the number of their force actually present as 4,000, the remainder, with another guns, having remained behind or deserted. Among their Sardars were Mir Khan Mahomed, Sher Mahomed's younger brother: Mir Mahomed son of Mir Rustum Khan; and a brother-in-law of Mir Nasir Khan; proof enough that in this last attempt h lain the hopes of the Talpur race.

In his dispatch Jacob added that Sher Mahomed had fled with ten horse men in the direction of the river and that he would attempt to cross it to reach his family in Rani Kot, and not fly to the desert without them. But in fact, the Mir seems to have fled to the Northward, for Roberts had not been able to cross the river to take part in the hunt. His force was in great distress owing to the appalling heat and remained at Sehwan. The General, too, had intended to push on to Jacob's assistance with his cavalry and artillery, but on the morning of the l5th he was himself incapacitated by heat-stroke. He was lying half conscious when, Jacob's dispatch arrived and this, in the words of his nephew William Napier, "did him as much good as Doctor Gibbon."

H.M 28th Regiment, which formed part of his force, had meanwhile lost one officer and twenty one men dead from heat apoplexy, and eleven more died at Hyderabad. Thither Napier was carried in a palanquin, after recalling the whole of the force with which he had advanced. His recovery was rapid, and William Napier wrote to Jacob again "Your defeat of Shere Mahomed cured him."

In his dispatch, Jacob had observed 'The conduct of all officers and men under my command has been most steady and excellent throughout, but in an action such as that of this morning there is no room for the display of much military prowess." But Napier recognized the value of the stroke at such a time. Mir Ali Murad s attitude had begun to arouse his suspicions and no one knew better than himself that regular troops could not keep the field much longer without fearful losses from the heat. Three weeks later, when Jacob arrived in Hyderabad, after capturing two more of Sher Mahomed's guns the General told him that at Shahdadpur he had prevented a Pindari war in Sindh.

Maulvi Abdullah Laghari, of Sanghar, whom I questioned on the subject, says that Sher Mahomed in fact taken refuge with the remnant of his men in the desert; and that if rain had not fallen they would have perished. They worked their way gradually northward to the *Registan* (desert) of Mirpur Mathelo, and eventually crossed the Indus near Ghotki and entered the hills.

For some years Sher Mahomed remained in the Marri country inciting the predatory tribes to harass the Sindh border: later he sent his sword to Napier, but would not surrender himself. For years he remained the hope of the diminishing party of irreconcilables, like Bonnie Prince Charlie to the Jacobites: the "Manghanhars" sang that God would grant him the turban of Sindh, and on the walls of the mosque at Wateji Richard Burton noted the couplet scrawled by a patriotic "Unemployed."— "*O Shere Mahomed, turn the reins of they steed towards Scine, And with one flash of thy brand consume 'Nupeer'.*"

It remains to say something of the campaign as a whole. Napier was much censured at the time for persisting in his "wild goose chase" against Sher Mahomed in the height of the hot weather, which cost so many lives. But the best answer to these critics was the complete success of his operations. Once he was committed to a war with Sher Mahomed, to have quitted the field leaving the Mir with ten thousand men and some useful artillery intact, would have postponed the pacification of the country by six months at least. The most that might be urged is that Napier was unduly cautious, and slow in preparing the combination of converging Forces between which Sher Mahomed's powers was finally broken. It must be admitted; incidentally, as pointed out by Commander Merriman, that Napier never duly acknowledged the contribution of the Indian Navy to his success. There are many who have been disgusted with William Napier's extravagant eulogies of his brother's skill, energy and foresight they may point to the lack of military qualities, other than courage in actual combat, among the Baluchis, in view of which Napier's elaborate calculation and co-ordination were uncalled for. His operations were, in fact, such that they would have accounted for a more formidable enemy—no bad criterion for generalship!

We may accept the conclusion of Sheppard that Napier's fame as a general may well be left to rest on this "little masterpiece of War."

# SIR CHARLES NAPIER AND THE MIRS OF SINDH

## H. T. LAMBRICK, I.C.S

The withdrawal from Afghanistan had been dictated by evident necessity; but Lord Ellenborough was not disposed to abandon also the position in Sindh taken up by his predecessor. He recognized that the hopes of extending commerce on the Indus bad been much exaggerated; but for strategic reasons and still more on grounds of prestige Sindh must continue to be occupied.

The hostile intrigues of the Mirs and their constant petty breaches of the commercial provisions of the existing treaty were considered to give fair grounds for imposing new and more rigorous terms on them, and the Governor-General adopted broadly recommendations already made by Outram that the more important places occupied since 1839 should be acquired in full sovereignty, all tribute being remitted in lieu. To facilitate the future conduct of British relations, the position of Rais, or senior chief, was to be revived in Lower Sindh in the person of Mir Sobdar Khan, who had been uniformly loyal; in Upper Sindh, where the aged Mir Rustam was Rais, the succession should pass on his death to his younger brother Mir Ali Murad, who had recently behaved well and appeared fitter to rule than Rustam's son Mahomed Hussein. Such an arrangement was not inconsistent with Baluch custom. The commercial provisions of the old treaty, intended to free trade on the Indus, were to be redefined so as to preclude all further cavil by the Mirs.

Ellenborough for his part decided to introduce British coinage into Sindh and to transfer to the Nawab of Bahawalpur, as a reward for his loyalty, Sabzaikot and other territory in Upper Sindh which the Mirs had seized from him some thirty years before. The proofs of delinquencies by the Talpurs which were to justify the presentation of a new treaty were to be supplied by Sir Charles Napier, the recently appointed supreme military and political authority in Sindh and Baluchistan.

Napier was a distinguished veteran of the Peninsular War and had also served in the American campaign of 1813. Subsequently he had been Resident in Cephalonia one of the Ionian Islands, where he had carried out important public works; and he had held with great credit the difficult Command of the Northern District in England during the Chartist agitation of 1839—41. He was known to be a thorough soldier, a student of his profession, shrewd and resolute; and he had earned also the reputation of being extremely impatient of opposition and 'difficult' in a subordinate post.

His complex character unfolds itself for us in his inimitable journal, edited by his brother William, the historian of the Peninsular War. Charles Napier recognized many of his

own 'sins of temper'; his habitual use of coarse expletives, his intermittent parsimony, his in ordinate ambition, his arbitrary nature. He claimed for the men of his race that their violence was momentary only, though himself and Willi he admitted to be revengeful. Withal he was a religious man in whom periods of self-exaltation, when he believed himself a chosen instrument working in the Divine purpose, were chequered with intervals of humility. He felt, and but feebly resisted, the influence of coincidences and portents; he had grown to trust absolutely to certain principles of action to which his mind would adapt, while distorting, the facts in hand; anything inconvenient or incompatible be would brush aside, careless of the consequences.

Beginning his Indian career at the age of sixty, Napier's opinions on most subjects were naturally fixed; and a few months service at Poona did not dispel his prejudice against the Company's government; he persuaded himself that long experience of the country was an over rated qualification for ruling it and that the policy of supporting native princes on their thrones was entirely wrong and unjust to their subjects.

Napier was a determined champion of the under-dog; he had shown it in Cephalonia and in the Northern Command. Yet his radical views jostled with the instincts of a born dictator. Men should be freed from their oppressors; the fruits of the earth and of their labour should be at the disposal of all mankind: but it were well if this were left to his own benevolent despotism to achieve and maintain. Now for the first time in his life he was to enjoy authority almost commensurate with his ambition. His command was to extend from the Khojak Pass to the sea and in it he was to be supreme in political as in military matters.

Napier went to Sindh conscious of the need to repress his own unsatisfied for military glory; but very soon after his arrival he had convinced himself that the Mirs might have to be '*thrashed into sense*'. The country and the common people appeared to him capable of great development, but not so long as they remained crushed under the ignorant tyranny of their rulers. For his negotiations with the Mirs the General proceeded steadily on the principle, 'Barbaric chiefs must be bullied or they think you afraid: they do not understand benevolence or magnanimity'. Thus, when Mir Rustam put off an appointment to visit him at Sukkur, under a misapprehension, Napier declined the old man's subsequent invitations to meet him; and the frequent military exercises which both he ordered on account of bad state discipline in General England's force and to show the hopelessness of resistance, increased the Mirs' alarm.

Napier was soon engaged in his first diplomatic duty—the investigation of the genuineness of two intercepted letters, selected by Ellenborough as instances of the hostile intentions of Nasir Khan of Hyderabad and Rustam of Khairpur. These, if proved, were to be the main basis for the new treaty. Ellenborough had expressed his entire confidence in Napier's sense of justice; but the investigation from which the general decided that the letters were authentic was entirely *ex parte,* and the only expert opinion

seems to have been that of the Head Munshi of the Residency. This man, Mirza Ali Akbar, was in dose touch with Sheikh Ali Hussein, the minister of Rustam's younger brother Mir Ali Murad who was deeply interested in the terms on which Upper Sindh was to be settled.

All Murad now obtained an interview with Napier and was assured that he would be supported in his claims to the Turban or Rais-ship of Upper Sindh, after the death of Mir Rustam, or earlier if the latter forfeited the Governor-General's protection. The General was as favorably impressed with Ali Murad as he was irritated by Mir Rustam's vacillations; from this moment British policy was dangerously compromised. The 'intelligence' which was already derived from sources mainly hostile to the Mirs seems thenceforth to have been manipulated by Ali Murad against Rustam and his other relations.

Napier and Ellenborough were soon at one in the opinion that some application of force would be re4uired before the Mirs would accept the new treaty. Sir Charles paid a visit to Shikarpur, which he had recommended Ellenborough to retain as a British possession, and took occasion to call in Jacob with the Scinde Horse from Khangarh, and they arrived at Sukkur on 2 November.

On 3rd December the General held a review of Jacob's regiment and though it was almost the first time that the whole corps had paraded together, having been split up for outpost and detachment duty on continuous field service since its first formation, the evolutions were so well performed that the General expressed himself highly pleased. Cavalry was the only arm in which he had hitherto felt his army deficient.

Napier now sent the new draft treaties to the Courts of Khairpur and Hyderabad for their acceptance, informing Mir Rustam that he would at once occupy the whole country on the left bank of the Indus from Rohri up to the Bahawalpur frontier, as though the treaty had been ratified. This territory was specified by Lord Ellenborough under a misconception; it far exceeded what he intended to transfer to the Nawab of Bahawalpur, and conscious of his own defective information the Governor-General gave Napier full discretion to adjust it equitably. But though Outram, according to his own account, had pointed out the error before he left, the General ignored it. The Mirs agreed to accept the treaty, but only under protest. Napier thereupon proceeded to pass part of his army, including the Scinde Horse, over the Indus to Rohri; thence the Bengal regiments under Colonel Wallace marched through this north-east territory *en route* for Ferozepoor. They found it entirely quiet; but from other parts of the country reports flowed in of the assemblage of the Mirs' feudal levies. The English mails were robbed; and Napier addressed a succession of menacing letters to Mir Rustam informing him that he would march on his capital Khairpur, and directing him to go to his brother Ali Murad and be guided by his advice. This last letter was written in reply to a message alleged to have been received from Mir Rustam by a munshi of Sir Charles's office, to the effect that the

old chief wished to take refuge in the General's camp. It is highly improbable that Rustam sent it; but be this as it may, the old chief went as recommended to Ali Murad's fortress at Kot Diji. A few days later Ali Murad informed the General that Rustam had resigned the Turban to him: and when Napier said that he must interview the old chief Ali Murad reported that he had fled. The General at once suspected that Ali Murad had extorted the Turban by force or fraud. This was soon confirmed categorically in a letter from Rustam himself; but Napier would not now forgo the opportunity of establishing at once the corner-stone of his policy—the elevation of Mir Ali Murad as Rais—and refused to investigate Rustam's complaint.

The Intelligence Department received numerous reports of warlike preparations by the younger Mirs of Upper Sindh, and of a league between them and their cousins of Hyderabad. Napier left three regiments to secure Sukkur from attack and felt free to move with the remainder of his army to bring the Talpurs to reason. He decided first to march to Imamgarh, a strong fortress in the desert sixty miles south eastward from Khairpur, belonging to one of the junior Mirs, his object being to show the fugitives that no retreat was secured. Thence he intended to march on Hyderabad; the Mirs, he told himself; would flee over the Indus and British rule, would be established all down the left bank.

So ended the year 1842, and Jacob records how the Mirs' civil officials in the ceded districts applied to know to whom, they were to give over charge of their various departments, 'When lo! these things had positively never been thought of, much less had any of the necessary arrangements been made!' For Napier had almost shrugged of the chafing trammels of his diplomatic duties. Outram was on his way back to Sindh, recalled to assist him in the irksome business of arranging details of the treaties; and Sir Charles turned gladly to be general of a fine army operating against unknown forces believed to be hostile. War was not declared, 'nor is it necessary that it should be'; he would march on Imamgarh. The General rebutted Rustam's complaints in an indignant proclamation, declaring that he would treat with no one who did not recognize Ali Murad as lawful Rais.

At midnight on 5th January Napier marched from Diji with 350 men of Her Majesty's 22nd Regiment, mounted in pairs on camels, 200 sabres of the Scinde Horse and two 24-pounder howitzers drawn by camels. Mir Ali Murad and Outram, who had just rejoined, accompanied the force. After the first march Jacob found that forage was too scarce for the horses of two whole squadrons and the General allowed him to send back all but fifty of his men.

Mir Rustam was encamped with his followers not far from Napier's line of march and Outram was permitted to visit him. Rustam declared publicly that his resignation of the Turban had been extorted. He did not feel equal to going to meet the General but sent one of his sons, who was told that Rustam might keep his own lands and lose only what

appertained to the Turban. He was also told that Imamgarh would be put in charge of Ali Murad.

The British force continued on its way, Jacob with the troop of Scinde Horse forming the advance guard. The last four marches led over immense waves of the sea of sand, and as many as sixty infantry men and fourteen camels were constantly put to the duty of hauling each gun up them. Not an enemy was seen, and on 12th January they came in sight of Imamgarh; a square fort with round towers at the angles, the walls forty feet high. It was utterly deserted and Napier might well congratulate himself that it was so, as his guns could have made but little impression on the huge walls.

There was a great deal of gunpowder in the fort, and the General, reflecting that the place might again become a refuge for rebels, determined to blow it up. He went through the farce of obtaining Ali Murad's consent in writing to the destruction of his nephew's property; the small store of grain left by the absent garrison was served out as rations; Major Waddington skillfully disposed his charges; and Imamgarh ceased to exist.

Intended as an example to the Mirs of the hopelessness of resistance, the destruction of Imamgarh, which was witnessed by one of Rustam's servants, must have convinced them that no submission would secure them from violence.

Napier now detached Jacob's second-in-command, FitzGerald, with a small escort of the Scinde Horse, to survey the route across the desert to Balmir; he was to return via Umarkot and Hyderabad. The Upper Sindh Talpurs were directed to send their representatives to Khairpur, whither Outram also proceeded, to arrange the details of the new treaty. But the Mirs neither attended themselves nor sent plenipotentiaries.

Outram found that with the unauthorized exactions in favour of Bahawalpur and the adjustments necessitated by the bestowal of the Turban on Ali Murad, the effect would be to reduce the revenues of Mir Rustam, his nephews and their sons and feudatory chiefs by nearly two-thirds. He declared that on such terms a peaceful settlement was impossible. Napier, having convinced himself that the Talpurs were attempting to spin out time till the favorable moment for attacking him, was inexorable. 'I see but two parties' with one interest: my own country and the population of Scinde. The Rais I consider a convenience: the Talpoor family do not consider at all, or see why we should support their unjust power.' Outram, believing that Napier was strictly carrying out Lord Ellenborough's instructions, wrote to him in despair that such a policy was 'most tyrannical, positive robbery: I consider that every life that may hereafter be lost in consequence will be a murder.'

Until the expedition to Imamgarh, John Jacob had to perform nothing more than routine duties as commander of a regiment in camp and on the march. But the General had seen enough of him and his men to be greatly impressed by their efficiency, and when a

special service was to be done he selected, them in preference to the Regular cavalry. Napier's information was that the Khairpur Mirs were collecting troops to oppose him and he wanted to prevent them from dispersing and taking refuge in the desert. In detaching the Scinde Horse his instructions to Jacob were to proceed southward skirting the desert as closely as possible until he arrived at or near Syedpur where he was to halt until further orders. If he came within reach of Mir Rustam he was to pay every attention to him; and should a meeting take place after 1st February he was to send the chief to headquarters with a strong escort or, if a rescue attempt appeared probable, with his whole corps. He was to avoid if possible any collision with the Khairpur troops and Rustam was to be assured that no restraint would be put upon him other than enforcement of his residence at a place of his own selection within his own estates. If Jacob heard of or met any armed bodies he was to disarm them if possible; and if they refused, to attack them after fair warning, unless they were troops of Ali Murad or Mir Sobdar Khan, who should be ordered to accompany him.

These orders were written on 27th January, when Napier was still encamped at Abu Bakr. Jacob marched via Lalu and reached Kumb Lima on 2nd February, about seventy miles in advance of the main army and within a march of Mir Rustain's camp at Kunhera. In a letter to his brother Philip, Jacob describes the difficulties of his route through semi-desert country, yielding no forage and water only inconsequence of recent rain. 'The General's intention in detaching me was to prevent the Ameers from flying to the Desert while he was marching south ward—a most childish idea considering that the Desert extends more than 300 miles in length, so that their Highnesses might have reached some of their private retreats within it before I could have known of their movement.' Mir Rustam at Kunhera was in fact on the edge of the desert still; and whatever rabble he had with him, he never dreamed of attacking Jacob who was encamped in the open with little over five hundred men, unsupported by either infantry or guns, and seventy miles distant from the army. Rustam does not even seem to have tried to prevent supplies from reaching the camp and the country people brought them in abundance. But he wrote to Jacob, both before that officer had reached Kumb Lima and at that place, imploring his and the General's mercy.

On 30th January the envoys of the Hyderabad Mirs waited on Napier at Naushahro, bearing their master's seals, with full powers to treat. Napier however directed them to return and take the Mirs of Khairpur with them to Hyderabad, where they should meet Outram. They were told that unless the General heard on the 5th that the Khairpur Mirs had started he would march against them; and he would in any case attack any organized bodies of armed men that he met It is not surprising that the most influential of the vakils, (accredit agents) Mirza Khusru, wrote to his master, 'The General is bent on war, so get ready.'

On 3rd February Napier wrote to Jacob, 'I hope Roostum will spare you, and not realize the fears of the Vukeels, and cut you to pieces! I suspect you have put him into an

exceeding state of terror by your march to Leemah-ka-Koomb he is a miserable idiot. .. !' Major MacPherson, Napier's Military Secretary, wrote in the same enclosure, 'The General requests me to add that Meer Roostum has with him between 6000-7000 men, and hopes that you will keep a good look out till you hear again from him… Roostum declares he won't send Wukkeels unless the General restores to him the Turban, and repairs all the injury he has done to him. The old fool, I wish he may get it!'

Next day Sir Charles wrote again, 'I am at this moment told that 1500 men are proceeding to join Meet Roostum and will pass by your quarters This is very insufferable in Meer Roostum, if the imbecile has any power, which is doubtful; but it shows that he must be put down. However, as I have promised to make no movement before the 6th inst., and as I wish to avoid killing any of these vagabonds if possible, you must let them pass unmolested.' He added that if they insulted him, Jacob was to give them the thrashing they sought to get; but that the fifteen hundred probably meant three hundred men in fact; he concluded by expressing his confidence in Jacob discretion, and his own desire to avoid hostilities.

The influence of Outram's views now appears in Jacob's letter to his brother:

> *Such is the absurd state of Sir C. Napier's 'Intelligence Department' that be writes to me almost daily about these wretched Ameers assembling forces in my immediate neighbourhood, and is in a dreadful state of alarm as to our safety. One day 1500 men have gone to join some warlike Chief within ten miles of me! On another 7000 warriors are hard by in our neighbourhood, and about to cut us all into very little pieces! with abundance of stuff of the same description. Never was there such cramming as that practised on the unhappy Griflin General, especially by his friend Ameer Ali Morad, Sir Charles and his Royal staff, mind you, being utterly unable to hold communication with 'the BLACKS' save through their moonshees, the said moonshees being all great rascals and privately in pay of Mr. Ali Morad, the king elect of Sinde! I have frequently when asked for my opinion given it pretty freely to the General touching the manner in which things are proceeding; but it is difficult to persuade a man that he has been made an ass of, when he fancies he has been displaying profound wisdom, and I suppose Napier will continue a 'Victim o' Gammon' to the end.*
>
> *I have now written to him that his information is entirely false and that his informants are purposely misinforming and misleading him; that the Ameers are remaining quietly at Hyderabad and are neither collecting nor moving troops; that 1500 Sindees would not venture to attack my 500 horsemen and that if the 7000 he talked of did so, we should certainly beat them. . . . I have received no answer to this yet, and do not know how the old man takes it. . . I expect however to hear of his being in. full march with his whole force in a day or two to attack the imaginary army assembled to oppose him.*

But though the Mirs of Hyderabad had not, probably, sent orders to assemble their forces at the time Jacob wrote his replies to Napier, they did so immediately after Mirza

Khusru's return to Hyderabad on about 4th February. Even so, the messages were sent only to particular chiefs; it was not a regular feudal levy and the measure was still a precautionary one taken because the General seemed 'bent on war'.

Sir Charles marched from Naushabro on 6th February, as he had said he would do unless he received word that the Mirs of Khairpur had started for Hyderabad Rustam had in fact actually reached that place on the 4th and the southern Talpurs now sent an urgent appeal remonstrating with the General; Mir Rustam had arrived in a deplorable condition and had suffered gross injustice, which they would explain to Major Outran when he arrived; meanwhile a further advance of the army would be unfriendly, for the force at Kunhera was only for the protection of the baggage and families of Mir Rustam.

However, the General marched on this and on the next four days; and the Mirs were confirmed in the belief that he intended their destruction. Outram on his arrival in Hyderabad on the 8th held a conference with the Mirs of both Upper and Lower Sindh. The chiefs of Hyderabad began by denying the acts on which the new treaty was grounded and said that if their Baluchis heard that the British army was advancing they would plunder the whole country. However, they declared that they would sign the treaty, as would also their cousins of Khairpur, if Rustam. Khan were restored to his rights Rustam himself explained in the full Durbar the manner in which the Turban was extorted from him and Mir Mahomed Khan inquired what fault he had committed that his fort of Imamgarh should be destroyed. Outran replied as best he could, declaring that the treaties must be signed and that subsequently Rustam might petition the General in regard to the Rais-ship.

Nothing was definitely settled that night but on the following after noon, in response to Outram's urgent instance, the Mirs sent deputies to sign a document by which they undertook to accept the treaty. Outram sent this to the General by the hand of FitzGerald who had arrived in Hyderabad on his return from Balmir, and with it a letter requesting Napier to halt for one day. He informed the Mirs of Upper Sindh that they must sign the treaty on the 10th. Rustam answered that he was willing to sign on that day but requested postponement till the 11th, as the previous day was the last and holiest of the Mohurram mourning which was observed very strictly by the Mirs. Outram desired the General to halt another day and he consented, telling Outram to inform the Mirs that he did so at their request, though to Ellenborough he wrote that he halted to give his tired camels a rest after five consecutive marches.

On the 11th the vakils of the Mirs of Upper Sindh came to the Residency and signed the treaty on behalf of their masters. That afternoon the light company of H.M.'s 22nd landed at the Residency. They had been sent down the river by Sir Charles who was convinced, partly by what he heard from FitzGerald, that the Mirs intended to fight, and that Outram was hopelessly outwitted by them and in great personal danger. Outram thought only of the disturbing effect the unprecedented arrival of a strong escort of

British troops would have on the minds of the Mirs and their followers. The chiefs had undertaken to disband their levies and promised to repeat the orders issued, but information that the General intended to advance from Sakrand reached them on the 12th and threw them into consternation. Outrain wrote to Sir Charles that should he advance beyond Hala, if he came so far, they would probably reassemble their forces in self-defence, 'in the idea that we are determined to destroy them, notwithstanding their submission.' It seems certain that the Baloch sardars who, had been summoned to be present on the 9th would have disobeyed any orders to return home as long as the Feringhi general appeared to act in the desire of measuring the strength of his small army against them. It was very unsatisfactory, Outram wrote, being unable to give a decided pledge to the Talpurs that the General would not advance, but only to express a hope that he might halt on hearing that the treaty had been signed, for, 'they cannot understand any motive for hesitation but deception.

This last observation perhaps produced on Sir Charles an effect contrary to that intended. Delay would endanger his army—be would march to show that he had no hesitation.

On the evening of the 12th February Outram held another conference with the Mirs at which they again brought forward the stumbling block of Mir Rustam's case. In Jacob's words—based of course on Outram's account and written just after Miani:

> *The Hyderabad Ameers protested against the injustice committed by the General in setting up one Ameer over another as in the case of Ali Morad and Meer Roostum…. They said (and with reason I think) that their agreeing to this involved a principle which rendered not only their sovereignties but the jaghires of all the chiefs in Sinde insecure.—that they were willing and ready to agree to all Lord Ellenborough's demands without exception as set forth in the draft of the treaty which was now offered to them: but that they could not submit to acknowledge the right of the' British Government to set up Ali Morad in the Principality of Khyrpore to the injury of the rightful prince Meer Roostum; this was not included in the treaty and even if the Hyderabad Ameers should personally submit to Meer Roostum's degradation they could not control the warlike chiefs under them who would all lose or fear to lose their lands by the proposed arrangement. If Ali Morad's elevation were insisted on they must try their fortune in war whether they would or no, for their Beloochee chiefs would compel them to fight.*
>
> *At last they signed and sealed everything demanded of them (Ali Morad's business they were told they had nothing to do with, and it was not mentioned in the draft treaty) on Outram promise to do his best to prevent the further advance of our army towards Hyderabad. They could not understand how it was that Outram had not the power positively to promise this, naturally remarking that on all similar occasions before, the army had always obeyed the orders of the diplomatist who represented the British Government at their Court, and that if this were not the case, they had no security against military violence from the General after that they should have disbanded their own army according to Outram's demands.....*

All the Mirs of Hyderabad had now affixed their seals to the treaty, as also Rustam Khan and Mir Mahomed Khan of Khairpur. Mir Nasir Khan of Khairpur not having his seal, with him promised to send it on the following day. On leaving the Durbar that evening Outram and his companions had to pass through a dense crowd of infuriated Baluchis, but were protected from serious injury or insult by a strong guard of horsemen sent by the Mirs. The tribesmen had been flocking into the capital since the night of the 11th, in with indignation for the wrong inflicted on Mir Rustam and determined to fight for the independence of their country. That night the feudatory Sardars swore on the Koran that as Mir Rustam was not to be restored to his rights they would fight the British whether the Mirs sanctioned hostilities or not.

On this momentous day, 12th February, an incident occurred which was the proximate cause of the bloodshed in Sindh. Jacob was encamped at Nakur, whither he had moved for convenience of forage, six miles from Sakrand where the main army was halted. For some days he had been aware of unusual movements of mounted men through the country near him. What now followed may be told in his own words:

A party of 25 well dressed and well mounted horsemen were stopped by my pickets; they were all armed to the teeth, had servants etc. with them, and appeared men of some consequence. It was rather too good a joke to let them pass through my camp, and I therefore ordered them to lay down their arms, and go to the General camp. This however they positively refused to do, they dismounted and stood together with matchlocks presented, declaring they would all die rather than give up their arms. I had not sufficient eloquence to persuade them to alter their determination, although I had 100 carbineers drawn up in line in front of them, and the least sign from me would have caused their instant death. I did not like to kill the rascals, who were really brave fellows with some stalwart old red-bearded warriors among them, so at last I went into the middle of them and told them to keep their arms and come with me, and if they perceived treachery they might shoot me; they were pleased at this and came with me into my lines where I left them with a strong guard over them and reported to the General. His reply did not reach for four hours and before that time the Beloochee courage had been cooled by their remaining seated in the sun exposed to the ridicule of my sowars, and they sent to say that they would give up their arms and go where I pleased.

Napier had just heard from Outram that the Mirs had solemnly promised to sign the treaty on the 11th; and his reply to Jacob read, This is the most provoking accident which could well have occurred; however it is not to be avoided…. you have done perfectly right in not forcing them. I wish there had been 500 instead of 25, and then there would be no difficulty.' He sent a whole squadron of the 9th Bengal Cavalry to help in persuading the Baluchis to surrender without resistance and Jacob sent them to Sakrand in their charge. The men proved to be Hyat Khan, a headman of part of the Marri tribe

settled in Sindh, with other notables. Their followers, to the number of about five hundred, were at the time in a village four miles away and on hearing of their leaders' capture dispersed to their homes. All had been on their way to join the Mirs and on Hyat Khan a note was found from Mir Mahomed Khan of Hyderabad, ordering him to assemble every male able to wield a sword and bring them to the rendezvous at Miani, some ten miles north of the capital, on the 9th.

Sir Charles was now convinced that the Talpurs had been carefully planning his annihilation, spinning out time by insincere negotiation until their full strength was mustered; that they had been and still were 'humbugging Outram'. 'He says "not a man in arms is at Hyderabad." Why, they have been marching on that place from many directions, and thousands have got there: all our spies are agreed on this. I am puzzled. He prays me not to move. I must move. 'What work he makes about Roostum's nerves! but I have my soldiers' health and safety and my own character to think of. I have driven these wolves into a sack, and will not be their dupe.'

On the afternoon of 13th February the Mirs' deputies met Outram in a third conference. They begged him for some pledge that Mir Rustam Khan would receive justice. Outram answered much against his own feelings and strictly according to his instructions. The Mirs' emissaries protested that their masters had agreed to everything the British Government had demanded— 'Why oppress them any further?' The obstacle remained, and at length they departed saying that unless some assurance with regard to the rights of the Khairpur chiefs were given, they had no hopes of allaying the excitement of the Baluchis.

On the 14th Napier advanced to Syedabad and Jacob joined him. On the same date the Mirs gave up hope of a peaceful settlement. Nasir Khan and Mahomed Khan of Hyderabad wrote to their Governor of Karachi that they, together with Mirs Sobdar, Shahdad and Hussein Ali, intended that day to take the field against the English who 'seem desirous of possessing themselves of our dominions.'

Outram had just informed Sir Charles that he believed 'all their vaunting would end in smoke'; but when he heard, on the morning of the 14th, of the capture of Hyat Khan Marri and the rest, he sent word that hostilities were now almost certain to break out. He also wrote an express to the commander of H.M.'s 41st Regiment, then on its way to Bombay from the north via Tatta and Karachi, to halt in case the General should need it. To the Mirs of Hyderabad he wrote, advising them to dissociate themselves from the proceedings of the Khairpur Chiefs, whom they should persuade to leave the Hyderabad territories. So passed 14th February, Outram was warned that the Residency would be attacked and was begged by the Mirs to leave, but he remained at his post until he should hear further from Napier.

**Jacob's narrative of the events may now be resumed.**

> *Outram had with him only the Light Company of the 22nd, and even that small party had little ammunition; he had informed the General of this and in the evening we (the S.I.H.) were started off to Hala with 50 sepoys and a lot of ammunition, there to embark on board of the 'Satellite' steamer supposed to be waiting at Halabunder; by way of assisting me the General insisted on sending two of Hutt's guns with me, which, delayed our march so much that we did not reach Old Hala till 3o'clock A.M. on the 15th when lo! no steamer was there. The army arriving at New Hala (some two miles from the other) at about 9 o'clock, we rejoined them, and after a great deal of disputing about the steamer it was discovered that the General had ordered her away three days before and had forgotten all about it…. 18 hours on horseback this day for nothing! Next day, the 16th, we marched to Muttari and here the most alarming reports reached the General apparently from authentic sources (letters from the Native Doctor of the Hyderabad Agency) - the Residency had been attacked by immense numbers, the buildings destroyed by artillery, that Outram's party had lost many men but effected their escape to the steamer, that the enemy had turned their guns on the steamer and sunk her with all aboard.*
>
> *Having perfect confidence myself that Outram would be reserved for greater things (Caesatem vehis et Caesaris fortunas) I did not believe a word of it, although the General did not doubt its truth. However in the evening Outram made his appearance in our camp having left his party safe on board of the steamer not far off. They had been attacked by some 8000 men, and artillery had been brought against them, but after a most gallant defence Outram effected his retreat to the steamer losing only a man or two, and one shot only striking the vessel afterwards: 60 of the Beloochees were killed in their attack on the house and gardens besides others slain by grape from the steamer's guns. No rest for us; we (S.I.H.) were sent out in the evening to look for the Beloochee army said to have advanced towards us from Hyderabad; we did not return till past one A.M., having found the enemy within 8 or 9 miles of us…..*

Meanwhile Sir Charles Napier allowed Outram to proceed with two hundred convalescent sepoys to create a diversion by burning the woods near the position in which the main force of the enemy was said to be. He warned the General that the battle would be severe.

The Baloch vassals of the Mirs of Sindh were indeed assembled in their thousands, eager for battle. The mother of young Hussein Ali clothed him in a coat of mail and made him fight for his race and his religion. Nasir Khan's reluctance to commit himself as long as there seemed the least hope of a peaceful settlement was misrepresented by his angry Sardars; disdainfully they presented him with a woman's dress. The imputation of cowardice was enough. Nasir Khan rode out with the others. The time had come to fulfill the words he had spoken not long since: 'We obtained this country by the sword; and if it is to pass from us, it shall not do so without the sword

## Miani—Hyderabad—Shahdadpur

## H. T. Lambrick, I.C.S

At four o'clock in the morning of 17th February reveille sounded in the British camp near Matiari and for the last time began the slow process of getting *en route* three thousand troops and thrice that number of followers in the chilly darkness. As usual, the Scinde Horse had been told off to lead the advance guard; the men awoke dog-tired after the long hours of fatiguing duty on the two previous days, and Jacob had some difficulty in getting them to turn out to time. However, once in the saddle the regiment became brisk again and marched, followed by a, company of Madras, sappers and a working party of a hundred, sepoys, to prepare passages through the numerous *nullahs* and canal beds for the artillery. Two 9-pounders completed the advance guard.

After seven miles the track converged on the dry bed of the Fuleli, a branch of the Indus running at this point nearly due south; a little farther on, when the sun had risen, the sound of distant cannon was heard. The General, who was with the advance guard, halted it and then ordered Jacob forward to discover the enemy's position. The Fuleli here passed between two shikargahs (*Hunting preserves of the Talpur rulers of Sindh*) enclosed within mud walls; Jacob detached a squadron under FitzGerald to skirt round that on the farther hank and himself with the rest of his regiment moved forward and somewhat to the left to reconnoiter beyond the nearer of the two, the wall of which ran on obliquely across the previous line of march. He had gone on at a trot for a mile, or more when some country people told him that the whole Baloch army was in front of him, and this was soon confirmed by immense clouds of dust and firing of artillery. Jacob sent back word to Sir Charles, who followed him up with the rest of the advance guard till he too came within sight of the enemy's position, at about a mile's distance. Here he halted to await the arrival of the main body of his army. Meanwhile Jacob led his regiment on to within five hundred yards' distance from the Baluchis; here he formed line and halted, and himself went forward to reconnoiter their position. The main body appeared to occupy a space extending some seven hundred yards between the shikargah and a village with enclosures in its front. Several cannon were drawn up in front of the line and opened on the Scinde Horse with round shot, Jacob approaching to within two hundred yards drew matchlock fire both from the shikargah and the village revealing that both flanks were occupied in advance of the centre. He now retired and sent back a note to the General of what he had seen. What he had not seen—for even from two hundred yards it was invisible—was that behind the front line of the Baluchis lay the bed of the Fuleli, here running at right angles to its former course; and in it vast numbers of the enemy were concealed.

FitzGerald now rejoined with the detached squadron. What followed may be told in Jacob's own words, in a letter to his father.

> *The enemy several times advanced a little as if to attack us, but on my moving our line forward also they returned to their former position and resumed their artillery fire. Our right was within musket range of the wall of the Shikargah, they advanced a party behind it and opened fire on us; many horsemen too here and there singly advanced to the front,, and dismounting fired at us with deliberate aim; however, though we were under fire of their artillery at little more than point-blank range for nearly two hours without intermission and the guns were really not badly directed, only six of our horses were killed by round shot. The musketry hurt no one although the balls whistled about fast enough. It would have done your heart good to 'see how steady my fellows were under it although every minute a shot struck close to their horses' feet.'*
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> *At last up came the whole force and after what seemed to us a very long time line was formed in our rear. Artillery on the right, Infantry in echelon at company distance, 9th Cavalry – reserve. Our Artillery opened their fire with some effect and then the whole advanced; shortly afterwards I was ordered to clear the front of the infantry and protect their left. I accordingly formed column of squadrons and advanced almost directly on the village....*

The 22nd leading the echelon came first into action and the infantry except the Grenadiers were soon all hotly engaged. Our artillery from the confined space had great difficulty in getting into action and only four guns were unlimbered at all, the leading horses were shot the moment they showed their heads at the bank of the river and the Beloochees were swarming about Hutt's muzzles, however he got a 12-pounder howitzer run up by main force arid fired obliquely backwards into the enclosure of the Shikargah whence the Beloochees were crowding round the angle of the wall to turn our right, another gun fired across the muzzle of this one; and the others into the enemy's camp and Horse in the rear; the execution done by Hurt's two guns first mentioned was fearful, the fellows fell in *heaps* at every discharge, each round knocked over twenty or thirty and I firmly believe that old Hutt saved the right of our line from being overwhelmed altogether. [Jacob the artillery man is speaking]

> *But to return to the infantry with whom of course must rest the strength of the battle: the struggle along the bank of the river was fearful, our fellows three times recoiled and thrice honestly renewed the fight although at one time the 22nd would not advance even when the old General cap in hand with Majors Waddington and Wylie stood before them and entreated them to make one more charge! The victory was worse than doubtful for many minutes and the Grenadiers sounded the retreat (Clibborn declares he only took up the sound from someone else!) However on they rush again, 22nd, 25th and 12th and the combat which had never ceased becomes more furious than before, the close fire of musketry is one continued roar (you could not even hear the artillery firing!) and the crest of the bersa is won.*

*Now for ourselves: when we had advanced close to the village I found that the Grenadiers were completely in our rear while the others were engaged on our, right front. I thought of course some party had been ordered to carry the village, the key of the position, and naturally supposed that this task had been allotted to the Grenadiers. Accordingly I went left and pushed my horsemen into the most awfully difficult ground you can imagine, we had so many falls that more than fifty horses were on their heads at once, and at the same time the fire from the village not sixty yards distant was tremendous, every nullah also was lined with match lock men concealed in and firing through the thorns. A great number of our men and horses were shot here. My horse, a first-rate hunter was mortally wounded through the belly and lungs, other balls struck my sword scabbard etc. To my disgust the ground to the left of the village was absolutely impassable, and the Grenadiers did not attack the village! While we were still halted under fire endeavoring to form in ground that would admit of no order or arrangement a staff officer came to me saying we were wanted in front, and that the 9 Cavalry had refused to charge or would not charge (these were his words, with their truth.! have nothing to do). I immediately pushed on at the trot, passed close under the right of the village, and charged shortly after crossing the river; we passed the Bengal Cavalry halted, one squadron in line on the left and the remainder dispersed about the village firing pistols into it. We charged right through the enemy's camp, slew more than a hundred of them and took Nusseer Khan's standard (a very old green flag with a lion and sword and Nusseer's name on it). The Beloochees did not run; to a man they smote sternly to the last as my fellows dosed with them. I had just begun to reform after the charge when Major Waddington came galloping up to say that we were wanted in the rear to repel a threatened attack on the baggage guard; accordingly back Russell and I went with what men we could get together, but FitzGerald not hearing my trumpets continued the pursuit and slew many more of the enemy. Their cavalry seeing our charge and us in full possession of their camp fled altogether and never came into action at all; there were at least 5000 of them! Our charge decided the battle (the General told me so on the ground). Our rear was not attacked, and thus ended one of the hardest and most honestly fought battles ever recorded in history.*

The British losses at Miani were 6 British officers killed, and 13, with 3 Indian officers, wounded; 54 other ranks killed and 177 wounded.; about one-ninth of the total force actually engaged. The Scinde Horse had 17 sowars wounded, some mortally, 23 horses killed and 21 wounded. The losses of the Bengal cavalry were less in horses killed but heavier among the soldiers and included one British officer killed and 4 wounded. The difference may be ascribed to their assault dismounted on the village and the slower speed, as compared with Jacob's, of their mounted attack.'

The casualties in the Mirs' host were fearfully severe, particularly in killed. Jacob says, 'The dead men were lying literally in heaps; I counted one of 80 and another of 50 in front of where the 22nd fought and they were lying nearly as thickly in front of the other corps.' The Talpurs themselves probably exaggerated their losses in admitting, as Jacob records, 5000 killed or died of wounds.

During the night Outram returned from his expedition to the riverain shikargahs. He had succeeded in partially burning the woods towards the Indus, and the smoke had been seen during the battle; but his party had been too exhausted to carry out his plan of emerging to create a diversion on the flank and rear of the Baloch army.

In the early morning of the 18th Mir Sobdar sent his munshi, Awatrai by name, with a letter informing Sir Charles that he had taken no part in the hostilities. Jacob was with the pickets when the munshi approached, and on obtaining the General's leave to bring him to his tent asked him whether he had any arms concealed. Awatrai replied that he had not and great was his consternation when a search revealed a sword underneath the camel saddle, which his driver had hidden there without his knowledge. Jacob however took this in good part, and produced the munshi before Sir Charles, who expressed his satisfaction with Sobdar's message, but desired his representative to bring in all the belligerent Mirs, who were to surrender in person before noon, failing which Hyderabad would be attacked. Nasir Khan and his allies decided to reject the alternative heroic measures recommended by some of their counsellors, to defend the fort with the troops who had returned from the battle and the fresh levies which had gathered, or to cross the river with them and renew the struggle in western Sindh; for there was no time to remove their women and children and the treasure. Nasir Khan, Shahdad and the young Hussein Ali Khan, who had been present in the battle accompanied Awatrai back to Miani. Jacob conducted the Mirs to the tent pitched for their reception. Napier returned their swords and spoke kindly to them, saying that their ultimate disposal rested with the Governor-General but that until his orders were received they would be treated with all consideration consistent with security Outram persuaded the General to allow Hussein Ali to return to the fort on parole.

Napier also wrote to Mir Sobdar Khan, telling him to remain perfectly at his ease, and to take care of the fort and town of Hyderabad. Outram at the same time sent word to Mir Rustam Khan that he would be well advised to make his submission.

While this was going forward an emissary from Mir Sher Mahomed, the independent prince of Mirpur, was in the camp. His master had advanced with a considerable force to within six miles of Miani, and wished to be informed what were the General's intentions towards him self. After consulting Outram Sir Charles wrote in reply, 'If you disperse your troops and keep no one with you, I shall reckon you just the same as before.' Sher Mahomed withdrew to his own territories, but decided to watch further events before making his peace.'

Napier this day wrote his dispatch on the battle of Miani. Of Jacob and the Scinde Horse he says, 'To this all soldier and his regiment I am indebted for the most active services, long previous to and during the combat. He won the enemy's camp, from which he drove a body of three or four thousand cavalry.' But passing over the well deserved

eulogies of the troops and the description of the battle, the dispatch is particularly remarkable for an error in a date, on which Napier founded his accusation of deliberate treachery on the part of the Mirs in attacking Outram; to this was mainly due the subsequent annexation of Sindh by the Governor-General. Napier writes that the Talpurs signed the treaty on 14th February; that this was immediately followed by a hostile demonstration by the Baluchis, and that next morning the Residency was attacked. It may be recollected that the signing of the draft treaty and the demonstration against Outram took place on the night of the 12th: the demonstration being the immediate result, as Mir Nasir Khan later showed, of the arrival at Hyderabad of news of the seizure by Jacob of Hyat Khan Marri and his men that morning. This incident was looked upon by the Baloch sardars as a final declaration of war by the General who, disregarding the fact that the Mirs had agreed to sign the treaty, which was reported to him on the 10th, would be satisfied with nothing but possession of the fort of Hyderabad. Nasir Khan himself only abandoned hope of averting hostilities on the 14th and had meanwhile urged Outram to rejoin the General, as he might find himself unable to restrain the fury of the Baluchis.

Outram himself declares that he at once pointed out to Sir Charles the mistake In ascribing to 14th February events which really occurred on the 12th, and protested against the injustice of the implication that the Talpurs had acted with deliberate treachery: but the dispatch went off to Lord Ellenborough unaltered.'

On the night of the 18th Jacob, who had employed his scanty leisure in making a survey of the field of Miani, was sent with his regiment and the 9th Cavalry to Hyderabad in charge of the British wounded. The rest of the army followed next morning and the whole encamped near the ruined Residency. Here Jacob found time to write to his father a brief account of the battle. He was 'somewhat tired'. 'For the last four nights I have not slept an instant and have been on horseback almost without intermission for the last 30 hours.'

Rustam Khan and the other Khairpur Mirs now surrendered and were installed with their cousins in a garden within the perimeter of the camp occupied by the army, entrenchment of which was immediately begun.

On the 20th Napier issued a stern order to put down plundering by the camp followers and also directed Mir Sobdar to dismiss all armed Baluchis from the fort, town and suburbs. The Mir obeyed, evidently without apprehension of the sequel designed; Outram too supposed that Sir Charles only intended to place a strong guard over the fort gate.

This day Outram relinquished his charge as Commissioner, handing over to Napier a letter which he had written on 27th January, but held back till the General should dispense with his services. He therein stated that as within his terms of reference he saw

no hope of effecting any good as Commissioner, he would not draw the pay allotted to the post but simply his allowance as a captain of the army in the field. This quixotry was intended as a pointed reflection on Lord Ellenborough: for Outram at the time and for many months afterwards supposed that Napier had done no more than carry out the Governor-General's instructions.

Whatever regrets Jacob may have felt for the departure of his friend, he fully understood the intolerable position in which he had been placed and was in complete agreement with him on the iniquities of the Sindh policy; he had just written to his father that Outram did well to go— 'He cannot serve under such a man as my Lord Ellenborough.'

They were not to meet again for fourteen years.

Outram dropped down the river *en route* for Bombay and England, his heart and mind tormented by thoughts of the injustice which he had tried in vain to avert. From Tatta he wrote to his old subordinate Brown, imploring him to do all in his power to alleviate the hard lot of the Mirs and to assure them of his active sympathy. But the next step to their prejudice had already-been taken. Hardly had he stepped on board the steamer when Napier issued a general order for a detachment to occupy the fort and city of Hyderabad accompanied by prize agents who were to take possession of all public treasure, 'till the decision of the Governor-General is received'. The part of the fort where the Mirs' families resided was not to be entered, and the strictest discipline was to be observed towards the peaceable people of the town.

The Mirs or their representatives now produced their treasures. Next, the prize agents ordered that the Talpur families should be moved out of the zenanas, a period of three, days being allowed to the ladies to remove themselves and their belongings. The palanquins in which they were conveyed were not searched and they were thus able to secure some of their personal jeweler; but as their slave girls were subjected to search at the gate by a common woman in the keeping of one of the officers, a great deal fell into the hands of the agents. Moreover many of the Mirs' confidential servants had been imprisoned, and there was no means of moving furniture and other personal belongings.

On 23rd February Mir Mir Mahomed Khan, who had compromised himself in a letter written together with Nasir Khan to their governor in Karachi, was sent to join the other captive princes, and he was followed next day by the bed-ridden Mir Sobdar. Neither had taken part in the battle but their feudatories had fought alongside the others.

Napier now issued general orders for the dispatch of business. Among these, 'everything relative to Prizes' was referable 'to the Prize Agents'. He had written to Ellenborough shortly after appointing them, urging that they should be allowed to report direct to the Governor-General's secretary, and that he himself should have nothing to do with the matter. Left to their own discretion the agents, after securing the gold, jewels, valuable

arms and similar treasure, laid hands on the personal house hold belongings of the Talpur families, no distinction being made between State and private property; and by the beginning of March regular auctions were held to convert the miscellaneous contents of the fort into cash.

On a few occasions Jacob went to the scene in order to examine some horses among the prize property which his men wished to purchase to supply the places of the large number disabled in the battle. There he saw heaps of silk embroidery, many pieces half finished and with the needles still in the work; ladies' dresses, infants' clothing and caps, ladies' work baskets and boxes, toilettes, carpets, furniture, beds and bedding, children's cots, and immense quantities of crockery and glass, lying exposed for sale. Jacob made no secret of his indignation, at the prize agents' proceedings, arguing openly that no conquest conferred a right over the private personal property of individuals, particularly women and children.

The Mirs and their ministers more than once complained to the General; but he would seem to have professed ignorance of the transactions and always referred the petitioners to the prize agents, 'whose business it is to settle such questions'—as if these same agents were not the very people complained against in one instance Jacob records an appeal being made successfully to E. J. Brown, who had become Civil Secretary to Napier: he overruled the prize agent who had refused the request of one of the Mirs' ladies, who was expecting a child, for a favorite bedstead which was plated with gold.

The General now had occasion to issue more stringent orders to put down plundering by the camp followers; remarking that such conduct would 'not only prevent the Beloochees from becoming our friends, but turn the Scindians against us.'

The Baloch warriors had in fact been rallying to Mir Sher Mahomed of Mirpur ever since Miani, and on 3rd March Napier sent him an ultimatum to disband them and come in to prove his own innocence, or expect to be attacked. But the Mir was well informed of all that was passing in Hyderabad and had no intention of proceeding there. He decided to maintain his ground with as strong an army as possible, but to remain on the defensive. Napier's own position was at this time far from secure, with the fort and the incomplete entrenched camp, four miles apart, both to be guarded, and the Talpur prisoners on his hands. But having his base on the river he could wait for reinforcements which he had summoned both from Karachi and Sukkur; Ellenborough too had dispatched troops from Ferozepoor on hearing of the outbreak of hostilities. Meanwhile Sher Mahomed's men interrupted the mail route via Cutch and other bands of Baluchis were active along the lower Indus.

The Mir was aware of the approach of reinforcements and saw that his position was becoming dangerous. On 15th March he sent a blustering message: if the General released his prisoners and restored his plunder, he would be allowed to evacuate the

country unmolested. The envoy had scarcely delivered his message when the evening gun sounded; this, said Napier, was his answer. Sir Charles was however still anxious for his reinforcements, and being led to believe that the captive princes were in constant communication with Sher Mahomed through their attendants, vented his wrath on them in a menacing letter. On the same day—the 18th—he went out on a reconnaissance with Jacob and the, Scinde Horse to show Mir Sher Mahomed that he was not afraid of leaving his entrenched position, and also to divert his attention from the body of troops now approaching Hyderabad by the land route from Rohri. On a second reconnaissance, on the 20th, Napier observed the position—a very strong one—occupied by the Mir at Tando Jam Ali. On his return he issued a general order to the troops, declaring his intention of marching against Sher Mahomed on the 24th.

On 21st March boats came up the Indus bringing artillery officers with recruits, some supplies, money and ammunition from Karachi; and almost simultaneously the 21st Bombay Native Infantry arrived by river from Sukkur. The final reinforcement—a small brigade consisting of the 1st Troop Horse Artillery, the 3rd Bombay Cavalry and the 8th Bombay Native Infantry, under the command of Major Stack was now within a long march of Hyderabad. Sir Charles sent out McMurdo with the Poona Horse under Lieutenant Tait, who joined Stack at Matiari. Marching on the 22nd, Stack had passed the field of Miani when the enemy appeared on his left front and subsequently advanced in considerable force on the left rear of the column, but were driven back by a sharp cannonade from the Horse Artillery. About the time the firing ceased, Jacob arrived with his corps, having been sent out by the General to meet Stack at Miani and the Scinde Horse formed the rear guard of the column on its final march into the camp?

Napier gave the new arrivals a day's rest on the 23rd and in the evening brigaded and maneuvered the rest of his troops. Envoys from Sher Mahomed once more arrived to demand the General's surrender, but be took them along the line and told them to report to their master all that they saw. He then passed across the Fulei an advanced force, joining it with the main army at day-break. Before marching against Sher Mahomed he caused the Governor-General's gazette on the battle of Miani, which had just reached him from Bombay, to be read out to the troops. Victory had placed at the disposal of the British Government 'the country on both banks of the Indus, from Sukkur to the sea, with the exception of such portions thereof as may belong to Meer Ali Murad, of Khyrpore, and to any other of the Ameers who may have remained faithful to his engagements.' Lord Ellenborough continued, 'The Governor-General cannot forgive a treacherous attack upon a representative of the British Government, nor can he forgive hostile aggression prepared by those who were in the act of signing a treaty.' Napier had thus achieved his object.

The gazette also announced that the Scinde Horse was to be permanently attached, on its existing establishment, to the Army of Bombay, and it was among the units receiving the battle honour 'Hyderabad 1843'. And on 24th March, when the army marched at dawn to

attack Mir Sher Mahomed, it was once more Jacob and his corps that formed the advance guard."

Napier had taken the precaution of placing the captive Talpurs in a steamer under the guard of the Indian Navy, and he left five hundred men to garrison the fort and eight hundred for the entrenched camp, mainly recruits, convalescents and men who had been wounded at Miani. There remained at his disposal rather more than five thousand men, the strength of the infantry and artillery being double that at Miani. Every man, from the general to the latest joined sepoy, was confident of victory.

The march was directed towards the east, but after four miles a peasant brought word that the Mir had shifted his position and, was some two miles to the northward. Sir Charles at once sent on the Scinde Horse to reconnoiter and ordered the column to wheel to the left and follow the direction he himself took as he galloped after Jacob. The latter established contact and formed line within cannon shot of the enemy, the main body of the army soon came up, b as at Miani its formation into line of battle was a lengthy process The left, formed within 1200 yards of the enemy, was galled by their artillery and while the General in person was employed in directing its withdrawal and the consequent redressing of the whole, he ordered Major Waddington and other staff officers forward to examine the Baloch position, which they did from three hundred yards' distance.

The British army was drawn up with cavalry on either flank and details of artillery dispersed between the infantry corps in the centre. The Scinde Horse were on the extreme right of the line and next to them the 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry. The left rested on the bank of the Fuleli, the bed of which was deep at this point, with mud and pools of water. Beyond it was a thick grove of trees and to the front, on the nearer bank, the tops of other trees were visible over a high bank of earth, which ran continuously for well over a mile to the right. From behind this bank came the flashes and smoke of the enemy's cannon, and the heads and flourished weapons of the Baluchis could be seen at intervals all along it. It was clearly an entrenched position with no discernible weak spot, though it was impossible from the front to judge in what strength it was held. Its extent to the left was ill-defined, but about two miles from the Fuleli there was a grove which Napier suspected to be held by the enemy; if so, there might be danger to his own right flank when he advanced his line. Napier now ordered his artillery to open fire, but as the enemy's guns continued to be plied as vigorously as before he soon felt it necessary to lessen the range by a general advance of five hundred yards. From the new position all the British batteries kept up a heavy cannonade for nearly an hour, and succeeded in blowing up several of the Baloch ammunition tumbrils. Though their guns were by no means silenced, Napier felt that longer preparation would only cool the spirit of his troops and resolved to launch his attack.

This was to be directed first against the point near the bank of the Fuleli where the appearance of trees behind the embankment seemed to indicate a village corresponding with that at Miami, for as yet there was nothing to show that it was occupied. When Leslie's troop of Horse Artillery began to advance, supported by the cavalry on their left and on their right by the 22nd, the Baluchis were seen to move rapidly towards the point menaced, which confirmed the General's belief that it was the most lightly held. Leslie was ordered to advance in 'bounds', at each halt firing obliquely on the centre and left of the enemy's line, while the rest of the artillery crossed their fire. The infantry were to attack in echelon from the left, so that the right of the line, partially refused, would not be taken in flank by any counter-attack that might be made from the wood on that side.

As soon as the Horse Artillery and the 22nd had advanced within musket range of the entrenchments they came under a heavy fire of matchlocks; Napier had in fact selected the strongest point in the Baloch position for his attack, as the village—Nareja—immediately in the rear was also full of the enemy. There was nothing to be done but press home the attack; but just at this moment a messenger hastened up to tell the General that the cavalry on his right wing were charging; he instantly galloped off to see what had occurred.

While Major Stack, as commander of this cavalry brigade, must have given the order for the charge, what we know of his military qualities suggests that the initiative came from one or other of his regimental commanders—John Jacob of the Scinde Horse or Captain Delamain of the 3rd Bombay Cavalry. Delamain had shown his mettle in Afghanistan, and Jacob after his charge at Miani knew perfectly what his men could achieve against Baloch warriors."

The opportunity came as Leslie's shrapnel began to enfilade the enemy's position, causing some disorganized movement among the tribesmen in the centre of their line. But there were no signs of turbans or flourished swords above the sector of the embankment immediately to the front of the cavalry brigade; it thus seemed likely that it was not held and that the enemy's line did not extend to the wood. Now the two regiments were put in motion, and swept forward with Delamain well in advance of the whole line: they breasted the embankment, crossed the channel behind it, which was unoccupied, and streamed over the higher bank beyond. They now came in sight of the real left wing of the Baloch army posted in and behind a second trench running at an oblique angle from the first; and bringing up their right shoulders charged straight at it. The Baluchis fired off their matchlocks and then had scarcely time to draw their swords as the horsemen came crashing in amongst them, overturning and cutting them down; in a short and fierce struggle they were destroyed as a military body. The two regiments, rapidly reforming, now charged Sher Mahomed's horsemen, posted in reserve; they fled at once, and a running fight ensued over several miles in which the Baluchis, horse and foot, were cut down or shot in a succession of m Jacob, who had not himself struck a blow at Miani, now had to use his sword freely in personal combat." At length the

pursuers caught sight of Mir Sher Mahomed himself, making the best of his way out of the battle. FitzGerald and Delamain pressed on in the hope of capturing him, but were overtaken by Colonel Pattle, Napier's second-in-command, who checked the pursuit, thinking that the two corps were too far dispersed and might be needed in the main battle.

By the time they rejoined the serious fighting was over. Sir Charles quickly perceived that the charge of Stack's brigade was likely to be successful and was no longer anxious for his right flank, though he was at first annoyed that the cavalry had acted without his orders. His infantry attack in echelon from the left was, at any rate, appropriate in the circumstances, and he galloped back to lead it. The 22nd advancing at his word under a severe fire were ordered to withhold their own until they were forty paces from the entrenchment; they then poured in a volley and plunged into it. A mass of swordsmen attacked them in front and on their flanks. Overcoming these in a fierce struggle and with heavy loss, they forced their way up the high parados and down into a second entrenched channel, far wider and deeper; again tulwar and bayonet clashed in hand to hand combat. On their right the artillery under Hutt advanced to the edge of the first entrenchment dealing fearful destruction at point blank range; to their right again the 25th, 21st and 12th Bombay Native Infantry came into action, supported by Whitlie's battery; the remaining brigade in the echelon consisting of the 8th and 1st Grenadiers had at first to withhold their fire, as a portion of the Scinde Horse and the 3rd Cavalry were seen to be in front of them, after destroying the enemy's left wing."

Meanwhile on the left of the 22nd Leslie brought his guns up under heavy fire to the brink of the Fuleli and on to the high parapet of the entrenchment, whence they raked the village of Nareja. Farther to the left, the Poona Horse and 9th Cavalry descended into the Fuleli and found their way past the village, completely turning the Baluchis' right flank.

By this time the irresistible 22nd had forced its way, with the loss of one-third of its numbers, over the second channel, and turned left on the village, the 25th and 21st Native Infantry conforming to its movement. The General was in the midst of a final fierce struggle among the houses; a magazine blew up, and at length the enemies were expelled and retreated, sullenly. Napier put himself at the head of the cavalry of the left wing, and prevented the retiring Baluchis from gaining the shelter of the forests along the Indus, where they might have rallied; they were thrown back on to the swords of Stack's brigade as it returned, and completely dispersed.

The casualties of the British army were 39 killed and 231 wounded— more than half the loss being borne by Her Majesty's 22nd. The Scinde Horse had a non-commissioned officer and seventeen men wounded, and thirteen horses killed. The Baluchis were supposed to have lost about two thousand men killed and wounded.

On 26th March Napier marched the army eastward to Tando Allayar, and next day went on himself with Jacob and the Scinde Horse to Mirpur, Sher Mahomed's unfortified capital, which the Mir had abandoned. From this place he sent FitzGerald with one squadron to reconnoiter the fort of Omarkot, on the edge of the desert, on his return from Balmir, early in February, FitzGerald had visited this place and believed it to have been provisioned by the Talpurs as a rallying point. Meanwhile in accordance with general orders received from Lord Ellenborough Napier formally presented to the Scinde Horse in front of the other troops the standard taken by them at the ever memorable battle of Meanee, in which that regiment by its distinguished conduct earned for itself the honour of being hereafter permanently attached to the Bombay Army.'

At the same time John Jacob received a personal distinction; Lord Ellenborough appointed him an honorary aide-de-camp to himself; 'as public testimony of the high approbation with which, as head of the Government of India, I regard your services'.

Napier reinforced FitzGerald, who had halted at Gherur, with some infantry and artillery, and Jacob marched with this detachment. Information that Omarkot was strongly garrisoned and that a rise in the Indus was filling the canals between Mirpur and Hyderabad caused the General to countermand a further advance; but almost at once it was found that both dangers had been exaggerated and the detachment was further reinforced and allowed to proceed. On 4th April Omarkot, after a short parley, was surrendered without a shot fired on either side. FitzGerald was left in charge of the fort with his squadron of the Scinde Horse and a company of infantry, and the other troops returned to Mirpur. Napier now marched the main body back to Hyderabad leaving two detachments at Mirpur and Tando Allayar. These, with that at Omarkot, he placed under the command of John Jacob, his head quarters being at Mirpur.

Jacob's orders, dated 10th April, were to strengthen and repair the fort at Mirpur, to take any measures he thought necessary to keep the country tranquil, and to put down any collection of armed Baluchis, if he could reach them without endangering the safety of his post. He was to send in weekly reports of his proceedings.

Jacob could hear of no assemblage of Baluchis nearer than at Naokot, a fort near the edge of the desert some sixty-five miles to the south of Mirpur. A body of Sher Mahomed's men here cut off the line of communication between Bombay and Sindh by way of Cutch. Jacob thought he could surprise them if he moved without delay, and o marched from Mirpur with two squadrons of his regiment simply informing the General what be was about. He was overtaken while on the march, nearly half-way to Naokot, by an express message from Sir Charles, disapproving of the move and ordering him to return at once to Mirpur. Jacob countermarched, and wrote expressing regret at having acted contrary to the General's wishes, explaining that he thought his instructions justified the attempt.

Napier replied that while be approved in principle of the move, his own plans had been upset by Jacob's marching without orders "which must never be done except when cut off and when it is impossible to wait for orders….. if the enemy are within reach and are likely to escape by delay, you can use your judgment.'

The Naokot business was not emergent—and unfortunately the commander of a small force designed to take possession of Tando Mahomed Khan, twenty miles south of Hyderabad, had meanwhile found the place held by hostile Baluchis and had retreated. Napier seems to have supposed that Jacob would have reached Naokot before his messenger could overtake him, 'However I know you are a careful commander and will go bridle in hand.' Two days later, on 25th April, he wrote, still supposing that Jacob had gone on, 'I am exceedingly anxious to have the result of your expedition: not that I have any doubt of your keeping clear of mistakes, but I wish to hear whether the Beloochee has really so strong a force in that part as he is said to have; and if so what your opinion is about the country, for I much fear that the inundation will render it impassable for troops."

But the opportunity had been lost and Jacob was obliged to remain at his headquarters. He obtained the General's permission to reduce the garrison of Omarkot and to send FitzGerald to Sukkur to bring down the families of the Scinde Horsemen who had been left there. His old second-in-command, Malcolm, was on his way back from leave to rejoin the regiment; and on his arrival Russell returned to his former corps, complimented with a highly gratifying regimental order from his commandant.

Sir Charles Napier was disappointed in his supposition that Sher Mahomed, being cut off from any base in the desert, would flee to the Panjab. The Mir kept the field, for the country people were devoted to his cause, supplied him freely with grain arid with information of the proceedings of the British, while concealing from the latter what they knew of his movements and plans.

Napier had been allowed to send the captive Talpurs out of the country and they were removed to Bombay at the end of April; but with Sher Mahomed at large the conquest of Sindh was by no means complete. Moreover, the Mir's brother Shah Mahomed was raising the country on the right bank of the Indus in middle Sindh and Ali Murad's rabble, which was first sent to deal with him, had little stomach for the task The General summoned Colonel Roberts down from Sukkur with detachments of the 6th, 15th and 20th Bombay Native Infantry, some artillery, and a troop of the 3rd Cavalry, the duty of this brigade being first to crush Shah Mahomed and then cross the river which was patrolled by steamers of the Indian Navy, and operate in Sher Mahomed's rear.

To Jacob was committed the task of preventing Sher Mahomed from breaking back towards the desert, while Napier himself advanced northwards from Hyderabad.

At the beginning of June the General informed Jacob of his part in the plan. He was concerned, and with good reason, at the increasing difficulties of active operations. Not only did the canals, now filled by the inundation, hamper swift movement, but the heat was fearful; he had already been prostrated himself and the troops in Hyderabad were suffering. What of those in the 'jungle'? Could not Jacob thatch his tents? Jacob wrote back cheerfully, 'We have no tents to thatch except a few belonging to some of the Native Officers, but I doubt not but that we shall weather it out.' He would be able, he thought, to make a most effective demonstration against Sher Mahomed from Mirpur; if the General would give him two guns, in addition to the four companies of infantry he had suggested, the Mir would consider the force an army. Napier agreed, but for some days he was perplexed by conflicting reports of Sher Mahomed's whereabouts and strength. Jacob had meanwhile heard that the Mir had dispatched a body of horse to collect men and seize grain from a place only twenty-five miles to the north of Mirpur; he sent a party to obtain more information, but could find out little enough; the one certain piece of news being that three hundred Baluchis had left the vicinity of Mirpur itself to join Sher Mahomed.

On 9th June a subaltern, of the 20th Bombay Native Infantry joined Jacob with four companies of his regiment and two guns, and a letter from Sir Charles arrived next day telling Jacob that he might advance. His latest information was that Sher Mahomed was at Hala. Napier gave his views on the Mir's probable intentions. His own plan was to pin him to the river bank if possible; when between three converging forces—Roberts's, Jacob's and his own—Sher Mahomed must be destroyed or surrender, for the Indian Navy would prevent him from crossing the Indus. Jacob's part was to head him off from the desert. Napier had kept back this letter in the expectation of hearing from Roberts and was able to add that that officer had surprised Shah Mahomed's camp at Pir Ari, west of the river, and captured the Mir: 'Roberts will be across this evening, and will bother brother Shere, I suspect, who will — and you will hunt him by the scent. Between you and Roberts, Shere Mahomed has a good chance of being picked up.'

Jacob marched that evening, but experienced great difficulty with his transport. The baggage camels were useless, worn out animals, and of the number carrying water-skins which had been sent only a few arrived. As usual, Jacob overcame all his difficulties before reporting them, and the General was highly pleased at his progress. His nephew William Napier wrote on the 12th 'You have Sir Charles' permission to rob, murder, steal, bang and anything else to procure carriage; you may do anything if you can but catch Shere Mahomed: do this and all your crimes will be pardoned. Roberts is at Sukkurund today or tomorrow. By tomorrow night you will not be far from Koheran. Shere Mahomed's followers have mostly abandoned him, and he will try to bolt to the desert. He fears the river and Koheran, and I don't think he will venture south....'

On the morning of the 13th Jacob arrived with his little force at the village of Shahdadpur, where he received information that Sher Mahomed had marched from

Hala towards the south-east. He heard nothing from Roberts, but supposed that the Mir's movement might well be the result of that officer's crossing the river in his rear. With the General now moving up towards Nasarpur, the Mir would almost certainly attempt to break through to the east, and Jacob calculated that Shahdadpur was a suitable place at which to watch for his next move.

At eleven o'clock that night a Brahmin servant of Sher Mahomed came into Jacob's camp and told him that his master was marching to attack him with his whole force, said to amount to between eight thousand and ten thousand men. Jacob pushed out his picquets, which about 3 a.m. sent back word that the enemy was coming on in considerable force. He sent out several parties to reconnoiter and finding that the Baluchis advanced very slowly, decided to attack them. He left a troop of the Scinde Horse and a company of the infantry to protect the camp and marched forward with the remainder, about eight hundred men of all arms.

The Baloch force was taken by surprise and hastily formed up on the bank of a *nullah,* horse, foot and artillery, in imposing numbers, and opened fire with three guns on Jacob's column. He in turn formed his line and replied with his artillery. The light was still, poor and every movement on the powdery white soil raised volumes of dust. Sher Mahomed and his subordinate leaders seem to have lost contact with each other, and their confidence evaporated. A rumor spread that another British force was about to attack them in flank. A sudden panic seized the Baluchis; they broke their ranks and began to withdraw from their position. Jacob, seeing this irresolution, advanced with the Scinde Horse, whereupon they dispersed and fled in every direction. The ground in their front was extremely rugged, and intersected with deep ravines; by the time Jacob had found a way across these obstacles the Mir and his men were well on their way to safety, and among the jungles, sandhills and canals running full of water effective pursuit was impracticable; but a few prisoners were taken.

The victory was all but bloodless: five or six Baluchis had been killed by Jacob's artillery fire and two of his horses by that of the enemy. But the Mir left on the field several standards and three well-equipped brass guns. The prisoners stated the number of their force actually present as 4000, the remainder with another gun having lagged behind or deserted. Among their sardars was a younger brother of Sher Mahomed, Mir Mahomed son of Mir Rustam, and a brother-in-law of Mir Nasir Khan—proof enough that the hopes of all the Talpur race had lain in this last venture.

In reporting this affair, Jacob stated his opinion that Sher Mahomed would not again attempt to take refuge in the desert. It appeared that he had fled back towards the river, beyond which his family had taken refuge in Ranikot fort in the hills. The natural assumption was that he was now certain to be caught between Roberts, Napier and the Indian Navy.

But Sher Mahomed, though now powerless, still had the sympathy of the country he was able to slip away to the north, for Roberts, his whole force in great distress from the appalling heat, had not been able to cross the river and remained at Sehwan till many days after the affair at Shahdadpur. Napier too did not reach Nasarpur, twenty miles northward from Hyderabad, till the night of the 14th. The General had intended to push on to Jacob's assistance with his cavalry and artillery, but next morning he was himself incapacitated with heat-stroke and unable to move. He was lying half conscious when Jacob's dispatch arrived and it, in the words of his nephew William Napier, 'did him as much good as Doctor Gibbon.' Her Majesty's 28th Regiment, which formed part of his force, had meanwhile lost one officer and thirty-one men dead from heat apoplexy. Sir Charles, at the age of sixty-one, doubtless owed his survival to his hard and abstemious life. He was tarried back to Hyderabad in a palanquin, recalling the whole of the force with which he had advanced: eighteen more men of the 28th died there. His own recovery was rapid, and William Napier wrote to Jacob again, 'Your defeat of Sher Mahomed cured him.'

In his dispatch Jacob had remarked, 'The conduct of all officers and men under my command has been most steady and excellent throughout, but in an action such as that of this morning there is no room for the display of much military prowess.' But Napier recognized the value of the stroke at such a time. Mir Ali Murad's conduct had begun to arouse his suspicions and no one knew better than himself that Regular troops could not keep the field in that season without fearful losses from the heat. Three weeks later, when Jacob arrived in Hyderabad, after capturing two more of Sher Mahomed's guns, the General told him that he had prevented a Pindari war in Sindh.

# THE SINDE QUESTION.
## Speech - I
## The Ameers of Sinde

*A Speech Delivered By Captain Eastwick*
*at the Court of Proprietors of East India Stock on 26th January, 1844.*

*East India House January 26th, 1844.*

A SPECIAL General Court of Proprietors of East India Stock, was held this day at the Company's House in Leadenhall Street, to consider certain resolutions on the subject of the recent annexation of Sinde to the British territories. The Minutes of the last Court having been read, the Chairman (Mr. J. Cotton) said this Court had been specially summoned, at the desire of nine proprietors, to consider certain resolutions regarding the recent proceedings in Sinde. After some preliminary discussion, whether the question should be postponed, the Clerk, at the command of the Chairman, read the following Requisition:—

***"To the Honorable the Chairman of the Court of Directors of the East India Company.***

"Honorable Sir,—We, the undersigned Proprietors of East India Stock, request that a Special General Court may be convened at the earliest period, to take into consideration the following resolutions proposed to be submitted to them :—

1. That, from the printed papers recently laid before the Proprietors, on the subject of Scinde, it is the opinion of this Court that the proceedings of the Government of India, which ended in the dethronement, exile, and imprisonment of the Ameers, and the seizure of their country and private property, were, uncalled for, impolitic, and unjust.

9. That this Court does, therefore, most earnestly recommend to the Court of Directors the immediate adoption of such steps, by representation to Her Majesty's Government, or otherwise, as may cause all practicable reparation to be made for the injustice already committed, and enforce the abandonment of a line of policy inconsistent with good faith, and subversive of the interests of the British rule in India.

We have the honour to be,
Honourable Sir,
Your obedient servants,

J. SULLIVAN.
WM. J. EASTWICK.

JOSEPH HUME
CHARLES FORBES
HARFORD JONES BRYDGES
JOHN POYNDER.
ARTHUR J. LEWIS
A. HOGO
London, January 16, 1844. THOMAS MARRIOTT.

***Mr. Sullivan then rose to bring forward the question. Captain Eastwick seconded the motion, and said :—***

I rise to second the motion. It is with great diffidence I venture to trespass upon the attention of this Court. I am not in the habit of addressing public assemblies, and I feel the difficulty I shall have in expressing my sentiments; I feel also, what is of fart greater consequence, how perfectly incapable I am of doing justice to the cause I have undertaken. I can assure the Court, the effort is a very painful one to me. But holding, as I do, such strong opinions on the impolicy and injustice of our late proceedings in Sinde, and. having had an especial interest in marking the progress of our relations with the native States off the banks of the Indus, I deem it my imperative duty as a friend to the natives of India, as an enemy to oppression, and as a Christian, to protest most solemnly against those proceedings, and to lend my humble aid to any attempt that may be made, to draw the attention of this Court, and the public at large, to a line of policy, so repugnant to my notions of justice, and, in my opinion, so discreditable to the British name. In the discussion of this question, in the discharge of what I conceive to be a public duty, I should wish to avoid every expression that might tend to excite angry feelings; I should wish especially to keep clear of that party spirit, which, losing sight of fixed and immutable principles, looks only to criminate persons; at the same time I should wish to speak unreservedly, and state the conclusions I have come to, derived from personal experience, and from a careful and attentive perusal of the documents recently laid before the Proprietors.

After the able and eloquent address of my Honorable Friend, it will not be necessary for me to occupy the time of the Court by entering minutely into the whole case. It will be sufficient if I state my reasons for giving him my support, and at the same time advert to any particular points that may appear to me not to have been sufficiently noticed. Agreeing as I do, generally, in the observations that have fallen from my Honorable Friend, and in the Resolutions proposed, recognizing most fully and cordially the necessity of bringing this question before the Court, in order that the facts may be given to the public in a tangible and authentic form, there are yet marked points of difference in our view of the case, and to some of these I will take the liberty of alluding. We differ, especially, in our view of the circumstances which led to the treaty entered into by the British Government with the Sinde State on the 20th April, 1838, and we differ also in

our view of the policy rendered imperative by the conduct of the Ameers immediately subsequent to that treaty. With the permission of the Court, I will take a brief review of the events of this period. The Papers before the Proprietors commence earlier, but it will not be necessary to do more than allude to the treaties of 1809, 1820, 1832, and 1834. The last, a commercial treaty with Meer Morad Ali Khan, the sole surviving brother of the Talpoor dynasty. We have then, that is in 1834, the British and Sir Governments on terms of amicable relation, and it will be my endea your to prove that overtures to a closer alliance were made by the British Government, with a view to pre serve the Sinde State from a great and impending danger, the danger of Sikh aggression, at the same time looking to the strengthening our political relations on the Indus, and the throwing open that river to the commercial world.

The Ameers themselves sought the protection of the British Government, and were anxious and willing to form a new treaty, based upon mutual advantage. With reference to their subsequent conduct, this is an important point to bear in mind.

It is well known that the aggressions of Runjeet Sing on all the neighbouring States, except those under British protection, were unceasing. Year after year he had seized portions of territory bordering on Sinde, and in 1836 by making a demand on the Ameers for twelve lacs of rupees, by taking possession of one of their fortresses, and advancing a claim to Shikarpore, he showed too plainly his desire of fastening a quarrel on the Ameers, which could only end in the subjugation of their country. His propositions to Lord William Bentinck at the meeting at Roopur in 1831, and his conversations with Sir Alexander Burnes, in 1832, prove that he had long entertained the project of annexing Sinde to his dominions; and no one, I imagine, acquainted with the relative power of the two States will dispute his being able to do so, if the Ameers had been left to themselves. But the British Government interfered, and hence the Treaty of the 20th of April, 1838. A reference to the printed official papers of 1836, and 1837, will show that the British Government had no wish to force the connexion, that "Noor Mahomed himself invited the British Representative," and not only agreed to all the stipulations, but offered to cede a portion of Shikarpore to pay the expenses, and expressed his hope that a British force might ho sent to Sinde to protect him from Sikh aggression, and strengthen his rule against internal enemies.

It would be useless to take up the time of the Court by reading numerous extracts. But let Noor Mahomed speak for himself in an interview with Sir Henry Pottinger, recorded in the 38th paragraph of the letter of December the 10th, 1836.

It must be recollected that at this period, Noor Mahomed was the acknowledged head of the Sinde State, and spoke the collective voice of the Government. Sir H. Pottinger writes, "Noor Mahomed told me he had agreed to all I had proposed, and would religiously abide by his stipulations, that should it be found necessary to send an army to Sinde, he would pay whatever portion of expense the Governor-General chose to name," (A little

farther on we find) "that he (Noor Mahomed) felt assured our interposition and power would soon tranquillize the countries to the northward, that it would be an act of grace, that would redound to the fame of the Governor- General, and bring blessings on his administration."

Surely no language can be more clear and unequivocal. Had Noor Mahomed acted up to these professions, had he fulfilled, as he was bound to do, the stipulations of this Treaty, he might have sat down under the protection of British power, secure from foreign and domestic enemies. It is quite evident, from the whole tenor of the Instructions of the then Governor-General, that at that period there was no desire of territorial aggrandizement, no sinister do signs against the Sinde State. But, by the characteristic delay of Asiatics, these negotiations were protracted from 1836 to 1838. Noor Mahomed was relieved from the impending danger of Sikh aggression, and was in no hurry to ratify his engagements. In the meantime, the aspect of political affairs on the north-western frontier had changed; a combination of Mussulman powers, hostile to British interests, had been entered into, and a counter-movement was deemed imperative, to arrest the course of intrigue, and provide for the security of the British Empire in India. I am not called upon to discuss the wisdom of the measures adopted, I only state the fact, as evincing the belief of those entrusted with the responsibility of governing India that a great crisis had arrived.

I think no one will dispute, that believing in such a crisis, believing in the paramount necessity of the proposed counter-movement, it was the duty of the Governor-General to look to all the subordinate arrangements requisite to ensure the success of that movement. It was to be expected also, of all States in amicable relation with the British Government, that they should afford their aid in such a crisis. The Ran of Kutch, the Ameer of Bahawulpore, and other chieftains, came forward to the utmost extent of their ability. But, even if active co-operation be deemed too much to expect of Native States, surely we had a right to insist, that those in friendly relations with us should at all events remain passive, and not choose this crisis to open a correspondence with the hostile powers, to profess allegiance to the head of the hostile combination, thus throwing their weight into the scale against us, and encouraging the advance of our enemies by the belief, that they would be received with open arms even by States bound to us by treaties. But to invite our enemies, was not the only indication of the hostile feelings of a Government for whose preservation we had so recently interfered, and who had expressed so deep a sense of the obligation. Every obstacle was thrown in the way if the advance of the British army, letters were written forbidding their subjects to assist us. They refused to fulfill the engagements of the treaty they had just concluded.

Our ally, Shah Shuja, was menaced and insulted, the British representative was treated with the grossest indignity, and even threatened with assassination; his assistant, the bearer of a treaty was driven from their capital; our stores of grain were plundered, and every step taken, short of actual hostilities, to obstruct and counteract the objects of the British Government.

In confirmation of the intrigue with Persia, I beg to direct the attention of the Court to letter No. 10, of the Resident in Sinde, dated August 13th, 1838. We there find, that when the ratified treaty of the 20th April, 1838, reached Hyderabad, the Ameers were on the point of dispatching letters to the King of Persia, that Meer Sobdar immediately withdrew from his share in the transaction, stating that "British friendship was sufficient for him." Nothing can mark the character of this measure more strongly; and from the concluding paragraph of the same dispatch, it is quite clear, that the Ameers were aware that the powers to the north-west had assumed an attitude of hostility towards the British Government.

At the next page we find the letter to the King of Persia. There can be no doubt of the authenticity of this letter. Noor Mahomed admits the fact of writing, and a copy was obtained from the very man who wrote it; and considering, as I said before, that the King of Persia was at the head of a hostile combination against us, but one construction can be placed upon such a proceeding: but we do not require the evidence of the letter. Noor Mahomed openly threatens to invite the King of Persia to his aid, having at this very moment in his palace, an emissary from the Persian camp, said to be related to the royal family of Persia. Nor is this the only proof of his hostile disposition; he writes to the Khyrpore Ameers to deter them from befriending us, and says that he is ready for peace or war.

With such unequivocal proofs of the hostile feeling of the Ameers, it appears to me, but one course was open to the Governor-General; — to impose such conditions on these Princes as would secure British interests from present injury, and afford a reasonable prospect of future tranquility. Hence the treaty of the 11th March, 1839. Up to this period, Sinde was tributary to Cabul; but henceforth it was released from all claims for tribute, and guaranteed from foreign aggression on the fulfillment of certain conditions. Objections have been made to many points of this treaty, as pressing too hard upon the Ameers; but that they were not greatly dissatisfied may be judged by the results. The tone of hostility was dropped, the line of demarcation between the two States was broken down, and even the Beloochee chieftains bore witness to our moderation and good faith. I will take the liberty of quoting a few passages from Sir Henry Pottinger's dispatch of 7th March, 1839. Speaking of Meer Noor Mahomed, Sir Henry Pottinger writes :— "The tone of his Highness's conversation was most friendly and becoming; he assured me he had seen his mistake in his demeanor towards the British Government, that he trusted his future conduct would prove the faithfulness with which he unequivocally professed his submission to the Governor-General. He had now cause to comprehends our power, as well as our good faith and forbearance. In another paragraph, we find that "the Beloochee chiefs candidly allowed that our procedure has been guided by the strictest adherence to our good faith." If we turn to Major Outram's affecting narrative of the closing scene of Noor Mahomed's life, contained in his dispatch of 6th December, 1840, when the dying Prince could have no motives for concealing or

misrepresenting his sentiments, it is quite clear that that chieftain was sensible of his former folly, and acknowledged the benefits of the British alliance. "My friendship for the British is known to God, my con science is clear before God," are the last solemn asseverations of the dying Ameer. And Major Outram writes, "His Highness, hailing me as his brother, put his arms round me, and held me in his embrace a few minutes, until I laid him quietly down. So feel and emaciated had the Ameer become, that this exertion quite exhausted him, and it was some minutes afterwards before he could speak; when beckoning his brother Meer Nusseer Khan, and youngest son Meer Houssein Ali, to the bedside, he then took a hand of each, and placed them in mine, saying, 'You are their Father and Brother, you will protect them." Will the people of England believe that this unhappy boy, Houssein Ali, thus confided to the fostering care of the British Government, has been dethroned, exiled, imprisoned, and plundered of his private property, without even a charge being brought against him? All that we find is that when his subordinate officers are accused of a breach of treaty, he immediately takes measures to prevent a recurrence of their misconduct.

I will add one more reference; it is to Meer Nusseer Khan's letter to Sir Charles Napier in 1842. It is a remarkable passage, and completely confirms the view I have taken of the whole of these transactions. Both Meer Noor Mahomed and Meet Nusseer Khan have expressed the same sentiments, in my private interviews with them. Meer Nusseer writes: "The British Government is aware that we were once the independent sovereigns of this country, and were on a footing of friendship with the English. When Sir A. Burnes requested permission to travel through our dominions, the late Meer Morad Ali Khan refused his consent, but the indulgence was at length granted at my intercession, as I hoped to obtain a return for the favour some day or other. Subsequently I and Meer Noor Mahomed Khan saw the advantage of seeking the protection of the wisest and most powerful nation on the face of the earth, and *therefore urged Sir Henry Pottinger, during two whole years, to come into the country,* after which, we finally succeeded in introducing a British force; our sole object in all this, was to secure to ourselves peace and quiet, and in furtherance of it we cheerfully gave up money for the construction of cantonments, and even consented to the payment of tribute. We were then perfectly happy and contented."

This is the construction put upon these events by the party principally concerned. What better evidence can be obtained?

In my mind, it sufficiently vindicates the British Government from the charge of forcing their alliance on the Ameers in 1838. It is clear these princes, following out the dictates of their own judgment, sought to connect themselves with a stronger power, as a means of self-preservation. Partly to obtain a better bargain, and to save the pride of their more ignorant retainers, and partly owing to the unsettled state of political affairs to the north-west, and to their own suspicious dispositions, they, unfortunately for themselves, adopted the tortuous and insincere course which led to the treaty of 1839. After that

treaty was concluded, their rule depended upon British support, and a new era commenced in Sinde. It is most unfair to confound the two periods, and to bring forward, in defence of the late proceedings against the Ameers, their conduct previous to the treaty of the 11th March, 1839.

I could add much more on this part of the case; there are many points that require elucidation, but I will not trespass on the time of the Court. I will only make one more remark, that whatever the opinion of Lord Auckland's policy, it can afford no ground of justification for Lord Ellenborough's harsh measures. If Lord Auckland behaved ill towards the Ameers, surely that was no reason why Lord Ellenborough should behave worse? On the contrary, it was a reason for treating these unhappy princes with greater consideration.

During the three years that succeeded the ratification of the treaty of 1839, all the authorities unite in praising the conduct of the Sinde chieftains. Throughout that eventful period which was characterized by disasters to our arms unparalleled in our Indian annals, the Ameers remained faithful to their engagements; at a season when, if they had nourished any hostile designs, they might have cut off all support of our troops to the north-west, and placed in jeopardy the very existence of the British force in Candahar.

Captain Postans, who then held responsible employment in Upper Sinde, bears unequivocal testimony to their good faith, and to the ameliorated state of the country. He writes: "A most satisfactory state of tranquility pervaded the country. Our steamers were allowed to navigate the river, not only unimpeded, but with every assistance." Again: "During the violence of the Brahoes, at Kelat, large bodies of our troops were pushed through the Sindhian territories in every direction, without the slightest interruption on the part of the Ameers: who, on the contrary, rendered us all the cordial assistance in their power, by furnishing guides and supplies. Had the conduct of these chiefs been otherwise, our interests would have suffered severely; but in justice to them it must be recorded, that they fully made up, on this occasion, for their former hollow professions and want of faith, by a cordial co-operation." I could quote also, if time permitted, numerous passages from the Blue Book to prove the good conduct of the Ameers; and I speak also from personal experiences One would have imagined that such conduct, during a most critical state of affairs, would have earned the Ameers some consideration; one would have imagined that such real services would have weighed something in the balance against alleged intrigues. But the Curse of India is the constant succession of rulers; measures adopted by one Governor-General, are over turned by the next. Services rendered under one administration, are forgotten or overlooked by the succeeding one. Such was the state of Sinde during the years 1839, 1840, and 1841; and it will be as well here to take a review of the political question, whether it was more desirable that that country should remain under its former rulers, or be subjected to our direct control.

It is my decided opinion that the annexation of Sinde to our already over-grown Eastern Empire, is a great error, politically and financially. By the treaty of 1839, we gained every object we could desire. We prevented Sinde from falling into the hands of any power hostile to British interests; we obtained the right of locating troops in any position we might deem most eligible; we opened the Indus to the commercial world. By our command of steam, if an emergency should occur we could pour into the country, at the shortest warning, any amount of military stores, and any number of troops; and having secured the good offices of the chiefs by a firm but conciliatory line of conduct, we could confidently reckon on all the resources of their territories being placed at Our disposal, as was proved during the Brahoe and Affghan operations. Having withdrawn from the countries beyond the Indus, in course of time we might have so reduced the number of our troops in Sinde, that they could have proved no burden to the finances of India; while, at the same time, our political relations and responsibilities would have been contracted to a narrower sphere—an object of paramount importance, in the opinion of those who' have paid attention to this subject. How stands the case at present? By an act of gross oppression we have become the sovereigns of Sinde, and on us devolves all the responsibility of governing the country—a country inhabited by wild and warlike tribes, who have little 'to lose; and whose motto' is, like that of the Affghans, "We are content with discord, we are content with blood, but we will never be content with a master." As in Affghanistan, we must maintain our rule by our cannon and bayonets. It is true that we have not the same difficulties to contend against. We are nearer our communications, and Sinde presents no natural obstacles to the march of armies. There will be no fear of a scarcity of supplies. There will be no intense cold to destroy hundreds in one fatal night.

But there is an enemy not less to be dreaded — a pestilential climate, which has already laid many a gallant soldier low, and will, I fear, continues to do so. When I was in Hyderabad, in 1839, scarcely a single individual attached to the Residency escaped fever. The regiments at Tatta were totally disorganized from the same cause. We learned, a few months ago, that fifty European soldiers perished in a few days from the intense heat. I witnessed similar fatal results to a detachment of Europeans in Upper Sinde. It is said, our rule will be acceptable to the people: I feel convinced this is a grievous error. Seven-tenths of the population is bigoted Mussulmans, who hate us with an intensity not to be described. There is no country where the Syeds exercise such influence: our coming must completely destroy their immunities and privileges. They will never cease to excite the tribes against us; and these tribes, inured from their infancy to scenes of rapine, will merge their private animosities to unite against the common foe; while the hosts of idle retainers of the late chieftains, deprived of their means of subsistence, will naturally swell the ranks of the disaffected. Although unable to withstand a disciplined army in the field, these tribes are yet formidable for desultory mischief. To keep them in check, and collect the revenue, it will require our military force to be always on such a footing, that the burden on our finances will be enormous. We must recollect, also, that service in

these distant countries is most distasteful to our native troops. Let us beware how we push too far the patience of our gallant and devoted native army.

I find Captain Postans estimates the revenues of Sinde at forty lacs of rupees. Speaking from my own experience, I should consider this estimate too high; but, granting the fact, we must, not forget that the greater part was always paid in kind; and, moreover, that we have made over a large portion to that arch-traitor, Ali Morad. Now, Captain Postans also estimates the military expenditure of the current year at eighty lacs of rupees; and I feel assured that a long period must elapse before we can much reduce our military force. These two facts require no comment.

But, it will be said, there are commercial advantages. The markets of Central Asia will be thrown open to British enterprise. Our proceedings during the last few years have destroyed British influence throughout Central Asia. Where we had friends, we have now bitter enemies. By overturning the existing governments, we have let loose all the bad passions of these turbulent tribes, and caused scenes of horror and desolation fearful to contemplate. There was formerly security to the merchant, there is now none. It will be long ere things subside into their usual channel. As to compelling trade by the sword and bayonet, the idea is absurd, not to mention its wickedness.

**One word on the river Indus**. We already possessed the free navigation of the Indus and the power of selecting emporia for our merchandise; so that, in this respect, we have gained nothing by our late acquisition. It is merely pretence to enlist the mercantile community on the side of injustice.

And now we have arrived at the point where we may investigate the grounds that have led to the transfer of Sinde to British authority.

I am not one of those who lay claim to impartiality, because I condemn the policy of my own country. I am proud of my birthright as an English man, but I wish to be just to all men. It is only by integrity and justice, under Providence, that England has been raised to such an eminence of glory. I have no desire to exalt the character of the Ameers, or to create any morbid sympathy in their favour. I am not blind to their faults, or the faults of their government; but this I think it right to state, that my first impressions were far more unfavorable against them, than those I entertained on a longer residence in Sinde. The question is not one of good or bad government. Few, I imagine, here present, will con tend that bad government gives another nation the right to interfere and overturn it. The question is the breach or observance of a solemn treaty. And here I may distinctly state my opinion, that if it were proved that the Ameers of Sinde were guilty of infractions of the treaty, we had a right to enforce that treaty. We had a right to impose more stringent, and strictly defined conditions, to prevent such violations for the future.

But a careful and deliberate inquiry ought to have preceded any stringent measures. The various cases of infraction of treaty ought to have been brought to the notice of the Ameers. If no satisfactory explanation was afforded, the Ameers ought to have been distinctly warned; the innocent separated from the guilty; and then, if any one persisted in breaking his engagements, we should have been justified in exacting the penalty.

There could be no pretence here, that great national interests would be injured by a little delay. There was no immediate nor pressing danger to the State, no possible reason why political expediency should supersede the common course of justice. Again, if the Ameers were guilty of treasonable intrigues against the British Government, they deserved to be punished. But, it was due to them, and due to our selves, to proceed with deliberation. Charges are not crimes, proof is required. The Ameers ought to have had the opportunity of answering these charges. The treasonable letters ought to have been shown to them. They ought not to have been condemned Un-heard; I will not say on *ex parte* evidence, because there was no evidence at all. I repeat, there was no political necessity to just a departure from rules held sacred by every Englishman.

But to proceed. A perusal of the Blue Book (which, I may remark, is completely *ex parte,* the best case that can be made out for the Government. If the Ameers had a Blue Book of their own, it would tell a different tale; I could help them, from my own knowledge, to many a palliating circumstance). A perusal of the Blue Book affords a mass of assertion, and vague accounts of intrigues in various quarters, to which all who know anything of the manner in which reports are raised in India, will attach but little weight.

The manufacture of these stories, for gullible political officers, is a regular trade. If such absurd rumors were listened to, no native prince would be safe. The British Government would be involved in continual warfare, until every native State was over turned. I speak advisedly on these points. As Political Agent in Upper Sinde, I had repeated opportunities of testing the value of the bazaar reports of Shikarpore. In the voluminous items of intelligence given in the Blue Book, I can recognize the names of many worthless characters; and from a careful analysis of the whole affair, I feel persuaded that the greatest part of these informants were in the pay of Au Morad, who fabricated these stories to effect the ruin of his elder brother, Meer Roostum. How admirably he succeeded, is unhappily too well known. But we are saved the trouble of entering upon these intrigues, as the justification of the Governor-General's measures is brought within a small compass by his own letters. It seems, however, that Major Outram attached a certain weight to these intrigues, and taking also into consideration the alleged infractions of the treaty, and the altered state of our political relations to the north-west, Major Outram proposed a revision of the treaty of 1839, relinquishing the money payments in exchange for territory; which arrangement, he writes, might be carried into effect without much difficulty. It must be confessed, that Major Outram's language regarding these intrigues is very strong, and calculated to create an unfavorable impression against the Ameers in the mind of Lord Ellenborough. But this is no

justification of Lord Ellenborough's harsh and arbitrary measures. Placed in the responsible situation of Governor-General of India, invested with the solemn functions of a judge, it was the duty of Lord Ellenborough to have waited calmly until the charges against the Ameers, and the evidence in support ? these charges, were laid before him. He would then have seen on what foundation Major Outram's strong language was based.

We find the charges and the evidence stated at length in two memorandums, with their accompaniments, submitted for the information of Sir Charles Napier. My honourable friend has sufficiently exposed the puerile absurdity of most of these charges. I shall come to them presently. We must first see what answer Lord Ellenborough returns to Major Outram's proposition: "He does not see any necessity for precipitate negotiations." This was on the 10th July, 1842. In August, the Governor-General writes to the Secret Committee, "That he had no intention to press on the Ameers any hasty change in their present relations." But, a few days afterwards, the appointment of Sir Charles Napier takes place, and the sentiments of the Governor-General, without any apparent reason, undergo a most material alteration.

In speaking of that distinguished officer, Sir Charles Napier, whose very name is interwoven with recollections of England's glory, I should wish to disclaim any intention of disrespect. I am not one to speak lightly of constituted authorities. I appeal to all those under whom I have served during my residence in India. I appeal to the testimonials I have received. I entertain the highest admiration of Sir Charles Napier's military talents; I appreciate his great services to his country; I believe him to be incapable of committing a willful injustice.

But, as an independent man, giving an independent opinion to the best of my humble judgment, lam bound to say, that I consider his ignorance of the languages, manners, and habits of the people with whom he had to deal, his want of experience in native character and political life in India, and above all, his total want of sympathy with the unfortunate Ameers, were the main causes of the fatal results of these negotiations.

I think no one act of the present Governor-General is more to be condemned, then, on the eve of difficult and complicated negotiations, thus sweeping away all the machinery by which the intercourse between the two States had been carried on for a lengthened period. It was not only unwise, but most unjust to the Ameers, and calculated to instil into their minds the greatest distrust and suspicion. But Lord Ellenborough goes still further: he most unnecessarily, in my opinion, gives unlimited power to Sir Charles Napier, and writes that he will abide by his decisions; thereby re moving all check upon Sir Charles Napier's proceedings.

I will commence with Sir Charles Napier's first letter to the Ameers, dated September 25th, 1842. It must be remembered that in a subsequent letter, of the 17th October, he

distinctly records his opinion that "only a fair pretext wanted to coerce the Ameers." I ask any candid person to read that letter, and state whether a pretext was likely to be long wanting. I have no hesitation in avowing my conviction that if the principles expressed there were acted upon, not only every native Government in India might be subverted, but every Government on the face of the earth. I will not stop to analyze the string of assumptions on which Sir Charles Napier builds his conclusions. To overlook the wrongs inflicted on individuals, on the general principle of benefiting the masses, is no new doctrine. This was the doctrine of the French Republicans; this was the doctrine of the Spanish adventurers in the New World, who marked their path with rapine and murder, and still regarded themselves as the soldiers of the church, the armed messengers of the gospel of peace. Thus we, under the specious plea of ameliorating the condition of society, and advancing civilization, are privileged to carry misery home to every hearth, and bring each independent nation under the yoke of our all-grasping rule. But, I would beg to direct attention, for one moment, to the document appended to this letter. It professes to be an equitable exchange between tribute and territory; and the account winds up with a balance in favour of the Ameers of 33,856 rupees. Honorable Proprietors will be astonished to learn that of the 13 lacs 28,000 rupees charged against the Ameers, on which interest is calculated, upward of eight lacs are an overcharge; and the sum of one lac of rupees annual tribute set down against the name of Meer Nusseer of Khyrpore, is not due by that prince, as an engagement from Sir A. Burnes exempted Meer Mobarick and his heirs from annual tribute, according to the Governor-General's decision, contained in a letter, dated February 8th, 1841. I would refer also to a letter, dated April 21st, 1842, from Major Outram, which will explain the overcharge with respect to the seven lacs of rupees, said to be due, on account of Shah Shuja. Honorable Proprietors will then be able to test the fairness of this exchange of land for money.

But let us turn to the cause of offence, and breach of treaty, alleged against the Ameers, as put forward by Sir C. Napier, in his first letter to these princes, dated 25th September, 1842. The first complaint is:

"Your Highnesses have prohibited the inhabitants of Kurachee to settle in the Bazaar." Now, I contend the Ameers had a perfect right so to do. By the fifth article of the Treaty of the 11th March, 1839, they were absolute rulers in their respective principalities, and the British Government was precluded from interfering with their subjects. It was never intended that our cantonments should thrive at the expense of their towns, and draw away all the in habitants, who would naturally flock to where they would be relieved from all taxes. If such were the case, how could the Ameers, as they very justly ask, realize their revenues, and pay their tribute? We first impose a tribute, we then take from these un happy princes, the means of paying it, and then punish them for not paying. It was distinctly stated by Sir Henry Pottinger, in his Instructions to me, that the cantonments were to be nothing more than the Bazaar, to which the Ameer had consented in the agreements of 1836.

The second complaint of Sir Charles Napier is, "That your Highnesses have ordered everything landed at the Bunder, in the first instance, to be taken to the Customhouse, and taxed." Here, again, I contend that their Highnesses were perfectly right. If we turn to the notification of Sir Henry Pottinger alluded to in his letter of the 25th November, 1839' we find "that duties will be levied on all goods landed at Kurachee, save *bond fide* government stores and supplies."

Now this order of the Ameers applied to goods sold by Naomull, a merchant of Kurachee, and could have nothing to do with government stores and supplies. If any previous permission had been granted to Naomull, the Ameers had a right to revoke it. It is quite clear to me that neither Sir Charles Napier nor the political agent understood the treaty in this limited sense. But one fact speaks clearly to Sir Henry Pottinger's version of this article: I know that he directed duties to be paid on all, his own goods and supplies that came from Bombay to Kurachee. To my mind, this completely justifies the Ameers.

The third complaint of Sir Charles Napier is, "That your Highnesses levy tolls on the boats belonging to the subjects of Sinde." It is my opinion that in this instance the Ameers were wrong. But the subject had been often mooted, and the Ameers had been, at one time, supported in their view by the native agent at Hyderabad. A reference to the correspondence will show that even Major Outram considered the point doubtful; and notwithstanding the decision of the late Governor-General, so late as June 21st, 1842, I find in Major Outram's sketch of a new treaty, he inserts an article providing for the abolition of tolls on the Indus, which, he writes in the margin, are "assumed to have been previously relinquished;" thereby implying that a misapprehension existed, and that there were grounds for discussion. Now, this is the very point to which I am anxious to draw particular attention.

If misapprehension did exist, if there were grounds for discussion, and I think I have shown that even the Ameers of Lower Sinde were not altogether in the wrong, the Ameers of Upper Sinde were decidedly right, as they had given no specific pledge on the subject. If such was the state of .the case, what was the course to be pursued? Surely we were not justified in proceeding at once to the infliction of the severest penalties, by the confiscation of the territories of these princes, and the abrogation of their rights as independent sovereigns. The weakness of the internal government in these States renders it probable that many of these complaints were owing to the misconduct of the subordinate officers of the Ameers; in many instances, probably, the complainants themselves were in fault, and trusted to the ignorance of British functionaries to escape detection. I could relate many barefaced attempts to elude the Customhouse duties, by fraudulent Persian papers. But, what is the practice amongst European nations, when misconstruction of the clauses of a treaty exists? Do the strongest and most powerful take the law into their own hands, and cut the Gordian knot—Napier fashion—with the sword? In the case of the Boundary dispute with America, what would have been

thought of England, (granting that we had the power,) if we had not only taken forcible possession of the disputed territory, but confiscated several American towns, those most eligibly situated for our own commercial purposes, because the Americans had the audacity to raise a question on the subject? I fear to take up the time of the Court by entering into too many details; but while on this subject, I beg for one instant to direct attention to Sir Charles Napier's letter, of the 26th November, to Meer Roostum — one of the most unjustifiable productions I ever read.

The case is this: — A kardar of Meer Roostum levies toll on a boat. According to Sir Charles Napier, this is an infraction of the VIIIth Article of the Treaty of the 25th November, 1838. Let us read Article VIII. It runs thus:—"In order to improve, by every means possible, the growing intercourse by the river Indus, Meer Roostum Khan promises all cooperation, *with the other powers*, in any measures which may be hereafter thought necessary for extending and facilitating the commerce and navigation of the Indus." Now, if we refer to the commentary of Sir Alexander Burnes, who concluded this Treaty, on this very Article, we find that Meer Roostum was never given to understand that the tolls were to be relinquished; and I would ask, is this general declaration (which in the Persian translation is probably still more general,) sufficient to entitle the British representative to denounce Meer Roostum as an enemy, if he does not consider himself bound to all the specific measures subsequently entered into with the other powers? Major Outram, in his letter of October 14th, distinctly informs Sir Charles Napier, that there was no document or record, in the Office, pledging the Upper Sinde Ameers to any specific measures regarding the tolls on the Indus; and until that was the case, whatever may have been written by political agents, as the result of private conversations, I think Meer Roostum was perfectly justified in refusing to resign so large a portion of his revenue. Not so Lord Ellenborough, who decides that the agreements of the Ameers of Hyderabad were to bind the Ameers of Khyrpore, forgetting that this very Treaty, of the 24th December, emancipated Khyrpore from the control of Hyderabad. Why does not Lord Ellenborough refer "to the other powers on the Indus?" — the Khan of Bahawulpore, and the Maharajah of the Sikhs? Because they were still permitted to exact tolls, and it would tell against his decision. Surely Meer Roostum had every right to quote their practice in his own favour. In my opinion, Sir Charles Na pier was decidedly wrong: but what is his next step? He demands that the kardar, one of Meer Rostrum's subjects, shall be sent a prisoner to him, that he may determine his punishment. This is a gross infraction of the treaty, as were many other acts of the gallant General; but Lord Ellenborough and Sir Charles Napier seem to consider, as my honorable friend very justly said, that treaties are only made to bind one party. The whole conduct of Sir Charles Napier brings to my mind very strongly a passage in Mr. Elphinstone's History of India, relating to Aurungzebe, and the North-eastern Affghans. It runs thus: "But from the numerous small communities, and the weakness of the internal government even in the large ones, there must often have been acts of aggression by individuals which required forbearance on the part of the royal officers. As Aurungzebe was very jealous of his authority, and as he knew nothing of the structure of society among the Affghans, it

is not unlikely that he suspected the chiefs of countenancing these irregularities underhand." Now this applies exactly to Sir Charles Napier, and led to the same lamentable result-—an unjust and unnecessary war.

But the question does not depend upon these transactions. It would be unnecessary to enter so much into detail, except to show the arbitrary and unjustifiable nature of the whole of these proceedings, and at the same time expose the untenable ground on which the charges of infraction of treaty, contained in the two memorandums, submitted to Sir Charles Napier, are founded. Lord Ellenborough himself was, no doubt, aware that misconstruction of the clause of a Treaty is no ground for penal measures, and he, therefore, rests his justification on the alleged treasonable correspondence. The whole case, therefore, against the Ameers is made to depend on three distinct propositions, which we find in Sir Charles Napier's letter of the 17th of November, of which Lord Ellenborough approves. And here I would remark, that my honorable friend has so ably dissected and rebutted the evidence in support of these charges, and has so completely exposed the injustice of depriving sovereign princes of their thrones and of their liberty on such questionable grounds, that I need not do more than cursorily touch upon the principal points, both to connect the subject, and to bring them to the recollection of the Proprietors.

The three propositions are these —1st. Is the letter of Meer Nusseer Khan to Beeburuck Boogtie, an authentic letter, or a forgery? 2nd. Is the letter of Meer Roostum Khan, of Khyrpore, to the Maharajah Shere Sing, an authentic letter, or a forgery? 3rd. Did Futih Mahomed Ghoree, confidential agent of Meer Roostum Khan, of Khyrpore, assist in the escape of Mahomed Shureef?

Sir Charles Napier considers the authenticity of the letter from Meer Nusseer Khan to Beeburuck Boogtie, to depend entirely on the authenticity of the seal; after failing in his comparison with the seals in the office, and falling back, on this most ingenious solution of the difficulty, that the Ameer employed two seals. He obtains the cover of another letter on which is a similar seal, and some writing of Chothram, Meer Nusseer Khan's confidential Moonshee, and this carries conviction to his mind. This is what he ath "securing firm moral ground." Was there ever such a perversion of language? To any one experienced in native courts it would be ludicrous (if such frightful consequences were not involved,) to contemplate Sir Charles Napier, gravely sitting down to measure the seal with a pair of compasses, and on this comparison proposing to found his right to enforce measures likely to entail war. The forgery of seals in Asiatic durbars is of every-day occurrence. In the records of this very book, we find that Major Outram's seal was successfully forged by one of the agents of the Hyderabad Court. In the notes of conference, the Ameer alludes to this circumstance. What does Major Outram add? "The hand writing was also ascertained to be that of one of your confidential scribes." Meer Nusseer Khan replies, "I solemnly deny that it was written by my authority. Why was not the paper shown to me?" I as solemnly assert that I believe Meer Nusseer Khan

spoke the truth. The venality of these confidential scribes is notorious. They are paid for furnishing intelligence of the Durbar proceedings. But it is a well known fact that seals are not used on such occasions, letters are not even written; messages are sent by confidential agents. I find Naomull confirms my statement as to the absence of seals; and in the very letter accompanying the memorandum, dated October 20th, Lieut. Mylne writes, "I am unable to produce documentary proof in support of my assertion. Of late his Highness has not often trusted the committal of his ideas to paper, but has dispatched trusty messengers furnished with credentials." But the internal evidence of this letter is sufficient to condemn it. The events alluded to took 'place months previous to the alleged date; and there is one expression, which in my mind stamps it as a forgery: Nusseer Khan is made to call Beeburuck Boogtie "an especial servant." Now, I speak from personal experience on this point. Beeburuck Boogtie is a petty chieftain of a tribe inhabiting the hills to the north of Shikarpore, and quite out of the, influence of the Hyderabad durbar. He is nominally subject to the Khan of Kelat, but in reality independent. Surely such a trumpery affair, granting the truth of it, is not to be placed on the same footing as a correspondence with a Government. But why was the letter not shown to the Ameer? Is this system, of condemning unheard, to continue? Is there to be forever one law for Englishmen, and another for the natives of India? We proceed to the letter alleged to have been written by Meer Roostum to Shere Sing. We find that Major Outram, writing to the Envoy at Lahore, states that he obtained this letter through a party inimical to Meer Roostum, and that he has doubts of its authenticity. The Envoy at Lahore, Mr. Clerk, than whom no man in India was more capable of giving a sound opinion, also doubts its authenticity. It is referred to Captain Poatans, and he writes, "The seal is certainly that of Meer Roostum, under the title he employs while corresponding with the Khalsah Government, and the hand-writing is like that of several letters in my office. I should have no hesitation in considering it a *genuine production of Meer Futih Mahomed Ghoree*, and in all probability written by himself, or one of his Sons."

In another letter Captain Postans states, that Futih Mahomed "uses Meer Rostrum's seal to his own purposes." There is not a particle of evidence, except the assertion of Lieutenant Brown, affecting Meer Roostum. But Sir Charles Napier solves the difficulty by making Meer Roostum responsible for the acts of his minister, and Lord Ellenborough confirms this decision. Is it possible to conceive any doctrine more unjust? If it can be proved that the minister acted under direct instructions from the prince, if he was an accredited agent, then the prince is answerable, surely not otherwise. What was the proper course to be pursued by the British representative? To bring the charges against the minister; if they were proved, to demand that he should be dismissed from his office, or banished the country, according to the nature of the offence. Will any man maintain, that, without any further inquiry, we were justified in confiscating the territory of the Ameer,—that Ameer who had evinced his devotion to us on so many critical occasions? But the internal evidence against the authenticity of this letter is still stronger than in the case of the former one.

Lord Ellenborough incorrectly charges Meer Roostum with "endeavoring to *commence a correspondence,* with a view to hostile proceedings against the British Government, with its most faithful and most esteemed ally and friend Maharajah Shere Sing."

But this letter is not the commencement of a correspondence; it must have been one of a series of treasonable letters, as it alludes to a treaty already conk eluded, and thereby compromises most faithful and esteemed ally and friend, Maharajah Shere Sing In the state of our relations with the Sikhs, it is most improbable that such a correspondence ever took place; and Lieutenant Leckie, in his letter of the 3rd of May, officially reports, *that a man named Suckoo Mull, carried on a wholesale trade in forged letters, between the Sikhs and the Ameers.* I feel convinced this letter emanated from the same workshop.

I need not enter upon the third charge, as I hold that Meer Roostum was not compromised by the acts of his minister; but my honorable friend has exposed the absurdity of the charge of compassing the escape of a state prisoner, who, in broad day, walks down to a boat, and embarks, with his followers and property, unquestioned and unmolested.

We have now done with the grounds put forward by Lord Ellenborough, to justify the employment of a "preponderating force," in case the new treaties were not acceptable to the Ameers. Let us turn to the treaties themselves; and here, as time presses, I will only advert to one or two points. A comparison between the treaty proposed by Major Outram, and that of Lord Ellenborough, will show the harsh nature of the Governor-General's new conditions. There is a mistaken impression abroad, that the selfishness of the Ameers, with respect to their hunting preserves, was their chief cause of objection to these new treaties. This is quite unfounded. The real causes of the outbreak were the confiscation of the jagheers of the Beloochee chieftains, and the impolitic measures of Sir Charles Napier, in Upper Sinde; for which, however, Lord Ellenborough is responsible, as they met with his approval. A great deal of unmerited obloquy has been heaped on the Ameers, on account of these hunting preserves.

Sir Henry Pottinger, with his usual wisdom and good feeling, places this question on its proper footing, hi his dispatch of the 10th December, 1836. One fact, also, ought always to be borne in mind, that there were thousands of acres of waste land in Sinde, equally eligible for cultivation as the hunting preserves.

But, we find by Lord Ellenborough's treaty, that the whole of the country between Subzulkot and Bohree was ceded in perpetuity to the Newab of Bahawulpore. Now as this is contrary to all Lord Ellenborough's instructions, and expressed intentions, I conceive it must have been a mistake. Lord Ellenborough proposed to bestow, on Bhawul Khan, two districts formerly wrested from his father, Subzulkot and Bhoongbara, but nothing more; he states this distinctly, in a subsequent letter of the 13th December. The districts of Subzulkot and Bhoongbara were worth about a lac and forty thousand

rupees. The districts actually ceded to Bhawul Khan, by the treaty, were valued at more than six lacs of rupees, amongst which are absorbed the perpetual jagheers of many Beloochee chieftains. Was it likely that they would submit to such wholesale plunder, because their chief had fallen under the displeasure of the Governor- General? We see here an instance of the recklessness of these proceedings. I find, in another part of the Blue Book, that Sir Charles Napier was not aware that we had a ratified treaty with the principal Ameer of the third division of Sinde, Mere Shere Mahomed. He does not know that Shere Mahomed has possessions on the Indus; in fact, he knows nothing about him. It was not very probable that he could offer any suggestions in correction of the errors of the Governor-General. Truly, it was the blind leading the blind. Alas! For the poor natives of India, turned over to the tender mercies of such rulers. I need not comment on the disregard of Mussulman prejudices, evinced in the article regarding coining money. It is right to state that, from a dispatch of Lord Ellenborough, dated February 9th, 1843, in answer to a representation of Sir Charles Napier, regarding the district between Bhoongbara and Rohree, there is reason to believe, had such a representation been made earlier, the Governor-General would have consented to a modification of the measure, but the mischief was already done.

And now these treaties, such as they are, are sent to the Ameers, and these unfortunate princes, over awed by the "preponderating force," express their willingness to accept them. It is impossible to read the letters of Meer Roostum, and Meer Nusseer Khan without feelings of the deepest sorrow, shame, and indignation. Meanwhile occurs the episode of the succession to the Turban, into which I have not time to enter fully. Ali Morad, the most designing of the Upper Sinde Ameers, completely hoodwinks Sir Charles Napier, and succeeds in effecting the ruin of his elder brother, Meer Roostum. That old and venerable chieftain, bewildered with the menacing and insulting letters of the British representative, and by the artful insinuations of his brother, expresses his wish to throw himself into the hands of Sir Charles Napier. Does this look like a desire to resort to force? Is this a proof of his contumacy, and hostile feeling to the British Government? What is the answer of Sir Charles Napier? He recommends Meer Roostum to seek refuge with his worst enemy, Ali Morad. A recommendation, under such circum stances, was, of coarse, a command. What is the result? The slightest knowledge of native Princes might have foretold. Ali Morad takes advantage of the opportunity, to practice on the fears of the helpless old man, who, by force or fraud is induced to resign the Turban, and is then persuaded to fly. The most remarkable feature of the case is, the conviction of Sir Charles Napier, that while trampling on the dearest rights of these wild Beloochees, and transferring the power of the state, from an aged and justly beloved chieftain to one who was an object of detestation, he had hit on the only expedient for ensuring a permanently peaceful state of affairs in Upper Sinde, But he is not satisfied to await the result of his own experiment. On the 23rd of December, we find, that ho reports, that "all the Ameers of Upper and Lower Sinde, have agreed to the terms of the proposed treaties." He has already committed one overt act of hostility, in taking possession of the territory between Subzulkot and Rohree.

In his letter of the 14th of December, he writes, "*I have, therefore, told the Ameers that I shall occupy their territory, in obedience to my orders.*"

Now, he had not the shadow of a title to take forcible possession of the territory of the Ameers, until the new treaties were ratified and exchanged. But he is not yet content. He sends the Ameers orders to disperse their troops. By what right, except that of might, did he take this step? Was there any article in the treaty that forbade the Ameers to assemble troops? After his repeated aggressions, were they to trust to his forbearance? This is not sufficient; he hits upon another expedient, to drive these unhappy princes to desperation. He marches upon Emamghur, a fort situated in the desert, belonging to Meer Mahomed Khan; to prove, as he states in his letter of December 27th, that "neither their deserts, nor their negotiations, can protect them from British troops." And Lord Ellenborough compliments him on his "decision and enterprise;" and, again, "entertains the hope that the new treaties will be carried into effect without bloodshed." Truly a pretty pair of pacificators !

After the exploit at Emamghur, Sir Charles, on the 22nd of January, 1843, continues his threatening march on Hyderabad. Blind to the colour these repeated aggressions must wear in the eyes of the Ameers—blind to the suspicions they were calculated to awaken—he still presses on in hostile array towards the capital. On the 8th and 9th of February, Major Outram meets the Ameers in Durbar. No thinking man can read those notes of conference without the deepest humiliation. On the 12th, the Ameers sign the treaty under a protest. In the meantime, Sir Charles Napier had crossed the frontier. The Beloochees, hearing this, flocked to the capital. The wrongs of their old and venerable chief,' Meer Roostum, the invasion of their rights, and the series of unjust and impolitic arrangements for the benefit of Ali Morad, were the chief causes of the excitement. The Ameers required some pledge of redress on these points. Major Outram could give none. He is told that the Ameers had lost all control over their Beloochees. He is warned to depart; but, regardless o danger, he still remains firm at his post.

On the 15th, the third day after the treaty was signed, the Residency is attacked by the Beloochee soldiery. None of the Ameers, except Meer Shaded, were present. After a gallant defence of four hours, Major Outram retires. He rejoins Sir Charles Napier, who, on the 17th, attacks the Beloochee army at Meanee, sad gains a decisive victory. The results are the captivity of the Ameers, and the annexation of Sinde to our Indian Empire. Thus closes the last act of this sad drama. In a military point of view, probably few achievements in India have been more brilliant; looking at it morally, a more disgraceful act never stained the history of our country. From the first step to the final scene, the same reckless in justice predominates. No distinction is made between the Ameers who were alleged to be guilty, and those who were known to be innocent. Meer Sobdar, whose whole career has been one of scrupulous fidelity, to whom Lord Ellenborough, in the very last treaty, had assigned territory as a reward for his good conduct, shares the

hard fate of Meer Nusseer and Meer Roostum; is dethroned, exiled, and imprisoned. It must not be forgotten that each chief was perfectly independent of all the others, responsible for his own acts, and guaranteed in his possessions and rights by a separate treaty.

Before I conclude, I would advert to two points, which catch the eye at the first glance, and, with superficial observers, divert the attention from the glaring injustice of the previous proceedings. Lord Ellenborough has artfully brought these points prominently to notice, in his proclamation of March 5th, 1843. He writes, "The Governor-General cannot forgive a treacherous attack upon a representative of the British Government, nor can he forgive hostile aggression prepared by those who were in the act of signing a treaty."

Now, both these assertions distort the facts. The treaty was signed on the 12th, incorrectly stated by Lord Ellenborough the 14th. The attack on Major Outram took place on the 15th. In the intermediate days, Major Outram was distinctly warned that the Ameers could not control the Beloochees. They had already saved his life once, and the lives of his escort, on their return from the conference.

In 1839, I was placed in exactly the same position. Aware of the weakness of the internal government of Sinde, and the inability of the Ameers to protect me, I thought it my duty to withdraw in order to avoid collision. If I had been attacked, after having been warned, could I have called the attack treacherous? Certainly not. Does Major Outram designate it as a treacherous act? He does not. Let him be summoned to the bar of the House of Commons, and answer for himself.

The Ameers had not the power to prevent this attack. We have no right to judge them according to our European notions of a Government. They were simply the heads of one of the principal tribes, the Talpoors, and the recognized channel of communication with foreign powers; but they had not even the jurisdiction of life and death, amongst some of the other powerful tribes, — the Lagharees for instance,— they ruled through the Beloochee chiefs. They could influence and persuade, but they could not restrain, nor enforce obedience, when opposed to Belooche prejudices. Captain Postans states and I can confirm the statement, that the meanest Beloochee will, at times, unhesitatingly beard the Ameers in public Durbar.

I feel convinced that the Ameers were not only not favorable to this attack, but exerted all their influence to prevent it, otherwise Major Outram must have been crushed. Will any man assert that the same troops who maintained such a desperate struggle at Meanee, against Sir Charles Napier's whole army, could not have destroyed a detachment of one hundred men?

And now let us turn to the charge of "hostile aggression prepared by those who were in the act of signing a treaty." The whole conduct of the Ameers shows that their preparations were strictly defensive, that they had not the least notion of aggressive measures. Lord Ellenborough himself writes, on the 14th of November — "The designs of the Ameers would seem, by the intelligence transmitted, to be of *a defensive character only.*" We must recollect, that this is written after the assembly of a "preponderating force" at Sukkur; after the Ameers were aware of the provisions of the new treaty, and after it had been officially reported, that the Ameers had been informed "that the English meditated treachery."

None but the most obstinately prejudiced, or the willfully blind, could accuse these unhappy princes of a desire of hostile aggression. It is against all the evidence: it is against all probability. Is it to be believed that the Ameers would have stood our staunch friends in the day of defeat and adversity, to break with us at the moment when our armies were returning flushed with victory? Is it credible, that with the experience of our recent successes in Afghanistan, they would rush headlong into so unequal a contest? I would refer the Court to a most admirable letter of Sir Henry Pottinger, dated 20th June, 1839. It is too long to quote, but bears remarkably on this point.

The Ameers knew their inability to cope with us in the field; they depended upon our sense of justice. What does, Meer Nusseer Khan write:— "*I know that the kings of England never sanction injustice.*" In all their letters, in every conversation, they refer to the treaty of 1839. Meer Nusseer calls it a Wall or Bund. On signing the new treaty, they express their determination *to petition* the Governor-General.

Let us read Meer Rostrum's letter to Sir Charles Napier; a more affecting document it never fell to my lot to peruse:—He writes, "God knows we have no intention of opposing the British, nor a thought of war or fighting; we have not the power. Ever since my possessions were guaranteed to me, and my posterity, by the British Government, under a formal treaty, I have considered myself a dependant of theirs, and have thought myself secure. I have always at tended to the least wish of the British officers; and now that my territory is being taken from me, I am at a loss to find out the reason of so harsh a measure. I have committed no fault. If any is alleged against me, let me hear what it is, and I shall be prepared with an answer. I feel strong in the possession of that treaty, and I trust to the consideration of the British still. If without any fault of mine you choose to seize my territory by force, I shall not oppose you, but I shall consent to and observe the provisions of the new treaty. However, I am now and shall continue to be a, suitor for justice and kindly consideration at your hands." My very blood boils with indignation, when I contemplate the wrongs of this old and venerable chieftain. When Political Agent in Upper Sinde, he treated me as a father does a son. I have sat with him in his inmost apartments, and heard him express his satisfaction that he had secured the friendship of the British Government. There was nothing that he would not have done to show his devotion and good feeling. He proved it in a thousand instances: and. what is his reward?

He is hurled from his throne, torn from his wife and family, and sent to die in a. prison in a foreign land.

I am one of those who believe that retribution awaits the guilty even in this world; and it is my solemn conviction that some great calamity will overtake this country, if such monstrous acts of injustice are sanctioned and upheld.

But I have shown what Meer Roostum writes: what does he do? He offers to throw himself into the hands of the British representative. Is it possible to show more plainly his submission and his reliance on the British Government; his confidence in British faith, and strict observance of treaties: that confidence which has done more to rise up our wonderful empire in the East, than all the exploits of British valour?

Notwithstanding Sir Charles Napier's repeated acts of hostility, notwithstanding hi threatening and aggressive march on Hyderabad, all those who know Sinde, must be aware that the Ameers could have no intention of proceeding to extremities. If they had meditated hostilities, they would have sent away their wives and families; they would have concealed their treasures; they would have called in all their levies, especially Meer Shere Mahomed, who was considered the bravest of their warriors, and who, on the prospect of hostilities with Lord Keane's army in 1839, brought his coffin and shroud to Hyderabad. And, if conscious of guilt, they would never have surrendered themselves immediately after the battle of Meanee. I repeat, it is only those determined to convict, against all evidence; it is only those prepared to trample upon all obligations that will pronounce judgment against the unfortunate Ameers of Sinde.

On the 4th of last April, I happened to be in the House of Commons, when a noble Lord, an honour to his country, gave utterance to the following sentiments. I quote from memory, but the words made a deep impression upon me at the time, and found a responsive echo in my breast:— "England (he said), with one arm resting on the East, and the other on the West, is in too many instances trampling under foot all moral and religious obligations. If such is to be the course of our future policy, if our superiority in arts, in arms, in science, and in strength, is to be turned to the injury and not to the advantage of mankind, I would much prefer that we should shrink within the proportions of our public virtue, and descend to the limits of a third-rate power."[2] While these words rang in my ears, I cast a rapid glance at the events which, within a brief space of time, have thrown such a fearful interest over our Eastern Empire. I called to mind our wild king-making crusade to Affghanistan, its reckless expenditure of treasure, its vast amount of human misery, its last fatal catastrophe. I called to mind the numberless tragic episodes that arose out of that ill-fated expedition, — a dynasty overturned at Kelat; the aged Chieftain slain in defence of his capital: an usurper seated

[2] Speech of Lord Ashley, on the suppression of the opium trade, 4th April, 1843.—Hansard's Parliamentary Debate., vol. Ixviii., 3rd Series, p. 406.

on the throne by the force of British bayonets; be again driven into exile by an indignant people, and the son of the slaughtered chief resuming his hereditary rights. I called to mind the hardships and sufferings of our gallant and devoted native army, our detachments, surrounded by an overwhelming superiority of numbers, cut up in detail by their fierce and warlike enemies—the disastrous fields of Kujjuk, Stirtof, and Nufoosk, where men found a soldier's grave whose names are unknown to fame, but who yet de served well of their country.

It is painful to reflect on the gallant lives thus uselessly sacrificed; on the misery caused to hundreds of English families. And if we have suffered misery, we have inflicted a hundred times greater: that may be a consolation to some, but to me it only conveys deeper shame and sorrow. War is at all times a great evil, but an unnecessary and unjust war it is fearful to contemplate, and fearful the responsibility of those who throw their sanction over a crime of such magnitude.

No wonder, then, that my mind turned with some sort of satisfaction to the reflection, that these execrable wars were at an end, that a new era was dawning on Hindostan, and that, profiting by experience, we should direct all our energies to the maintenance of peace, and to the moral and physical advancement of the millions over whom we are permitted, by a gracious Providence, to preside. Little did I imagine that the very next mail would bring accounts of an act 'of aggression to which our Indian annals, unhappily so fertile in such acts, can afford no parallel. Little did I imagine that the very man who had denounced the Affghan expedition as a crime, who had gone out of his way to mark his total dissent from the policy of his predecessor, who had so recently put forth to the world that memorable declaration, that, "content with the limits that nature appears to have assigned to its empire, the Government of India will devote all its efforts to the establishment and maintenance of general peace." Little did I think that the author of this declaration, without even the plea of an imaginary or real danger to the State, with all the aggravation of ingratitude for services rendered during a season of unwonted trial, would have grasped at frivolous and flimsy pretexts to goad a barbarous but brave people to desperation, and again to let loose all the horrors and calamities of war.

It is my conscientious conviction, that if the thinking pert of this Christian nation, that if the independent portion of the public press—to which we owe the preservation of our own liberties—could once be roused to the consideration of this question, such a storm of indignation would burst forth, that no Minister would be hardy enough to refuse a full and searching inquiry. The time is past, at all events in this free country, when the follies and passions of an individual can plunge the nation into all the calamities of war. Is it then to be permitted that the servants of the East India Company shall wantonly have recourse to such en extreme arbitrament? Is there to be no end of these wars of aggression? and no voice raised in their condemnation? If the Ministry of this country oppressed with business, are unable or unwilling to grapple with Indian questions,—if

the Great Council of the kingdom have neither leisure nor inclination to enter upon an inquiry involving the rights of justice and humanity,—involving the good name and good faith of the British nation, it is easy to predict that these acts of tyranny and aggression will continue, that one iniquity will only lead to another; and, to use the emphatic words of the unfortunate Ameers of Sinde, applied to their own case, "There will be no justice for the natives of India, until the Almighty sits on the judgment-seat."

I repeat this is no party movement; it is a step beyond the petty squabbles of political intrigue; it is an appeal to those loftier principles which alone ought to guide the councils of a great and enlightened Christian Government. Every Englishman shares the responsibility of these acts; and we especially, as the intermediate body between the British public and the natives of India, bound as we are to that country by so many ties of friendship and gratitude,—are We also to remain silent, and to make no effort to awaken public attention to questions of such overwhelming national importance? I, for one, could not reconcile silence to my conscience. I believe it to be the duty of every Member of this Court to record his opinion against a line of policy that reflects so much discredit on the British name, and entails so much misery upon our fellow-creatures this belief I second the motion, and call upon every independent man now present to support it.

## N O T E.

*[ Extract from Speech of Lord Howick on Vote of Thanks to Sir Charles Napier and the Army of Sinde, February 12th, 1844.]*

"When he found his opinion supported by Sir Henry Pottinger, by Major Outram, and by Lieutenant Eastwick, he could not doubt but that there must be good grounds for entertaining that opinion. He found Lieutenant Eastwick, in the speech which he had lately published,—a speech which he thought equally creditable to him for the ability it displayed, and for the high tone of moral sentiment which was embodied in it—he said, he found in that speech the following words in confirmation of his, view of the question:-

'As an independent man giving an independent opinion to the best of my humble judgment, I am bound to say that I consider his (meaning Sir Charles Napier's) ignorance of the language, the manners, and the habits of the people with whom he had to deal, his want of experience in native character and political life in India, and, above all, his total want of sympathy with the unfortunate Ameers, were the main causes of the talk result of these negotiations.'

"*Such was the opinion of Lieutenant Eastwick; and he (Lord Howick) confessed that it was an opinion in which he entirely participated.*" – *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates,* vol. lxxiii., 3rd Series, pp. 538, 539.

# THE SINDE QUESTION.

## SPEECH – II

*A Speech Delivered By Captain Eastwick*
*at the Court of Proprietors of East India Stock on 23rd March, 1858.*

***AT a Quarterly General Court of the Proprietors of East India Stock held March 23, 1853, at the Company's House, in Leadenhall Street, Sir J. W. HOGG, Bart., M.P., in the chair, the minutes of the last Quarterly General Court were read and confirmed, and the Secretary read the head, of the accounts and paper laid on the table, agreeably to the by-laws.***

***Colonel Dickinson rose to move for certain papers concerning the Ameers of Sinde.***

***The Chairman said there was no notice on the paper, but this being a Quarterly Court, the Honorable Proprietor had a right to make his observations.***

***Colonel Dickinson said that the subject to which the papers which he was desirous of obtaining related, had come under the consideration of the Court some years ago. They related to the conduct of Meer Ali Morad in Sinde towards the late Meer Roostum of Kyrpoor, and the sons of Roostum, and were a continuation of the documents relating to the investigation into the conduct of Ali Morad, and also a copy of Sir George Clerk's Minute or Report, dated April 24, 1848. Mr. M. Clark seconded the motion.***

***Captain Eastwick said :—***

I think the Honorable Proprietor who has brought forward this motion is entitled to the thanks, of the Court. I shall very gladly give him my humble support, both on the general ground of advocating publicity, which I consider a vital principle in the promotion of good government, and also with reference to the particular object he has in view. It has always appeared to me of very great importance that official and authentic documents connected with events in India, should on all occasions, when practicable, be given to the public, in order that the public mind should be instructed on Indian affairs, and means should be afforded to Parliament, and to the nation at large, of forming sound and accurate opinions on the details of our Indian administration. India has of late years been brought very close to us; yet few will deny that, except on particular occasions—is at the present crisis—an unaccountable apathy and indifference prevail with regard to Indian) affairs. One of' the chief causes is the difficulty of obtaining authentic information, and the consequent ignorance on Indian subjects. Now I quite concur with a thoughtful and judicious write on Colonial affairs, that whatever tends to diminish 'this "ignorance and in difference will tend to the promotion of good

government," and that therefore "it is the duty of all those public departments in the dominant country which are specially entrusted with the care of dependencies, to provide for the publication of statistical and other information respecting their condition at stated intervals, and in a commodious form."[3] This principle has of late years attracted more of the attention of the Indian authorities, both at home and abroad. The establishment of a Statistical Department in the East India House, and the course pursued by the enlightened Governor, of the North-west Provinces, are steps in the right direction. But I should be glad to see the principle more fully recognized, and more extensively carried out in practice. I should be glad to see a system organized for the diffusion of the valuable information collected in the Statistical Department, more especially the information relating to the great measures of improvement, moral and physical, which have already been carried out, and are still in progress, in all parts of India. I feel convinced the public advantage would far outweigh the expense, and the result would be a beneficial impulse to our administration in India, and a greater appreciation of it in this country. In the government of the East India Company, as in all other governments on the face of the globe, there are no doubt grievous defects, and shortcomings, which every Mend of India and of mankind must deplore. But notwithstanding all that has been recently said and written, I am one of those who believe that British rule has conferred substantial blessings on the people of India; and that the government of the East India Company, if judged by impartial minds, making due allowance-for the difficulties inherent in the state of society in that country; the character of the instruments with which the machinery of government is to be worked, and the drawbacks attendant on the progressive increase of our dominions, will be found to have fulfilled its mission, and not be deemed unworthy of the confidence of the British nation. But with reference to the particular motion before the Court, asking for the official dispatches and proceedings connected with the case of Ali Morad, subsequent to the Minute of the Governor-General, dated 27th February, 1851, and also for the Report of Sir George Clerk, I cannot see any valid, reason why any one of these documents should be withheld. If it were merely on the ground of the enormous drain on the finances of India caused by the annexation of Sinde, the public interests require, and the Proprietors have a right to demand, that every document connected with this important question should be submitted for their consideration. When we find, by the official statements recently printed that, up to the year 1848, Sinde has cost the Imperial Treasury no less a sum than two millions five hundred thousand pounds sterling; when we find that, so late as the 18th June, 1852, the official estimate of the continued cost of this province, in excess of revenue, and exclusive of the pay of the regular troops belonging to the Sinde Division of the Army amounts to at least 20 lacs of rupees annually,—I do think my Honorable Friend is perfectly justified in drawing the attention of the Court to so serious an expenditure of the public money. There is one document included in his motion, the production of which I consider of peculiar importance,—the Report of Sir George Clerk, on the occasion of his visit to Sinde in 1848, in which he gives

[3] *Essay on the Government of Dependencies*, by Sir George Cornewall Lewis, chapter ix, page 255.

an account of the state of the province at that period, and the financial results of its acquisition up to that date. Now it is a remarkable fact that we are to this moment very much in the dark with respect to Sinde at that period. During the whole of Sir Charles Napier administration, not only political matters, but all the details of the internal administration of that province—fiscal, judicial, and financial—were kept in the Secret Department; and not only was the expenditure in the Secret Department, but greater powers over the public purse were granted the Governor of Sinde than to the Governors of Bombay or Madras, or to any other public functionary, as far as I can understand, holding the position of Sir Charles Napier. And when it is recollected that, during the whole of this period, the excess of expenditure over revenue was very great,—that there was an annual deficit in the years 1843-44, 44-45, 45-46 and 46-47 amounting in the aggregate in round numbers to upwards of a million and three-quarters sterling; and when, on the other hand, it was stated as the opinion of the ablest collector at that time, that "in five years. the revenue of Sinde would reach a million sterling,"[4] and Sir Charles Napier himself reported, that Sinde was no burden on the finances of India, but on the contrary, added to its resources, not only by the excess of revenue over expenditure, but also with reference to the location of the troops,—I say, when such glaring discrepancies exist, I do think a case is made out for the production of all the documents that can throw light upon the subject. I have no hesitation in expressing my own opinion—and this is a point of importance with reference to the subject now under discussion before the Committee on Indian affairs—that making every allowance for the embarrassment and disorganization consequent on the acquisition of a newly conquered province, if after a proper time had elapsed the details of internal administration in Sinde, and the financial expenditure, had been placed under the strict control and supervision of the home authorities, as is the case with all other portions of our Indian territories, many wasteful and ill-advised experiments would have been checked, and a great saving of the public money effected. But irrespective of financial considerations, all those who take an interest in this question are aware, that publications and statements have been put forth under the authority of great names, professing to give a history of the events in Sinde, which officers of the highest reputation, of unblemished integrity, and of large experience in Indian affairs, officers like Colonel Outram, Major Jacob, and others, moat competent to give an opinion, having themselves borne a prominent part in these transactions,—pronounce to be full of mistakes and exaggerations, to use the mildest terms; more especially with reference to the unfortunate Ameers, whose characters have been traduced and calumniated, in the teeth of the most unimpeachable testimony. On this subject I speak advisedly. I personally knew the Ameers, with some of them I was on terms of personal intimacy, and I can truly say, the more I knew of them, the higher opinion I formed of their many amiable qualities. I admit, there were stories in circulation to their prejudice; and when I first went to Sinde I was surrounded by a Hindoo clique, who would not have scrupled to make any assertions, more especially if

[4] The general opinion of all persons conversant with the revenue of Sinde is, that it will increase in a great extent. The ablest collector thinks it will reach a million sterling in five years, and the cost of the Government need not increase at all.—*The Conquest of Sinde*, by Major-General W. Napier, Part II, Page 531, Appendix No. IX.

they had perceived any unfavorable bias in my mind against the Ameers. And I do not deny that, from what I had read and what I had heard, I was inclined to judge harshly of the Ameers. When, however, I had opportunities of knowing the mild and benevolent qualities of Meer Roostum Khan, when I became acquainted with Meer Sobdar, and his son Futih Ali, it would have required a large amount of credulity and prejudice to have given credence to the stories circulated against them. Unfortunately, those functionaries who are unable to speak the native languages are precluded from direct and confidential intercourse with the native princes and chieftains with whom they have to deal, and they are therefore almost entirely dependent for information on their native subordinates, who too often mislead them, and plunge them into errors, which they themselves would be the first to deprecate. But I ask, when these errors are manifest, does not our duty to the natives of India demand that they should be exposed? Should they not be held up as beacons to others? Does not the cause of truth, and the cause of good government, demand that every document bearing the stamp of official responsibility should be produced, in order that a right judgment should be formed, and great public principles established. On this ground alone, if there were no other, I would support the motion of my Honorable Friend, and every motion having for its object the production of papers calculated to throw light on this painful case. But there is another and more practical reason, to which I wish to direct the attention of the Court. In consequence of the recent remarkable disclosures in Upper Sinde, it is very generally admitted by the authorities that the ruin of the unfortunate Ameers was owing to the treachery of their relative, Meer Ali Morad; and had Ali Murad's character been known then, as it is known now, no war in Sinde would have taken place. The late President of the Board of Control, Lord Broughton, expresses himself without reserve on this point. In his speech in the House of Lords, on the 29th March, 1852, he says that "he (Lord Broughton) did not believe that if the then Governor-General (Lord Ellenborough) had been cognizant as be now was of the misdeeds of Ali Morad, that the war would have taken place; he did not wish to open the question, but he felt as confident as of his own existence, that had that Noble Earl known as much then as he knew now of Ali Morad, the conquest of Sinde would not have taken place, certainly not under the circumstances under which it had taken place. This man had been the cause of the shedding of a great deal of blood. He had been guilty of one of the basest of crimes, of defrauding one of his nearest relatives, and of betraying the cause of his own countrymen; and more than that, though it was not a crime of so deep a stain, of cheating the very Power, and the very persons, who had raised him to his station, placed him on his ill-gotten throne, and maintained him there. He did not know how there could be blacker guilt, or how there could possibly be a greater combination of offences." And yet the man thus characterized, is only mulcted of the lands and revenue of which he had defrauded his unhappy relative. He is permitted to retain his hereditary patrimony, and is not even made to pay back the revenues be has for so many years been illegally enjoying; while the unfortunate victims of his treachery are still permitted to languish in undeserved exile, and no steps are taken to afford even partial reparation to those who have been so grievously injured. We take good care to assert our own rights, but we will not move a finger to assist those whom we have

helped to wrong; for it was only through the countenance of our power that Ali Morad was enabled to carry through his iniquitous schemes. We oblige him to disgorge his plunder, but instead of restoring it to the rightful owners, we take it for ourselves. Is it possible to believe that, if these facts were thoroughly known and understood that such injustice would be tolerated; and are not the friends of the Ameers justified in using their best endeavors to place before the public every document that can throw light on such transactions? Every document that we obtain makes the case stronger. Since last Quarterly Court, the Blue Book has appeared containing the Minute of Mr. Willoughby, marked, as Lord Dalhousie says, "with all that research, extensive knowledge of public affairs, and distinguished ability, which are the characteristics of every important document that issues from Mr. Willoughby's hands." And Lord Dalhousie himself writes, "I am earnest in my desire that we should show mercy to the fallen, and use the means at our disposal to raise out of their present unquestionable misery the members of a family once royal, long our faithful friends, now so crushed and poverty-stricken." Two years have elapsed since these touching words were written, and we do not yet know what steps have been taken to wipe out this stain from the British name. Nine years ago, shortly after the intelligence of the conquest of Sinde reached this country, in concert with some other Proprietors, of larger Indian experience than myself, I raised my humble voice against an act of aggression which we considered unjust and impolitic, and calculated to bring discredit on the British rule in India, and which one of India most eminent statesmen has pronounced to be "the most unprincipled and disgraceful act that has ever stained the annals of our empire in India." At that tune, I was necessarily ignorant of many of the circumstances that have since transpired; I formed my judgment on the statements in the published Blue Books, on my own experience in Sinde, and on my intimate personal knowledge of the characters and objects of the principal personages in this sad political drama. For the credit of the British reputation in India, for the honour of my country, I should rejoice if I could now publicly state that maturer reflection, and a more thorough acquaintance with the facts of the case, had induced me to modify if not altogether to change my previously expressed opinions; but I regret to say that all that I have since heard, and all that I have since read, all that has come before me privately and in my official capacity, has only served to strengthen my former convictions, and to sharpen my sense of the intolerable wrong that has been committed, and my shame and indignation that no steps have been taken to afford even partial reparation to those who have been so grievously injured. I am happy to think that the Court of Directors have, from the commencement, advocated the cause of the unfortunate Ameers, but alas! hitherto advocated it in vain. I trust the Court will pardon me for entering, at such length, on this painful question, but it is so seldom there is an opportunity of publicly expressing our sentiment, that I hope I may be permitted to touch briefly upon one or two prominent points; and before I do so I would solemnly disclaim any feelings of a personal nature, more especially with reference to the gallant and distinguished General, against whose political acts in Sinde I have felt it to be my duty on all occasions, publicly and privately, to protest. I recognize to the fullest extent his high military reputation, his energy and self-denial, and devotion to the service of his

country; but I feel bound to repeat my opinion, that as a statesman and diplomatist, be signally failed in Sinde: and had the powers he wielded been placed in the hands of a Pottinger, a Clerk, a Lawrence, or an Outram, or any of those political officers whose deeds reflect such lustre on the Indian services; the wishes of the Government might have been carried out without bloodshed, and without that indelible stain which must now for ever tarnish the British name in connection with the transactions in Sinde.

I mentioned just now that one of my chief reasons for supporting the present motion was the amount of misrepresentation abroad calculated to mislead the public mind. One of the fallacies most industriously propagated is the altogether unfounded statement that the conquest of Sinde was the inevitable consequence of the war in Afghanistan, the "tail of the Afghan storm," as it is termed; that the policy pursued by Lord Auckland, in 1838 - 39, left Lord Ellenborough no alternative, in 1842 - 43, but to destroy the Ameers, and annex their country. I altogether deny this proposition. The two events are totally distinct and separate. They must stand or fall on their own merits. I maintain that Lord Ellenborough's government is alone responsible for the ruin of the Ameers and for the spoliation of their country; and for the consummation of that disastrous policy which, not to mention its gross injustice, has entailed such a heavy burden on the finances of India. It is quite true that the expedition to Cabul, and the selection of Sinde as the base of military operations, entailed the necessity of a change in our political relations with the Ameers. It is quite true that they were, at first, unwilling to enter into these relations, coupled as they were with several unpalatable conditions; that they evinced a decidedly hostile feeling, and in fact proceeded to overt acts that would have justified hostilities on our part; but all this occurred before the treaty of the 11th March, 1839. After that treaty was concluded, by which, be it recollected, the Ameers were guaranteed in their respective territories, and taken under British protection, a change came over their feelings and conduct and, with the exception of one or two of their body, they evinced the greatest desire to cultivate our alliance, and to act up to their engagements. Now this is a most important point in the justification of these unfortunate princes. Their enemies endeavor to mystify the public mind, by confounding the two periods before and after the treaty of 1839. They quote the conduct of the Ameers before the treaty of 1839, when they were undoubtedly hostile, as proofs of their hostility at a subsequent period, when their cordiality and good faith were equally manifest. Sir Charles Napier writes, "Everybody knows that the Ameers were in deadly hostility to us from first to last, and if they do not know it, their ignorance is pitiable." Now I cannot imagine an assertion more opposed to all the evidence, or more at variance with the facts of the case. Sir Henry Pottinger declares positively, that "the Ameers punctually fulfilled their engagements," and extracts from his Reports, too numerous to quote, would prove that his evidence is strongly in their favour. I myself held temporary charge of our political relations with Sinde on the departure of Sir Henry Pottinger and I can bear the most positive testimony to the general desire of the Ameers to act in good faith and carry out the wishes of the British Government. Colonel Outram succeeded to the permanent appointment; and under his able administration, during a crisis of unusual delicacy and difficulty, the

whole resources of Sinde were placed at the disposal of the British troops, and the greatest services were rendered. On this point I will quote the opinion of Mr. Elphinstone, the highest authority on all matters connected with India, who writes, "We forced a subsidiary grant and tribute on Sinde, we made open war on the Brahoes of Kelat, killed their chiefs, and took their capital, and on these two powers all our communications with Candahar depended. To keep them quiet, and prevent them thwarting our measures would have been difficult, even in times of peace and prosperity; yet such was Colonel Outram's management, as to obtain their cordial cooperation during the whole of our dangers and disasters in Afghanistan. Our movements in every direction from Candahar depending on the country supplies we received from them, all of which they might have withheld without any show of hostility or ground of quarrel with us. Had they been disposed for more open enmity, General England's detachment could neither have retired nor advanced as it did; and it is doubtful whether Nott himself could have made his way to the Indus, through the oppositions and privations he must have suffered in such case. Advance towards Cabal he certainly could not, without the assistance he received through Sinde and the Kelat country." Captain Postans records his sense of the value of the services of the Ameers and their cordial cooperation. All the other political officers, and even the letters of Government, speak the same language. So late as the 24th January, 1842, Colonel Outram is directed by the Government of India to convey to the Ameers their acknowledgments for the friendly feeling evinced by them, and their sense of the liberality of their administration I have omitted to allude to a remarkable and affecting incident connected with the death of Meer Noor Mahomed Khan, who evinced his implicit confidence in the British Resident (Colonel Outram), by confiding to him his two sons; adding in that solemn hour, when there cannot be a doubt he gave utterance to the real sentiments of his heart, "My friendship for the British is known, to God: my conscience is clear before God." And yet in the teeth of this array of evidence Sir Charles Napier has the hardihood to assert, that "Everybody knows that the Ameers were in deadly hostility to us from first to last; and if they do not know it, their ignorance is pitiable." All those most competent to give an opinion declare, that throughout the crisis of our unparalleled disasters in Afghanistan, the Ameers rendered us most valuable services; and that, with one or two exceptions, during the whole period from 1839 to 1842, their conduct was, marked by good faith and cordiality. At the same time there were various discussions regarding the interpretation of articles of the treaty: of some of which, I maintain, the Ameers took the correct view, in others, they were wrong, but all the points ware susceptible of easy settlement by friendly negotiation — bearing in mind Sir John Malcolm's golden' maxim, "that where the interpretation of a treaty was doubtful, the leaning should invariably be rather to the expectations originally raised in the weaker party, than to the interests of the stronger party." There were also intrigues and rumors of intrigues; as there always have been and always will be, when a native state is first brought into close connection with the British Government. These intrigues, if left to themselves, would have perished of neglect. There were also treasonable letters, of questionable authenticity, furnished and probably concocted by interested parties. In my opinion, the substantial services rendered by the

Ameers should have far outweighed these alleged offences. But, in the opinion of the Resident, they furnished ground for the revision of the treaty on equitable terms, the basis of which was to be a territorial cession by the Ameers in return for a fair equivalent in the shape of remission of annual tribute, and certain arrears due under former treaties. Such was the state of Sinde on the arrival of Sir Charles Napier, in the month of September 1842. Shortly afterwards he proceeded to Upper Sinde, and received charge of the chief civil and military authorities of the province. And here I would beg permission to take a rapid glance at the state of political affairs in India at that period. On the 1st of October, Lord Ellenborough issued a proclamation announcing the pacific and conservative policy of his government. The brilliant achievements of Pollock and Nott had again attached the prestige of invincibility to British arms; and one of the ablest of India's statesmen ob served, "that we stood on surer ground in all quarters than at any former period of our Indian history." About this time the memorable Address was issued by the Governor General to his brothers and friends, the princes and chieftains of India, amongst whom were of course included the Ameers of Sinde. They were told that "the insult of 800 years was avenged; that the victorious British army bore the gates of the temple of Somnath in triumph from Afghanistan, and the despoiled tomb of Sultan Mahomed looked down on the ruins of Ghuznee." No doubt the Hindoo and Mahomedan princes of India duly appreciated this intelligence. Without, however, attaching too much weight to this characteristic rodomontade, which is chiefly remarkable as indicative of a want of sobriety of mind and judgment, happily rare amongst British statesmen, I think we have a right to conclude that the Governor General was satisfied with the general aspect of the political horizon, and that affairs were in that position that we could have afforded to treat with lenity the real or alleged offences of the weaker native states. What is the policy laid down by the ablest statesmen of India to be pursued towards those states? What do we find so often reiterated in the works of Malcolm, Monro, and Elphinstone? Is it to take every opportunity of crushing the native states? Is it that we should beat about on every side to find a pretext to coerce them? On the contrary, it is our interest as well as our duty to endeavor to preserve them, in order to postpone that period which must inevitably arrive sooner or later, when the whole of India will be brought under our direct rule. In accordance with this wise principle, Sir Henry Pottinger left on record his opinion, "that our policy was not to quarrel with Sinde; that we should not hastily take offence, but bear with the faults of its semi-barbarous rulers and population, on whom our example and intercourse must, in a few years, work a most salutary effect; and who, it is to be recollected, have for generations looked upon us as a nation of foreigners grasping at conquest, with one guide to our actions, that of might being right." How far the views of Sir Charles Napier, with respect to the policy to be pursued towards Sinde, were calculated to disabuse the Sindians of this ancient prejudice may be gathered from a perusal of a remarkable essay, dated the 17th October, 1842; an essay remarkable alike for its logic and its morality. In it we find Sir Charles Napier writing, "I have maintained we only want a pretext to coerce the Ameers;" and no reasonable person will hesitate to admit that if the principles laid down in that essay were to meet with general acceptation, there would be little difficulty

in the stronger powers finding pretexts to coerce the weaker. Accordingly, shortly afterwards, Sir Charles Napier declares, "They have given a pretext. They have broken treaties." If Sir Charles Napier had said, they have been charged with breaking treaties, he would have been nearer the mark, but be jumps to a conclusion. He finds the unfortunate Ameers guilty without ever giving them the opportunity of explaining or refuting the charges brought against them. In the same manner he decides that the people of Sinde hated their rulers. And among numberless other hasty conclusions, there is one to which I must allude: it concerns poor old Meer Roostum. Sir Charles Napier reports that Meer Roostum had been excused a lakh of rupees tribute for his former good conduct. "He appears as hostile as any of the other Ameers;" and then Sir Charles adds most unjustifiably, "and by no means to have merited our leniency." Thus setting aside the recorded opinions of all his predecessors, who had borne uniform testimony to the good conduct of Meer Roostum; Sir Charles, at this time, having been but a few weeks in Sinde, not knowing a word of the language, and receiving all his information second-hand. His own idea of the observance of treaties may be gathered from his announcement that "he would not be played off like a shuttlecock;" and told this was done by that Ameer, and that by another, and have a week's inquiry to find out who was responsible for an act of aggression—forgetting that the rights and pos sessions of each Ameer were guaranteed by separate treaty, and that each was only responsible for his own acts. One would have thought that it was a sufficient misfortune to those unfortunate princes that the chief authority in Sinde had fallen into the hands of one so ill fitted, by previous experience and habits of mind, to grapple with the intricacies of their case, and deal out impartial justice. Under ordinary circumstances there would have been an appeal to superior authority; the calm sagacity of a Hardinge, and the firm and enlightened statesmanship of a Dalhousie, would, as at a later period, have checked the impetuosity of the gallant General, and afforded time to reconsider the verdict. But the evil star of the Ameers was in the ascendant. Unfortunately Lord Ellenborough had abdicated the functions of a Governor General by writing to Sir Charles Napier that he would abide by his decision. It was a grave error, on the eve of difficult and complicated negotiations, to sweep away the machinery through which all the business in Sinde had hitherto been transacted; it was a still graver error, to remove all check upon Sir Charles Napier's proceedings. It may be granted that when war is declared the General commanding should be unfettered and unrestrained, but it is more than doubtful how far it is just and wise to invest a General at the head of an army with the power of deciding the question of peace or war. An acute writer on the Sinde controversy has observed, that affairs in Upper Sinde were at this period in a singularly confused and intricate state. I admit that, seen at a distance through the misty atmosphere of garbled Blue -Books, or on the spot through the polluted medium of bribed native officials and venal Moonshees, there might have been difficulty in discerning the right path; but an experienced Indian political officer who could have dispensed with subordinates, and gone straight to the fountain-head, would have rallied all the well disposed around him, and soon disconcerted the machinations of Ali Morad and his accomplices. It must not be forgotten that it has since been proved, that the chief native officials were in the pay

of Ali Morad. The first object of course would have been to have secured an interview with Meer Roostum, to have reassured and comforted him, and to have taken up the only position worthy of a British Representative, that of arbiter between the contending factions. It is now proved, and a most important point it is, that the assembling of the Beloochee troops was to decide an intestine quarrel, and with no view of hostility towards the British Government. Meer Roostum's earnest desire to seek the mediation of the British General shows his entire confidence in British justice. He writes, "God knows we have no intention of opposing the British, nor a thought of war or fighting. We have not the power. Ever since my possessions were guaranteed to me and my posterity by the British Government under a formal treaty, I have considered myself a dependant of theirs, and have thought myself secure. However, I am now, and shall continue to be, a suitor for justice and kindly consideration at your bands." A lingering death in a foreign land, away from his home, his family and Mends, his character traduced, and unrelenting harshness shown to his children, were the justice and kindly consideration accorded to an old and faithful ally by the conqueror of Sinde. It would occupy too much time to enter into the details which led to the final catastrophe. They have already been described in this Court on previous occasions. It is sufficient just to glance at the menacing proclamations, the insulting letters to Meer Roostum, such as never before were written by any British representative to a prince in alliance with us, the ill-advised recommendation to Meer Roostum to place himself in the power of Ali Morad, who was at that moment plotting his brother's ruin (a recommendation, under the circumstances, from the British General being equivalent to a command); the seizure of the rich districts of Subzulkot and Bhoongbara under pretence of a treaty which had never been executed, and the destruction of Emamghur while at peace with the Khyrpore state. War has not been declared, writes Sir Charles Napier, nor is it necessary to declare it. It was during the progress of these events, a few weeks previous to the battle of Meanee, that Colonel Out- ram penned that solemn remonstrance. He writes to Sir Charles Napier, "It grieves me to say that my heart, and that judgment which God has given me, unite in condemning the course we are carrying out for his Lordship, as most tyrannical, positive robbery. I consider that every life that may hereafter be lost in consequence will be a murder." There could but be one result to these unjustifiable proceedings. If Sir Charles Napier supposed that by a system of intimidation he would bring on a pacific settlement, he was grievously mistaken. God forbid that I should impute to Sir Charles Napier, or to any British General, a desire to plunge into the horrors of war. I believe, in the words of his own affidavit, that "he never sought for fame at the expense of humanity; and that he always strove, to the utmost of his power, to mitigate the evils of war." But I equally believe that his appointment led to the conquest of Sinde, which in other hands would have been averted. More than ten years have now elapsed since Sinde became a British province. However I may lament the events that led to its acquisition, I concur with those who consider the act as now irrevocable. I believe that under British rule substantial benefits will be conferred upon it, and I should be the last person to advocate any measure calculated to embarrass or retard its progressive improvement. In advocating all practicable reparation to the surviving members of the Talpoor family and

even their return to Sinde, under such restrictions as the authorities on the spot might advise, I have no apprehension of an untoward result. Meer Mahomed Houssein, eldest son of Meer Roostum Khan, since 1843 a peaceful fugitive in the neighbouring states, writes recently, "I am an old man, and desire that I may be permitted to return to Sinde, and that a place of residence may be appointed for me there. There need be no fear of my entrance on traitorous schemes, for no one has power to resist the British. To go to India there is no objection in distress, but the name of being a prisoner we cannot bear," The late Commissioner in Sinde spoke most favorably of Mahomed Houssein, and saw no objection to his return to Sinde. With regard to those unfortunate princes who have dragged out a miserable existence under the iron rule of Ali Morad, in a worse condition than his menial servants, there can be no question that a provision should be made for them, and that they should be permitted to live under British protection. One word with respect to the wives of the dethroned Ameers: Sir Charles Napier declares, that he believes that these helpless women and their dependants carried off about three millions sterling in gold bars and jeweler. What does Colonel Outram say to this? and what did the unfortunate ladies themselves say in their petition to our Gracious Queen Victoria: "God knows the hardships we suffer for our food and raiment, and through our separation from the Ameers we endure such distress and despair that life is die tasteful to us."

Sir Charles Napier may believe that three millions sterling of gold bars and jewels could be carried, through the guards that surrounded the palace, by helpless women and their terrified dependants; and Sir William Napier may believe that the Ameers "chopped their children to death soon after birth, or suffocated them under cushions; that they chastised their women with twisted brass wires, and committed other hellish deeds." But it will be a mournful reflection to thoughtful minds that the lives and properties of' thousands of their fellow-creatures should have been placed at the mercy of minds so constituted as to give credence to such wild and improbable stories. In reference to this subject, only a few months ago I heard from authority on which I can implicitly rely, that the aged widow of Meer Roostum was living in a reed hut into which, my informant said, he would not put one of his dogs; and that this once royal lady derived her only means of subsistence from the miserable earnings of a few faithful followers who sold wood in the Bazar, and shared their scanty earnings with her who had once been the honored wife of the ruler of Upper Sinde. Surely such a spectacle must cast an indelible stain upon the British name, once so famed for acts of clemency and liberality, even to their most implacable enemies. Surely if these facts were known, the public opinion of England, so keenly alive to the cry of oppression in every quarter of the globe, would not long permit such wrongs to remain unredressed? In a calm and dignified narrative of the events which accompanied the dissolution of the National Assembly in France, published in the leading journal of this country, on the 11th of December, 1851,[5] there

[5] A letter written by Alexis Dc Tocqueville.—See *Memoir and Remains*, vol. ii., page 176.

was this tribute to the honor and magnanimity of the British nation: "As a witness of these events, I wish to make them known to you in all sincerity, convinced as I am, that when English men approve violence and oppression, it is because the truth is not set before them." England, under God's blessing, has risen to a proud pro-eminence among the nations of the world. If we look abroad we see her empire extending to the uttermost confines of the earth, and still day after day gathering new countries under her protecting wing. If we look at home, we see the vessel of the state gliding calmly and steadily through the storms and tempests that threaten to over whelm the neighbouring governments. No wonder Englishmen regard their country with a sort of idolatry, and in their comparisons with other nations forget the blots upon their own escutcheon. However ungracious the task to direct attention to these blots, it is a wholesome one. It is imperative, not only for the good of the present generation, but for the judgment of posterity. There is no fear that any English man worthy of the name should bear too hardly on his country's failings; there is no fear that he will detract unjustly from the fame of those glorious spirits, whose names are enshrined in the imperishable annals of a nation's glory, and. a nation's gratitude. But the cause of truth must not be sacrificed even at the shrine of love of country; and if we would preserve a severe standard of public virtue, we must exercise an impartial judgment, and do our duty in spite of obloquy and reproach.—With these views I support the motion, and earnestly pray that it may prove of some advantage to the cause of the oppressed Ameers of Sinde.

## WAS NAPIER'S ACTION JUSTIFIED

## DIFFERENT OPINIONS

### *Extract from a Letter from Captain French, Political Agent, Nimaur, late Assistant Political Agent, Upper Sinde.*

It is very deplorable that General William Napier should have published to the world such charges against the ex-Ameers of Sinde. As far as my observations will enable me to speak, they are totally unfounded. I was in Sinde and Cutchee from the 6th September, 1840, to the 7th December, 1842, when I left for Ferozepoor, and during that period, or in fact until the appearance of the "Conquest of Sinde," on my word I never, as far as my memory will enable me to speak, heard of such doings by the Meers. Had such horrible atrocities ever been perpetrated, I think you will allow I must have heard of them; first, because, as you know, I amused myself by gathering some notes on Sinde; and, secondly, because the Ameers and their rule was a daily subject of conversation for many months of the above period, while I was at Sukkur, in every house there. Many officers had Sinde Moonshees; I had one, and some of the others, like myself, employed them probably more with a view of acquiring local knowledge than aught else. I have but to repeat, that until the appearance of the "Conquest of Sinde," I do not recollect ever having heard of these abominations; I don't believe a word of them, but they will be all believed at home.

(Signed) P. T. FRENCH.

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*From Major Woodhouse, Commanding the 6th Regt. N.I.*

Sattarah, 16th Sept., 1845.

In the latter end of 1820, Captain Sadler, of H. M.'s Service, was sent by the Bombay Government as an Envoy to the Court of the Ameers of Hydrabad. The other members of the mission were W. Simeon, Esq., and Dr. Hall, and I had the command of the escort. The mission disembarked at Kurrachee, and froth thence went to Hydrabad, where it remained about two months, and then returned to Bombay by the way of Luckput Bunder. During that time I did not hear anything which indicated any want of humanity on the part of the Ameers, or called in question their characters as rulers for justness and moderation. Had anything existed to militate against a favorable impression of their characters in these respects, It would In all probability have become known to the mission; and I think I do not err In saying that every member of it left Sinde with a good opinion of the Ameers as men and rulers; and during the late field service in Sinde, no

facts came to my knowledge to lead me to assign to them a lower standard of character than I was formerly ready to accede to them.

(Signed) F. B. WOODHOUSE.

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*From Dr. Hawthorn, Surgeon 3rd Regt. Light Cavalry*

17th August, 1845.

SIR, — I have much satisfaction in bearing testimony to the gentlemanly demeanor and strictly sober habits of the Ameer of Hydrabad, when they were in power in 1835-1836.

I resided at Hydrabad for a period of seven months during which I was in professional attendance on His Highness the late Meer Noor Mahommed Khan. I had almost daily an opportunity of seeing the other Ameers, either in darbar or in their private dwellings, and frequently accompanied them on their hunting excursions. I never had any reason to suppose they were in the slightest degree addicted to intemperance: on the contrary, they had the greatest horror of any intoxicating liquor or drug; end would never take medicine without an assurance from me that It did not contain opium.

(Signed) H. P. HAWTHORN.

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*From Captain Luckie, late Assistant Political Agent in Lower Sinde*

Sattarah, 2nd October, 1845.

My first introduction to the durburs of Upper and Lower Sinde was in the year 1830, when I accompanied the late Sir Alexander Burnes on a mission to Lahore. Subsequently I went to Hydrabad in October, 1838, and remained there until September, 1842, as assistant to Sir Henry Pottinger and yourself. During this time, I was frequently with the Ameers, both in open durbar and at private interviews, on business and in a friendly way. With one solitary exception, I never knew them deviate from their style and bearing, which was always frank and gentlemanly.

In their habits they were temperate, and I never saw them in any way excited. As parents they were kind, and took a pride in the education of their sons. They were beloved by their chiefs and dependents that were at Hydrabad, and in constant attendance on them.

(Signed) J. D. LUCKIE.

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***From Captain Hart[6] 2nd Grenadier Regiment, giving his opinion of the Ameers and their Government***

A residence of three years in Sinde (1839-40-41) led me to the conclusion that the government of its Ameers had been judged by too high a standard. Compared with the rule of despotic states in Europe during the past century, their sway was mild, and although unrestrained in the exercise of absolute powers their people were not subjected to harsher measures than are common to native governments in India. The aversion of the Ameers to shed blood was notorious. Property was generally secure, notwithstanding the absence of any regular police. Even the jealousy evinced for the preservation of their shikargahs never carried them the length of the extreme punishments once authorized by the forest laws of Britain.

The acknowledged fact, that crimes of any magnitude were rarely coin mitted, spoke of itself for the condition of the lower classes; of food they had sufficient in quantity, and of clothing in quality, to satisfy their wants. Limited in Sinde, as in other eastern countries, to securing a bare subsistence, the cultivators endured no hardships to which their Indian brethren are not liable; while the simplicity of the form of assessment freed them from numerous petty extortions of subordinates to which the latter are often exposed. The almost exclusive monopoly by the Hindoo population of the management of the revenue, proved that they did not consider the bigotry of their rulers as an intolerable burden. That trade was not, in all instances, depressed or obstructed, was shown by the transit of opium through Sinde to the coast in preference to the route of the British province, as well as by the encouragement afforded to merchants by the remission of customs duties in proportion to the extent of their traffic.

Of the private character of their ruler, the Sindians spoke favorably. They were said neither to indulge in spirituous liquors nor to smoke; and violating the sanctity of a subject's dwelling in search of wealth, or tenants for their herems, were acts unheard of, &c. &c.

(Signed) S. HART.

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[6] Author of the article on Slavery in Sinde, in the *United Service Magazine* for January, 1844.

*From Captain Gordon, in charge of the ex-Ameers of Hydrabad.*

Dum-Dum, 27th July, 1845.

My Dear Sir, — I have to acknowledge your letter of the 14th instant requesting my sentiments on certain charges preferred against the Ameers of Sinde, in the second volume of a work recently published, entitled the "Conquest of Sinde." I shall reply to your queries in the order in which they occur in your letter to my address; premising, that from my almost constant daily intercourse with the Ameers since they arrived in India, in April, 1843, I have had the best opportunities of judging of their character and habits.

I observe, therefore, in reply so your first query, that the Ameers are the most temperate of men, rigidly abstaining from wine, and every kind of liquor; while to smoking also they have a strong aversion, and cannot even endure the smell of tobacco; and it will not be supposed that their present habits of "total abstinence" in these respects are newly acquired, or different from those they have hitherto been accustomed to. In regard, therefore, to "smoking" and "drinking," the Ameers are examples to most of us who boast a higher civilization, and a more self denying morality.

With regard to your second query, I am unable to conjecture on what grounds it has been asserted that the Ameers' memorials were written for them by persons at Bombay and not by the Ameers themselves. In my opinion, the memorials referred to are in no respect superior to the usual correspondence of the Ameers, who are quite as capable of representing their own case, and proposing and answering objections, as are educated men among ourselves; and this fact will not be disputed by any person who has had opportunities of observing their good sense and shrewd and pertinent remarks on men and things. I am aware that an opinion is abroad that the Ameers are a set of "Illiterate barbarians;" but this is not the case, for with one or two exceptions they are well acquainted with, and appreciate, the best Persian authors (in prose and verse), and the knowledge thus acquired from books, improved by their own sagacity and experience, has made them no mean judges of the motives which ordinarily govern men in their actions. After these observations, I need not obtrude my opinion that the Ameers were fully equal to write the petitions alluded to;—that they did write them, is my most firm conviction, and on this point I can scarcely be mistaken.

The Ameers solemnly deny the allegations referred to in your third query, regarding the destruction of infants in their zenanas; and in justice to them I cannot withhold my testimony, that while I was employed in Sinde and the neighbouring countries, I never once heard that such a practice existed among the Ameers; and had it prevailed it is scarcely possible that it could have been concealed from you and others who resided constantly for several years at, I may say, the doors of the Ameers.

It was, I believe, the wish of the ex-Ameers that their ladies should not accompany them from Sinde; and since their arrival In India, they have always expressed the utmost repugnance to their removal, in the hope, no doubt, that they themselves would eventually be restored to their own country. This hope they still cherish, and while it lasts (although far less intensely than before) they will never sanction a proceeding which, as we are well aware, is so offensive to their ideas of female honor and decorum. The Ameers have always spoken to me of the removal of their ladies as a step to be resorted to only in the event of their "vakeels" returning unsuccessful from England, and they now perceive that their worst fears in this regard are likely to be realized.

(Signed) FORBES M. GORDON

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***From Captain Whitelock, late Assistant Political Agent, Lower Sinde***

Seroor, 10th Sept., 1845.

It would be absurd to draw any line of comparison between any of the princes of Asia and the enlightened and accomplished ruler of the more civilized parts of Europe. Among Eastern ones, however, the Ameers deservedly ranked high in the estimation of all the Europeans who had been on terms of intimacy with them. The Ameers in common with all mankind, had faults and weaknesses, but in many respects their conduct was most exemplary. They religiously abstained from drinking wine or intoxicating liquors of every description; nor did they use tobacco, with the solitary exception of taking snuff; and, moreover, they were not addicted to that almost universal practice among Mahommedan, of smoking tobacco. Their manners were mild and gentlemanly, their dispositions humane; and, as far as I could judge, their deportment towards their children, relations, and dependants was invariably kind and affectionate.

I have felt great surprise at the reports that have been circulated of the Ameers' ill-treatment of their wives and females; and I can conscientiously aver, that, during my residence in Sinde, I never heard such a thing hinted at, although it is well known that there was an influential clique among the Hindoos, who were ever too ready to prejudice the Europeans against the ruler of Sinde. I feel, however thoroughly convinced that the Ameers were incapable of acting in so cowardly and despicable a manner. It is true that, with regard to women, there were amongst them one or two sensualists, and they of all persons were not likely to have acted towards them with harshness yet, one of these, the late Meer Nusseer Khan, has been more particularly accused of treating them with great cruelty.

(Signed) C. R. WHITELOCK,
Captain, late Assistant Political Agent, Lower Blade.

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*From Captain Postan, 15th Regt. N. I., late Assistant Political Agent, Upper Sinde.*

I had the strongest personal regard for all the late Ameers of Sinde. In my personal intercourse with them, they always left the most favorable impressions from their urbanity, amiability, and desire to please. As rulers, though I could point out many faults in their mode of government, these were the consequences of their confined views as to civil polity but, on the whole, the bulk of their subjects were probably as happy and contented under their rule as could be desired. Their great failing was profusion, on the one hand, and avarice on the other, but they were merciful to a *fault,* and *just,* where they judged for themselves. As man, I consider them exemplary characters (taking into the case their education, and prejudices of birth and religion), and the devotion and respect evinced toward, them, by their children and all about them, was a conclusive proof of the domestic harmony which reigned in their singularly-constituted families. I really doubt If it were possible to find in our own country so many families, each and every member of which had his own interests to support, living together so peaceably and affectionately.

They have, I hear, borne their reverses like men, patient under many misfortunes; and this is an additional proof that their minds were well regulated in prosperity.

(Signed) T. POSTANS
Late Assistant Political Agent, Upper Blade.

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*From DR. WINCHESTER, Civil Surgeon, Rutnagherry, late Residency Surgeon at Hydrabad.*

Bombay, 27th Sept., 1845.

During the two years I passed at the Residency in Lower Sinde, I had, as you are aware, daily intercourse with the different Ameers of Hydrabad. Previous to my nomination to Sinde I had been much associated with officers who had a personal knowledge of their Highnesses, from their official situation, and I was never prepared, from their conversation, to expect anything unfavorable to the Ameers. Nor do I think from the latter end of 1844, when I first went to the province of Cutch, that I ever heard attributed to them, with one rumored exception, and that regarding only one prince, any of those vices which have since been made so notorious. I most assuredly never heard any act of cruelty mentioned; on the contrary, I always thought the Ameers were lenient as rulers) and dispensers of criminal justice; and however oppressive their system of taxation

might have been, it never was enforced by cruelty. The condition of the villages and inhabitants did not mark that the population of Sinde was worse treated than the generality of Eastern countries. I hays passed repeatedly, alone, unarmed, through great portions of Lower Sinde in 1839-40 and 41, end never met with insult; but, on the contrary, with civility and kindness.

In their habits, the Ameers were exceedingly simple, and in manners unaffected. Their food was plain; their drink was water and except in the use of snuff I never heard, or saw, any of them using tobacco or ardent spirits. They were free from the prejudices Mussulmans generally have towards Christians and I never heard them affect to despise any other religion than the Hindoo, of which they had every contempt, on account of its idolatry.

No one ever hinted to me that the Ameers ill-treated their women. I repeatedly asked natives the manner in which women are obtained for their zenanas. I never heard of force being used; but that the women were very reconciled to their lot, being enriched by valuable presents of jewels, and insured a competence for life. When I have been within the precincts of the harem, I never beheld anything that could lead to the supposition of tyranny. H. H. Meer Nusseer Khan often solicited medicine for his females, as did the other Ameers, evincing, in the detail of their complaint, anxiety for their welfare and I on one occasion was much struck with the conduct of Nusseer Khan towards a lady of his harem who was dangerously Ill.

(Signed) JAMES W. WINCHESTER
Civil Surgeon, Rutnagherry.

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***From Dr. Leith, Assistant Presidency Civil Surgeon, late Surgeon to the Political Agency in Lower Sinde.***

Bombay, 20th Sept., 1845.

From December, 1841, to November of the following year, I resided at Hydrabad in medical charge of the Lower Sinde Political Agency; and it being the chief part of my duty to give medical attendance to the Ameers, or to any member of their families that might require It, I had, during that time, almost daily opportunities of seeing them either in durbar or in private. And being again appointed medical attendant to the Ameers, in April, 1843, when they were brought in captivity to Bombay, and from thence sent to Sassoor, I saw them during nearly two months under very greatly altered circumstances.

During my acquaintance with the Ameers, I remarked their great freedom from the vice, usually prominent among Indian Mussulmans, and I was pleased with their affable and

gentle manners and domestic habits, and also with the mild exercise of their power as rulers. The people generally seemed to love them; and from what I saw during my stay at Hydrabad, I could have expected the devotion they displayed a few months afterwards, in supporting their chiefs when fighting for their honor, their independence, and their territory. I never saw anything to give me the least suspicion that any of the Ameers used any intoxicating thing; nor did I ever, while in Sinde, hear even a rumor that they did so; and I think I must have known it if they had. The use of intoxicating substances I have heard several of them openly condemn: most of them used snuff but none of them ever smoked tobacco or anything else. During the many opportunities of observation that my visits to the sick afforded me, I never saw or heard of any conduct toward, the members of their households but what was marked with kindness. During my residence at Hydrabad, I heard of but one severe punishment being inflicted; the criminal was a murderer, and the usual penalty of having his hands cut off by the executioner was inflicted; and in this case the Ameers showed great anxiety for the safety of the man's life after the amputation.

(Signed) A. U. LEITH

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***From D. Peart, Civil Surgeon Poonah, and in charge of the ex-Ameers of Khyrpoor.***

Poonah, 17th July, 1845.

Ex-Ameer Roostum Khan of Khyrpore, with his youngest son, Ali Buksh, and his nephew, ex-Ameer Nusseer Khan, have been under my care since March, 1844, and I feel the greatest satisfaction in being able to bear testimony to their noble bearing under their misfortunes; and I can safely say, that since I have had the pleasure of knowing them, I have never observed anything whereby even the slightest shadow of a suspicion of intemperance or debauchery could be attributed to them; and I have had ample opportunities of judging, visiting them at all times. Ex-Ameer Meer Roostum Khan, now upwards of eighty years of age, Is in full possession of his faculties — his memory is good, and he is most strict in his religious observances; his mode of living is abstemious, eating meat only once a day, and his sole beverage water or milk.

Respecting the memorials which have been forwarded to England since the ex-Ameers have been under my care, I can assure you most positively that they have never had the most trifling assistance in framing them; neither were they seen by, or their contents known to, any European, until after they had been placed in my hands for transmission to Government.

(Signed) J. U. PEART

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*From Captain Mylne, 6th Regiment, .N. I., late Political Agent, Hydrabad.*

Bombay, 18th January, 1845.

I hasten to reply as briefly as possible to your questions regarding the private character of the ex-Ameers of Lower Sinde, and most truly can I say that, as far as my own observation went, and as far as I could learn from others, very few indeed of the native Princes of India could so well stand the test of inquiry into their domestic life.

I had, as you know, many opportunities of seeing them: they had, in general, very short notice of my intention of waiting upon them, and my visits not being confined to mere formal interviews at the durbar, I had the better means of remarking the total absence of all marks of debauchery and symptoms of excess. I cannot recall to my recollection having ever heard, during the seven months of my being in charge of the agency, any accusation against them as being addicted to the common Muasulman vice of intemperance; and, kept informed as I was, through several sources, of their everyday life, it could hardly have failed of coming to my ears had there been anything approaching want of kindness or affection displayed by them to their families. But the manner in which they invariably alluded to their households, and the grief expressed when any member of their families was in distress, convinced me that much attachment existed between them.

Need I say, that if there are any other points on which my opinion of the unhappy Ameer can be of any service, it will afford me much pleasure to give It?

CHAS D. MYLNE

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*Extract from "The Conquest of Sinde, a Commentary," by Lieut.-Col. Outram, C. B., Resident at Sattarah.*

To these convincing testimonials, I would add that of an officer long resident in Sinde, and intimately acquainted with its people. "My own knowledge," he writes, "that is, from personal intercourse, is nothing, but the unanimous testimony of all the native who were in a position to know, shows that, with the sole exception, I believe, of Ali Moored, the Meers of Sinde were sober and temperate to an extraordinary degree,—not only not drinking or using intoxicating liquors or drugs, but not even smoking a hookah."

On Sir Henry Pottinger I call to confirm the testimony thus rendered in their favour by every British officer who has had an opportunity of intimately knowing the Ameers. He can inform his countrymen that the documents now submitted to the reader are sober and literal statements of undeniable facts.[7] Sir Alexander Burnes's eulogies of Meer Roostum, "the good old man," I have already placed before the reader.[8] And if, as I

[7] "*The Conquest of Sinde, a Commentary*," by Lieut.-Col. Outram, C.B., Resident at Sattarab. Wm. Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh and London, 1846.

[8] I deeply regret that I have it not in my power to refer to Captain Del'Hoste's Journal, written in 1882, which, though buried in the Records of Government, I believe contains sketches of the characters of the Ameers. The following passage, extracted from Dr. James Burnes's book, will show how innocent were the preceding generation of Ameers of the foul charge. brought against their sons: —

"The Ameers of Sinde are lees sunk in sensuality and Indulgence than Mahommedan prince, in general Meer Moored All Khan asked me on one occasion whether I had any objection to his taking *daroo*, a word which I understood in its usual acceptation of ardent spirits; and I was proceeding to explain that it would be better to avoid all stimulants, and particularly wine, for the present, when he abruptly interrupted me, by begging that I would not use the name of the forbidden juice of the grape in the presence of a true believer. I found afterwards that his Highness only meant a pomegranate; and although this anecdote may give an impression of display before a large assembly, still I believe it is well ascertained that the Ameers never indulge in intoxicating drugs or liquors. They have been known to dismiss persons with disgrace from their presence, who have appeared before them redolent of wine; and Bahadoor Khan Cokur, a Beloochee chief of high birth, in the service of Meer Moored Ali Khan, was suspended from his employments for a considerable time, from having been once seen in a state of intoxication. The Ameer universally objected to take medicine in the shape of tinctures, from the spirit they contained. There is not a hookah to be seen at their court, nor does any of the family ever eat opium. It was to be hoped that this temperance on the pars of the rulers had had a proportionate effect on their subjects; but experience obliges me to declare that most of the soldiery, end many of the courtiers, are addicted to every specie of indulgence that can either enervate the mind, or debilitate the body. The eating of opium is as common in Sinde as in Cutch; and I found no present more acceptable than a few bottles of brandy, and no annoyance more intolerable than incessant indirect applications to repair the ravages of unlawful disease, or to renew the powers wasted in luxury and debauch. The Ameers commence business about two hours before daybreak, when each holds a private levee to listen to complaints, and adjust the affairs relative to his peculiar province. It is on this occasion only that they wear turbans. About sunrise, they repair to their apartments to dress, and appear shortly afterwards in durbar, where the whole family regularly assemble, and where all State proceedings are transacted. The letters which have arrived during the night or preceding day, are then thrown before them in a heap, and the time is passed in reading or giving orders regarding them, and in conversation till ten or eleven o'clock, when they withdraw to their morning repast. At two o'clock they again show themselves abroad, and remain together till dark, when they separate for the night to their respective places of abode."

Conquest o page 348:—" Nusseer Khan of Hydrabad, depicted the most noble and generous of the Ameers, the most humane of the pernicious brood, had in his zenana a whip expressly to correct the women; the last is composed of two lengths of twisted brass wires! It is no fabled the usage is certain, &c. That the romancist who palmed off on his too credulous countrymen the arrant nonsense (out-Heroding the famed Munchausan) of Fitzgerald of the "tempestuous band," should write such trash, excites but little wonder. But it is surprising, and derogates not a little from the respect due to the collective wisdom of the nation, that the absurd fable should have been listened to hi Parliament.

It must have astonished all English gentlemen in India conversant with the mild ways of Mahommedan gentlemen towards the inmates of their harem.—(subjected to no other hardships than that of voluntary seclusion, which they themselves consider as disgraceful to infringe as would an English female regard a reflection cast on her chastity)—to see so want only libelous and utterly absurd an accusation gravely uttered by a British Senator in the presence of the Parliament of England. The report of the debit given by Hansard states, that *sensation* was caused by this climax to all the misrepresentation and mystification palmed on the House on that occasion, but the nature of that sensation is not described: for the honor of my countrymen I trust that it was the sensation of indignation at the unblushing assurance of Mr. Roebuck in presuming to attempt to impose such trash on the representatives of our nation. Of all the Ameers, Nusseer—the courteous, refined, and even chivalrous Nusseer—was the last on whom the romancist should have attempted to cast this stigma Nusseer who would as soon have given pain to a woman as would Mr. Roebuck or General Napier dream of inflicting the same barbarous cruelty on their own daughters. Poor Nusseer is now no more. It has pleased God to summon him whither the malice of his persecutors can no longer pursue him; where the wicked cease from troubling, and the weary are at rest. He was mercifully removed ore the atrocious calumnies of General William Napier could add another drop of bitterness to the overflowing cup of his misfortunes. *Requiescat in pace.* His nephew, Meer Hoossein Ali, indignantly replied as follows to the charges, as preposterous as they are malignant, of the historian —"Whatever stories the General has written concerning our ladies we could reply to them by as bad and worse words about him; but it is not our custom to write evil about any one, or call him bad name., agreeably to the saying, the man of wisdom will not call him a respectable man

who uses the names of respectable men with disdain. (Persian proverb.) Sir Charles Napier has described the killing of children by the Ameers but in reply we say, thousands of woes to him who wrote such a thing, for we are neither guilty of that, nor know anything about it. This is on as unfounded charge and a false calumny. Let it be asked, how can a man be so inhuman as to cut to pieces a young child, and in consequence expose himself to the fire of hell and the curse of God? Regarding the brass whip which the General has written about, it is all a lie, like the rest of his accusations; because a whip is for horse and not for women. There is no matter if the General has gut it (the whip with which it was alleged Meer Nusseer chastised his women) in his possession to show to the people, for we also can produce not only a brass whip but hundreds of iron, whips." And thus the young Ameer concludes his humble attempt to defend the memory of his father, and to uphold the character of his brethren, all that remained to them: —"Sir Charles Napier calumniate the Ameers, because he know that he has injured them very sadly; and, by calling the Ameers monsters, he hopes to draw off the sympathy of people from their sorrowful misfortune; but he will fall in his design even in this world; and on the day of judgment, when the Beloochee, who were innocently murdered by the General in the battles of Meanee and Dubba, shall rise against him,—on such a day, where will he find refuge from the accusations and complaints of those whose characters he has blackened by his calumnies?"

A brass whip—by no means a great rarity In the East—ii found in the women's apartment, and the logical Inference is, that it was designed for their backs; By a parity of reasoning, the valuable firearms, sword, jewels, and treasures, found In the zeuanas, may be concluded to have been collected by the ladies, who addicted like their lords to intrigue, were meditating a "revolt of the Hurem! Alas, poor England! if your senators are at the mercy of Mr. Roebuck, and your rising generation are dependent for Eastern facts on the imagination of General William Napier! England of all nations is most interested in obtaining correct information regarding India; English men are of all Europeans the most ignorant, and the most easily imposed on, in all that concern it!

To prove how cruelly the Ameers treated their ladies, the historian tells us, that "when the Ameers fell, not one woman, old or young, mother, wife or concubine, would follow them to Bombay, so much were they detested;" and we are told that they "sought and obtained leave to return to the homes of their childhood." The reader of the foregoing page will not be surprised when I tell him that THIS IS PURE UNMITIGATED FICTION; though he will probably be amused at the hardihood of the fabrication. The ladies did not accompany their lords, because to have done so would have been an acknowledgment that all hope of the Ameers was abandoned. The treatment of the captive Ameers, the indignities to which they were exposed, the undefined horror entertained by all Asiatic of transportation across the "black water" (sea), and the incertitude as to the final disposal of the captive princes when in the country of those who had evinced such a recklessness of justice, truth, and mercy,—were enough to deter even affectionate wives from voluntarily accompanying their husbands at first. But it was not their husband' wish that their wives should accompany them. UP TO MY LAST ACCOUNTS – JULY 1845 – THE AMEERS' LADIES, SO FAR FROM HAVING "RETURNED TO THE HOMES OF THEIR CHILDHOOD," WERE STILL LIVING IN A TANDA (A WALLED VILLAGE) ABOUT THREE MILES FROM HYDRABAD! What says Dr. Peart, in charge of the Khyrpoor Ameers, and Captain Gordon, in charge of those of Lower Sinde, on this subject? The former writes:.—.

"In reply to the last part of your letter, from frequent conversations I have had with the ex-Ameers upon the subject, I am enabled to state that their disinclination to have their families sent to them from Sinde is quite insurmountable; and when I have proposed It to them, their reply has always been, 'As long as we are prisoners, this is so place for our wives a children, to make them prisoners also.' I trust you will excuse my refraining from informing the ex-Ameers of the allegations that have been made against them, as I am sure, by so doing, I should be adding fresh causes of sorrow."

The latter, thus:—" The Ameers solemnly deny the allegation referred to in your second query, regarding the destruction of infants in their zenanas, and in justice I cannot withhold my testimony, that while I was employed in Sinde and the neighbouring countries. I never heard that such a practice existed among the Ameers, and had it prevailed, it is scarcely possible that it could have been conceded from you and others who resided constantly for several years at, I may say, the doors of the Ameers. IT WAS, I BELIEVE, THE WISH OF TFE EX-AMEERS, THAT THEIR LADIES SHOULD NOT ACCOMPANY THEM FROMM SINDE, AND SINCE THEIR ARRIVAL IN INDIA, TEST HAVE ALWAYS EXPRESSED THE GREATEST REPUGNANCE TO THEIR REMOVAL. IN TEN HOPE, NO DOUBT, THAT THEY THEMSELVES WOULD EVENTUALLY BR RESTORED TO THEIR OWN COUNTRY. THIS HOPE THEY STILL CHERISH, AND WHILE IT LASTS (ALTHOUGH FAR LESS INTENSELY THAN BEFORE) THEY WILL NEVER SANCTION A PROCEEDING WHICH, AS WE ARE WELL AWARE IS SO OFFENSIVE TO THEIR IDEAS OF FEMALE HONOUR AND DECORUM. THE AMEERS HAVE ALWAYS SPOKEN TO ME OF THE REMOVAL OF THEIR LADIES, AS A STEP TO BE RESORTED TO ONLY IN THE EVENT OF THEIR VAKELS RETURNING UNSUCCESSFUL FROM ENGLAND, AND THEY WILL NOW PERCEIVE THAT THEIR WORST YEARS IN THIS REGARD ARE LIKELY TO BE REALIZED." This, be it remembered, Is the testimony of two high-minded English gentlemen, writing simultaneously from the eastern and western extremities of India, daily associating with the Ameers, and acquainted with all their thoughts. They cannot be supposed to be discontented "at being by Lord Ellenborough debarred from plundering the Sinde revenues, under the names of collectors," &c. They are gentlemen whose words have never been doubted, nor their honor called in question; with no interest in the matter save that of Englishmen jealous for the honor of their country. And what is opposed to them? The assertion of one whom I have proved to be as reckless of truth as he is ignorant

confidently expect I have satisfied my reader of the utter groundlessness of this charge of debauchery and drunkenness against the Ameers generally and against the venerable Meer Roostum in particular, I may safely leave it to his judgment to determine what degree of credit is due to the monstrous and incredible stories narrated on the same authority as that which I have just proved to be so worthless. The Ameers have been accused of committing deeds exceeding in iniquity those ever invented in the most fabulous romance of ancient or modern days; such as, chopping their own "offspring to pieces with their own hands, immediately after birth; but more frequently placing their wider cushions, smoking, drinking, and jesting with each other about their hellish work while the children were being suffocated beneath then;" chastising their wives with "whips of twisted brass wires," for "what they deemed the poor women's offence, such, perhaps, as weeping over their slaughtered children ' hellish deeds, which rendered them objects for horror rather than sympathy."

Such are the statement put forth as History, and as worthy of the belief of the most civilized portion of the globe! They can only be accounted for, by some heartless wag baring practised on the credulity and too ready ear of Sir Charles Napier (to hear anything to the disadvantage of his victims), who forthwith transmitted what may have been intended as a bad joke and fiction, to him who was to become the annalist of the Conquest of Sinde.

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***Translation of the PETITION of the Wives of the dethroned Ameers of Sind transmitted through their accredited Envoys, to Her Majesty Queen Victoria.***

May the shadow of Queen Victoria increase, the pure, and the magnificent as Balkis (Queen of Sheba).

It is almost two years since Sir Charles Napier came to Hydrabad, In Sinde, with an army and artillery, and plundered our habitations of all our money, ornaments, jewels, and of everything of value. And at the same time he took from us the Ameers and our children, and sent them to Hindostan as captives. We helpless women, devoid of power, were, when Sir Charles Napier arrived, seated in our houses. What manner of custom is this, that he should enter our dwellings, and plunder us of our valuable, leaving us not sufficient for our support? Two years have elapsed since he tore us from our houses, and native city, and compelled us to dwell outside the town of Hydrabad, in huts, like the destitute. God knows the hardships we suffer for our food and raiment; and through our separation from the Ameers, we endure such distress and despair, that life is distasteful

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of what he pretends to discuss—the champion of a brother whose policy is unjustifiable, and only to be extenuated by proving its victims monsters more horrible than It. had hitherto entered into the mind of man to conceive!

to us. That one should die when God wills it, is no calamity; but we endure with each successive day the torment of a new death; wherefore we cherish the hope, that you yourself being a Queen, as we were once, will sympathize with us, and will take compassion upon us, and cause restoration of those things of which Sir Charles Napier has robbed us; and since our hearts are lace rated with grief at being separated from the Ameers, and from our sons— by which, indeed, we are brought to the brink of despair— you will remove this cause of distress, otherwise we should reckon it the greatest favour to put an end to our existence. May your days be lengthened!

Signatures of the Begums of.—
Meer Kurm Ali Khan.
Meer Noor Mahomed Khan.
Meer Mahomed Nusseer Khan.
Meer Sobdar Khan.
Meer Meer Mahomed Khan.

Written on the 27th of the month Shuwal, 1260,
at Hydrabad, in Sinde.

***Translation of a Paper given to Lord Ashley by the Vakeelss of the Ameers of Sinde.***

August 1845.

We, Akhund Habibullah, Diwan Mitharam, and Diwan Dyarain, the accredited Envoys of the Ameers of Sinde, solemnly declare that we have never, on any occasion, acquiesced in the truth of the charges against our masters the Ameers. We believe, and we affirm it in the most solemn manner, that the letter said to have been written to Bibarak Bugti by Mir Muhammad Nasir Khan, was a forgery. We believe, before God, that the Ameers are wholly innocent of the charges brought against them.

Signatures of—

AKHUND HABIBULLAH.
DIWAN MITHARAM.
DIWAN DYARAM.

19, Harley Street, 15th August, 1845.

***Extract of a letter from Lieut.-Col Outram, C. B., formerly Commissioner in Sinde, to Lieut.-Gen. Sir Charles Napier, G.C.B., dated 26th January, 1843 (a few weeks previous to the battle of Meanee).***

"It grieve, me to say that my heart, and that judgment which God has given me, unite in condemning the course we are carrying out for his Lordship, as most tyrannical; positive robbery. I consider that every life that may hereafter be lost in consequence, will be a murder."[9]

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***Extract of a letter from the Right Honorable Sir Henry Pottinger, Bart., G.C.B., formerly resident in Sinde, read in the House of Commons, by Lord Ashley in February, 1844.***

"Your letter brought our happy and merry days in Sinde vividly to my mind, and I lamented, on reading it, if possible more deeply than I had done over the 'fallen estate' of my old friends the Ameers, whose case I have all along said, and ever shall say under all circumstances, and in all society and places where I may hear it alluded to, is the most unprincipled and disgraceful that has ever stained the annals of our empire in India. No explanation or reasoning can, in my opinion, remove the foul stain it has left on our good faith and honor; and as I know more than any other man living of previous events and measures connected with that devoted country, I feel that I have a full right to exercise my judgment, and express my sentiments on the subject. I was in hopes that some influential voice would have been raised in England against the tyranny and spoliation that had taken place; but the intelligence by the last mail—that of July--holds forth no such prospect; and all that I can now hope is, that the author all this cruelty and misery may meet with his deserts hereafter. I shall only add, that I shall esteem it a favour if you will let my opinions be known wherever you hear the a mentioned, and that you cannot use too strong language in expressing my disgust and sorrow on the occasion."

[9] Vide "*The Conquest of Sinde, a Commentary*," page 290, Part 1st .

# INEVITABILITY OF THE CONQUEST OF SINDH BY THE BRITISH IN 1843

## By: M. H. PANHWAR

The last decade of 18th century and the first half of the 19th centuries witnessed a political triangle in Asia. The Russians started their expansion to the South in Central Asia, while the British though still in Calcutta, but clearly fore-saw that the whole India, soon was to form a part of their vast Empire. They saw Russia, a powerful country of Europe, with vast room for expansion into Asia.

The Ottoman Empire of the Medieval-age pattern by then had become stagnant and its survival was at the mercy and convenience of the other European powers. Persia was weak and internally divided. India was politically divided into small Khanates.

The British plan was therefore, to meet Russia preferably at the Sir Darya and failing which, at the Oxus river, although at one time they were content that the border should be on the Indus, as was one time accepted by Delhi-Sultanate with Mangols in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and the latter Mughals had settled with Nadir Shah and Ahmed Shah Abdali. Subsequently, the British realized that the Indus would be too brittle and delicate a line to content the Russians.

Little was realized (outside the British Government's secret files), what was in making, on the international scene. Captain W.J. Eastwick, in his speeches in the British Parliament in favor of the defeated Amirs of Sindh, spoke for 15 continues years, for which Sindians in general were grateful to him and have all along quoted him as champion of their cause. But what was on the Government records, was hardly known to Captain William J. Eastwick and his brother Edward Hobbhouse the author of "Dry Leaves from the young Egypt", a political agent in Sindh, at the time of its conquest.

Lord Ellenborough as Chairman, Board of East India Company, had recommended to the Prime Minister the conquest of Sindh as early as 1830, thirteen years before he himself, as the Governor General of India, had authorized Charles Napier to do so. These thirteen intervening years were simply part of the big game, a matter of waiting and finding more justification.

Had the British not been thrown out from Afghanistan by a revolt led by Akbar Khan, they probably would have converted Sindh into one of the many Indians States under the British Paramouncy, but the set-back in Afghanistan meant, that they must push their frontiers to Khyber and Chamman Passes immediately. The conquest of Sindh and later on of the Punjab and subjugation of Baluchistan, was thus a direct out-come of the

British having been up-rooted from Afghanistan and there was no justification in waiting any longer.

The expansion of the British in India and the Russians in Central Asia which created conditions for the conquest of Sindh, is given below, in a chronological order, in

1) **1757 AD**
   British conquer Bengal.

2) **1764 AD**
   Oudh and Mughal Emperor at the British disposal.

3) **1765 AD**
   Diwani or Bengal, Bihar and Orissa granted to the British.

4) **1775 AD**
   Benaras and Gazipur surrendered to the British.

5) **1760-1783 AD**
   In 1783 British were in possession of Bihar, Bengal, Benaras, Madras and Bombay.

6) **1791 AD**
   British were alarmed at expansion of Russia and feared that it may replace the Turkish Empire in Asia.

7) **1796-1797 AD**
   Shah Zaman invaded certain parts of N.W.F.P., with the intention of extending his domain to all areas held by his grandfather, Ahmed Shah Abdali.

8) **1798 AD**
   British added Sri-Lanka (Ceylon), Malabar, Dindigul, Baramahal.

9) **1798-1809 AD**
   The immediate danger to the British was Neopleon of France and his flirtations with Muslim rulers of Persia, Mysore and else-where in the South Asia, and also with Sindh through Persia.

10) **1798-1809 AD**
   Neopleon's attack on Egypt, made invasion of India by a European power including Russia, a practical possibility. Further confirmation came in 1800-1 from the Shah of Iran, who communicated to the Governor General of

India, through the latter's emissary that in the event of Russian occupation of Iran, there would be long term consequences for India.

11) **1799 AD**

Part of Tipu's Mysore, from Goa to Cannanore and South Mysore, become British.

12) **1799-1805 AD**

Carnatic, Kutch, Gorakhpur, the Upper and the Lower Ganges –Jamuna – Doab, became British. Broach and areas north of it also became British.

13) **1801 AD**

British came to know of Emperor Paul's (of Russia) preparations for expedition on India.

14) **1803 AD**

Trans-Caucasia divided among Russia (Georgia). Ottomans (Western 20%) and vassals of Iranian Qajars.

15) **1803-1804 AD**

Russians took Mingrelia from Ottomans.

16) **1803-1806 AD**

Russians took Azerbaijan from Qajars of Iran.

17) **1808-1916 AD**

Elphonstone's visit to Afghanistan (1801) and Henry Pottinger's travels in Baluchistan (1810), further aroused interest in areas beyond the Indus and the Sutlej and possibility of what Russians may do there.

18) **1813 AD**

Treaty of Gulistan after the defeat of Persian Army by Russians. Iran relinquished all its territorial claims in Caucasus and withdrew its warships from the Caspian Sea.

19) **1814 AD**

British signed a mutual defense pact with Qajars of Iran, promising military and financial aid in case of a foreign power attacked Persia.

20) **1815-1818 AD**

Maratha States became British protectorates. Kutch, Kathiawar and Rajasthan states accept British Paramouncy.

21) **1820-1830 AD**

Russians push eastwards almost to Afghanistan frontier.

22) **1826 AD**

Bharatpur falls to British.

23) **1826 AD**

Iran tried to recover part of Caucasus from Russians under British advice, but was defeated.

24) **1826 AD**

Some areas of Bhonsle of Nagpur annexed.

25) **1827-28 AD**

Russians took northern Armenia from Qajars of Iran, making the British to realize, how helpless were their allies, close to Russian borders.

26) **1828 AD**

Treaty of Turkmachal gave Russian full control over the South Caucasus. The Persians paid indemnity of £ 15 millions, gave extra territorial rights and commercial concessions to Russia.

27) **1829 AD**

Lord Ellinborough, on becoming President of Board of Directors of the East India Company, and after reading Evan's book on the designs of Russians (London 1828), became convinced that by conquest of or by influence on Iran, Russians would secure road to the Indus. He was in favor of occupying Sindh, Lahore and Kabul as soon as Russian troops move against Khiva. He suggested the exploration of Indus. British trade with Central Asia was to be promoted and British agents were to keep an eye on Russian activities.

28) **1830 AD**

Annexation of Aachar by the British.

29) **1831-1832 AD**

Muhammad Ali of Egypt made a bid to wrest control of Syria from Sultan or Turkey and even defeated the latter's army at Konya in the heart of Turkey. The Sultan was saved only by Russian ships and troops. Turkey became a virtual satellite of the Russians.

30) **1832 AD**

British became convinced that by capture of Khiva, the Russians would nearly be in command of navigation of the rivers, which lead down to the very frontier of Indian Empire.

31) **1833-1841 AD**

Russian interest now was to preserve and control the Ottoman Empire as defensive barrier for Russia, against the powerful maritime states of France and Great Britain. The Sultan did not trust the Russians and British succeeded in disrupting Russian plans for an exclusive alliance with Turks. This done, British turned to Sindh, Punjab, Afghanistan. Ellinborough in 1835 suggested that each of the above three states should be made to feel that their security depended on the British support. It was at this juncture that British stopped Ranjit Singh's invasion of Sindh in 1835-1836 and also of Afghanistan. This also resulted in treaties with Amirs of Sindh by Pottinger, Burnes mission to Kabul, failing which, treaty with Shah Shuja, a deposed Afghanistan King, in exile in Ranjit Singh's territory was supported to become ruler of Afghanistan.

32) **1834 AD**

Annexation of Ceorg by the British.

33) **1835 AD**

Annexation of Jaintia by the British. Sikh states east of Sutlej accept British paramouncy.

34) **1839 AD**

Deposition of Raja of Sitara by British.

35) **1839 AD**

With Ranjit Singh's death in the Punjab started the period of instability and Sikhs no longer were an important power to deal with. Amirs were weak and in no position to stop British Army of the Indus, on way to Afghanistan. The fate of Sindh and Punjab stood decided and only effectual annexation remained. The British reinstated Shah Shuja, but two years later were defeated and repulsed. This was an evidence how difficult it was to control and distant country far from base, without actually conquering it. But British had actually demonstrated their striking capacity to the ruler of Kabul, as well as convincing the Shah of Persia, who no longer attempted to capture Heart from Afghanistan to make it a gate way for Russians to move on India.

36) **1839-1840 AD**

Shah Shuja installed as puppet king of Afghanistan.

37) **1839-1843 AD**

The British demonstration of Striking power in Afghanistan produced cool and calculated reaction among Nichol-I Czar of Russia and his officials, as they no longer had any intention of expansion beyond the Oxus River bordering Afghanistan. Conquest of Sindh was partly show-down of what British would attempt against Russian's crossing the Oxus.

38) 1841 AD

British defeated and expelled from Afghanistan.

39) **1843 AD**

Conquest of Sindh.

40) **1844-1845 AD**

Battle with Sibi-Kachhi and Mari tribes to push frontiers towards Chaman.

41) **1845 AD**

British purchased Danish possessions in India.

42) **1845 AD**

The First Sikh War and defeat of Sikhs.

43) **1848-1849 AD**

Sitara annexed by the British.

44) **1849 AD**

Sambalpur annexed by the British.

45) **1849 AD**

Conquest of the Punjab and annexation.

46) **1853 AD**

Secession of Berar by Nizam of the British.

47) **1854 AD**

Annexation of Jhansi by British.

48) **1855 AD**

Treaty with Dost Muhammad of Afghanistan.

49) **1856 AD**

Annexation of Oudh.

50) **1865 AD**

Taskhent conquered by Russia.

51) **1868 AD**

Annual grant to Rs. 5 lac to Sher Ali Amir of Afghanistan and reducing him as a puppet king by the British.

52) **1868 AD**

Uzbek Khanates i.e., Bukhara and Samarkand annexed by Russia.

53) **1873 AD**

Khiva annexed by Russia.

54) **1875 AD**

Khokand (Khawaqd) acquired by Russia.

55) **1876 AD**

Treat of Kalat making it a princely state and annexation of districts bordering Afghanistan.

56) **1878 AD**

Flight of Sher Ali.

57) **1879 AD**

Abdication of Yakub of Afghanistan.

58) **1880 AD**

Abdul-Rehman installed as puppet king of Afghanistan now reduced to a satellite state of the British.

59) **1884 AD**

Marv taken by Russia.

60) **1886 AD**

Annexation of Burma by the British.

61) **1887 AD**

Marv divided between Qajar and Russia.

62) **1895 AD**

Pamir territory acquired by Russia.

63) **1900 AD**

British expedition to Tibet, results in heavy British influence in that country.

**The British treaties and engagement with Sindh between 1799 and 1837 A.D.**

The international situation mentioned above had so developed between 1791 AD, and 1839 AD, that the British were concerned with not only of their own interests in the South Asia, but their other colonies and British Islands. They made treaties with Sindh and also sent following missions to the Amirs:-

i) Crowe's Mission to Sindh, May to August 1799 Ad, and again in 1800 AD, to watch Zeman Shah's influence and French intrigues, under the cover of establishing a trade factory, which was done, but the factory at Thatta was to be closed down in 1800 under the orders of Amirs, who were threatened with invasion from Shah Zaman, if Amirs failed to expel the British.

ii) In 1809 AD, an emergency mission under Seton was sent and assigned to deter Amirs from coming under French influence, through Qajars of Iran. Under this treaty the British were to help Amirs against any claim or threat of Afghanistan. This treaty was not ratified by the Government of India as Napoleon's defeats no longer necessitated such cooperation from Amirs and British also wanted the doors to remain open for any negotiations with Afghanistan, in view of Russian's push towards Central Asia.

iii) Sadlier's Mission to Sindh and the treaty of 1821 was necessitated by a genuine grievance on the part of the British, namely Jasmi pirates on Sindh coast caused damaging to British ships since 1910 and 1819 AD, and Khosa banditti or Nagar Parkar raiding Kutch, with had become a British protectorate since 1817 A.D. Both parties honored this Treaty. The Sadlier Mission, however, probed deep into Sindh's political situation, when he observed: "Amirs have no one minister; each has his separate information, who offers their opinion without regard for their master's interest".

iv) In 1830 AD, with Ellenborough as President of East India Company, in his Minutes, suggested that Sindh was to be conquered. Burnes came to Hyderabad (Sindh), via the river Indus, from where he went up to Lahore, surveying the Indus and settlements along its banks, collecting enormous information of historical, geographical and strategically value. This was followed by Pottinger's visit and separate Treaties with Amirs of Hyderabad and Khairpur in 1832 AD, allowing the British commercial ships free passage to the Indus. The important aspect of the treaties was that the ruling houses of Mirs were divided and from here onwards they were dealt with individually by the British.

v) By the 1834 AD, treaty Amirs were forced to accept British envoys in Sindh, though agreement for establishment of a permanent agent was delayed until 1838.

vi) In 1836 AD, British intervened and stopped Ranjit Singh of the Punjab from invading Sindh in return for posting of British troops at their capital, to be paid by Amirs, posting of British official at Shikarpur, to be the medium of communication between Amir and Sikhs and withdrawal of Amirs and Sikh envoys from their respective capitals. One fourth of Shikarpur was succeeded to meet expenses of the British agent. Posting of permanent British agents in Hyderabad was agreed in 1838 A.D. By this time, two main objectives of the British, the survey of the Indus River and the establishment of permanent Residency in Sindh, had been achieved. Sindh virtually had become a vassal state under the British Paramouncy.

It may be mentioned that after 1831 AD, the British policies save Sindh from being usurped by Sikhs under Ranjit Singh. This strategy was necessary, so that Ranjit Singh does not become too strong to challenge the British at any time and besides British were to have Sindh anyway, so why to give it to the Sikhs? The British thus helped in lingering on the Talpur Rule over Sindh for more than one decade at least.

'*Dry Leaves of young Egypt*' by Captain Edward Hobbhouse Eastwick, brother of Eastwick, the member of the parliament was not the only open to protest against the British conquest of Sindh. James Outram, John Jacob, Pottinger and Buist were four others, who supported the Talpur cause. Captain William J. Eastwick was influenced by his brother. However, one of them had access to the British Government files in London.

Whether conquest of Sindh was justified from the Sindhian point of view or their British supporters; it was definitely justified from the view point of the British Empire. It had to take place some day and probably it was the most appropriate time. Had the British not annexed the Punjab and Sindh and waited longer, the Russians perhaps would have done it. International forces, not realized locally, had already been at work for more than half a century.

**Technological Gap.**

The Technological gap which started with the development of ships fitted with guns by the Portuguese and Spanish in the late 15$^{th}$ century and also with the development of hand guns gave Europeans a great advantage over the other nations. The age of Renaissance, which started in Europe in the 15$^{th}$ century was to lead to the freedom of thought and scientific thinking, and this type of thinking was not so developing in the East. Modern science and its applications too were developing in Europe from 16$^{th}$ century onwards. This gave Europeans advantages which were not at all perceived in the East.

Another major development was the break-through in the development of power, by use of energy in the fossil fuels; a lead which has continuously increased the economic and scientific gap day after day in the past two centuries, leaving the East behind. A few instances of technological advances until the British conquest of Sindh in 1843 AD were:-

1769 James Watt invented steam Engine. Each engine of 20 horse power working for eight hours was doing work of 160 men in a single shift. Steam engine could, if needed, work round the cloth, to replace 500 men, and the amount spent on its fuel was much below the salaries of a fraction of the displaced labor. Thus, it became cheap to produce articles in factories fitted with this power. The East was overnight turned into importer of the machine-made foreign goods.

1783 Balloon was successfully flow by heat energy of hot air in Paris, France.

1800 Volta, in Italy, invented battery, thereby producing electrical energy by chemical process.

1804 Invention of a locomotive by use of steam engine lead to the development of railways.

1807 Robert Fulton, an English man, built the first commercial passenger steam boat.

1821 Natural gas was developed and marketed near Fredonia (N.Y.,) in USA.

1829 An American named Joseph Henry, invented electric generator.

1837 Invention of reaper, by McCormick; steam shovel by Otis and telegraph by Morse were major contributions to farm mechanization, earth moving and communication technologies.

1843 Rail roads already expanding resulted in cheap handling of freight as well as passengers. By the time of the conquest of Sindh, England already was the leading country in technology in the world; a justification in it-self for control of the world economy.

**Secret Surveys.**

Yet another development necessitated by the plans to conquer more territories in India, was secret surveys and maps of other states. Surveys of the seas and the coasts as guide for seamen, goes back to the Greek times, but secretly producing maps of other States was started by the Portuguese and the Spanish in the 16th century. These were done mostly by triangulation and guess work, but detailed and actual measurement of land leading to the preparation of maps was started by the British soon after 1760 A.D.

For places like Sindh, where the British had less access, an ingenious device, like a wheel and with revolution counter (like Milo-meter in a car) was devised. Sometimes it was to form a part of a wheel-barrow, on which was fitted a magnetic compass and it also carried some baggage of the officers. The distances could be measured with the help of wheel with a certain amount of accuracy and direction was shown by compass as it changed en-route. The man pushing the wheel-barrow, had to keep a log at each change of direction of the route. With the help of such a simple device the British were able to carry out a large number of surveys of Sindh.

From these and many sources of other minor surveys, were prepared many maps of routes, as well as those of the whole Sindh. A map produced just after the conquest of Sindh in 1844 without any new surveys, appears to be almost like the modern map of Sindh, with the Indus, routes and towns and majority of them accurately placed, as on the modern maps.

This technological gap had left the unsuspecting Sindhi rulers, ignorant and helpless, before the already well established masters of the South Asia.

Heliograph a predecessor of telegraph for sending messages by flickering of lamp light at night and reflecting of sun's light by minors was already in operation between Sindh coast and Calcutta before 1843 AD and it was this heliograph which conveyed the message of Napier to Ellenborough PECCA VI, i.e., I have sinned, meaning there by having acquired 'Sind' or committed 'Sin' Spelling of Sindh.

Some note-worth of these are:-

| YEAR AD | OFFICIAL | R O U T E |
|---|---|---|
| 1808 | Seton | Mandavi to Hyderabad. |
| 1808 | Pottinger | Karachi to Thatta. |
| 1815 | Todd | Jaisalmir to Rohri. |
| 1827<br>1829<br>1831 | Masoon | Various routes from Karachi, Thano Bula Khan, Jhangara, Kambar and Uthal to Baluchistan. |
| 1828 | James Burnes | Bhooj to Hyderabad. |
| 1829 | Alexander Burnes | Nagar Parker, Rann of Kutch, Eastern mouth of the Indus. |
| 1931 | Del Hoste | Bhooj to Khairpur via Hyderabad and thence to Matiari, Hala, Sakrand, Nawabshah, Daur and Kot Lalu to Khairpur, returning via Larkana, Mehar, Kakar, Dadu and Sehwan, then along the Indus upto Hyderabad, and finally to Bhooj. |
| 1832<br>1833 | Alexander Burnes | From the mouth of the Indus to Lahore via the Indus. This was the most important survey of all, thus far under taken. |
| 1836 | Carless | Hyderabad to the Indus mouth, via the river and the whole Sindh Cost. He had already surveyed the Sindh Coast in 1817. |
| 1838 | N. Campbell | Hajamree, a mouth of the Indus to Hyderabad via Charo. |
| 1839<br>1840 | Quarter Master of Bombay Army's staff, accompanying Indus Army to | Hajamree to Sehwan. Hajamree to Soanmiani. Karachi to Sehwan and Sehwan to Jhal via the Indus, as well as different |
| 1839 | Margary | Karachi to Sehwan. |
| 1839 | John Jacob | Hyderabad to Nagar Parkar. |
| 1839<br>1840 | N. Campbell | Sehwan to Shikarpur. |
| 1839<br>1840 | Nott (Brig.) | The Punjab to Shikarpur via the river Indus and via Daharki-Ghotki and Sukkur route. |
| 1839<br>1840 | John Keenee | Karachi-Gharo to Shikarpur via the Western hills. |
| 1839<br>1840 | N. Campbell | Shikarpur to Kabul, via Bolan Pass. |
| 1840 | P.I.C. Messuer | Hyderabad to Barmir in Rajasthan. |
| 1840 | P.I.C. Mensuer | Gharo Creek. |
| 1841 | John Jacob | Deesa in Kutch, to Luhree in Kachi district of Baluchistan, via Nagar Parkar, Wagha-Bazar, and through Thar to Rohri, Again from there to Luhree via Khangarh. |
| 1843 January | John Jacob | Umerkot to Barmir. |

Sindh was spelled differently since 18th century. It was written as Scindy up to end of 18th century. From 1809 it became Scind. Delhoste wrote it as Sinde, a spelling which was followed up to 1850 when it turned in Scindh on all government records. The cumbersome spelling changed to Sindh in 1860, a correct version of the Sindhi spoken word, but too difficult for the British officials to pronounce and therefore by about 1880 they re-wrote it as Sind, a spelling which was standardized by the Hunter's Imperial Gazetteer of India in 1884. Eastwick had not used all the three different spellings, as current in his times; neither had his publishers taken notice of it. The most sympathetic speeches in favor of returning Sind to Talpur Amirs was printed by Smith Elder, London 1863. It contains the following speeches of W.J. Eastwick:-

(a) A speech delivered at the Court of Proprietors of the East India Stock, on 26th January, 1844, known as 'The Amir of Sind'.
(b) A speech delivered at Court of Proprietors of East India Stock, on 23rd March, 1853, known as 'The Sinde Question'.
(c) A speech delivered on the occasion of the Banquet at Manchester to Sir H. Pottinger, 'East India Company Services'.
(d) A speech delivered at the Court of Proprietors of East India Stock on 3rd June 1858. 'Sir James Outram's Services'.
(e) A speech delivered at the Court of Proprietors of the East India Stock on 25th August 1858. 'Sir John Lawrence's Services'.
(f) A speech delivered at an Adjourned special Court of Proprietors of the East India Stock, held at the India House on 20th January 1858.

All these writings formed part of papers put up before the Parliament on 'Sindh Affairs'. The subject was such debated and discussed over past 140 years and for further information the reader may refer to:-

(i) Lambrick, H.T. (1952), '*Charles Napier and Sind*', Oxford University Press, Oxford.
(ii) Huttenback, R.A., (1962), '*British Relations with Sind*, 1799-1843. A Dissection of Imperialism', Los Angeles, USA.
(iii) Therani, Kala, (1973), '*British Political Missions to Sind*', New Delhi.
(iv) Duarte, Ardian (Dr.), (1976), '*British Relations with Sind*', Karachi.

Original work of James Outram, '*The Conquest of Sind*': A commentary is also readily available in a reprint. '*Dry Leaves from Young Egypt*' gives conditions in Sindh as also Appeals of Talpurs to the Queen of England.

## SINDH AND ITS AMEERS[10]

## MARIANNE POSTANS.

People who look for only comfort and good cheer, with constant amusement on the way, would do better to study the history and geography of Sindh by means of travellers' records, than to venture a personal expedition on its classic river; for its dust- storms and its deserts are alike grievous to the eye, while the sterility of a misgoverned country afflicts the traveler, on whichever side his view may fall.

For myself, however, I have found considerable interest in Sindh; but this has been derived from an intimate acquaintance with the country, its princes and people; and the traits which I thought most characteristic I have endeavored to group together, for the purpose of affording to the reader, if possible, a *coup d' oeil* of this new country of our occupation.

The great feature in Sindh is, of course, its river; and although I have since voyaged upon the beautiful stream of Egypt, the Nile gives me no reason to alter my opinion, that the Indus is far the noblest river of the East.

During the inundations caused by the melting of the mountain snows, this great stream rushes furiously down from the magnificent range of the distant Himalayas to the sea, breaking down banks, whirling along trees, and in its mighty strength defying even the power of steam. The fisher, at this season, draws back appalled from its waves; and the native craft, rude and strong as it is, dare not oppose its currents. I have sailed on the Indus when the eye could not descry its banks, and when a body thrown on it was instantly dragged down by the power of its whirlpools, and seen no more; but the most remarkable instance I remember of this peculiar feature of the Indus, was on one occasion when I happened to be standing in the garden of the Sukkur residency. A crowd of people were crossing with horses and goats from the opposite bank of the river, when, suddenly a movement upset the boat; it was once only whirled round by the current, and in a moment more not a vestige remained of either it or its hapless occupants.

In the winter months, however, the stream is sluggish, calm, and placid; and on its bosom floats fearlessly the pullah fisherman, earnestly engaged in his vocation, or voyaging, it may be, to a neighbouring village. Few things in Sindh appear to the

[10] This article is taken from the book *"Travels, Tales, and Encounters in Sindh and Balochistan 1840-1843"* written by Marianne Postans. Marianne Postans was wife of Lt. Thomas Postans of Bombay Native Infantry; she accompanied her husband from 1833 to 1838 while he was posted in India, she wrote two books about her experience in India.

traveler so strange as this; and however often he may have voyaged upon the Indus, and consequently remarked these fishermen, he can never regard them without interest and curiosity. These fishers all live on the river banks, and farm it in tracts; they subsist their families on the proceeds of their toil, and procure them in the following way. Their chief property consists of an earthern vessel, and a coarse net fastened to a forked bamboo. On shore, the fisher carries this vessel on his head, and the net upon his shoulder, so that his implements do not incommode him much; but when at the river's edge, he casts the vessel, like bread upon the water, and himself on it, and strikes out into the midst of the stream. Here he expects his prey, and holds his net perpendicularly in the stream until he snares the fish; on which, taking it from the toil, he mercifully stabs it (which, after all, is more pitiful than suffering it to gasp forth its life on a cold marble slab), and drops it into the vessel, commencing sport anew. The pullah is a delicious fish, and the Sindhians broil it in a fashion calculated to tempt the most fastidious epicure to eat thereof; but, as a good Mahommedan, the fisher never rises from the water without smoothing his beard, and uttering a "Bismillah!" which sort of grace seems to entitle him to his feast.

It is very remarkable how fearless these people are when seated on this description of frail craft. I remember once to have been voyaging up the Indus in the Planet steamer', the rate at which we were going casting up mimic waves of no inconsiderable size, when, suddenly looking down, I saw a Sindhian not lying, but seated on the common earthen vessel, already within the influence of the steamer. There was not a particle of fear perceptible in the man's demeanor; but, on the contrary, he sat with folded arms and upturned face, smiling most knowingly at us, and shewing the finest teeth that could be imagined, for which he owed much, I fancy, to his river diet. The fishermen of the Indus are all a fine race, and their wives and daughters tall, robust, and often handsome; they share the toils of the men, and commonly steer the boats, which are sometimes their only home. The costume of these damsels is more picturesque, but not so graceful as that of the Hindoo women of India; they wear a bodice of cloth of various colours, sewn together in horizontal stripes, and decorated with bits of looking-glass, surrounded with embroidery, a somewhat scant petticoat, and a handkerchief which fastens across the head; but, instead of turning their faces to the wall with that provoking affectation of modesty so common in India, the Sindhian lady meets your gaze with a cheerful smile, and wishes you good morning as heartily, as if she were of the sex who inherit freedom as their birthright.

From the cheapness and abundance of turquois, which are brought to Sindh in large quantities from Persia, the women, even of the laboring class, use them as ornaments; and the contrast of the bright blue stone against the cheeks of these nut-brown maids is extremely pretty. They are favorites, too, from being considered, as they are in Egypt, preservatives against the evil eye.

The country of Lower Sindh, between Hyderabad and Kurrachee, is much more pleasing to the eye as seen from the river than that above; and this arises from the number of

hunting- grounds that skirt the banks; and as these form a very peculiar feature in Sindh, both as affects its scenery and people, I will endeavor to describe one that I visited, which will convey an idea of the whole, as they vary little but in size.

A thick fence surrounded a large forest of trees, brush and underwood, which extended to some distance from the river banks. Entering this by a small wicket, we proceeded along a narrow pathway, surrounded by dense foliage, which led to the centre of the hunting-ground. Here, between the trees, in an artificial space, appeared a small pool of clear, bright water, literally obscured by fowl of almost indescribable varieties; and from this, in various directions, numerous little avenues, and leading back among the tangled brushwood into the closest retirements of the forest. On one side was a small mud hut, open in front, in which sit the Ameers, surrounded by their retainers; the wood is then beaten from the confines towards the centre, when animals of almost every description—deer, wild hog, sambur, black buck, hares, and small game—rush pellmell down the avenues, and are fired on by the matchlocks of the princes and their huntsmen.

So infatuated are the Ameers with this their favorite sport, that they pursue it madly on all occasions, and the finest portions of the country are overgrown by hunting-forests. All are situated on the banks of the river; and to gain them, the princes embark in their jumpties, or state pleasure-barges, which transport themselves and their retainers to any hunting-ground they may select. These jumpties are excessively gay and picturesque; they have pavilions, covered with crimson embroidered cloth, to shelter the princes and their friends; are adorned with numerous flags, and commonly crowded with Belooche and Affghan retainers, whose many-hued attire, mingled with the brightly- coloured caps of the Sindhians, is singularly gay in its general effect. And then the jumpti itself is a long rakish-looking craft, carrying two sails, and so fast under a fair wind, that not even the Greek caique could skim more swiftly along the waters. Nor is minstrelsy wanting to increase the royal luxury, for the eastern drum sounds from its decks with the warrior song of the wild Beloochee.

The Ameers appear never to be manageable except on these excursions; and whenever a matter of serious import is proposed to them, they uniformly interrupt the preface by an invitation to a hunting-ground, and there, between the reports of matchlocks and the wild shouts of the huntsmen, discuss the most important affairs of state. The expense of these establishments is of course enormous; and I was assured that every head of game killed in the hunting forests cost the Ameers fifty pounds and this without reference to the value of the land, if otherwise employed.

Although, in India, I have seen the gentle inmates of the harems peep through the lattices of their cages to see wrestling and buffalo fights, the ladies of the lords of Sindh are never suffered to share in the pleasures of the chase; but are constrained to remain in the fort of Hyderabad, amusing themselves with the costly, though barbaric toys purchased from the Cabool merchants. Of these I was once shewn the magnificent posts

of a charpoi, or native bedstead, intended for the palace; they were each about a foot in height, and incrusted with precious stones, emeralds, and rubies; the value of each was estimated at two hundred guineas. The wives of Meer Nusseer Khan and Meer Sohrab the principal Ameers, are Beloochee women, and said to be remarkably handsome, but I found it quite impossible to obtain an entrance into the harem for the purpose of judging for myself. Meer Nusseer Khan is a handsome man, possessing remarkably dignified and courteous manners, but his character is firm, and his affection for our rule but slight; his son, also, is a fine lad, who has already made some progress in the acquirement of the English language.

Of all the princes of Sindh, however, I was most charmed with Meer Ali Moorad of Khyrpore, who is the very *beau-ideal* of a strong-hearted and independent chief. He is "the last of the barons"—the only one of all the Sindhian rulers, who, consistent in his independence from first to last, refused all connection with the British as allies, and held his own strongholds calmly but sternly, alike uninfluenced by either our threats or our promises.

On one occasion we had encamped on the opposite side of the river to the forts of Ali Moorad, and in the midst of some fine hunting-grounds, when the prince announced his intention of crossing the Indus to meet us, and do the honors of his preserves. For three days after this declaration of his highness's will, the Indus, at the usual ferry, was literally covered with boats and rafts, laden with the retainers, the huntsmen, the horses, matchlocks, tents, dogs, and sporting material of the Meer, and, last of all, with much labour, was brought over the hunting-elephant, with his howdah and chains, and driver and cook,—a large boat-load of themselves. The day succeeding this arrangement, the Meer and his immediate followers appeared, and rode to the encampment prepared for their reception, about a mile from our own.

The Ameer's tent was remarkably splendid; it was made wholly of bright crimson cloth, richly embroidered, and surrounded with an outer wall, to keep off the people. The interior was decorated with hanging lamps, rich Persian carpets, and large cushions of purple velvet, worked with seed-pearls and gold; while the entrances were sentinelled with a body guard, dressed in a uniform similar to that worn by the soldiers of the Punjab, with English muskets, and in every way well appointed. At some distance from the tent, bodies of horsemen had picketed their steeds, whose gay crimson housings lay in strange confusion on the ground, mixed up with swords and spears, matchlocks and hubble-bubbles (pipes).

There were, on this occasion, some six hundred of the Ameer's followers, the majority of them Beloochees and Affghans. These worthies, who receive but nominal wages as retainers of the prince, are billeted on the villages, they and their horses; a measure by no means satisfactory, I should think, either to the goats or fowls, neither to the owners of the corn fields.

The day after his arrival, when the Meer himself Moslem as he is, had recruited with a certain, or rather an uncertain, quantity of Curacoa, and the elephant had devoured an incredible number of grain-cakes, to the infinite recreation of the village children, it was announced that Meer Ali Moorad would commence his sports by the attack of a tigress and cubs that had shewn themselves in the neighbourhood, and been tracked by the huntsmen. As we had been requested to accompany him, however, his highness expressed his intention of paying me a visit of ceremony on his way.

Our suite of tents was sufficiently commodious, but we were desirous of throwing as much pomp and dignity round the occasion as possible, and consequently spread forth all the Persian rugs in our possession, grouped guns, swords, pistols and daggers in every direction, put half-a-dozen more rickety chairs in stately rows than there was really room for, inasmuch as the self-satisfaction of an Asiatic always rises in exact proportion to the height of his seat, and a man of the same rank will feel grossly insulted if he is put on a cushion while his friend occupies a chair, and these arrangements satisfactorily made, we had but to cause the sepoy guard to form an avenue in front, and the most roaring horses to be saddled and brought forward, when all was declared in the most satisfactory order for receiving Meer Ali Moorad, the Beloochee chieftain of Dejee.

The word "punctuality," to an Asiatic, merely conveys to him the idea of something he is bound to break; and, therefore, when Ali Moorad sent to say he would be with us punctually at eleven, we of course knew that he would arrive about two; and, as we expected, about that time a tremendous shouting was heard, with the discharge of match and some five hundred armed and mounted men, accoutred equally for the war or for the chase—with spears glancing brightly in the sunlight, flags floating on the breeze, the hawks jingling loudly their silver bells on the woodman's wrist—dashed over fence and brushwood into the inclosure that surrounded our tents. After shouting forth the prince's titles, the retainers of his highness backed their snorting, rearing, but well-trained horses, leaving the Meer, with his favorite attendants, as a sort of tableaux, in the centre of the group. The Meer then dismounted, and our sepoys presented arms.

One trait among Asiatics has always excited my admiration and surprise; it is, their extreme courteousness of demeanor, and their possession of a politeness of manner, which we consider in England to be only acquired by constant intercourse with good society. Thus Meer Ali Moorad, who had never seen an Englishwoman in his life, and had associated with none but the wildest and most warlike of the tribes about him—whose life was passed in sallies from his fort, or in sports of the field— now entered my tent, and paid his compliments to me with the air and grace of the most finished courtier.

The Meer is a fine-looking man, about forty years of age, and was splendidly dressed in a lilac satin robe, confined round his waist with a scarf of gold thread, a similar fabric forming his turban. A gold and green embroidered strap crossed his shoulder, and

supported a diamond-hilted sword; while several daggers and knives, richly gemmed, appeared above the folds of his girdle.

An Asiatic's salutation is a much more laboured affair than the English "*How d'ye do?*" for their leisure gives them time to be polite, and they use it at length. Thus, as soon as Meer Ali Moorad was seated, he asked us, one after the other, if we were "*well, quite well, better than usual?*" And being satisfactorily assured that we could be no otherwise in the presence of his highness, he returned to the charge, and put round the same questions again, in the same rotation, a second and third time. This over, his favorites entered and sat round him—a strange, wild-looking, splendidly-attired set of Patan warriors; and then the discourse fell on guns and horses, and flint-locks and percussion, until the Meer, calling me his sister, and presenting me with a pair of Cashmere shawls worked in gold, expressed his desire to proceed to the chase; whereon all the people, who had been feeding their roaring steeds on the ripe ears of corn in the adjoining field, mounted in haste, and with a tremendous clatter of carbines and iron stirrups, brought their horses, rearing, plunging, and kicking, to the front again; and we all stood, bridle in hand, until the Meer had mounted, and his titles and virtues had been duly shouted forth; whereon, midst a cloud of dust that nearly obscured our horses' heads, we also found our saddles, and joined the Meer.

Some four miles' riding brought us to the ground to which the tigress and her cubs had been tracked; and we here found that a species of mud tower had been erected, in which we were, with inglorious safety, to watch the proceedings of the huntsmen. These unfortunates, who are paid, like the driver of an, elephant, a certain monthly salary, in consideration of the probable chance of their forming a first course for their noble game, were aided by a large number of yet more unfortunate Sindhians, who, without any inducement at all but the prince's will, had been dragged from their fields, armed with a sword and club, and promoted to the duty of doing battle with the tigress. Leashes of huge powerful Affghan dogs were then brought forward; the lair of the tigress surrounded by beaters of drums, shrill pipers, and armed men; the dogs were slipped, and the battle commenced. The tigress, with a loud roar, burst forth, followed by her cubs, to meet their enemies; and dogs, sword and matchlock men, villagers and huntsmen, surrounded their prey, and commenced the attack. The height of the reeds and brushwood prevented our seeing more than the heads of the hunters, and now and then the bright sleek back of the tigress; but her infuriated roar told us that she was making a noble defence, which ended, however, in a shout of victory, and the fall of her own and the mangled bodies of her cubs The dogs were dragged off, panting and wounded; and an unfortunate villager, whose face and eye had been fearfully torn in his battle with one of the cubs, was brought forward to the foot of our tower, his face streaming with blood, and his appearance betraying great agony. The Meer commended his courage, and directed him to approach him. From this order, I expected at least that the prince purposed to present him with money, make him huntsman, or remunerate the poor creature in some substantial way or other, for his misery and pain. However, as

soon as he approached, Ali Moorad turned round, snatched from the dirty shoulders of a matchlock-man a scarf composed of about three yards of coarse blue cotton, and threw it to the villager as his recompense, when the man retreated from the presence; and the people commended the generous condescension of the prince, in giving away what did not belong to him, with as much fervour as if he had bestowed on the wounded man a dress of brocade, and made him governor of a province.

The Sindhians are a grave, sad people, and the sound of dancing, the voice of music, is seldom heard among them. It would be strange, however, were it otherwise, where life is held as nought when its loss may contribute to the ruler's pastimes; where the ground, which should yield corn to the husbandman and fruit to the planter, is overrun with rank weeds and thorny bushes, to shelter wild and dangerous beasts; and where the villager tills his field with his sword by his side, and the grain-seller stands with his matchlock in his hand in the market-place, to guard his property from robbery by the prince's followers.

The battle against the tigress having ended, we returned to our tents, where, in the prophet had never taken the trouble to form a religion at all.

In common, however, with the lowest of their subjects, the princes are fearfully superstitious, and therefore it was that Meer Ali Moorad directed that the bones of the tigress should be preserved in his fort of Dejee, to protect it in case of attack, and to save its inhabitants from the evil eye, disease, and death.

If one were to class man as he is in the East, it would certainly be as a talking animal, so unwearyingly do the people indulge in the privilege of speech; and, therefore, around our tent sat groups over huge fires, the evening of the chase, talking the battle over, and eulogizing their personal feats.

An Asiatic never fails to make the most of his prowess, and so was it on this occasion; but the most horrible vain-boasting was made by our moonshee, the veriest coward on earth, and yet desirous of being thought a perfect Roostum This man, the moment the tigress appeared, I saw snatch up his matchlock, and rush in the agony of fear through the thicket, losing his turban by the way; he was now telling a most attentive party, his listeners, that he had been foremost when the tigress rose from her lair; that he stood firm, and fixed his eye on hers, to awe the brute, but that she struck, with one blow of her vast paw, the turban from his head, and bounded past him. No one dared to doubt this story of the valiant speaker's, for everyone would have told a tale too similar; and, therefore, approbation was expressed by a general "*Shah bash*" (well done!), and the narrator twisted his moustache with an air of perfect triumph.

In a few days the curse of the Meer's presence was withdrawn from the thoroughly-sacked villages around us, and we accompanied him to Sukkur, one of the prettiest spots

on the river; it is now the headquarters of our troops in Sindh, and will continue so, it is said, as "Victoria on the Indus." In time, therefore, we may hope that the hunting-forests of the Ameers may be changed to fields rich in produce, and the gay jumpties, no longer bristling with the swords and matchlocks of the retainers who desolate the country, may be devoted to the pastimes of princes, peaceful and wise of rule.

## AFFAIRS IN SINDH[11]

## BY WILLIAM HOUGH

There had been treaties made with the Ameers in Sindh on the 22nd August, 1809, and on the 9th November, 1820.[12] The East India Company had a factory at Tatta in 1751.[13] On the 20th April, 1832, a treaty was entered into between the East India Company and the government of Hyderabad in Sindh; and a supplementary treaty on the 22nd April, 1332, with Meer Roostum, of Khyrpoor,[14] regarding the navigation of the river Indus, and the levying of tolls or duties on the transit of merchandise. On 23rd December, 1834, a commercial treaty with the government of Hyderabad[15] was entered into, regulating the tolls on boats, instead of duties on goods, as the latter plan involved delay, and the examination of the goods. On the 20th April, 1838, a treaty was entered into with the Ameers of Sindh, to use our good offices to adjust the differences subsisting between the Ameers of Sindh and Runjeet Sing, the ruler of Lahore; and also, that an accredited British minister should reside at the court of Hyderabad.[16] In 1839, a treaty with the four Ameers of Hyderabad was entered into;[17] by Article xi. of which, it was declared that no toll was to be levied on trading boats passing up or down the river Indus within the territories of the Ameers of Hyderabad; thus rendering the navigation of that river *free* to everyone. By Article ii., a British force was to be maintained in Sindh, and stationed at Tatta, "or such other place westward of the river Indus as the Governor-general may select. The Governor-general will decide upon the strength of this force, which it is not intended shall exceed five thousand fighting men."[18] By Article x., the Company's rupee was to be the currency of Sindh, it being of equal value with the Bakkroo or Timooree rupee, the currency of Sindh[19] Before the expedition to Cabool marched from Ferozepoor in December 1838, it had been settled with the Ameers of Sindh, that the British troops were to march through that country, and the possession of the fort of Bukkur was afterwards obtained from the Ameer of Khyrpoor, by treaty, to be held by the British during the operations in Affghanistan. It was required as a depot. When Sir W. Cotton arrived at Rohree in January 1839, Sir J. Keane and the Bombay troops were moving up from Kurrachee, towards Hyderabad. The treaty of 1839 had not been signed by the Ameers, and as large bodies of the Beloochees were assembled, and assembling at that

[11] This article is taken from a book "*Political and Military Events in British India, from the years 1756 to 1849*" Written by: William Hough, published in 1853.
[12] Sindh "*Blue Book*," 1838-43, p. 1.
[13] Hamilton's Gazetteer and authorities.
[14] "*Blue Book*," pp. 2 and 3
[15] "*Blue Book*," p. 4.
[16] "*Blue Book*," p. 5.
[17] Treaties with Sindh, p. 6, No. 8.
[18] Three lakhs rupees were to be yearly paid by three of the Ameers.
[19] There was an intention to have a rupee of equal value all over India. It took place in 1835.

capital, a brigade of the Bengal troops made seven marches towards Hyderabad; when, hearing of the treaty having been signed, we returned to Sukkur, to prepare to move on to the Bolan Pass en route to Candahar.

On the 4th November, 1842, a year after the outbreak at Cabool (2nd November), "a draft of a treaty between the Ameers of Hyderabad and the British government was prepared :—

By Article 2. The Company's rupee was to become the only coin legally current in the dominions of the ameers, after the 1st January, 1845.[20]

By Article 5. The Ameers renounced the privilege of coining money.[21]

The 6th Article relates to the cutting of wood for the steamers navigating the Indus.

By Article 7. Kurrachee and Tatta were to be ceded to the British government, and a free passage between Kurrachee and Tatta.

By Article 8. Subzulkot,[22] and the territory between the present frontier of Bahawulpoor and the town of Rohree, are ceded to his Highness of Bahawulpoor, "the ever faithful ally and friend of the British government."

Sir W. Napier says,[23] the Sindhian princes "were again excited by Nott's advance from Candahar; they judged it a forced abandonment of that important city, and though he afterwards destroyed Ghuznee, and, in conjunction with Pollock, ruined Istalif and Cabool, the apparently hurried retreat from Afghanistan which followed, bore, for the misjudging people, the character of a flight. It was viewed as a proof of weakness, and Baluchis and Brahooes became more hopeful and more confident than before. The Ameers of Upper and Lower Sindh consulted together, how best to league against the Feringhees; Seik vakeels were at Khyrpoor, ready to start for Lahore, loaded with presents for the Maharaja; and at the same time, letters came from the victorious Affghans, reminding the Ameers that they were feudatories of the Doonaree empire, and exhorting them to act boldly in the common cause. These things led to the Ameer's final destruction; they were the forerunners of the battle by which they fell; but their primary cause, it has been shown, was deeper seated. The Sindhian war was no isolated event. "*It was the tail of the Affghan storm.*"[24]

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[20] The date of the coinage of the Company's rupee throughout our Indian possessions.
[21] The act of coining is the right of the sovereign of a country.
[22] Which had been taken from the Nawab by the Ameers.
[23] "*Conquest of Sindh*," part i. p. 111,
[24] It is a mistake to suppose that the army going to Cabool, could have proceeded altogether through the Punjab. Sir C. M. Wade, and the Sikh Mahommedan troops, went by that route. But even, on our return from Cabool with Lord Keane (October 1839), four months after Runjeet Sing's death, the Sikh chiefs made great objections to our passage through their country. It was the subject of negotiation, as our convoys were often leaving our provinces for Cabool. Besides, the Sindh treaty had not been signed.

Our reverses had, no doubt, induced the Ameers of Sindh to expect our defeat in other quarters. Meer Roostum, of Khyrpoor, wrote to Meer Nusseer Khan, of Hyderabad, on the 21st October, 1842:—"I have received your friendly letter,[25] together with the Koran,[26] in which was written the agreement, bearing your seal, relative to war or peace, as it might happen, with the British, Sikhs, and others; they came safely to hand, by Mahomed Khan, Talpoor, and Moolla Buchal, your confidential messengers. The purport being, that I was to accept and approve of the Koran (containing the written compact), and to send one in return[27]; they also gave me your verbal message, and I was much pleased." "Not to place dependence upon them (our brothers), but to exert yourself in entertaining sepoys, and men of the Belooch tribe. Now is the time, whatever it may cost," &c.

The Bombay troops must have gone by the Bolan "Pass and Candahar. The danger of invasion is not via Cabool, but by the route via Herat, Candahar, and Sindh.

Proposed agreement between Meer Roostum Khan and Meer Nusseer Khan.[28] "If Meer Nusseer Khan should be opposed by his brothers of Hyderabad, or any chiefs or rulers (but especially by the British Feringhees), I, Meer Roostum, will, without hesitation, come to his assistance with my brothers, sons, and the whole tribe." "I, Meer Roostum, will have no regard for life or death, prosperity or ruin, but will join Meer Nusseer with all my forces, without any dread of the consequences." Meer Roostum had formally and publicly resigned, and placed the turban on the head of Ali Moorad, his younger brother.[29] At last, Meer Roostum fled to Hyderabad.

Emaum Ghur in the desert.—In January, 1843, Sir C. Napier selected two hundred irregular cavalry, put three hundred and fifty of the 22nd Queen's regiment on camels, loaded ten more with provisions, eighty with water, and marched to take Emaum Ghur, having a garrison of four times his numbers, well provided.[30] The skirts of the waste swarming with thousands of Belooch horsemen. He took the fortress and then blew it up. The Duke of Wellington said in the House of Lords,—"Sir Charles Napier's march upon Emaum Ghur, is one of the most curious military feats which I have ever known to be performed, or have ever perused an account of in my life. He moved his troops through the desert against hostile forces; he had his guns transported under circumstances of extreme difficulty, and in a manner the most extraordinary, and he cut off a retreat of the enemy which rendered it impossible for them ever to regain their positions."

[25] "Blue Book," p. 430, Appendix, No. 382.
[26] Writing an agreement or treaty, &c. in the Mahomedan bible is held most sacred.
[27] Such are sent, when writing letters is considered dangerous. The returned Koran is a proof of the acceptance of the agreement.
[28] "*Blue Book*," p. 431, No. 883.
[29] "*Conquest of Sindh*," part ii. p. 475, December 1842.
[30] "*Conquest of Sindh*," part ii. p. 237 to 241. "He forced Ali Morad and the native guide to go with him."

The treaty of the 4th of November, 1842, (before alluded to) was signed and sealed on the evening of the 14th of February, 1843; [31] but on the 15th, Major Outram, was attacked at the residency near Hyderabad, by eight thousand men and six guns. Major Outram,[32] after a gallant defence, went on board a steamer with his escort, and joined the army under Major-general Sir C. Napier.

Battle of Meeanee, 17th of February, 1843.— Sir Charles Napier heard of the account of the attack on Major Outram, at Hala. On the 16th of February,[33] Sir Charles marched to Muttare. "Having ascertained that the Ameers were in position at Meeanee (ten miles distance) to the number of twenty-two thousand men; and well knowing that a delay for reinforcements, would both strengthen their confidence and add to their numbers, already seven times that which I commanded, I resolved to attack them, and we marched at four a. m., on the morning of the 17th. At eight o'clock the advanced guard discovered their camp; at nine we formed in order of battle, about two thousand eight hundred men of all arms and twelve pieces of artillery. We were now within range of the enemy's guns, and fifteen pieces of artillery opened upon us, and were answered by our cannon. The enemy were very strongly posted; woods were on their flanks, which I did not think could be turned. These two woods were joined by the dry bed of the river Fulaillee, which had a high bank. The bed of the river was nearly straight, and about twelve hundred yards in length. Behind this, and in both woods were the enemy posted. In front of their extreme right, and on the edge of the wood, was a village. Having made the best examination of their position, which so short a time permitted, the artillery was posted on the right of the line, and some skirmishers of infantry with the Sindh irregular horse, were sent in front, to try and make the enemy show his force more distinctly, we then advanced from the right in echelon of battalions, refusing the left to save it from the fire of the village. The 9th Bengal light cavalry formed the reserve in rear of the left wing; and the Poona horse, together with four companies of infantry, guarded the baggage. In this order of battle we advanced, as at a review, across a fine plain, swept by the cannon of the enemy. The artillery, and her Majesty's 22nd regiment in line, formed the leading echelon; the 25th native infantry, the 2nd; the 12th native infantry, the 3rd; and the 1st grenadier native infantry, the 4th.

"The enemy was one thousand yards from our line, which soon traversed the intervening space. Our fire of musketry opened at about one hundred yards from the bank, in reply to that of the enemy, and in a few minutes the engagement became general along the bank of the river, on which the combatants fought, for about three hours or more with great fury, man to man. Then, my lord, was seen the superiority of the musket and bayonet over the sword and shield, and matchlock. The brave Beloochees, first discharging their matchlocks and pistols, dashed over the bank with desperate resolution, but down went these bold and skilful swordsmen under the

[31] "*Blue Book*," p. 505.
[32] "*Blue Book*," p. 509.
[33] "*Blue Book*," p, 511, No. 473 Despatch. "*Conquest of Sindh*," part ii. p. 305.

superior power of the musket and bayonet. At one time, my lord, the courage and numbers of the enemy against the 22nd, the 25th, and the 12th regiments, bore heavily in that part of the battle. There was no time to be lost, and I sent orders to the cavalry to force the right of the enemy's line. This order was very gallantly executed by the 9th Bengal cavalry[34] and the Sindh horse, the details of which shall be afterwards stated to your lordship, for the struggle on our right and centre was, at that moment, so fierce, that I could not go to the left. In this charge the 9th light cavalry took a standard and several pieces of artillery, and the Sindh horse took the enemy's camp, from which a vast body of their cavalry slowly retired, fighting. Lieutenant Fitzgerald gallantly pursued them for two miles, and, I understand, slew three of the enemy in single combat. The brilliant conduct of these two cavalry regiments, in my opinion, was the crisis of the action, for, from the moment the cavalry were seen in the rear of their right flank, the resistance of our opponents slackened; the 22nd regiment forced the bank, the 25th and 12th did the same, the latter regiment capturing several guns, and the victory was decided. The artillery made great havoc among the dense masses of the enemy, and dismounted several of their guns. The whole of the enemy's artillery, ammunition, standards, and camp, with considerable stores, and some, treasure, were taken."

[34] Before the order arrived, Captain (now major) A. Tucker, 9th light cavalry, had urged Colonel Pattle to move to turn the enemy's right flank, and charge their rear, with the view of checking their advance. Colonel Pattle did not, at first, like to take upon himself the responsibility, but at last did, and the corps was moving off when Sir Charles's aide-decamp came up. The author has Colonel Pattle's own statement in his possession, and has seen an official letter from a brigade major regarding the case. The dispatch had been sent off before the statement was communicated.

## LIST OF KILLED AND WOUNDED

| | Officers | MEN | Horses |
|---|---|---|---|
| 9th light cavalry, killed | 1 | 3 | 9 |
| 9th light cavalry, wounded | 5 | 29 | 35 |
| Sindh horse, killed | 0 | 0 | 23 |
| Sindh horse, wounded | 0 | 17 | 21 |
| 2nd company 2nd battalion camel battery, wounded | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| 3rd company 3rd battalion Golundaze horse and mule battery, killed | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| 3rd company 3rd battalion Golundaze horse and mule battery, wounded | 0 | 2 | 4 |
| C. company Madras sappers and miners, wounded | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| Her Majesty's 22nd regiment, killed | 1 | 23 | 0 |
| Her Majesty's 22nd regiment, wounded | 5 | 49 | 0 |
| 1st grenadier regiment native infantry, killed | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| 1st grenadier regiment native infantry, wounded | 0 | 4 | 0 |
| 12th regiment native infantry, killed | 3 | 12 | 0 |
| 12th regiment native infantry, wounded | 2 | 45 | 0 |
| 25th regiment native infantry, killed | 1 | 16 | 0 |
| 25th regiment native infantry, wounded | 2 | 28 | 0 |
| Staff, wounded | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Staff, killed | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Total .. .. .. .. | 21 | 233 | 95 |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Killed .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 6 | 56 | 33 |
| Wounded .. .. .. .. .. | 16 | 177 | 62 |
| Grand total .. .. .. .. .. | 22 | 233 | 95 |

### *Officers Killed.*

- Lieutenant-brevet Captain Adjutant Cookson, 9th Bengal light cavalry.
- Captain Tew, his Majesty's 22nd.
- Brevet-Major Jackson, 12th Bombay native infantry.
- Brevet-Captain Meade, 12th Bombay native infantry.
- Lieutenant Wood, 12thBombay native infantry.
- Major Teesdale, 25th Bengal native infantry.

### *Officers Wounded.*

- Captain A. Tucker, 9th light cavalry.
- Brevet-Captain S. Smith, 9th light cavalry.
- Lieutenant H.G.C. Plowden, 9th light cavalry.

- Ensign J. H. Firth, 39th native infantry.
- Lieutenant-colonel J. L. Pennefather, her Majesty's 22nd regiment.
- Captain Conway, her Majesty's 22nd regiment.
- Lieutenant F. P. Harding, her Majesty's 22nd regiment.
- Ensign R. Pennefather, her Majesty's 22nd regiment.
- Ensign H. Bowden, her Majesty's 22nd regiment.
- Ensign Holbrow, 12th native infantry.
- Lieutenant Quarter-master Phayre, 25th native infantry.
- Lieutenant Bourdillon, 25th native infantry.
- Major Wyllie, assistant-adjutant-general.

"Meer Roostum Khan, Meer Nusseer Khan, and Meer Wullee Mahomed, of Khyrpoor, Meer Nusseer Khan, Meer Shadad Khan, and Meer Hoossein Khan, all of Hyderabad," surrendered themselves as prisoners of war in Sir Charles's camp.

The enemy's force was said to be twenty-five thousand eight hundred and sixty-two.[35] The British force two thousand four hundred, deducting two hundred men with Major Outram. But only one thousand seven hundred and eighty were said to be engaged, as the Poona horse and four companies of infantry guarded the baggage. In extreme cases even a baggage guard may be called into action. It appears that on the 25th of December, 1842,[36] the late Shah Shoojah's regiments, and 19th Bengal native infantry, under the command of Brigadier Wallace, left Rohree en route to Ferozepoor. The Governor-general, on the 24th of November, 1842, wrote to Sir Charles—" If you should not have detained the brigade, under Lieutenant-colonel Wallace, it would be desirable to recall it, or at least to halt it, upon making your demands.[37] I am very desirous of effecting our purpose without bloodshed, and the presence of a preponderating force may enable us to do this." Sir W. Napier says,[38] "On the 14th of February the Ameers sent messengers to Major Outram, commanding him to be gone; for they now perceived their hope to get the general into their hands was illusive, and they desired to push the troops at the residency into the confusion of embarkation, that they might attack them to advantage." Major Outram, whether he expected hostilities or not, "had sent orders to stop the 41st regiment, then on its way to Kurrachee, to embark for Bombay (they had not reached Tatta); thus taking upon himself to interfere with a positive order of the Governor-general, which directed that regiment to embark immediately.[39] Major Clibborn writes,[40] on the 24th of November, 1842—"Futteh Mahomed Ghoree[41] goes occasionally to the

[35] "*Conquest of Sindh*," part iii. p. 504, Appendix.
[36] "*Blue Book*,"1 p. 481.
[37] "*Blue Book*," p. 458, par. 7. The new treaty had not been signed.—He had been allowed to retain them. "*Conquest of Sindh*," part i. p. 140.
[38] "*Conquest of Sindh*," part ii. p. 288.
[39] It has been said that Sir Charles could not stop the 41st foot on their way down the Indus. He was only a few miles from the bank of the river, and a sum of money, in India, will always induce some one to take a letter anywhere.
[40] "*Blue Book*," p. 461. Intelligence from Sindh.
[41] Prime minister of Meer Roostum.

servants of Colonel Pattle, 9th cavalry, to pump out the intentions of the English. He writes to Meer Roostum to be under no apprehension, as the Bengal regiments are certainly to leave for Ferozepoor in a few days hence." On the other hand, Mahomed Shah "writes daily for Meer Nusseer Khan's information, to warn them to be on their guard, as the English will certainly bear down on them at Khyrpoor, and that there is no intention of the troops moving on to Ferozepoor." Sir Charles also knew that by delay, even to the 18th of February, the Ameers counted on having sixty thousand fighting men.[42] Sir Charles had left troops under Colonel Roberts at Sukkur. Why then send away Lieutenant-colonel Wallace's force? The district granted to him might have been made over to the Khan of Bhawulpoor, after the treaty had been signed and affairs had been settled.

Shere Mahomed, of Meerpoor,[43] was within six miles of the battle of Meanee, intending to have joined on the 18th of February. Sir W. Napier says it was an error not to attack Shere Mahomed. "It produced another terrible battle, and went nigh to cause the destruction of the army." Sir Charles took possession of Hyderabad. That gave him a strong position.[44] He applied for reinforcements, and Lord Ellenborough sent more troops as soon as he heard a rumor of the battle of Meanee from a native source. Of the battle of Meanee the Duke of Wellington said,[45] "He gained the camp of the enemy, got possession of his guns, and obtained the most complete victory, taking up a position in which he was not again likely to be attacked. Not only did he secure Hyderabad, and the portion of the Indus which lay in his rear; he brought up reinforcement, and placed himself at the head of a stronger army than that which he commanded before the battle. He manifested all the discretion and ability of an officer familiar with the most difficult operations in war." It has been said that Sir Charles acknowledged he committed an error in sending away the Bengal troops.

### *Annexation of Sindh:*

Sir W. Napier says,[46] "*It was perplexing at first to decide how the Ameers were to be treated, and this perplexity impeded the measures necessary for the security of the army; were they prisoners of war, or deposed princes? The battle had altered the political relations between them, as sovereign princes and the Anglo-Indian government. It was no longer a question of enforcing a new treaty. They had appealed to the sword, and were, by defeat, placed at the mercy of their conquerors. How would the Governor-general treat them? This question was decided on the 12th of March, twenty-four days after the action of Meanee. Lord Ellenborough, by proclamation, annexed Sindh to the British possessions in the east, and the Ameers were to be sent captives to Bombay*."

[42] "*Conquest of Sindh*," part ii. pp. 293, 304.
[43] "*Conquest of Sindh*," part ii. pp. 324, 326
[44] Five hundred men reserved for a garrison. He then ordered down the troops from Sukkur.
[45] "*Conquest of Sindh*," p. 330. Speech; debate on the vote of thanks.
[46] "*Conquest of Sindh*," p. 334.

The battle of Dubba, four miles from Hyderabad, 24th of March, 1843.-—Shere Mahomed, of Meerpoor, was at the head of about twenty- five thousand men.[47] He had threatened to "Cabool the English." At break of day, on the 24th of March, five thousand fighting men were under arms in front of the British camp;[48] of these, one thousand one hundred were cavalry, and there were nineteen guns, five being horse artillery. Two pieces were left to defend the camp, seventeen remained with the army. Dubba is eight miles north-west of Hyderabad. The enemy had twenty-five thousand men and fifteen guns, eleven of which were in battery. Two lines of infantry were entrenched, and behind them a heavy mass of cavalry in reserve. Their right rested on the Fullaillee, the bed of which, though generally dry, had at that point a large pond of mud protecting the flank, and beyond the nullah was a thick shikargah, which prevented the position being turned. Another nullah there was to the rear of the former, forming an obtuse angle to the front line, and there the left of the enemy's army was posted. Thus the true front of battle extended from the right, for one mile perpendicularly to the Fullaillee, presenting, what may be termed, the right wing and centre to an attack ; but the left wing, behind the second nullah, was refused. All the cavalry were behind the left in one great mass; and behind the right wing stood the village of Dubba or Naraja. Between the first line of the right and centre and the village of Dubba was a second nullah. Both had ramps for advancing or retreating. The enemy's second line was placed near the second and largest nullah, behind which were the enemy's guns. He had cleared the low jungle in front of his line.

The British force marched from Hyderabad in column and formed line, but the left was too near the right of the enemy's line.[49] This was afterwards remedied by throwing the left back a little. The cavalry were on the flanks, and the artillery, in the intervals, between the regiments. Then, the right was a little refused; for there was a wood towards that flank. Sir Charles expected an attack from that quarter, and threw forward the cavalry of that wing. He found that the enemy outflanked him on the right about half a mile, and still had their cavalry in reserve. But he could not see the double lines and nullahs containing their centre and right. Dubba appeared empty. Major Waddington, engineers, and Lieutenants Brown and Hill, rode close up to the centre of the Beloochee position, and along the front to the junction of the centre with the left. They thus forced the enemy to show his first line for two-thirds of its extent. Several of the ramps for passing the nullah were discovered. Sir Charles[50] "put his troops in motion to attack; preserving here, as at Meanee, the *echelon* order, and hoping by his promptness to gain, not only the nullah at its junction with the Fullaillee, but to pass it, and seize the village of Dubba also, before the Beloochs could arrive there in force." Sir Charles, in his dispatch,[51] says, "The British line advanced in *echelons* from the left, her Majesty's 22nd

[47] "*Conquest of Sindh*," p. 339. Sir W. Napier says twenty-five thousand to forty thousand men. Page 354 gives twenty-six thousand men.
[48] "*Conquest of Sindh*," p. 375.
[49] "*Conquest of Sindh*," p. 379.
[50] "*Conquest of Sindh*," p. 382.
[51] "*Annual Register*," 1843, p. 353, History.

regiment leading the attack. The enemy was now perceived to move from his centre, in considerable bodies, to the left, apparently retreating, unable to sustain the cross fire of the British artillery; on seeing which, Major Stack,[52] at the head of the 3rd cavalry, under command of Captain Delamain, and the Sindh horse, under the command of Captain Jacob, made a charge upon the enemy's left flank, crossing the nullah, and cutting down the retreating enemy for several miles.[53] While this was passing on the right, her Majesty's 22nd regiment, gallantly led by Major Poole, who commanded the brigade, and Captain George, who commanded the corps, attacked the nullah on the left with great gallantry." They "marched up till within forty paces of the entrenchment, and then stormed it like British soldiers." "Meanwhile, the Poona horse, under Captain Tait, and the 9th Bengal cavalry, under Major Story, turned the enemy's right flank, pursuing and cutting down the fugitives for several miles. Her Majesty's 22nd was well supported by the batteries commanded by Captains Willoughby and Hutt, which crossed their fire with that of Major Leslie. Then came the 2nd brigade, under command of Major Woodburn, bearing down into action with excellent coolness. It consisted of the 25th, 21st, and 12th regiments, under the command of Captains Jackson, Stevens, and Fisher, respectively. These regiments were strongly sustained by the fire of Captain Witley's battery, on the right of which were the 8th and 1st regiments, under Majors Browne and Glib- borne: these two corps advanced with the regularity of a review up to the entrenchments, their commanders, with considerable exertion, stopping their fire, on seeing that a portion of the Sindh horse and 3rd cavalry, in charging the enemy, had got in front of the brigade. The battle was decided by the troop of horse artillery and her Majesty's 22nd regiment."[54]

The Duke of Wellington, said of Sir C. Napier, in the House of Lords on the 12th February, 1844, on the occasion of the vote of thanks to the army in Sindh,[55] "He manifested at all times entire discretion and prudence in the formation of his plans, great activity in making the preparations which were necessary to insure success;— and, finally, great zeal, gallantry, and science, in carrying his plans and preparations into full execution." His march upon Emaum Ghur was one of the most curious military feats which he had ever known to be performed, or had ever perused an account of in his life. He moved his troops through the desert against hostile forces; he had his guns transported under circumstances of extreme difficulty, and in a manner the most extraordinary; and he cut off a retreat of the enemy, which rendered it impossible for them ever to regain their positions." And "the advance and attack of which he had been speaking, resulted in another brilliant victory, in which he again showed all the qualities of an excellent general officer, and in which the army displayed all the best qualities of the bravest troops."

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[52] Sir W. Napier finds fault with this charge made without orders.

[53] Sir W. Napier says, "He thus exposed the flank of the line of battle, and exposed the whole army to a defeat, if the wood had really been filled with the selected division of Beloochs," &c., p. 385.

[54] At the battle of Dubba, Sir Charles turned both the enemy's wings, and thus rendered their centre of less importance, and which their defeat weakened. At Meanee we could only turn the enemy's right flank.

[55] "*Annual Register*," 1843, p. 355, Extract.

The British loss was,[56] two hundred and seventy officers and men, of which number, one hundred and forty-seven were of her Majesty's 22nd regiment. The enemy lost about eight thousand,[57] as allowed by themselves.

After this victory,[58] Sir C. Napier marched southward, and took possession of Meerpoor; and on the 4th of April, the fortress of Oomerkote, to the east of Hyderabad, opened its gates to the British forces. Shere Mahomed, though a fugitive, was preparing for a fresh attack, when Sir Charles resolved, if possible, to surround and cut him off, by dividing his army into three detachments. On the 8th of June, Colonel Roberts engaged, and totally defeated, one of the hostile Ameers, Shah Mahomed, at the head of two thousand men, taking their leader prisoner. And on the 14th, Captain Jacob was attacked by Shere Mahomed himself, and four thousand Beloochees, whom he completely routed; the Ameer, with very few followers, escaping with difficulty into the desert. Shortly afterwards, Lord Ellen- borough appointed Sir C. Napier governor of Sindh. Towards the close of the Sikh campaign, 1845-6, Sir C. Napier marched via Mooltan, with a portion of his force from Sindh. He went on a-head with an escort, and reached army head quarters after the battle of Sobraon. He was present at the review at Lahore.

[56] "*Conquest of Sindh*," p. 389.
[57] "*Conquest of Sindh*," p. 457.
[58] "*Annual Register*," 1843, p. 356.